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Abstract	  
	  The	  thesis	  argues	  that	   international	  scholarship	  has	  failed	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	   process	   of	   recognition	   presupposes	   and	   reproduces	   already	  recognizable	   objects	   and	   agents.	   The	   example	   used	   in	   the	   thesis	   is	   that	   extant	  studies	  on	  the	  recognition	  of	  religion	  in	  international	  affairs	  assume	  that	  religion	  is	  always	  already	  present	  and	  intelligible	  as	  a	  category	  of	  political	  thought	  and	  action.	  It	   continues	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   this	   tendency	   is	   inherent	   in	   the	   theory	   and	  practices	   of	   recognition	  more	  broadly.	   In	   forgoing	   study	   of	   the	  processes	   through	  which	   these	   agents	   and	   objects	   were	   differentiated	   and	   individuated	   in	   the	   first	  place,	   recognition	   cannot	   but	   contribute	   to	   their	   reification.	   Moving	   beyond	   this	  impasse	  in	  IR	  Theory,	  the	  thesis	  argues,	  requires	  a	  more	  finely	  attuned	  genealogical	  sensitivity	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   question	   how	   entities	   of	   international	   politics	  become	   recognizable.	   This	   suggests	   that	   scholars	   dwell	   on	   the	   processes	   through	  which	  they	  are	  constituted	  and	  made	  intelligible,	  i.e.	  recognizable.	  	  	  This	   insight	   is	   illustrated	  with	   reference	   to	   how	   “religion”	   became	   internationally	  recognizable	  as	  a	  differentiable	  and	  politically	  relevant	  category	  in	  and	  through	  two	  distinct	   yet	   related	   historical	   processes:	   the	   partition	   of	   South	   Asia	   with	   the	  establishment	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  demise	  of	   the	  British	  Empire.	  Both	  states	  were	  claimed,	  enacted	  and	  subsequently	  recognized	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  religious	  difference;	  Muslim/non-­‐Muslim	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan	   and	   Jew/non-­‐Jew	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Israel.	   By	   studying	   macro	   and	   micro	  processes	   through	   which	   religion	   became	   a	   differentiated,	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  juridical,	   cultural	   and	   political	   category	   the	   thesis	   shows	   the	   processes	   through	  which	  religion	  became	  recognizable	  and	  how	  this	  particular	  recognizable	  version	  of	  religion	   was	   reified	   through	   the	   international	   recognition	   thereof,	   that	   is,	   the	  recognition	  of	  these	  two	  states	  as	  a	  Muslim	  Homeland	  and	  a	  Jewish	  National	  Home.	  	  	  The	  thesis	  thus	  argues	  against	  the	  assumption	  that	  religion,	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  is	  a	  root	  cause	   in	  the	  establishment	  of	   these	  two	  states,	  a	  source	  of	  violence	   in	  the	  ongoing	  conflicts	   with	   their	   neighbors,	   or	   an	   instrument	   of	   peace.	   Rather	   it	   argues	   that	  religion	   was	   made	   recognizable	   and	   reified	   in	   a	   particular	   shape	   and	   meaning	  through	   the	   processes	   of	   the	   international	   recognition	   of	   the	   two	   post-­‐colonial	  states.	  Rather	  than	  looking	  to	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  religion	  in	  international	  affairs,	  the	  thesis	  investigates	  the	  multiple	  manners	  in	  which	  religion	  emerged	  as	  a	  politically	   salient	   point	   of	   reference	   according	   to	   which	   a	   changing	   international	  order	  took	  shape	  and	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  which	  new	  international	  agency	  was	  and	  is	  claimed	  and	  recognized.	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  Emilie	  Buri,	   Duccio	   Braccaloni,	   Inés	   Campillo,	   Konstantinos	   Eleftheriadis,	   the	  Gourguechons,	   Bogna	   Hall,	   Tine	   Hanrieder,	   Patrick	   Herron,	   Karin	   Kolber,	   Marc	  Krebs,	   Marion	   Lecoquierre,	   Nadia	   Marzouki,	   Frank	   McNamara,	   Daniel	   Mertens,	  Angelika	  Schori,	  Lisa	  Schurr,	  Jorge	  Sola,	  Maja	  Spanu,	  Kristina	  Stoeckl,	  Anna	  Tayler	  –	  and	  family	  –	  Marianna	  Birnbaum	  and	  Maj-­‐Britt	  and	  Hans	  Sörling.	  My	  parents	  Mona	  and	   Staffan	   Birnbaum	   have	   continued	   to	   give	  me	   everything	   humanly	   possible	   in	  support	  and	  love	  regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  seldom	  received	  any	  proper	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  what	  it,	  actually,	  is	  that	  I	  am	  writing	  about.	  My	  gratitude	  to	  Gabriel	  Vetter	  is	  beyond	  words.	  He	  has	  been	  the	  very	  foundation	  without	  which,	  none	  of	  this	  would	   have	   been	   possible.	   The	   thesis	   is	   dedicated	   to	   my	   sister	   Sara	   who	   passed	  away	   too	   early	   to	   see	   any	  of	   this	   take	   shape.	   It	   is	   in	  her	  memory	   I	  write	   and	  will	  continue	  writing.	  Vi	  saknar	  dig.	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Introduction	  	  
	  	  It	   is	   the	  end	  of	  November	  of	  1947,	  and	  inside	  the	  quarters	  at	  Lake	  Success,	  on	  the	  outskirts	   of	  New	  York	  City,	   the	  members	   of	   the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  are	  preparing	   to	   cast	   their	   votes	   regarding	   the	  Partition	  of	  Palestine.	   In	  February,	  earlier	  that	  year,	  the	  British	  cabinet	  had	  decided	  to	  return	  their	  Mandate	  and	  hand	  over	   the	   ”Palestine	   Question”	   to	   the	   newly	   founded	   United	   Nations	   (UN).	   The	  General	  Assembly	  had	  met	  in	  a	  special	  session	  and	  established	  a	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Palestine	   (UNSCOP)	   in	  order	   to	   reexamine	  what	  had	   come	   to	  be	  known	  as	   the	  “Palestine	   problem”,	   the	   possibilities	   of	   Palestinian	   partition	   and	   the	   prospective	  constitution	  of	  an	  independent	  Israeli	  state.	  On	  November	  29,	  the	  recommendations	  of	   the	  UNSCOP	  were	   brought	   before	   the	  UN	  General	   Assembly	   at	   Lake	   Success	   in	  New	  York,	  where	  the	  vote	  was	  held.	  	  
	  Pakistan	   had	   gained	   independence	   only	   a	   few	  months	   earlier,	   on	   August	   14,	   thus	  ending	   two	  centuries	  of	  British	   rule,	   together	  with	   India.	  Both	  Pakistan	  and	   Israel	  were	   recognized	   as	   sovereign	   states	   a	   year	   apart	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Second	  World	  War,	  representing	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  decolonialization	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.	  Both	  gained	   their	   independence	   through	   partition	   from	   their	   neighbors	   delineated	  largely	  according	  to	  religious	  marcation.	  Pakistan	  was	  the	  ”Muslim	  Homeland”	  that	  had	   been	   separated	   from	   non-­‐Muslim	   India	   and	   Israel	   was	   the	   ”Jewish	   National	  Home”	   carved	   out	   of	   non-­‐Jewish	   surroundings.	   The	   centrality	   of	   religion	   to	   the	  partitions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  emergence	  and	  recognition	  of	  these	  two	  new	  international	  actors,	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  evident.	  However,	  rather	  than	  arguing	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	   religion	   in	   international	   affairs,	   this	   thesis	   will	   ask:	   How	   did	   religion	   become	  
recognizable	   as	   a	   distinct	   and	   differentiable	   category	   within	   these	   processes	   of	  international	  relations?	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  This	   thesis	   is	   a	   theoretical	   investigation	   into	   the	   question	   of	   recognition.	   More	  precisely	   it	   is	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   questions	   of	   recognition	   and	   religion	   in	  international	   relations.	   In	   common	   terminology,	   and	   in	   most	   academic	   work	  recognition	   is	   about	   empowerment.	   It	   is	   about	   elevating	   an	   individual	   or	   a	  community	   into	   actorhood,	   about	   giving	   a	   voice	   to	   those	   who	   lacked	   one,	   and	  enabling	  participation	  in	  the	  social	  and	  political	  processes	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  them.	  I	   do	   not	   aim	   to	   refute	   that	   meaning.	   Recognition	   is	   indeed	   about	   empowerment.	  However,	   it	   is	  not	  only	  about	  empowerment.	   It	   is	  also	  about	  dependency	  and	  pre-­‐conceived	  routes	  of	  access.	  In	  order	  to	  recognize	  something,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  or	  to	  be	  made	   recognizable,	   it	   needs	   to	   fit	   into	   the	   framework	   of	   visibility.	   How	   is	   one	   to	  recognize	   something	   that	  one	  cannot	   see?	  Further,	   in	  order	   to	  extend	  recognition,	  there	   needs	   to	   be	   someone	   or	   something	   to	   extend	   it	   to.	   Recognition	   requires	   a	  preexisting	  object	  or	   subject	   to	   empower.	  Throughout	   the	   thesis,	   I	  will	   argue	   that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  problematic	  aspects	  of	  recognition	  in	  international	  relations,	  which	  have	   received	   too	   little	   attention,	   and	  which	  have	   consequences	   that	   speak	  directly	  against	  the	  empowering	  aim	  of	  recognition	  itself.	  I	  will	  not	  suggest	  that	  we	  should	   dispose	   of	   recognition,	   but	   rather	   shall	   argue	   in	   favor	   of	   extending	   and	  deepening	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  thought	  of	  and	  used.	  	  After	  examining	  different	  approaches	  to	  recognition	  and	  religion,	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	   the	   thesis	   that	   recognition	   tends	   to	  assume	   that	   the	  agents,	   identities,	  objects,	   and	   concepts	   that	   are	   to	   be	   recognized	   are	   already	   clearly	   differentiated	  and,	   more	   importantly,	   that	   they	   are	   differentiatable.	   Recognition	   pays	   little	  attention	   to	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   these	   objects,	   concepts	   or	   identities	   become	  differentiated,	   or,	   as	   I	   will	   put	   it,	   it	   sidelines	   the	   processes	   through	   which	   they	  
become	  recognizable.	  Recognition	  presupposes	  its	  agents,	  objects	  and	  the	  epistemic	  frameworks	  within	  which	  they	  feature.	  Through	  the	  recognition	  of	  these	  agents	  or	  objects,	   for	   example,	   through	   the	   extension	   of	   rights	   and	   responsibilities	   to	   them,	  they	  will	  be	  reproduced	  as	  separate	  and	  separated	  entities,	  sidelining	  the	  process	  by	  which	   they	   emerged.	   I	   refer	   to	   this	   aspect	   as	   a	   lack	   of	   genealogical	   sensitivity,	  by	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which	  I	  mean	  a	  lack	  of	  attentiveness	  to	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  concepts,	  identities,	  agents,	   or	   objects	   emerge	   as	   differentiated	   and	   differentiable	   entities,	   ripe	   for	  recognition.	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   lack	   of	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   reflects	   a	   reifying	  
tendency	   in	   recognition,	   that	   is,	   a	   particular	   form	   of	   forgetfulness	   about	   these	  processes	  of	  emergence.	  	  	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  thesis,	  I	  investigate	  ways	  of	  how	  to	  approach	  these	  reifying	  tendencies	   of	   recognition	   and	   how	   a	   stronger	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   to	   the	  processes	   by	   which	   something	   becomes	   recognizable	   in	   international	   relations	  might	  be	  nurtured.	  I	  argue	  that	  while	   international	  recognition	  may	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  top-­‐down	  process,	  when	  recognition	  is	  given,	  for	  example,	  by	  an	  international	  community,	   this	   framework	  does	  not	  suffice	  as	  an	  explanation	  or	  help	   to	  reach	  an	  understanding	   of	   the	   recognition	   process,	   unless	   the	   bottom-­‐up	   processes	   of	   pre-­‐closure,	  that	  is,	  the	  processes	  of	  becoming	  recognizable	  or	  becoming	  intelligible,	  are	  also	   analyzed	   in	  detail.	   Further,	   I	  will	   argue	   that	  unless	   these	   latter	  processes	   are	  taken	   into	   account,	   the	   framework	  of	   recognition	  will	   tend	   to	   reproduce	   itself,	   its	  objects	  and	  agents.	  This	  theoretical	  argumentation	  is	  then	  illustrated	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  international	  recognition	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  Israel.	  	  	  
Outline	  of	  the	  chapters	  	  	  The	   first	   chapter	   engages	   with	   the	   work	   regarding	   recognition	   and	   religion	   in	  international	  relations.	  Rather	  than	  presenting	  a	  more	  traditional	  literature	  review,	  the	  chapter	  outlines	  the	  arguments	  of	  three	  ”critical”	  IR	  scholars,	  examining	  in	  detail	  the	   constructivist	   account	   of	   Daniel	   Philpott,	   the	   English	   School	   account	   of	   Scott	  Thomas	  and	  the	  Habermasian	  account	  of	  Mariano	  Barbato.	  All	  three	  scholars	  agree	  in	  their	  diagnosis	  that	  religion	  has	  been	  systematically	  excluded	  from	  the	  theory	  and	  practice	   of	   international	   relations,	   and	   while	   they	   list	   different	   reasons	   for	   this	  exclusion,	   they	   continue	   to	   agree	   about	   its	   problematic	   nature	   and	   argue	   for	   the	  need	  to	  recognize	  religion	  in	  international	  affairs.	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  While	   Philpott	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   published	   material	   on	   the	   topic,	  Thomas	  sees	   the	  exclusion	  of	   religion	  as	  a	   symptom	  of	  a	   fundamental	  assumption	  regarding	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   current	   ”Westphalian”	   international	   order.	   This	  ”Westphalian	   presumption”,	   Thomas	   argues,	   mythologizes	   the	   privatization	   of	  religion	   and	   the	   secularization	   of	   international	   relations.	   Barbato’s	   Habermasian	  account	  also	  understands	  the	  exclusion	  as	  more	  than	  a	  epistemic	  blind	  spot,	  but	  sees	  it	  emerging	   from	  the	  dominance	  of	  a	  more	  general	   form	  of	  secular	   liberal	   thought	  that	  renders	  religious	  traditions,	  actors	  and	  ideas	  as	  necessarily	  partisan,	  irrational	  and	  dogmatic,	  in	  contrast	  to	  its	  own	  enlightened,	  secular	  neutrality.	  	  	  The	   neglect	   or	   systematic	   sidelining	   of	   religion	   is	   problematic	   to	   Philpott	   as	   it	  ignores	   the	   fact	   that	   religion	   lies	   “at	   the	   very	   root	   of	   modern	   IR.”1	  Religion	   is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  current	  Westphalian	  international	  order	  of	  sovereign	  states,	  since	  this	   order	   would	   never	   have	   emerged,	   were	   it	   not	   for	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	  Reformation	  and	  Protestant	  ideas	  of	  political	  authority	  shaped	  the	  states’	   interests	  in	   sovereign	   statehood.2 	  Thomas,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   argues	   for	   the	   need	   to	  contextualize	   the	   basis	   upon	   which	   religion	   was	   excluded	   from	   IR,	   that	   is,	   the	  “Westphalian	   assumption”	   that	   religion	   in	   public	   life	   causes	   political	   upheaval,	  intolerance,	   war	   and	   destabilizes	   the	   international	   order.3	  Westphalia,	   Thomas	  continues,	   did	   not	   secularize	   the	   international	   system,	   but	   religious	   doctrines,	  cultures	   and	   civilizations	   continued	   to	   impact	   upon	   the	   common	   culture	  underpinning	  different	  international	  societies	  throughout	  history.	  Christendom	  was,	  and	   continued	   to	   be,	   the	   framework	   for	   international	   practices	   of	   diplomacy	   and	  war,	   practices	   that	   are	   incommensurable	   outside	   of	   this	   framework. 4 	  The	  Westphalian	  presumption	  also	  skews	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  present	  “resurgence	  of	   religion”	   in	   the	   global	   South,	   regions	  where	   religion	   never	   lost	   its	   political	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Philpott	  2000:	  206.	  2	  Philpott	  2002:	  93;	  2000:	  244;	  2002:	  66f.	  3	  Thomas	  2003:	  24;	  Thomas	  2000:	  821;	  2005:	  28.	  4	  Thomas	  2000;	  2005.	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social	  power	  to	  begin	  with.5	  Leaving	  this	  presumption	  intact,	  the	  global	  resurgence	  of	   religion	   seems	   like	   an	   internationalization	   of	   a	   private	  matter,	   threatening	   the	  international	   order.	   Barbato’s	   Habermasian	   accounts	   regarding	   the	   promises	   of	  what	   he	   calls	   a	   post-­‐secular	   society	   also	   acknowledge	   a	   systematic	   exclusion	   of	  religion	   from	   public	   deliberation.6	  Here,	   however,	   the	   exclusion	   stems	   less	   from	  scholarly	   neglect	   or	   historical	   narratives,	   and	   more	   from	   secular	   liberalism’s	  skepticism	  concerning	  religion’s	  purported	  neutrality.	  However,	  equating	  secularity	  with	   neutrality	   forgets	   how	   the	  Hellenic	   roots	   of	   current	  Western	  political	   theory	  were	  deeply	  intertwined	  with	  early	  Christian	  thought.7	  More	  important	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  religion	  is	  already	  intertwined	  with	  the	  ’secular’	  political	  traditions	  aiming	  at	  its	  exclusion,	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   religion	   needs	   to	   be	   recognized	   on	   epistemological	  grounds.	   Religion	   should	   be	   recognized	   in	   public	   discourse	   on	   ”substantive”	  grounds,	   since	   it	   carries	   the	   semantic	   potential	   for	   secular	   thought,	   keeping	  something	  “hermeneutically	  vibrant”	  and	  “intact”	  that	  would	  “otherwise	  have	  been	  lost	   elsewhere”.8	  Further,	   since	   rational	  morality	   is	   “unable	   to	   foster	  any	   impulses	  towards	  solidarity,	  that	  is,	  towards	  morally	  guided	  collective	  action,”	  and	  since	  pure	  practical	  reason	   lacks	   the	  ability	   to	  answer	  up	  to	   the	  disintegrating	   imperatives	  of	  the	  market	   and	   a	  modernization	  moving	   “out	   of	   control”,	   (international)	   political	  theory	  “has	  good	  reasons	  to	  be	  open	  to	  learning	  from	  religious	  traditions.”9	  	  	  After	   outlining	   these	   different	   arguments	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   religion	   in	  international	   relations,	   I	  ask	  what	   it	   is,	  precisely,	   that	   these	  scholars	  want	   to	  have	  recognized.	  What	  do	  they	  understand	  ”religion”	  to	  be?	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  each	  author’s	  understanding	  of	  religion	  and	  claims	  that,	  while	  arguing	   for	   the	   need	   in	   IR	   to	   recognize	   the	   importance	   of	   religion,	   none	   of	   these	  scholars	  reflect	  sufficiently	  on	  what	  it	  is	  they	  want	  to	  have	  recognized,	  and	  how	  this	  phenomenon	   has	   emerged	   as	   a	   differentiable	   entity,	   that	   is,	   how	   it	   has	   become	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Thomas	  2010b:	  507.	  6	  Habermas	  2008:	  6;	  110ff;	  2001:	  22;	  Barbato/Kratochwil	  2009;	  Barbato	  2010a,	  2012a,	  2012b.	  7	  Habermas	  2008:	  110ff.	  8	  Habermas	  2008:	  142.	  9	  Habermas	  2010:	  79;	  2008:	  109.	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intelligible	  or	  recognizable	  –	  to	  them	  and	  to	  a	  broader	   intellectual	  community	  –	   in	  the	  first	  place.	  They	  all	  lack	  what	  I	  call	  a	  genealogical	  sensitivity.10	  	  In	  the	  second	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  the	  critical	  aspects	  regarding	  recognition	  in	  a	  broader	  sense,	   by	   engaging	  with	   social	   and	   international	   political	   theory.11	  After	   outlining	  the	   broad	   currents	   of	   that	   scholarship,	   I	   go	   on	   to	   point	   out	   that	   many	   of	   these	  accounts	   presuppose	   their	   objects	   and	   agents.	   That	   is,	   they	   assume	   that	   there	  already	   is	   someone	   or	   something	   to	   which	   recognition	   can	   be	   extended,	   they	  assume	   a	   differentiated	   social	   ontology	   without	   asking	   how	   this	   differentiation	  came	   about.	   Axel	  Honneth,	   for	   example,	   assumes	   a	   ”potential”	   identity	   to	   become	  ”actualized”	   through	   recognition.	   Charles	   Taylor	   requires	   an	   identity	   as	   a	  benchmark,	   in	  order	   to	  evaluate	  possible,	  and	  damaging	  effects	  of,	  misrecognition,	  while	  Alexander	  Wendt	  argues	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  single	  World	  State	  through	  the	  integration	  of	  individual	  states,	  pre-­‐differentiated	  ”Selves”	  able	  to	  overcome	  the	  differentiation	   into	   a	   collective	   ”Us”.	   By	   recognizing	   the	   difference	   of	   others,	   as	   a	  respect	   for	   cultural	   and	   other	   differences,	   recognition	   is	   envisioned	   as	   leading	  towards	   more	   peaceful	   international	   relations.	   However,	   the	   recognition	   of	  differences	  does	  not	  only	  empower	  those	  who	  embody	  this	  difference,	  but,	  prior	  to	  it,	   also	   assumes	   the	   existence	   of	   this	   difference,	   and,	   by	   extending	   rights	   and	  responsibilities	   to	   these	   entities	   or	   agents,	   it	   reproduces	   them.12 	  Rather	   than	  transcending	  a	  differentiated	  social	  reality,	  recognition	  assumes	  and	  reproduces	  it.	  I	  argue,	  therefore,	  that	  recognition	  presupposes	  its	  agents	  and	  objects,	  and	  ignores	  or	  forgets	   about	   the	   way	   in	   which	   these	   differences	   come	   about	   or	   how	   they	   are	  reproduced.	  Forgetting	  about	   the	  way	   in	  which	  difference	   is	  produced	  also	  means	  forgetting	  about	  the	  alternatives	  to	  this	  differentiated	  order.	   I	  refer	  to	  this	   form	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Geuss	  2002,	  1994;	  Visker	  1991.	  11	  At	   this	   point	   I	   want	   to	   clarify	   and	   differentiate	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   thesis.	   The	   thesis	   is	   not	   a	  performative	   analysis	   of	   recognition	   politics	   in	   IR.	   It	   is	   not	   making	   claims	   about	   the	   benefits	   or	  problems	   of	   international	   political	   entrepreneurs	   using	   the	   recognition	   language	   or	   framework	   to	  make	  their	  claims.	  These	  actors	  –	  claiming	  recognition	  for	  Somaliland,	  Timor	  Leste	  or	  Kosovo	  –	  work	  with	  reified	  versions	  of	  their	  acclaimed	  states,	  they	  invoke	  by	  evoking	  them.	  This	  is	  another	  kind	  of	  analysis	  and	  does	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  thesis	  is	  an	  exercise	  in	  theory	  analysis	  and	  critique,	  the	  points	  illustrated	  with	  historiographical	  material.	  	  12	  Markell	  2005.	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forgetfulness	  as	  reification,	  and	  argue	  that	  recognition	  inhabits	  a	  reifying	  tendency	  that	  has	  not	  been	   addressed	   sufficiently	  within	   international	   scholarship.	  The	   last	  part	  of	   this	  chapter,	   therefore,	  discusses	   the	  relationship	  between	  recognition	  and	  reification	  within	  international	  relations.	  	  	  I	   argue	   throughout	   the	   chapter	   that	   greater	   attention	   should	   be	   afforded	   to	   the	  processes	   by	   which	   an	   agent	   or	   object	   of	   recognition	   becomes	   recognizable.	   By	  attending	   more	   to	   these	   processes	   of	   differentiation,	   the	   reifying	   tendency	   of	  recognition	   can	   be	   countered.	   This	   argument	   builds	   upon	   the	   assumption	   that	  recognizability	  epistemologically	  precedes	  recognition,	  that	  is,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Judith	  Butler:	  "One	  'exists'	  not	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  recognized,	  but,	  in	  a	  prior	  sense,	  by	  being	  recognizable."13	  Recognizability	  comes	  before	  recognition.	  A	  category,	  subject,	  object,	   agent,	   state,	   identity,	   etc.	   needs	   to	   be	   recognizable	   as	   such	   in	   order	   to	   be	  recognized.	  They	  need	  to	  be	  “visible”	  within	  the	  current	  framework	  of	  knowledge,	  in	  that	   particular	   epistemic	   framework	   and	   its	   scheme	   of	   classification.	   As	  recognizability	   comes	   prior	   to	   recognition,	   and	   as	   recognition	   in	   this	   way,	   is	  dependent	   upon	   the	   current	   epistemic	   framework,	   that	   which	   is	   visible,	   and	  recognizable,	   in	   this	   framework	  will	   be	   recognized	   and	  maintained.	   There	   is,	   so	   I	  argue	   in	   this	   chapter,	   a	   reproductive	   power	   in	   recognition,	   in	   that	   it	   tends	   to	  reproduce	   its	   epistemic	   framework	   and	   the	   agents	   and	   objects	   within	   it.	   The	  argument	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   the	   epistemological	   frameworks	   cannot	   change	   or	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  agents	  and	  objects	  does	  not	  have	  an	  impact	  upon	  what	  can	  be	  “seen”,	   “known”	   or	   recognized.	  However,	   it	   also	   posits	   that	   such	   a	   change	   in	   new	  ranges	  of	  “visibility”	  necessarily	  constitutes	  a	  change	  in	  recognizability,	  i.e.	  a	  part	  of	  the	   process	   of	   becoming	   recognizable.	   In	   this	   sense,	   struggles	   for	   recognition	   can	  therefore	   be	   read	   as	   struggles	   for	   recognizability,	   a	   quest	   to	   change	   the	   system	  within	  which	   the	   individuals	   and	   groups	   find	   themselves.	  My	   argument	   is	   against	  assumptions	  by	  scholars	  such	  as	  Honneth,	  who	  need	  to	  assume	  a	  “potential”	  identity	  to	   be	   “actualized”	   through	   recognition,	   and	   thereby	   imply	   that	   this	   “potential”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Butler	  1997:	  5.	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identity	   is	   already	   recognizable.	   I	   argue	   against	   these	   assumptions	   regarding	   pre-­‐differentiated,	   pre-­‐existing	   objects	   and	   agents.	   Ignoring	   the	   investigation	   of	   how	  these	   objects	   and	   agents	   become	   recognizable	   will	   leave	   the	   framework	   of	  recognition	  to	  stabilize	  and	  reproduce	  itself,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  objects	  and	  agents	  within	  it.	   This	   is	   problematic	   for	   several	   reasons.	   First,	   by	   leaving	   objects,	   agents	   and	  epistemic	  frameworks	  intact	  recognition	  affirms	  the	  power	  structure	  in	  place.	  While	  this	  need	  not	  be	  a	  problem	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  it	  does	  undermine	  the	  sensitivity	  to	  new	  forms	  of	  agency,	  i.e.	  those	  forms	  that	  do	  not	  –	  yet	  –	  play	  on	  the	  existent	  register	  of	  visibility	  or	  recognizability.	  This	  lack	  of	  sensitivity	  towards	  the	  new	  will,	  in	  the	  end,	  impoverish	  the	  plurality	  of	  any	  social	  system	  worth	  its	  name,	  leaving	  it	  blind	  to	  that	  in	  process	  of	  emerging	  and	  reproducing	  that	  which	  already	  is.	  Besides	  undermining	  the	   premises	   of	   plurality	   the	   reification	   of	   subjects	   and	   objects	   of	   international	  affairs	   becomes	   dangerous	   when	   it	   treats	   social	   facts	   as	   natural	   ones.	   The	  forgetfulness	   of	   reification	   allows	   for	   natural	   kinds	   to	   be	   instrumentalized	   and	  “turned	   unproblematically	   onto	   sentient	   beings.”	   (Levine	   2012:	   46).	   This	   would	  leave	   those	  who	  do	  not	   fit	   the	  reified	  concept	  as	  deviants	  and	   legitimately	   treated	  accordingly.	  	  In	  the	  third	  chapter,	  I	  illustrate	  the	  discussion	  and	  arguments	  made	  in	  the	  thesis	  so	  far	   on	   the	   examples	   of	   the	   international	   recognition	   of	   Pakistan	   and	   Israel.	   I	   had	  argued	   that	   recognition	   sidelined	   or	   ”forgot”	   the	   processes	   by	  which	   an	   object	   or	  agent	  became	  recognizable,	  and	  that	  it	  displayed	  a	  reifying	  tendency.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  illustrate	  a	  number	  of	  these	  processes,	  and	  show	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  contribute	  to	  making	  the	  ”Muslim	  Homeland”	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  ”Jewish	  National	  Home”	  of	   Israel	  recognizable	  as	  such,	  processes	  that	  would	  have	  been	  sidelined	   in	  case	   of	   simple	   recognition.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   multiple	   processes	   of	   becoming	  recognizable,	   that	   is,	   the	   processes	   of	   differentiation	   –	   between	  Muslim	   and	   non-­‐Muslim,	   Jew	   and	   non-­‐Jew	   –	   were	   stabilized	   through	   colonial	   governing	   practices	  such	   as	   the	   census,	   administrative	   maps,	   national	   regulations	   such	   as	   quotas	   in	  political	   representation,	   local	   representative	   administration,	   strikes	   and	   violent	  outbreaks,	   et	   cetera,	   but	   that	   they	   were	   finally	   reified	   through	   the	   process	   of	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international	   recognition,	   thereby	   forgetting	   the	   preceding	   struggles	   to	   form	   and	  uphold	  these	  differentiations.	  	  The	  chapter	  takes	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  three	  instances	  of	  differentiation.	  The	  first	  part	  on	  
numbers	   describes	   the	   process	   through	   which	   the	   Indian	   census	   contributed	   to	  homogenizing	   the	   heterogeneous	   group	   of	   Indian	   Muslims	   into	   a	   politically	  representative	   entity.	   In	   Palestine,	   the	   immigration	   policies	   under	   the	   British	  Mandate	  had	  contributed	   to	   the	  understanding	  of	   Jews	  as	   immigrants,	  but	  also,	  of	  the	  European	  immigrants	  as	  Jews,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  cultural-­‐linguistic,	  historical,	  geographical,	   religious,	   political	   or	   any	   other,	   differences.	   The	   second	   part	   on	  
representation	   shows	   the	  Muslim	   League	   and	   their	   leader,	  Muhammad	  Ali	   Jinnah,	  claiming	  and	  gaining	  sole	  representational	  power	  over	   the	  British	   Indian	  Muslims,	  enforcing	   the	   distinction	   favored	   by	   their	   “Two	   Nation	   Theory”	   between	   the	  Muslims	   and	   the	  non-­‐Muslims	   as	  being	   fundamental,	   national	   and	   civilizational	   in	  nature.	   In	   Palestine,	   the	   international	   recognition	   of	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   Jewish	  Agency	  settled	  the	  acclaimed	  difference	  between	  Jews	  and	  non-­‐Jews,	  similarly	  to	  the	  Muslim	   League,	   as	   a	   fundamental	   difference	   between	   two	   ”peoples”,	   and	   tied	   the	  Jews	   to	   the	   Palestinian	   territory.	   The	   last	   section	   on	  boundary	  drawing	   illustrates	  the	   work	   by	   the	   boundary	   commissions	   in	   British	   India	   to	   separate	   the	   future	  Pakistani	   Muslim	   Homeland	   from	   its	   non-­‐Muslim	   neighbor.	   It	   showed	   how	   the	  knowledge	   of	   the	   census	   and	   the	   colonial	   maps	   were	   authorized	   and	   their	  conflictual	   background	   erased.	   It	   further	   describes	   the	   work	   of	   refugee	  administration,	   militias	   and	   the	   institutions	   reclaiming	   ”abducted	   women”	   to	  inscribe	  the	  official	  border	  between	  the	  newly	  separated	  international	  agents	  on	  the	  ground.	  In	  Palestine,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Peel	  commission	  authorized	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  Balfour	   declaration	   and	   the	   Mandate	   of	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   regarding	   the	  separate	  nature	  of	  the	  Jews	  from	  the	  non-­‐Jews,	  and	  territorialized	  these	  differences.	  Ten	  years	  later,	  this	  distinction	  made	  its	  way	  into	  the	  United	  Nations’	  deliberations	  on	   Israeli	   independence,	   and	   was	   thereafter	   inscribed	   into	   international	   law	  through	  the	  partition	  of	  Palestine.	  	  	  
	   10	  
These	   historical	   instances	   of	   demarcation	   illustrate	   the	   contested,	   political,	   and	  processual	   nature	   of	   the	   categories	   of	   “religion”,	   “Muslim”	   and	   “Jew”	   during	   the	  process	   of	   Pakistani	   and	   Israeli	   recognition.	   The	   international	   recognition	   of	  Pakistan	  and	  Israel	  reified	  the	  boundaries	  around	  and	  between	  political,	  social	  and	  religious	   communities.	   It	   reinstated	   the	   logic	   of	   a	   differentiated	   social	   ontology	  of	  "Self"	   and	   "Other".	   The	   recognition	   process	   reproduced	   and	   reinstantiated	   the	  colonial	   epistemic	   framework	   of	   differentiated	   and	   differentiable	   religious	   and	  cultural	   communities,	   reifying	   them	   into	   internationally	   recognized	   and	  recognizable	  political	  entities.	  	  In	   the	   first	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   –	   Chapters	   1,	   2,	   and	   3	   –	   I	   discuss	   international	  recognition	   and	   religion,	   and	   argue	   that	   recognition	   is	   partly	   problematic,	   as	   it	  presupposes	   and	   reproduces	   its	   objects,	   agents	   and	   epistemological	   frameworks	  and	  “forgets”	  about	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  these	  have	  emerged.	  I	  frame	  it	  as	  a	  lack	  	  of	  genealogical	  sensitivity,	  and	  argue	  that	  recognition	  contains	  a	  reifying	  tendency.	  In	   the	  second	  part	  of	   the	   thesis	  –	  Chapter	  4	  and	  5	  –	   I	  approach	  these	  questions	  of	  reification,	   recognizability	   and	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   and	   continue	   the	  argumentation	   of	   the	   previous	   chapters	   regarding	   the	   reifying	   aspects	   of	  recognition,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   call	   for	   an	   approach	   that	   can	   nurture	   genealogical	  sensitivity	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   process	   of	   how	   something	   becomes	   recognizable	   in	  international	   relations.	   I	   do	   so	   by	   tapping	   into	   post-­‐postivist	   scholarship,	   and	   in	  particular	   by	   engaging	   its	   emphasis	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   questioning	   ontological	  premises	  and	  denaturalizing	  seemingly	  natural	  knowledge,	  an	  aspect	  which	  I	   term	  ”becoming”.	   The	   emphasis	   of	   this	   perspective	   of	   “becoming”	   on	   the	   processes	   by	  which	   knowledge	   –	   for	   example	   of	   differentiated	   agents	   and	   objects	   or	   of	   a	  particular	  epistemic	  system	  –	  emerges	  reflects	  precisely	  the	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  I	  saw	  as	  lacking	  from	  the	  framework	  of	  recognition	  examined	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  While	   this	  perspective	  of	   “becoming”	  offers	  me	  a	  way	   to	  engage	  with	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  and	  track	  the	  processes	  of	  how	  something	  becomes	  recognizable,	  it	  tends	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to	   underestimate	   the	   dependency	   of	   the	   stability	   of	   knowledge	   for	   objects	   and	  agents	  to	  be	  intelligible,	  an	  aspect	  contrasting	  with	  becoming,	  which	  I	  term	  ”being”.	  Allowing	  the	  being	  to	  incorporate	  itself	  into	  naturalized	  knowledge,	  forgetting	  about	  the	  way	  it	  ”became”	  what	  it	  ”is”	  would	  end	  up	  reifying	  the	  being.	  This	  was	  the	  aspect	  of	  recognition	  that	   I	  am	  aiming	  to	  avoid.	  What	  I	  am	  pursuing,	   instead,	   is	  a	  balance	  between	   being	   and	   becoming,	   between	   stabilizations	   of	   knowledge	   and	   an	  awareness	  of	   their	  non-­‐natural	  character.	   I	  want	   to	  attain	  a	   level	  of	  balance	   in	   the	  tension	  between	  being	  and	  becoming,	  not	  allowing	  one	  to	  dominate	  the	  other.	  After	  outlining	  different	  alternatives	   to	   this	   sought-­‐for	  balance,	   therefore,	   I	   argue	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  chapter	   for	  an	  alternative	   to	   recognition.	  This	  alternative	  builds	  on	   the	  critical	   power	   of	   becoming	   in	   order	   to	   open	   up	   space	   for	   alternative	   knowledge,	  objects	  and	  agents,	  and	  then	  argue	  in	  favor	  of	  filling	  this	  space	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  beings,	  leaving	  the	  truth-­‐claim	  of	  each	  being	  to	  balance	  out	  the	  truth-­‐claim	  of	   the	  others.	  The	  hope	  was,	   in	   this	  way,	   to	  nurture	   the	  genealogical	   sensitivity	  of	  ”non-­‐reified”	  thinking.	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  an	  analysis	  of	  ”becoming	  recognizable”	  and	  thereby	   refer	   to	   the	   ”becoming”	   as	   the	   necessary	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   and	   the	  ”recognizable”	   as	   the	   ”beings”	   without	   which	   the	   object,	   agents,	   and	   identities	   of	  recognition	  –	   in	   the	   case	  of	   the	   thesis,	   ”religion”	  –	  would	  not	  be	   intelligible	   in	   the	  first	  place.	  While	   the	   argumentation	  of	   the	   thesis	   is	   indebted	   to	  post-­‐foundational	  thought,	  it	  is	  not	  in	  its	  entirety	  a	  post-­‐foundational	  thesis,	  but	  rather	  an	  attempt	  to	  balance	  foundations	  against	  each	  other,	  against	  a	  single	  ”being”	  gaining	  the	  status	  of	  
the	   single	   Being,	   i.e.	   become	   reified.	   This	   way	   I	   hope	   to	   nurture	   the	   genealogical	  sensitivity	  sought	  in	  the	  first	  part	  and	  which	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  open	  up	  to	  those	   new	   agents,	   objects,	   subjects,	   frameworks	   that	   are	   not	   yet	   recognizable	   as	  such.	   I	   aim	   to	   present	   a	   perspective	   sensitive	   to	   the	  way	   new	   objects	   and	   agents	  
become	  recognizable	  in	  international	  relations.	  	  	  The	  fifth	  and	  final	  chapter	  is	  also	  the	  second	  illustration	  of	  the	  theoretical	  discussion	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  While	  I	  focused	  on	  tracing	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  religion,	  	  Muslim	  and	  Jewish,	  emerged	  as	  recognizable	  categories	  in	  the	  third	  chapter,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  place	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  outcomes	  –	  the	  “beings”	  of	  Muslim	  or	  Jew	  –	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emerging	  from	  these	  processes.	  I	  do	  so	  in	  order	  to	  show	  the	  emergence	  of	  multiple	  ”beings”	   in	   the	   constellation	   of	   religion	   in	   international	   relations.	   While	   the	   first	  illustration	   had	   been	   broad	   in	   range	   and	   wide	   in	   scope,	   this	   second	   illustration	  places	  a	  much	  narrower	  focus	  on	  two	  individuals:	  the	  colonial	  intellectual	  Reginald	  Coupland,	   and	   Pakistan’s	   UN	   representative	   and	   future	   foreign	   minister,	  Muhammad	   Zafrullah	   Khan.	   These	   two	   men	   are	   interesting,	   as	   they	   occupied	  opposite	  positions	  during	  the	  negotiations	  leading	  to	  the	  partition	  of	  Palestine	  and	  Israeli	   independence	   in	   the	   United	   Nations	   in	   the	   fall	   of	   1947,	   and	   also	   opposite	  positions	  regarding	  the	  partition	  of	   India	  and	  the	   independence	  of	  Pakistan.	  While	  Coupland	  had	  been	  the	  author	  of	  the	  first	  Palestine	  Partition	  Plan	  –	  the	  ”Peel	  report”	  –	   upon	   which	   the	   final	   plan	   was	   based,	   and	   had	   argued	   against	   the	   partition	   of	  British	   India,	  Khan	   represented	   the	  opposition	   to	  Palestine	  Partition	   and	   thus	   the	  independence	  and	  international	  recognition	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel,	  while	  representing	  the	  claim	  to	  partition	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  case.	  	  The	  “religion”	   that	  emerges	   from	  underneath	   the	   focus	  on	  Coupland	  and	  Zafrullah	  Khan	  is	  ambiguous	  and	  partly	  contradictory,	  and	  questions	  any	  reified	  assumptions	  regarding	  religion	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  recognition.	  Coupland	  understood	  the	   “Jewish”	   and	   the	   “Muslim	   beings”	   as	   natural	   and	   essential,	   the	   Jewish	   ”race”	  being	  differentiated	  by	  its	  particular	  religion	  since	  ancient	  times.	  While	  the	  essence	  of	   these	   beings	  was	   fundamental,	   there	  was	   not	   a	   zero-­‐sum	   relationship	   between	  them	  and	  their	  non-­‐Jewish	  or	  non-­‐Muslim	  neighbors.	  While	  the	  boundaries	  around	  the	   Jewish	   ”race”	   of	   Palestine	   and	   the	   Muslim	   ”race”	   of	   India	   were	   clear-­‐cut	   and	  impossible	  to	  transcend	  through	  assimilation,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  accommodate	  them	  within	   a	   single	   political	   community,	   as	   had	   been	   done	   within	   the	   British	  Commonwealth	  before.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   “Jewish	   Israel”	   the	  references	   to	  religion	  are	  melted	  into	  a	  single	  pot	  together	  with	  ”race”,	  ”nation”,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  ”culture”	  and	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   cause	  much	   trouble	   in	   and	   of	   itself.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   “Muslim	  Pakistan”	  religion	  had	  become	  more	  clearly	  differentiated	  from	  “race”	  and	  “nation”,	  and	  was	  now	  seen	  to	  threaten	  the	  political	  solution	  to	  a	  political	  conflict	  by	  pulling	  back	  Pakistani	  nationalism	  to	  old	  Pan-­‐Islamic	   ideas.	  Religion,	   in	  this	  sense,	  was	  an	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outdated	  framework,	  which	  needed	  to	  be	  overcome,	  and	  the	  British	  Indian	  Muslims	  needed	  to	  be	  emancipated	  from	  their	  religious	  consciousness,	  as	  had	  been	  the	  case	  in	   Europe	   and	   during	   course	   of	  most	   Arab	   nationalist	  movements.	   The	   difference	  between	   Muslim	   and	   non-­‐Muslim	   here	   refers	   to	   differences	   in	   race,	   nation	   and	  culture,	  but	  does	  not	  have	  to	  include	  a	  difference	  in	  religion.	  Religion,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan,	  did	  not	  have	  to	  be	  central	  to	  –	  or	  should	  not	  even	  have	  been	  part	  of	  	  –	  (the	  definition	  of)	  Muslims	  and	  their	  claims	  to	  political	  independence.	  	  	  	  Khan,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   mainly	   stayed	   away	   from	   essentialized	   categories,	  emphasizing	  time	  and	  again	  their	  contingent	  nature.	  While	  representing	  the	  Muslim	  League	  in	  the	  negotiation	  of	  the	  international	  border	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  –	  which	   had	   an	   acclaimed	   “Two-­‐Nation	   Theory”	   of	   fundamentally	   different	   Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  –	  he	  remained	  cautious	  in	  this	  vocabulary.	  The	  British	  Indian	  Muslims	  needed	   a	   “homeland”,	   but	   more	   in	   order	   to	   escape	   the	   economic	   and	   social	  subjugation	   by	   the	   Sikhs	   and	   Hindus	   during	   British	   rule	   than	   due	   to	   an	   inherent	  need	  to	  territorialize	  Islam.	  	  At	  the	  UN	  negotiations,	  Khan	  needed	  to	  balance	  furthering	  the	  Pakistani	  claim	  as	  a	  Muslim	   National	   Homeland,	   while	   refuting	   the	   same	   right	   for	   a	   Jewish	   National	  Homeland	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Jews.	  He	  needed	  to	  argue	  the	  case	  that	  the	  Jews	  were	  different	  from	  the	  Palestinian	  Arabs,	  but	  without	  recognizing	  their	  specific	  status	  as	  a	  nation	  with	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  as	  the	  case	  had	  been	  for	  the	  Pakistani	  Muslims.	   Even	   if	   he	   had	   been	   cautious	   with	   regard	   to	   using	   the	   essentialized	  language	   of	   different	   “races”,	   “religions”	   or	   “nations”,	   Pakistan	   had	   claimed	  independence	  as	  a	  Muslim	  Homeland	  due	  to	  religiously	  marked	  differences	  from	  its	  Indian	  neighbor,	  and	  he	  had	  to	  clarify	  why	  the	  Jews	  were	  not	  a	  comparable	  case	  to	  the	   Muslims.	   Facing	   the	   Second	  World	  War	   legacy,	   Khan	   could	   not	   return	   to	   the	  Muslims’	   need	   for	   socio-­‐economic	   refuge,	   since	   the	   Russian	   and	   European	   Jewish	  immigrants	   to	  Palestine,	  who	  would	  be	   the	  backbone	  of	   the	  new	  Jewish	  state,	  had	  every	  reason	  to	  seek	  refuge	  outside	  of	  their	  home	  countries	  following	  the	  genocide	  of	   the	   Holocaust.	   The	   distinction	   he	   then	   ended	   up	   drawing	   between	   the	   Indian	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Muslims	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Jews	  on	  one	  hand	  side,	  and	  the	  Arab	  non-­‐Jews	  and	  the	  Palestinian	   Jews	   on	   the	   other,	   was	   that	   of	   being	   or	   not	   being	   indigenous.	   The	  temporal	  argument	  of	  connection	  to	  the	  territory	  –	  the	  Indian	  Muslims	  were	  a	  part	  of	   the	   land	   before	   partition	   was	   considered	   –	   became	   his	   main	   point	   of	  differentiation.	   Zafrullah	   Khan	   tried	   to	   distinguish	   a	   “Jewish	   minority”	   from	   a	  “Muslim	  nation”	  with	  reference	  to	  their	  status	  as	  peoples	  indigenous	  to	  the	  land.	  In	  the	  end,	   it	  was	  not	  a	  particularly	  successful	  venture.	  While	  Khan’s	  attempts	  to	  stir	  this	   solid	   brew	   and	   loosen	   the	   essentialized	   categories	   remained	   unsuccessful,	  Coupland’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   natural	   distinction	   between	   Jews	   and	   non-­‐Jews	  found	   its	  way	   into	   the	  Peel	   report,	  and	   from	  there	   into	   the	  negotiations	  of	   the	  UN	  General	  Assembly,	  and	  became	  authorized	  via	  international	  law.	  	  During	   his	   time	   in	   the	   Indian/Pakistani	   boundary	   commission,	   Khan	   represented	  the	  Muslim	  League	  with	   a	   clearly	   reified	  understanding	  of	   the	  difference	  between	  Muslims	  and	  non-­‐Muslims.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  UN,	  Khan	  represented	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	   Palestine	   partition	   and	   Israeli	   independence,	   a	   group	   of	   Egypt,	   Syria,	  Transjordan	  and	  Iraq,	  which	  was	  also	  very	  insistent	  on	  reified	  distinctions	  between	  Jews	   and	   non-­‐Jews.	   Although	   representing	   two	   bodies	   with	   a	   strongly	   reified	  language	   and	   understanding	   of	   the	   situation,	   Khan	   hardly	   ever	   adopted	   that	  language.	  	  	  The	   aim	   of	   these	   different	   illustrations	   will	   be	   to	   emphasize	   and	   illustrate	   the	  processes	   of	   how	   the	   ”Muslim	   Homeland”	   of	   Pakistan	   and	   the	   ”Jewish	   National	  Home”	   of	   Israel	   became	   recognizable	   as	   such.	   By	   showing	  how	   the	  multiplicity	   of	  different	  ”Muslim”	  and	  ”Jewish”	  beings	  emerged	  from	  different	  processes,	  I	  hope	  to	  counter	  the	  reifying	  tendencies	  in	  recognition	  that	  were	  identified	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  thesis.	  I	  thereby	  hope	  to	  nurture	  a	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  within	  the	  recognition	  framework	  and	  thereby	  the	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  “religion”	  not	   yet	   recognizable	   as	   such.	   The	   aim	   of	   this,	   then,	   is	   to	   sustain	   a	   multiple	   and	  ”mutually	   incompatible	   ways	   of	   seeing.”	   (Levine	   2012:	   63),	   i.e.	   a	   particular	  understanding	  of	  plurality	  that	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  difference.	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  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  increased	  attention	  should	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  process	  of	  
becoming	  recognizable	  in	  international	  relations.	  I	  will	  investigate	  how	  to	  approach	  the	  reifying	   tendencies	   that	   featured	   in	   the	  recognition	   framework,	   that	   is,	  how	  to	  approach	   the	   forgetfulness	   of	   the	   processes	   of	   emergence	   of	   objects,	   agents,	   and	  epistemic	   frameworks	   of	   recognition.	   I	   will	   investigate	  what	   are	   the	   processes	   of	  ‘becoming’	   in	   international	   relations,	   that	   is,	   how	   do	   objects	   and	   agents	   become	  recognizable	  and	  how	  do	  epistemic	  frameworks	  change	  in	  order	  for	  new	  agents	  and	  objects	   to	   become	   recognizable.	   I	   will	   to	   nurture	   a	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   in	   the	  framework	  of	  recognition	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  dangers	  of	  reification.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  first	   part	   argues	   that	   unless	   these	   kinds	   of	   investigations	   are	   conducted	   into	   the	  premises	  on	  which	  recognition	  rests,	  it	  is	  bound	  to	  remain	  within,	  and	  reproduce,	  its	  originating	   epistemic	   framework	   and	   the	   particular	   bias	   that	   such	   a	   framework	  carries.	   If	   the	   question	   of	   recognizability	   is	   not	   afforded	   sufficient	   attention,	   the	  framework	  of	  recognition	  will	  tend	  to	  stabilize	  and	  reproduce	  itself	  and	  the	  objects	  and	   agents	  within	   it,	   losing	   the	   ability	   to	   recognize	   new	   international	   objects	   and	  agents	  not	  yet	  recognizable	  as	  such.	  The	  second	  part	  attempts	  to	  prepare	  the	  ground	  for	   answering	   these	   questions	   and	   for	   nurturing	   a	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   against	  the	  reifying	  tendencies	  in	  recognition.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  suggesting	  an	  approach	  whereby	  the	   multiple	   versions	   of	   the	   recognizable	   objects	   and	   agents	   –	   the	   recognizable	  
beings	  –	  balance	  each	  other’s	  truth	  claims.	  The	  limits	  of	  the	  recognition	  framework,	  as	   well	   as	   the	   alternative	   approach	   of	   becoming	   recognizable,	   will	   be	   illustrated	  through	   the	   cases	   of	   the	   international	   recognition	   of	   the	   ”Muslim	   Homeland”	   of	  Pakistan	  and	   the	   ”Jewish	  National	  Home”	  of	   Israel.	  By	   re-­‐reading	   these	   two	  cases,	  my	   illustrations	   will	   try	   to	   stem	   the	   reifying	   tendencies	   of	   this	   recognition	   onto	  “religion”	  in	  international	  relations.	  	  	   	  
	   16	  
	  
Chapter	  1:	  Recognizing	  religion	  	  	  Before	   the	   2001	   attacks	   in	   New	   York	   and	   the	   subway	   bombings	   in	   London	   and	  Madrid,	   scholars	   of	   international	   relations	   paid	   very	   limited	   attention	   to	   the	  question	   of	   religion.	   Political	   theory	   in	   general	   and	   international	   relations	   in	  particular	  had	  approached	  its	  objects	  of	  study	  through	  a	  framework	  of	  the	  modern	  and	   the	   rational,	   both	   of	   which	   explicitly	   refrained	   from	   engaging	   with	   religion,	  Indeed,	   its	   relevance	   was	   expected	   to	   decline	   as	   modern	   society	   developed.14	  Accordingly,	   the	   different	   parts	   of	  modern	   society	   –	   economy,	   law,	   and	   politics	   –	  were	   viewed	   as	   self-­‐sufficient,	   without	   any	   need	   for	   a	   religious	   context. 15 	  In	  addition,	  the	  current	  international	  order	  was	  considered	  to	  have	  emerged	  at	  a	  point	  in	  time	  when	  religion	  had	  been	  separated	  from	  politics,	  at	  the	  Peace	  of	  Westphalia	  in	  1648.16	  Finally,	  the	  community	  of	  IR	  scholars	  and	  the	  discipline	  they	  constituted	  were	   increasingly	  rooted	   in	  a	  positivist	  method	  and	  rationalist	  ontology	  that	  were	  unable	  to	  provide	  a	  quantitative	  measurement	  of	  the	  ‘”intangible”	  or	  accommodate	  the	  non-­‐rational	  or	  irrational.	  Given	  this	  “secular”	  starting	  point,	  how	  was	  IR	  to	  deal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Secularity	   has	   not	   only	   been	   seen	   as	   a	   normative	   necessity	   of	   the	   modern	   state,	   but	   also	   as	   a	  historical	  empirical	  development,	  characteristic	  of	  „modernity“.	  The	  process	  of	  secularization	  refers	  to	   a	   supposedly	   actual	   historical	   pattern	   of	   differentiation	   and	   transformation	   of	   the	   “religious”	  sphere,	   i.e.	   the	  religious	   institutions	  and	  churches,	  and	  of	   the	  secular	  sphere,	   the	  economy,	  science,	  health	   and	   state	   (Casanova	   1994).	   The	   idea	   is	   simple,	   Peter	   Berger	   writes,	   “modernization	  necessarily	  leads	  to	  a	  decline	  of	  religion,	  both	  in	  society	  and	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  individuals”	  (Berger	  1999:	  2;	   Taylor	   1998:	   32-­‐35;	   Habermas	   2005:	   317ff;	   Norris/Inglehart	   2004:	   7;	   Connolly	   1999:	   19-­‐25;	  Lynch	  2000:	  744.	  15	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  progress	  of	  science	  and	  its	  inherent	  rationality.	  These	  were	   expected	   to	   replace	   irrationality	   and	   superstition	   of	   religion	   (Berger	   1999:	   2ff).	   Within	   the	  social	  sciences,	  and	  particularly	  within	  sociology,	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  secularization	  was	  developed.	  These,	  at	   first	  modern	  European,	  and	   later	   increasingly	  globalized	  historical	   transformations,	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  general	  teleological	  and	  progressive	  human	  and	  societal	  development	  (Casanova	  1994,	  2003:	  5).	  The	  progress	  was	  seen	  as	  one	  departing	  from	  the	  “primitive	  Sacred”	  to	  the	  “modern	  Secular”.	  Most	   famously,	  Max	  Weber	  believed	   that	  what	  he	  called	   the	  “process	  of	   rationalization”	  –	  the	  increasing	  dominance	  of	  a	  “scientific	  mindset”	  in	  all	  cultural	  settings	  –	  would	  dissolve	  the	  magical	  belief	   of	   modern	  man,	   trapping	   the	   him	   in	   an	   “iron	   cage	   of”	   rationality	   (Kippenberg	   2003:	   214ff;	  Berger	  2008:	  23).	  This	   thesis	  of	  disenchantment	  (Entzauberung	  der	  Welt;	  Weber	  1968[1913])	  was	  not	   definitive,	   but	   even	  with	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   re-­‐enchantment	   (Wiedererzauberung)	  Weber	   saw	  the	  decline	  of	  religion	  as	  the	  most	  possible	  development	  accompanying	  the	  modern	  “rationalization”	  process	  (Weber	  1988[1920]:	  254;	  see	  also	  Kippenberg	  2003).	  	  	  16	  Skinner	  1978;	  Parker	  1980;	  Pagden	  1987;	  Osiander	  2001;	  Osiander	  1994,	  Chap	  2.;	  Krasner	  1993:	  242ff,	  1999,	  2001:	  21;	  Gross	  1948;	  Philpott	  2009,	  2000;	  Fox/Sandler	  2005:	  23.	  
	   17	  
with	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  religion?	  	  Some	   attempts	   have	   been	  made	   to	   incorporate	   religion	   into	   prevailing	   positivistic	  methods.17	  These	   take	   their	   cues	   from	   various	   sociological	   studies,	  which	   connect	  the	  religious	  identity	  of	  an	  individual	  with	  his	  or	  her	  social	  behavior	  and	  choices.	  It	  is	  argued	  that,	  although	  religion	  is	  seldom	  the	  single	  cause	  of	  action	  when	  it	  affects	  the	  behavior	  of	  policy	  makers,	   it	  can	  “inspire,	  cause	  or	  influence	  conflict”	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  it	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  neglected	  as	  an	  important	  factor,	  particularly	  in	  the	  arena	   of	   international	   security.18	  It	   is	   thus	   claimed	   that	   IR	   is	   broadened	   in	   its	  explanatory	  potential	   through	   the	   inclusion	  of	   religion	  as	   a	  variable.	   In	   this	   sense,	  religious	   actors	   are	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   something	   ontologically	   different	   from	   their	  secular	   counterparts19	  with	   a	   different	   rationality	   and	   particular	   “idiosyncratic”	  reference	  systems.20	  Religion,	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  a	  “world	  of	  its	  own”.	  	  Scholars	  employing	  a	  more	   interpretative,	  hermeneutic	  approach	  have	  questioned	  this	  kind	  of	   focus,	  which	   investigates	   the	   influence	  of	   religion	  as	  a	  variable	  on	   the	  individual	  mindset.	   For	   these	   scholars,	   religion,	   as	   such,	   cannot	   “create	  behavior,”	  since	   the	   category	   itself	   is	  man-­‐made	  and	   thus	  needs	   to	  be	  approached	   in	  a	  more	  historically	  and	  contextually	  sensitive	  manner.21	  Rather	  than	  taking	  religion	  at	  face	  value,	   this	   kind	   of	   critical	   scholarship	   argues	   for	   the	   need	   to	   investigate	   the	  consequences	   of	   thinking	   of	   religion	   as	   a	   separate	   category,	   distinct	   from	   politics	  and	  distinct	  from	  the	  secular.	  If	  religion	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  “other”	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  secular,	   and	   the	   secular,	   for	   example,	   was	   argued	   to	   be	   necessary	   for	   neutral,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Fox	  2003;	  2001;	  2007b.	  	  18	  Fox/Sandler	  2004:	  71.	  19	  Hoffman	  1995,	  Rapoport	  1991.	  20	  Toft	  2006;	  2007;	  Toft/Philpott/Shah	  2011.	  21	  Beyond	  this	  crude	  division	  between	  positivist	  and	  non-­‐positivist	  scholarship	  there	  exists	  a	  whole	  range	   of	   scholarship	   on	   religion	   in	   international	   security	   (Gray	   2007;	   Farr	   2008;	   Carlson/Owens	  2003;	   Little	   2007;	   Gopin	   2000;	   Appleby	   2000;	   Hoffman	   1995;	   Huntington	   1993,	   1996;	   Toft	   2006,	  2007;	   Toft/Philpott/Shah	   2011;	   Snyder	   (ed)	   2011;	   Sandal/James	   2011;	   Sheikh	   2012;	   Dalacoura	  2000;	  Mavelli	  2011,	  2013)	   in	   identity	   formation	   (Juergensmeyer	  1993;	  Thomas	  2000,	  2005;	  Bruce	  2003;	   Byrnes/Katzenstein	   2006;),	   in	   IR	   as	   a	   discipline	   (Laustensen/Wæver	   2000;	  Hasenclever/Rittberger	  2000;	  Kratochwil	  2005;	  Hanson	  2006;	  Kubalkova	  2000;	  Snyder	  2011;	  Lynch	  2000,	   2009;	   Fox	   2001,	   2004,	   2007a,	   2007b;	   Fox/Sandler	   2004;	  Haynes	   2011;	   );	   religious	   freedom	  (Sullivan/Hurd/Mahmood/Danchin	  (forthcoming).	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legitimate	   government,	   the	   contestation	   over	  what	   the	   secular	   –	   and	   its	   religious	  “other”	   –	   meant	   and	   whom	   it	   included	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   struggle	   over	   legitimate	  political	   power	   and	   participation.	   Further,	   if	   the	   secular	   was	   argued	   to	   be	   a	  precondition	   for	   the	   workings	   of	   reason	   and	   rationality,	   a	   precondition	   for	  accountability,	  then	  the	  understanding	  of	  what	  or	  who	  was	  secular	  or	  religious	  also	  became	   a	   question	   of	   who	   could	   or	   could	   not	   be	   included	   as	   fully	   recognized,	  rational	   and	   accountable	   actors	   into	   the	   moral	   and	   political	   orders	   of	   an	  international	  system	  or	  society.	  	  For	  example,	   in	  her	  work	  on	   the	  politics	  of	   secularism	   in	   international	   relations,22	  Elizabeth	   Shakman	   Hurd	   argues	   that	   “the	   determining	   conditions	   and	   effects	   of	  what	  gets	  categorized	  as	  ‘religion’	  are	  historically	  and	  culturally	  variable”.23	  Rather	  than	   assuming	   that	   religion	   impacts	   upon	   international	   relations	   in	   one	   way	   or	  another,	  she	  asks	  how	  “processes,	  institutions,	  and	  states	  come	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  religious	   versus	   political	   [as	   private	   versus	   public]	   and	   [how	   to]	   ascertain	   the	  political	   effects	   of	   such	   demarcation”. 24 	  Hurd	   sees	   secularism	   as	   one	   of	   the	  modalities	  governing	  this	  demarcation	  and	  formation	  of	  religion,	  and	  as	  such	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  organizing	  principles	  of	  modern	  politics,”25	  and	  an	  integral	  “part	  of	  the	  cultural	  and	  normative	  basis	  of	  international	  relations	  theory“.26	  Hurd's	  work	  –	   and	   that	   of	   other	   scholars	   -­‐	   presents	   secularism	   as	   a	   mode	   of	   governance	  regulating	  and	  constituting	   the	  boundaries	  of	  religion	  and	   its	   legitimate	  space	  and	  place.	  Religion	  seems	  missing	  from	  IR	  scholarship,	  because	  most	  IR	  scholars	  adopt	  a	  view	   of	   the	   world	   based	   on	   a	   secular	   ‘‘reality,’’	   whereby	   scholars	   miss	   out	   on	  ‘‘secularism’s	  role	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  subjects	  that	  it	  presupposes’’	  that	  is,	  both	  religion	   and	   the	   secular.	   Nor	   do	   they	   account	   for	   the	   political	   decision-­‐making	  process	   that	   demarcates	   the	   category	   of	   ‘‘religion’’	   from	   that	   of	   ”politics’’. 27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Hurd	  2004a,	  2004b,	  2008,	  2010,	  2012;	  Cady/Hurd	  2013.	  23	  Hurd	  2011:	  72.	  24	  Hurd	  2008:	  16,	  my	  brackets.	  25	  Hurd	  2008:	  23.	  26	  Hurd	  2008:	  10.	  27	  Hurd	  2004:	  254,	  256.	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Secularism	   in	   international	   relations,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   a	   power/knowledge	   regime	  with	  a	  productive	  power,	  constituting	  religion	  as	  something	  distinct	  from	  the	  public,	  political	   and	   liberal	   secular	   sphere	   of	   international	   relations,	   and	   most	   often	   as	  private,	   apolitical,	   and	   illiberal.	   The	   failure	   to	   recognize	   the	   constructedness	   of	  religion	  and	  the	  “moral,	  political,	  and	  epistemological	  consequences”	  of	  secularism	  explains	   why	   “students	   of	   international	   relations	   have	   been	   unable	   to	   properly	  recognize	  the	  power	  of	  religion	  in	  world	  politics”.28	  	  The	   various	   versions	   of	   secularism	   –	   as	   an	   epistemic	   category	   or	   a	  ”power/knowledge	  regime”	  –	  have	  been	  analyzed	  as	  tools	  of	  power	  of	  the	  modern	  state,	   as	   a	  Eurocentric	   framework	  of	   thought	  with	  powerful	  workings	   in	   the	  post-­‐colonial	  world	   and	   in	   the	   reproduction	   of	   an	   Islamic	   ”other”.29	  Building	   upon	   this	  critical	   work,	   post-­‐secular	   accounts	   emerged	   articulating	   alternatives	   beyond	  contemporary	  secular	  frameworks.30	  These	  have	  traced	  the	  ”return”	  or	  ”resilience”	  of	  religion	  in	  modern	  life	  and	  have	  argued	  for	  new	  models	  of	  politics,	  which	  would	  be	   able	   to	   include	   the	   growing	   number	   of	   religious	   arguments,	   communities	   and	  ideas	   in	   the	   public	   realm.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   post-­‐secular	   also	   featured	   as	   a	  framework	   for	   new	   forms	   of	   critical	   thinking	   that	   challenged	   the	   view	   that	   the	  values	  of	  equality,	  democracy,	  inclusion,	  freedom,	  or	  justice	  are	  best	  pursued	  within	  a	  liberal	  and	  secular	  framework.31	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  three	  scholars	  who	  identify	  with	  theoretical	  positions	  in	   international	  relations	  where	  the	  abovementioned	  virtues	  of	  historical	  and	   contextual	   sensitivity	   are	   written	   large,	   namely	   Social	   constructivism,	   the	  English	   School	   and	   Habermasian	   Critical	   Theory.	   I	   will	   analyze	   in	   detail	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Hurd	  2008:	  154,	  1.	  29 	  Wilson	   2011;	   Mavelli	   2012a,	   2012b;	   Barbato	   2010a;	   Bilgin	   2008;	   Hallward	   2008;	  Byrnes/Katzenstein	  2006;	  Luoma-­‐Aho	  2009.	  30	  Through	   the	  work	   of	   political	   theorists	   such	   as	   Charles	   Taylor,	   Jürgen	   Habermas,	   Judith	   Butler,	  Talal	  Asad,	  Craig	  Calhoun	  and	  William	  Connolly.	  	  31	  Mavelli/Petito	  2012.	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argumentation	   of	   Daniel	   Philpott,	   Scott	   Thomas	   and	   Mariano	   Barbato.32	  All	   three	  agree	   in	   their	   diagnoses	   that	   religion	   has	   been	   systematically	   excluded	   from	   the	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	   international	   relations.	  While	   they	   list	  different	   reasons	   for	  this	  exclusion,	  they	  continue	  to	  agree	  about	  its	  problematic	  nature	  and	  argue	  for	  the	  need	  to	  recognize	  religion	  in	   international	  affairs.	  Theirs	  are	  not	  simply	  arguments	  regarding	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   concept	   in	   international	   relations	   theory,	   but	   that	  religion	  –	  as	  ideas	  (Philpott),	  communities	  (Thomas),	  or	  an	  epistemic	  treasure-­‐chest	  (Barbato/Habermas)	  –	  represents	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  the	  fabric	  of	   international	  relations	   itself.	  After	  outlining	  and	  analyzing	   their	  arguments	   in	  detail,	   I	  will	  point	  out	   that,	   while	   arguing	   for	   the	   need	   to	   recognize	   the	   importance	   of	   religion	   in	  international	  relations,	  neither	  of	  the	  scholars	  reflect	  sufficiently	  on	  what	  it	   is	  they	  want	  to	  have	  recognized,	  and	  how	  it	  became	   intelligible	  or	  recognizable	  –	  to	  them,	  the	  discipline	  or	  a	  broader	  international	  audience	  –	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  They	  all	  lack,	  what	   I	   call,	   a	   genealogical	   sensitivity,	   regarding	   the	   recognition	   of	   religion	   in	  international	  relations.	  	  
Social	  constructivism:	  Daniel	  Philpott	  and	  the	  kinetic	  energy	  of	  ideas	  	  
“No	  Reformation,	  no	  Westphalia”	  	  International	  relations	  has	  neglected	  religion,	  Daniel	  Philpott	  argues,	  referring	  to	  a	  survey	  of	   ”leading	   international	   relations	   journals	   over	   the	  period	  1980-­‐99”.	  Only	  six	   out	   of	   1600	   articles	   feature	   religion	   as	   an	   ”important	   influence”.33	  This	   fact	   is	  problematic	  for	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  different	  reasons.	  First,	  he	  states,	  religion	  cannot	  be	   ignored,	   since	   it	   lies	   ”at	   the	   root	   of	   modern	   international	   relations”	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  These	  three	  authors	  represent	  historical	  and	  contextual	  sensitive	  approaches	  and	  all	  question	  the	  exclusion	  of	  religion	  from	  international	  scholarship.	  However,	  while	  they	  are	  critical	  of	  the	  exclusion,	  none	  of	  theirs	  are	  ”crude”	  inclusion	  arguments.	  These	  are	  made	  elsewhere	  and	  are	  rather	  easy	  to	  deconstruct.	  Rather,	  the	  following	  authors	  arguments	  can	  be	  placed	  much	  more	  close	  to	  the	  IR	  ”critical”	  mainstream	  and	  each	  represent	  a	  particular	  ”critical”	  school	  of	  thought,	  Critical	  theory,	  the	  English	  School	  and	  Social	  Constructivism.	  	  33	  Philpott	  2001:	  9;	  2002:	  69.	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present	  Westphalian	  international	  order.34	  The	  order	  refers	  to	  a	  system	  of	  sovereign	  states	   that	   emerged	   after	   Protestant	   principalities	   challenged	   the	   prevailing	  authority	  of	   the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	   its	  aligned	  Empires	   in	  16th	  and	  17th	  century	  Europe.35	  While	   “Westphalia”	   has	   been	   understood	   by	   a	   majority	   of	   international	  scholars	  to	  mark	  the	  move	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  Europe	  as	  unified	  by	  Christendom	  to	  a	  system	  of	   sovereign	   states,36	  from	  a	   religious	   to	   a	  modern,	   secular	  world,	  Philpott	  argues	  that	  this	  very	  international	  order	  would	  never	  have	  emerged	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   Reformation	   and	   Protestant	   ideas	   of	   political	   authority	   had	  shaped	  states’	  interests	  in	  sovereign	  statehood.	  ”[P]lumbing	  the	  causal	  logic	  behind	  this	   correlation,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   intrinsic	   content	   of	   Protestantism	   itself	   point	   to	  sovereignty”. 37 	  ”No	   Reformation,	   no	   Westphalia”	   is	   the	   short	   version	   of	   this	  argument.38	  Due	   to	   the	   reason	   alone	   that	   religion	   is	   constitutive	   for	   the	   present	  international	   order,	   it	   ought	   to	   be	   placed	   on	   the	   forefront	   of	   international	  scholarship.	   Philpott	   concludes:	   ”if	   the	   place	   of	   religion	   at	   the	   origins	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Philpott	  2000:	  206.	  35	  Regarding	  religion,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Osnabrück	  revises	  the	  Diet	  of	  Augsburg	  and	  the	  right	  of	  the	  ruler	  to	  implement	  religious	  unity	  onto	  his	  territory.	  Instead,	  the	  treaties	  in	  1648	  wrote	  that	  each	  part	  of	  the	  empire	  from	  there	  on	  be	  settled	  according	  to	  the	  situation	  on	  1	  January	  1624	  (Münster	  section	  47;	  Osnabrück	  article	  5.1ff).	  The	  authority	  of	  the	  polities	  were	  deprived	  of	  the	  power	  given	  to	  them	  in	  Augsburg	   to	   determine	   the	   religious	   liation	   of	   their	   lands	   and	   Osnabrück	   further	   guaranteed	   the	  private	  exercise	  of	  recognized	  confesssions,	  that	  is,	  Catholic,	  Lutheran,	  and	  Calivinist.	  (Asch	  1997).	  36	  The	   “Westphalian”	   international	   order	   that	   followed	   the	   settlement	   of	   these	   conflicts	   “made	   the	  territorial	   state	   the	   cornerstone	  of	   the	  modern	   state	   system.”	  Morgenthau	  1985	   (1948):	  294;	   for	  a	  critical	  reading	  of	  Westphalia	  see	  Osiander	  2001;	  Krasner	  1993;	  Spruyt	  1994;	  Blaney	  and	  Inayatullah	  2000,	  2001;	  David	  Campbell	  similarly	  argues	  that	  the	  narrative	  of	  a	  clear	  medieval-­‐modern	  break	  is	  used	  to	  sanctify	  the	  identities	  forged	  by	  the	  state	  system.	  (1992:	  46ff).	  Leo	  Gross	  called	  Westphalia	  ”the	  majestic	   portal	  which	   leads	   from	   the	   old	   into	   the	   new	  world”	   (Gross	   1948);	   Quentin	   Skinner	  argues	   that	   after	   Luther	   the	   ”idea	   of	   the	   Pope	   and	   Emperor	   as	   parallel	   and	   universal	   powers	  disappears,	   and	   the	   independent	   jurisdictions	   of	   the	   sacerdotium	   are	   handed	   over	   to	   the	   secular	  authorities.”	   (Skinner	   1978b:	   15).	   According	   to	   Stephen	   Krasner	   the	   settlement	   at	   Westphalia	  “delegitimized	   the	  already	  waning	   transnational	   role	  of	   the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  validated	   the	   idea	  that	   international	   relations	   should	   be	   driven	   by	   balance-­‐of-­‐power	   considerations	   rather	   than	   the	  ideals	  of	  Christendom.”	  (Krasner	  2001:	  21).	  The	  new	  Westphalian	  system	  recognized	  the	  state	  as	  the	  dominant	   actor,	   “replacing	   the	   transnational	   authority	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church.”(Thomas	  2005:	   54).	  Within	  such	  a	  state	  system	  the	  ”role	  of	  the	  divine	  was	  in	  effect	  marginalized.”(Fox/Sandler	  2005:	  23).	  The	  ’integrationalism’	  of	  religion	  and	  politics	  of	  the	  Medieval	  Europe	  and	  its	  Res	  Publica	  Christiania	  was	  ”defeated”	  by	  the	  Westphalian	  settlement.	  (Philpott	  2009:	  187).	  The	  ”secularizing	  spirit	  of	   this	  settlement	   of	   the	   Thirty	   Years	  War”	   expanded	   through	   the	   globalization	   of	   the	  Westphalian	   state	  system	   ”to	   a	   global	   dominion	   that	   still	   endures.”	   (Philpott	   2002:	   71).	   In	   this	   sense,	   Westphalia	  secularized	  the	  international	  system.	  37	  Philpott	  2000:	  207.	  38	  Philpott	  2000:	  206.	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international	  relations	  becomes	  more	  clear,	   then	  perhaps	   its	  place	   in	   international	  relations	  today	  will	  be	  taken	  more	  seriously.”39	  	  	  The	  quest	  to	  “take	  religion	  more	  seriously”	  not	  only	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  religion	  is	   constitutive	   for	   the	   present	   international	   system,	   but	   also	   from	   the	   fact	   that	  religion	   represents	   a	   challenge	   to	   this	   very	   international	   order.	   Religious	  international	   organizations,	   such	   as	   Al	   Qaeda,	   ”directly	   challenge	   the	   authority	  structure	   of	   the	   international	   system”.40	  This	   challenge	   ought	   to	   ”call	   to	   direct	   far	  more	  energy	  to	  understanding	  the	  impetuses	  behind	  [these]	  movements”.41	  Only	  by	  understanding	   the	   ideas	   that	   motivate	   these	   religious	   groups	   will	   their	   actions	  become	   intelligible,	   and	   only	   then	   can	   appropriate	   political	   responses	   be	   found.	  These	  actors	  ”were	  animated	  by	  a	  kind	  of	  conception,	  were	  organized	  around	  a	  kind	  of	   idea,	   and	   appraised	   the	   international	   system	   to	   a	   kind	   of	   notion	   [to]	   which	  international	   relations	   scholars	   have	   paid	   relatively	   little	   attention:	   religion.”42	  International	   relations	  must	   recognize	   the	   centrality	  of	   religion	   to	   these	  dynamics	  and	  must	  overcome	  its	  own	  secular	  bias.	  ”[W]e	  must	  come	  to	  understand	  that	  these	  groups	   are	  defined,	   constituted,	   and	  motivated	  by	   religious	  beliefs	  …	  Out	  of	   these	  beliefs,	  they	  then	  construct	  a	  political	  theology	  [that]	  prescribes	  action	  accordingly.	  That	   such	  beliefs	   constitute	   influential	   global	  networks	  and	  motivate	   their	  actions	  call	   into	  question	  the	  secularization	  of	   international	  relations,	   in	  both	  practice	  and	  theory.”43	  In	  other	  words,	  international	  relations	  must	  recognize	  religion.	  	  	  
Ontological	  assumptions	  	  If	  religion	  is	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  an	  influential	  component	  of	  international	  relations,	  what,	  precisely	  is	  this	  “religion”?	  How	  do	  we	  distinguish	  religious	  ideas	  from	  other	  ideas?	  How	  is	  religion	  different	  from	  culture,	  or	  ethnicity?	  Philpott	  provides	  us	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Philpott	  2001:	  9.	  40	  Philpott	  2002:	  67.	  41	  Philpott	  2002:	  77.	  42	  Philpott	  2002:	  66f.	  43	  Philpott	  2002:	  93.	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two	  ways	   to	   proceed:	   First	   he	   offers	   a	   definition,	  mainly	   in	   order	   to	   differentiate	  religion	  from	  ”Marxism,	  Nazism,	  nationalism	  and	  witchcraft”.44	  Accordingly,	  religion	  is	   ”a	   set	   of	   beliefs	   about	   the	   ultimate	   ground	   of	   existence,	   that	   which	   is	  unconditioned,	  not	  itself	  created	  or	  caused”.45	  Later,	  he	  modifies	  this	  core	  definition,	  preferring	   to	  use	   the	   term	   “political	   theology”,	  which	  he	   sees	   as	   a	   less	   closed	   and	  more	   open-­‐ended	   term	   than	   religion.	   However,	   even	   if	   political	   theology	   differs	  from	   religion	   so	   as	   to	   be	  more	   sensitive	   to	   social	   and	   political	   contexts,	   it	   is	   still	  constituted	   by	   the	   tenets,	   beliefs	   and	   doctrines	   of	   religion.	   The	   difference	   with	  potential	   secular	   counterparts	   ”is	   brightest”	   when	   religion	   is	   a	   source	   of	  preferences,	   that	   is,	   in	   terms	  of	   its	   ideas.46	  For	  Philpott,	   religion	   is	   religious	   ideas,	  and	  these	  are	  ”powerful,	  autonomous,	  and	  not	  simply	  the	  by-­‐product	  of	  nonreligious	  factors	  …	   Ideas	  shape	  politics.	  A	  religious	  actor	   is	  more	   likely	   to	  engage	   in	  certain	  forms	  of	  political	  activity	  …	  the	  stronger	  it	  holds	  doctrines	  that	  favor	  those	  activities	  …	   In	   any	   particular	   context,	   political	   theology	   translates	   basic	   theological	   claims,	  beliefs	  and	  doctrines	  into	  political	  ideals	  and	  programs”.47	  	  	  Secondly,	   Philpott	   points	   out,	   religion	   can	   be	   differentiated	   from	   non-­‐religion	   by	  looking	   at	   the	   practices	   they	   bring	   about.	   Ideas	   are	   mirrored	   in	   the	   practices	   of	  those	  who	  believe	  in	  them,	  that	  is,	  their	  “converts”	  on	  the	  ground.	  In	  reference	  to	  the	  impact	   of	   Protestant	   ideas	   of	   the	   constitution	   of	   the	   Westphalian	   international	  order,	  Philpott	  writes:	   “We	  know	  that	  people	  have	   [adopted	  Protestant	   ideas	  and]	  become	   Protestants	   when	   they	   organize	   into	   new	   congregations,	   speak,	   worship,	  teach,	  and	  write	  like	  Protestants.”48	  That	  is,	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  ideas	  and	  the	  “evidence	  of	  conversion,	  of	  identity	  formation”	  that	  follow	  from	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  ideas	  ”lies	  in	  the	  new	  religious	  practices	  of	  those	  who	  adopted	  [them].”49	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Philpott	  2002:	  68.	  45	  Philpott	  2002.	  46	  Philpott	  2009:	  198.	  47	  Toft/Philpott/Shah:	  2011:	  29;	  27,	  see	  also	  Philpott	  2002:	  93;	  2000:	  244;	  2002:	  66f.	  48	  Philpott	  2001:	  71.	  49	  Philpott	  2001:	  124.	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First,	   there	   is	   a	   logical	   circle	   here:	   The	   Protestant	   ideas	   are	   supposedly	   made	  evident	  through	  Protestant	  practices.	  If	  one	  rejects	  the	  definition	  of	  these	  practices	  as	  Protestant,	   the	   impact	  of	  Protestant	   ideas	   is	   vacant.	  That	   is,	   if	   the	   ideas	  of	   “the	  separation	  of	  powers”	  and	  “tolerance”	  that	  came	  with	  the	  Reformation	  had	  been	  the	  trademark	  of	  another	  kind	  of	  thinking,	  religion	  would	  have	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  Westphalian	  settlement,	  and	  thus	  with	   the	   international	  order	  emerging	   from	  that	  settlement.	  There	  is	  nothing	  intrinsic	  to	  religion	  tying	  it	  to	  Westphalia	  that	  could	  not	  have	   been	   provided	   by	   other	   philosophical	   traditions	   or	   movements.	   Why,	   then,	  highlight	   the	   importance	  of	   religion?	  And	  how	  can	  we	  assume	   that	   this	   religion	   is	  commensurable	  throughout	  four	  centuries?	  	  	  Secondly,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  ideas	  are	  not	  simply	  mirrored	  in	  practices,	  but	  are	  also	   constituted	   by	   them.	   That	   is,	   ideas	   can	   represent	   rationalizations	   for	   already	  ongoing	  practices,	  and	  practices	  can	  be	  productive	  of	   the	   ideas	   they	   later	  claim	   to	  embody.	   Philpott	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	   constructive	   power	   of	   the	  enactment	   of	   ”Protestant	   ideas”,	   that	   is,	   he	   omits	   to	   explain	   precisely	   how	   and	   in	  what	  way	  the	  practices	  that	  were	  defined	  as	  Protestant	  were	  productive	  of	  the	  ideas	  that	   are	   understood	   as	   Protestant. 50 	  Philpott	   lacks	   a	   genealogical	   sensitivity	  concerning	   the	   productive	   power	   in	   the	   performance	   of	   “religious”	   practices	   for	  religious	  ideas	  and	  thus	  for	  “religion”	  itself.	  Further,	  he	  ignores	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  –	  referring	  to	  something	  Protestant	  or	  Sunni,	  etc.	  –	  is	  productive	  of	  the	   meaning	   of	   these	   religious	   references.51	  Neither	   the	   power	   of	   the	   use	   of	   the	  meaning	   of	   religion,	   nor	   the	   power	   of	   the	   practices	   upon	   the	   religious	   ideas	   are	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  Ideas	  –	  be	  they	  of	  sovereignty	  or	  of	  religion	  –	  impact	  upon	  international	  relations	  but,	  per	  Philpott,	  are	  not	  formed	  by	  them.	  	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  Philpott	  does	  not	  state	   that	   ideas	  are	  autonomous	  of	  context,	  but	   that	  they	  arise	   in	  circumstances	  and	  contexts	   that	  nourish	  such	   ideas.	  Further,	   there	   is	  not	   one	   single	   idea,	   but	   a	   conglomerate	   of	   different	   ideas,	   gravitating	   around	   one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Adler/Pouliot	  2011;	  for	  a	  critical	  review	  see	  Ringmar	  2014.	  51	  For	  the	  ”use”	  of	  language	  in	  language	  games	  see,:	  Wittgenstein	  1953.	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basic	   background	   idea.	   However,	   as	   sensitive	   as	   Philpott	   may	   be	   towards	   the	  complexity	   of	   ideas,	   he	   lacks	   sensitivity	   regarding	   how	   these	   emergent	   ideas	   are	  dependent,	   or	   rather,	   how	   they	   are	   constituted	   by	   the	   way	   in	   which	   they	   are	  subsequently	   performed	   or	   used.	   Philpott	   lacks	   a	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   for	   the	  productive	  power	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  ”religious”	  practices	  and	  how	  they	  and	  their	  use	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  meaning	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  religious	  ideas	  and	  of	  religion	  itself.	  	  
Problems	  regarding	  the	  ontological	  assumptions	  	  Why	   is	   this	   problematic?	   Philpott	   himself	   states	   that	   ”a	   complete	   genealogical	  account	   of	   the	   origin	   of	   an	   idea	   is	   impossible	   …	   such	   an	   account	   is	   not	   my	   aim	  here.”52	  However,	  Philpott	  throws	  out	  a	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  with	  the	  bathwater	  of	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  genealogy.	  The	  task	  is	  not	  to	  carry	  around	  the	  history	  of	  each	  term	  one	  uses	  to	  explain	  or	  understand	  international	  dynamics.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  of	  including	  a	  measure	   of	   sensitivity	   to	   different	   productive	   powers	   in	   the	   performances	   of	  “religious”	   practices	   and	   a	   modicum	   of	   sensitivity	   concerning	   how	   the	   use	   of	  religious	  references	  is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  ideas	  that	  can	  be	  argued	  in	  reference	  to	  it.	  Neither	   the	   power	   of	   the	   use	   for	   the	   meaning	   of	   religion,	   nor	   the	   power	   of	   the	  practices	  for	  the	  religious	  ideas	  are	  taken	  into	  consideration	  here.	  Philpott’s	  account	  lacks	  this	  genealogical	  sensitivity,	  and	  through	  his	  quest	  to	  have	  religion	  recognized	  in	   the	   “theory	  and	  practice”	  of	   IR,	  he	   reaffirms	  a	  very	  particular	  understanding	  of	  what	   religion	   is,	   empowers	   those	   who	   can	   claim	   this	   version	   of	   religion,	   and	  sidelines	  the	  debates	  and	  struggles	  on	  how	  this	  present	  state	  of	  affairs	  came	  to	  be.	  He	   lacks	   a	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   regarding	   the	   emergence	   of	   religion	   as	   a	  knowable,	  distinguishable	  issue,	  power	  or	  agent	  in	  international	  relations.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Philpott	  2001:	  258.	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The	  English	  School:	  Scott	  Thomas	  and	  the	  Westphalian	  Presumption	  	  
	  According	  to	  Scott	  Thomas,	  religion	  has	  been	  excluded	  from	  international	  relations	  not	   so	  much	   due	   to	   the	   negligence	   of	   its	   scholars,	   but	   rather	   due	   to	   a	   particular	  misconstruction	  of	  history,	  more	  precisely,	   a	  misconstruction	  of	   the	  history	  of	   the	  Westphalian	   Peace	   and	   its	   secularizing	   consequences.	   The	   “Westphalian	  presumption”	   builds	   on	   the	   widespread	   view	   of	   the	   Peace	   of	   Westphalia	   that	  “delegitimized	   the	   already	   waning	   transnational	   role	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   and	  validated	  the	  idea	  that	  international	  relations	  should	  be	  driven	  by	  balance-­‐of-­‐power	  considerations	   rather	   than	   the	   ideals	   of	   Christendom.”53.	   This	   new	   state	   system	  overcame	  the	  “integrationalism”	  of	  religion	  and	  politics	  of	  Medieval	  Europe	  and	  its	  
Res	  Publica	  Christiania,	  which	  were	  thus	  ”defeated”.54	  The	  ”secularizing	  spirit	  of	  this	  settlement	  of	  the	  Thirty	  Years	  War”	  was	  to	  expand	  through	  the	  globalization	  of	  the	  Westphalian	  state	  system	  ”to	  a	  global	  dominion	  that	  still	  endures.”55	  In	  other	  words,	  Westphalia	   secularized	   the	   international	   system.	   Thomas	   views	   this	   Westphalian	  presumption	  as	  permeating	   the	  discipline	  of	   international	   relations	  and	   informing	  the	  “liberal	  international	  project”	  more	  generally.56	  	  	  He	  argues	  for	  the	  need	  to	  contextualize	  the	  basis	  upon	  which	  religion	  was	  excluded	  from	   IR.	   The	   sidelining	   of	   religion	   is	   not	   a	   random	  matter,	   he	   points	   out,	   but	   is	   a	  symptom	  of	   a	   particular	   understanding	   of	   the	  Westphalian	   Peace,	   suggesting	   that	  the	   European	   “Wars	   of	   Religion”	   between	   1550	   and	   1650	   had	   proven	   that,	  when	  religion	  was	   brought	   into	   public	   life	   it	   caused	   political	   upheaval,	   intolerance,	   and	  war,	   and	   destabilized	   the	   international	   order.	   In	   this	   sense,	   cultural	   and	   religious	  pluralism	   is	   considered	   to	   threaten	   international	   stability	   and	   challenge	   a	  sustainable	   peaceful	   international	   society.	   In	   order	   to	   minimize	   the	   effect	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Krasner	  2001:	  21.	  54	  Philpott	  2009:	  187.	  55	  Philpott	  2002:	  71.	  56	  Thomas	   2000:	   815;	   see	   also	   Thomas	   2005:	   151;	   Blaney	   and	   Inayatullah	   (2000)	   claim	   that	   the	  Westphalian	  system,	  and	  the	  intellectual	  heritage	  following	  from	  it,	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  that	  –religious,	  cultural,	   and	   social	   –	   uniformity	   is	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	  prevent	   international	   disruption	  of	   order	  and	  that,	  unmanaged,	  differences	  will	  cause	  disorder.	  ”Westphalian	  system	  …	  functions	  primarily	  to	  reinforce	  this	  suspicion	  of	  difference.	  (Blaney/Inayatullah	  2000:	  32)..	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religious	  disagreement	   and	   to	   end	   the	  destructive	   role	   of	   religion	   in	   international	  relations,	   the	  modern	   state,	   the	   privatization	   of	   religion	   and	   the	   secularization	   of	  international	  relations	  represented	  the	  necessary	  reforms.57	  	  	  The	   Westphalian	   presumption	   misconstrues	   historical	   and,	   in	   effect,	   current	  international	   relations.	   Religion	   did	   not	   simply	   disappear	   from	   the	   international	  realm	  following	  the	  Westphalian	  Peace.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  transfer	  of	  loyalties	  from	  religion	  to	  the	  state	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  state’s	  monopoly	  on	  the	  use	  of	  power	  and	  coercion	   in	   society,	   religion	  was	  deprived	  of	   its	   social	   and	  disciplinary	  powers	  and	  was	  accorded	  a	  role	  that	  was	  better	  compatible	  with	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  emerging	   sovereign	   state.	   However,	   religious	   doctrines,	   cultures	   and	   civilizations	  continued	  to	  impact	  upon	  the	  common	  culture	  of	  the	  international	  societies	  to	  come,	  and	   Christendom	   was	   –	   and	   continued	   to	   be	   –	   the	   framework	   for	   international	  practices	  of	  diplomacy	  and	  war,	  practices	  that	  would	  be	   incommensurable	  outside	  this	   framework.	   The	   Westphalian	   presumption,	   Thomas	   continues,	   not	   only	  furnishes	   a	   false	   picture	   of	   Westphalia	   as	   the	   secularization	   of	   international	  relations,	   but	   also	   skews	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   international	   “resurgence	   of	  religion”	   today.	   This	   seems	   especially	   problematic	   in	   the	   global	   South,	   or	   other	  regions	   than	  never	   experienced	   the	  Westphalian	   “privatization”	  of	   religion,	  where	  the	   latter	   retained	   its	   political	   and	   social	   power.	   Leaving	   the	   Westphalian	  presumption	   at	   work,	   the	   global	   resurgence	   of	   religion	   seems	   like	   the	  internationalization	  of	  a	  private	  matter,	  the	  reemergence	  of	  something	  that	  should	  have	  long	  since	  retreated	  into	  the	  inner	  life	  of	  the	  individual	  sovereign	  states.	  With	  the	  Westphalian	   presumption	   at	   work,	   the	   increased	   international	   importance	   of	  religion	  lurks	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  Westphalian	  settlement	  and	  its	  international	  order	  and	  stability.58	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57Thomas	  2000,	  2003,	  2005.	  58	  Thomas	  2003:	  24.	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Rereading	  Westphalia:	  From	  socially	  embedded	  religion	  to	  abstract	  dogma	  
	  For	  Thomas,	  the	  view	  of	  Westphalia	  as	  a	  point	  in	  time	  –	  whether	  real	  or	  symbolic	  –	  when	  international	  relations	  were	  freed	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  religion,	  is	  too	  great	  of	  a	  simplification.	  The	  actual	  change	  was	  a	  different	  one.	  Rather	  than	  representing	  the	  beginning	   of	   secularized	   international	   relations,	  Westphalia	   provided	   a	   change	   in	  the	  meaning	   of	   religion	   to	   one	  more	   compatible	  with	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   evolving	  state.	  In	  the	  time	  preceding	  Westphalia,	  Thomas	  points	  out,	  religion	  carried	  a	  social	  meaning,	   that	   is,	   religio	   was	  meaningful	   only	   in	   reference	   to	   practices	  within	   the	  particular	  (Christian)	  communities	  that	  sustained	  it.59	  However,	  this	  changed	  during	  the	  early	  modern	  period.	  “As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  modern	  concept	  of	  religion	  the	  virtues	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  Christian	  tradition	  came	  to	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  communities	  in	  which	   they	  were	  embedded”.60	  The	  development	   from	   the	   social	   to	   the	  modern	  meaning	  of	  religion	  was	  necessary,	  according	  to	  Thomas,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  religion	  “compatible	   with	   the	   power	   and	   discipline	   of	   the	   state”.61	  Religion	   was	   detached	  from	  the	  virtues	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  ecclesial	  community	  and	  was	  privatized	  in	  the	  –	   abstract	   –	   form	   of	   belief	   and	   conscience.	   The	   “previous	   [intellectual	   and	   social]	  discipline	   of	   religion	  was	   taken	   over	   by	   the	   state,	  which	  was	   given	   the	   legitimate	  monopoly	   on	   the	   use	   of	   power	   and	   coercion	   in	   society.”62	  The	   state	   used	   this	  “invention	   of	   religion”	   to	   legitimate	   the	   transfer	   of	   the	   ultimate	   loyalty	   of	   people	  from	  religion	  to	  the	  state	  as	  part	  of	  the	  consolidation	  of	  its	  power.	  The	  state	  had	  to	  separate	   “doctrines	   and	   beliefs	   from	   practices	   and	   communities	   as	   part	   of	   state-­‐building	  and	  affirming	  internal	  sovereignty”.63	  	  	  The	   Westphalian	   presumption	   that	   “religious	   and	   cultural	   pluralism	   can	   not	   be	  accommodated	   in	   international	   society,	   but	   must	   be	   privatized,	   marginalised,	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Thomas	  2003:	  24ff,	  2005:	  54ff.	  60	  Thomas	  2000:	  821.	  61	  Thomas	  2000:	  822.	  62	  Thomas	  2000:	  822;	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Thomas	  Hobbes:	   ‘This	  the	  generation	  of	  that	  great	  Leviathan,	  or	  rather	  [to	  speak	  more	  reverently]	  of	  that	  Mortal	  God,	  to	  which	  we	  owe	  under	  the	  Immortal	  God,	  our	   peace	   and	   defense.”	   (Hobbes	   1991	   (1651):	   120	   emphasis	   added);	   See	   this	   understanding	  reflected	  in	  Grotius’	  “De	  Veritate	  Religionis	  Christianae”.	  63	  Thomas	  2000:	  823,	  2005:	  28.	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even	   overcome	   –	   by	   an	   ethic	   of	   cosmopolitanism	   –	   if	   there	   is	   to	   be	   international	  order”	   builds	   on	   this	   version	   of	   religion	   as	   a	   privatized	   dogma,	   detached	   from	  practice. 64 	  Thomas’s	   conceptually	   critical	   reading	   of	   religion	   in	   international	  relations	   shows	   how	   the	  Westphalian	   presumption	   needs	   this	   very	   ”’invention	   of	  religion”.	  The	  only	  way	  of	  separating	  religion	  –	  and	  its	  previous	  disciplinary	  power	  –	  from	  the	  realms	  of	  state	  power	  was	  to	  reject	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  state	  power	  and	  the	  international	  society,	  in	  which	  it	  was	  embedded,	  were	  dependent	  upon	  it.	  A	  new	  version	   of	   religion	   was	   needed,	   a	   ”modern”	   version	   which	   could	   be	   much	   more	  easily	  accessed	  and	  controlled.	  The	  new	  religion	  –	  the	  dogma	  and	  doctrines	  –	  were	  to	   remain	   in	   the	   private	   sphere,	   and	   not	   interfere	  with	   the	   public	  matters	   of	   the	  state	   or	   the	   international	   system	   of	   which	   the	   latter	   was	   part.	   Not	   necessarily	  problematic	   in	   itself,	   Thomas	   states,	   the	   Westphalian	   presumption,	   nonetheless,	  skews	  the	  analysis	  of	  religion	  in	  present	  international	  relations,	  not	  only	  due	  to	  the	  incommensurability	   of	   concepts	   between	   different	   historical	   periods,	   but	   also	  because	  international	  relations	  scholars	  ”risk	  misunderstanding	  the	  [present]	  global	  resurgence	   of	   religion	   if	   we	   apply	   a	   modern	   concept	   of	   religion	   to	   non-­‐Western	  societies	  where	  this	  transition	   is	   incomplete,	  or	   it	   is	  being	  resisted	  as	  part	  of	   their	  struggle	  for	  authenticity	  and	  development.”65	  	  During	  the	  conflicts	  preceding	  the	  Westphalian	  settlement,	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  was	  not	   one	   of	   doctrine.	   “[W]hat	  was	   being	   safeguarded	   and	   defended	   in	   the	  Wars	   of	  Religion	   was	   a	   sacred	   notion	   of	   the	   community	   defined	   by	   religion,	   as	   each	  community	  fought	  to	  define,	  redefine,	  or	  defend	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  sacred	  and	  the	  profane	  as	  a	  whole.”66	  In	  this	  sense,	  religion	  in	  early	  modern	  Europe	  should	  be	   interpreted	  as	  a	   “community	  of	  believers	   rather	   than	  as	  a	  body	  of	  doctrines	  or	  beliefs	  as	  liberal	  modernity	  would	  have	  it.”67	  The	  Westphalian	  presumption	  ignores	  this,	   treats	  Westphalia	   as	   the	   beginning	   of	   secularized	   international	   relations	   and	  the	   occurrence	   of	   religion	   within	   this	   international	   realm	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Thomas	  2000:	  815,	  2005:	  151.	  65	  Thomas	  2005:	  23.	  66	  Thomas	  2003:	  25.	  67	  Thomas	  2000:	  820f.	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Westphalian	   secular	   order.	   The	   Westphalian	   presumption	   excludes	   religion	   and	  generally	  perceives	  the	  growing	  reference	  in	  international	  relations	  to	  religon	  as	  the	  internationalization	  of	  a	  private	  matter	  and,	  hence,	  as	  a	  problem.	  	  	  However,	   Thomas	   points	   out,	   religion	   is	   not	   a	   problem	   in	   international	   relations.	  Rather,	   the	   international	   realm	   is	   permeated	   by	   it.	   The	   formation	   of	   the	  international	   “thick	   practices”	   of	   diplomacy	   and	  war	  were	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   a	  particular	  religious	  and	  cultural	  tradition	  of	  Christendom,	  and	  are	  incommensurable	  when	  placed	  outside	  of	  this	  framework.	  Beyond	  the	  fact	  that	  religion	  historically	  has	  been	   the	   bones	   around	  which	   the	  muscles	   of	   the	   practices	   of	  war	   and	   diplomacy	  evolved,	   it	   continues	   to	   play	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   “global	   South”.	   International	  relations	  “has	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  complex	  understanding	  of	  religion	  since	  religion	  is	  an	  increasingly	  (or,	  indeed,	  always	  has	  been)	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  way	  people	  in	  the	  global	  South	  interpret	  their	  personal	  lives	  and	  social	  world”.68	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  part	  of	  the	  world	  will	  comprise	  almost	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  world’s	  population	  by	  the	  year	   2050 69 	  and	   that	   the	   discipline	   of	   international	   relations	   is	   becoming	  increasingly	  pluralized	  to	  cover	  a	  “truly	  multicultural	   international	  society”	  should	  urge	   international	  scholars	   to	   “tak[e]	   cultural	  and	  religious	  pluralism	  seriously	   [as	  it]	   will	   be	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	   international	   politics	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐first	  century”. 70 	  Ceasing	   to	   exclude	   religion	   from	   IR,	   Thomas	   points	   out,	   entails	  countering	   the	   Westphalian	   presumption	   and	   its	   version	   of	   religion	   as	   private,	  abstract,	  de-­‐contextualized	  belief.	   ”If	   the	  global	  resurgence	  of	   religion	  and	  cultural	  pluralism	  are	   to	  be	   taken	  seriously,	   then	  a	  social	  understanding	  of	  religion	  and	   its	  importance	  to	  the	  authenticity	  and	  development	  of	  communities	  and	  states	  should	  be	  recognised	  as	  part	  of	  any	  post-­‐Westphalian	  international	  order.”71	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  2010b:	  507.	  70	  Thomas	  2000:	  819.	  71	  Thomas	  2000:	  816.	  
	   31	  
The	  centrality	  of	  the	  living	  tradition:	  MacIntyre	  and	  the	  English	  School	  
	  Rather	   than	   settling	   with	   the	   Westphalian	   presumption	   and	   its	   version	   of	   de-­‐contextualized	  religion,	  Thomas	  sees	  promise	  in	  the	  historical	  sociology	  of	  the	  early	  English	  School,	  that	  of	  Martin	  Wight,	  Herbert	  Butterfield	  and	  David	  MacKinnon,	  who	  prioritize	   taking	   ”seriously	   the	   impact	   of	   religious	   doctrines,	   cultures	   and	  civilizations	   on	   international	   relations”.72	  These	   scholars	   see	   international	   society	  and	   its	   intersubjective	  sense	  of	  belonging	  between	  states	  as	  having	  emerged	  via	  a	  common	   culture,	  which	  underpinned	  different	   states-­‐systems	   in	   history.	   It	  was	   ”a	  prior	  or	  deeper	  agreement	  among	  states	  …	  necessary	  to	  develop	  rules,	  laws,	  norms,	  or	   institutions	   of	   international	   society.	   In	   other	   words,	   a	   deeper	   understanding	  
[was]	   necessary	   for	   the	   rational	   interest	   of	   states	   to	   foment	   international	  cooperation.” 73 	  This	   deeper	   understanding,	   common	   culture	   or	   underlying	  foundation	  emerges	  out	  of	  cultural	  and	  religious	  contexts	  of	  different	  types	  of	  state-­‐systems.	   ”This	   is	   why	   the	   early	   E[nglish]	   S[chool]	   …	   emphasized	   that	   a	   common	  cultural	   or	   religious	   foundation	   was	   often	   necessary	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   the	  different	  historic	  states	  systems	  or	  international	  societies	  in	  history.”74	  More	  recent	  scholars	   of	   the	   English	   School	   have	   mostly	   abandoned	   the	   question	   of	   religion.	  While	  some	  scholars	  still	  argue	  for	  the	  need	  for	  cultural	  foundations	  of	  international	  society,	   they	   are	   rather	   referring	   to	   a	   common	   cosmopolitan	   culture	   of	   liberal	  modernity.75	  To	   these	   scholars,	   the	   ”resurgence	   of	   religion”	   and	   the	   pluralism	  advocated	  in	  its	  name,	  appears	  more	  as	  a	  challenge	  than	  as	  a	  resource.	  	  	  According	  to	  Thomas,	  the	  Westphalian	  presumption	  indicates	  a	  change	  from	  a	  social	  meaning	   of	   religion	   to	   that	   of	   an	   abstracted	   dogma.	   Rather	   than	   depicting	   a	  historical	   development,	   however,	   this	   presumption	  mythologizes	   the	   privatization	  of	   religion	   and	   the	   secularization	   of	   international	   relations.	   Moreover,	   the	  redefinition	   of	   religion	   during	   this	   time	   period	   was	   a	   necessary	   means	   to	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consolidate	  the	  power	  of	  the	  emerging	  state,	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  and	  analyzed	  as	  such,	  instead	  of	  built	  upon	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  given	  condition.	  The	  exclusion	  of	  religion	  from	   international	   relations,	   Thomas	   argues,	   rests	   upon	   this	   assumption	   that	  religion	  is	  a	  private	  matter.	  Related	  to	  the	  English	  School,	  this	  view	  distorts	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  multitude	  of	  international	  practices,	  norms	  and	  institutions	  are	  rooted	  in	  religious	   traditions	   and	   communities,	   and	   leaves	   the	   international	   resurgence	   of	  religion	   misunderstood.	   Leaving	   the	   Westphalian	   presumption	   at	   work,	   this	  resurgence	   appears	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   international	   secular	   order.	   However,	   by	  questioning	   the	  Westphalian	   presumption	   and	   addressing	   religion	   via	   a	   different	  historical	   sensibility,	   Thomas	   argues	   that	   religion	   is	   better	   understood	   as	   a	   social	  tradition,	  or	  as	  a	  ”living	  tradition”.	  	  	  This	   ”living	   tradition”,	   or	   social	   tradition,	   follows	   on	   from	   the	   work	   of	   Alasdair	  MacIntyre	  and	  the	  view	  that	  human	  actions	  only	  become	  intelligible	  once	  they	  are	  interpreted	   as	   a	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   narrative	   of	   the	   collective	   life	   of	   individuals,	  communities	   and	   states.76	  Values,	   virtues,	   practices	   and	   identities	   are	   expressed	  through	   and	   rooted	   in	   the	   culture,	   tradition	   and	   history	   of	   the	   particular	  communities	   in	  which	   they	  are	  embedded.	  Thus,	  practices	  of	  warfare	  or	  statecraft	  can	   only	   be	   understood	   if	   one	   takes	   into	   account	   the	   larger	   context	  within	  which	  they	   took	   place.	   According	   to	   Thomas,	   before	   Westphalia,	   this	   context	   was	  Christendom,	   and	   the	   practices	   of	   international	   relations	   –	   war	   and	   diplomacy	   –	  were	   embedded	   in	   the	   wider	   religious	   and	   cultural	   traditions	   of	   Christendom.	  Between	   the	   15th	   and	   17th	   century,	   these	   practices	   became	   detached	   from	   the	  Christian	  traditions,	  ”Christendom	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  invention	  of	  religion,	  and	  religion	  came	  under	  the	  modern	  state’s	  power	  and	  discipline.”77	  The	  international	  practices	  were	  detached	  from	  Christianity	  as	  a	  social	  tradition,	  and	  were	  reduced	  to	  rules	  and	  further	   codified	   by	   the	   merging	   idea	   of	   international	   law.	   Thomas’s	   MacIntyrean	  reading	   of	   this	   process	   argues	   that	   this	   reduction	   of	   the	   thick	   practices	   of	  international	  relations	  –	  those	  embedded	  in	  the	  social	  traditions	  of	  ”world	  religions,	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cultures	  and	  civilizations”	  –	   to	   thin	  practices	  of	  procedural	   rules	  has	   ”undermined	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  social	  bond	  that	  made	  them	  binding	  in	  international	  society”	  in	  the	  first	  place.78	  By	  detaching	  rules	  from	  practices	  and	  the	  practice	  communities	  out	  of	  which	  they	  grew,	  ”the	  debates	  on	  just	  war,	  arms	  races,	  or	  humanitarian	  intervention	  have	   become	   incommensurable	   not	   only	  within	   the	  Western	   societies,	   but	   among	  Western	  and	  non-­‐western	  countries	  as	  well.”79	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  for	  religion.	  The	  reduction	  of	  religion	  from	  its	  social	  meaning	  as	  a	  ”living	  tradition”	  to	  an	  abstracted	  and	   static	   dogma	   or	   set	   of	   beliefs	   has	   rendered	   religion	   private,	   and	   as	   such	  necessarily	  excluded	  from	  the	  realm	  of	   international	  relations.	   Instead	  of	  adopting	  the	  Westphalian	  presumption	  and	  excluding	  religion	  from	  IR,	  Thomas	  argues	  for	  a	  re-­‐reading	   of	   these	   historiographical	   accounts,	   which	   would	   enable	   scholars	   and	  practitioners	   alike	   to	   take	   religion	   “seriously”.	   ”Taking	   religious	   and	   cultural	  pluralism	   seriously	   means	   identifying	   those	   practices	   of	   particular	   religions	   and	  cultural	  traditions	  …	  cultivating	  and	  supporting	  them.”80	  	  
	  
Taking	  religion	  seriously:	  Affirmation,	  restoration	  and	  recognition	  
	  Thomas	   argues	   for	   the	   need	   to	   contextualize	   the	   basis	   upon	   which	   religion	   was	  excluded	   from	   international	   relations,	  namely	   the	   ”Westphalian	  presumption”	  and	  continues	   to	   argue	   that	   religion	   needs	   to	   be	   ”taken	   seriously”	   in	   world	   politics.	  However,	  one	  might	  object,	   if	   religion	   is	  not	  a	  set	  of	  doctrines,	  as	   the	  Westphalian	  presumption	  claimed,	  what	   is	   it	   then?	  The	  first	  hint	   in	  this	  direction	  was	  given	  via	  MacIntyre’s	  framing	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  social	  and	  a	  ”living”	  tradition,	  one	  that	  evolves	  and	  changes	  with	  the	  community	  within	  which	  it	  is	  embedded.	  However,	  if	  religion	  is	   ”living”	   and	   changing	  with	   its	   context,	  what,	   precisely,	   is	   to	   be	   taken	   seriously?	  Once	  Thomas	  detaches	   the	  meaning	  of	  religion	   from	  the	  stable	  core	  of	  dogma	  and	  doctrine	  and	  ties	  the	  definition	  of	  religion	  to	  the	  changing	  life	  of	  the	  community,	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  understand	  what	  he	  wishes	  to	  have	  recognized.	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  In	  the	  end,	  Thomas’	  argument	  that	  we	  should	  ”take	  religion	  seriously”	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  an	  argument	  against	  the	  necessity	  –	  and	  possibility	  –	  of	  a	  public	  sphere	  with	  individuals	   detached	   from	   their	   ”cultural	   and	   religious”	   convictions.	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	   it	   is	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  religion,	  the	  religious	  communities	  –	  “faith	  communities”	  –	  and	  the	  organization	  that	  embodies	  them.	  Thomas	  illustrates	  the	   different	   segments	   of	   world	   politics	   where	   religion	   already	   plays	   a	   role	   –	  democracy	   promotion,	   economic	   development,	   international	   cooperation,	  diplomacy,	   peace	   building	   –	   and	   lists	   organizations	   that	   embody	   this	   embedded	  understanding	   of	   religion	   –	   Catholic	   Relief	   Services,	   World	   Vision,	   Christian	   Aid,	  Fatayat	   (The	   association	   of	   young	   Islamic	   women),	   the	   Women’s	   Welfare	  Association	  	  (Indonesia),	  Sarvodaya	  Shramadana	  Movement	  (Sri	  Lanka),	  and	  Sarkan	  Zoumountsi	  Association	  (Cameroon).	  He	  sees	  this	  embodied	  and	  embedded	  religion	  in	   the	   United	   Nations,	   or	   at	   the	   tables	   of	   the	   Organization	   for	   Security	   and	  Cooperation	  in	  Europe	  (OSCE).	  Thomas	  wants	  “religion”	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  a	  multitrack	  diplomacy,	   assuming	   its	   role	   next	   to	   governments,	   NGOs	   and	   professional	  organizations,	   business	   communities,	   research	   institutions	   et	   cetera.	   	   In	   taking	  religion	  seriously,	  Thomas	  argues	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  religious	  communities	  at	  the	  deliberation	   table	   of	   international	   organizations,	   in	   fora	   for	   international	   conflict	  solution,	  diplomacy	  and	  democracy	  building.81	  	  This	   position,	   however,	   carries	   with	   it	   a	   range	   of	   problems.	   First,	   as	   Rogers	  Brubaker	  has	  argued,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  care	  taken	  when	  using	  self-­‐description	  of	   groups	   and	   their	   leaders’	   distinguishing	   characteristics.	   The	   groups	  and	  their	  elites	  belong	  to	  the	  empirical	  data	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  analytical	  toolkit.	  	  “We	  must,	   of	   course,	   take	   vernacular	   categories	   and	   participants’	   understandings	  seriously,	  for	  they	  are	  partly	  constitutive	  of	  our	  object	  of	  study.	  However,	  we	  should	  not	  uncritically	  adopt	  categories	  of	  ethnopolitical	  practice	  as	  our	  categories	  of	  social	  
analysis	   …	   participant’s	   accounts	  …	   often	   have	  what	   Pierre	   Bourdieu	   has	   called	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Thomas	  2005:	  176-­‐196.	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performative	  character.	  By	  invoking	  groups,	  they	  seek	  to	  evoke	  them,	  summon	  them,	  call	  them	  into	  being.	  …	  Reification	  is	  a	  social	  process,	  not	  simply	  an	  intellectual	  bad	  habit.	  …	  To	  criticize	  ethnopolitical	  entrepreneurs	   for	   reifying	  ethnic	  groups	  would	  be	   a	   kind	   of	   category	   mistake.	   Reifying	   groups	   is	   precisely	   what	   ethnopolitical	  entrepreneurs	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  doing.	  …	  As	  analysts,	  we	  should	  certainly	  try	  to	  
account	   for	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   –	   and	   conditions	   under	   which	   –	   this	   practice	   of	  reification	   …	   can	   work.	   However,	   we	   should	   avoid	   unintentionally	   doubling	   or	  
reinforcing	   the	   reification	   of	   ethnic	   groups	   in	   ethnopolitical	   practice	   with	   a	  reification	  of	  such	  groups	  in	  social	  analysis.”82	  	  The	   language	   of	   elite	   participants	   in	   international	   organizations	   –	   so	   called	   “first	  level”	   language	   –	   should	   not	   be	   abstracted	   up	   to	   the	   level	   of	   analysis,	   since	   the	  partisans	   have	   the	   task	   of	  mobilization	   and,	   using	   the	   language	   accordingly,	   they	  will	  seek	  to	  “evoke	  what	  they	  invoke”.	  Abstracting	  the	  language	  of	  practitioners	  and	  elites	   to	   the	   language	   of	   analysis	   legitimizes	   the	   claim	   to	   representation	   by	   these	  practitioners	  and	  elites.	   It	  confirms	  the	  authority	  over	  religion	  by	  those	  who	  claim	  to	  represent	  it.	  If	  this	  religion	  –	  that	  of	  the	  groups	  and	  their	  elites	  –	  is	  what	  Thomas	  wants	  to	  have	  ”taken	  seriously,”	   then	  his	  model	  reinstates	  the	  power	  structures	  of	  those	   communities	   who	   claim	   to	   be	   religious	   and	   the	   elites	   within	   these	  communities	   who	   claim	   to	   represent	   them.	   How	   are	   the	   “living	   traditions”	   of	  religious	   communities	   and	   traditions	   supposed	   to	   stay	   “alive”	   if	   they	   are	   (only)	  recognized	  in	  the	  form	  in	  which	  their	  elites	  represent	  them?	  	  Aside	   from	   the	   question	   of	   the	   reification	   of	   the	   communities’	   elites’	   definition	   of	  religion,	   another	   problem	   arises	  with	   regard	   to	   Thomas’	   attempt	   to	   have	   religion	  recognized	  in	  IR	  and	  the	  fora	  of	  international	  relations.	  That	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	   take	   something	   seriously	   that	   one	   has	   rendered	   contingent?	   How	   to	   grasp	   the	  moving	  vehicle	  of	  a	  “living	  tradition”?	  If	  religion,	  the	  very	  thing	  Thomas	  wants	  us	  to	  ”take	   seriously,”	   is	   tied	   to	   the	   communities	   within	   which	   it	   resides,	   we	   will	   take	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  	  Brubaker:	  2004:	  9f;	  For	   the	   relation	  between	  practical	  knowledge	  and	   theory	   in	   IR	   see:	  Guzzini	  2013:	  528ff.	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something	  else	  seriously	  on	  every	  occasion.	  The	  contingency	  of	  Thomas’	  definition	  of	   that	  which	  he	  wants	   IR	   to	   take	   seriously	   seems	   to	  undermine	  his	  own	  venture.	  Alternatively,	   it	   forces	   us	   to	   ”take	   seriously”	   the	   claims	   to	   authority	   and	  representation	  by	  those	  who	  can	  and	  have	  already	  exercised	  authority	  and	  engaged	  in	  representation,	  those	  who	  are	  already	  recognizable	  in	  their	  claim	  to	  religion,	  that	  is	  most	  commonly,	  the	  communal	  elites.	  Or,	  it	  invests	  the	  IR	  scholar	  him-­‐	  or	  herself	  with	  the	  power	  to	  define	  what	  religion	  ”is”,	  a	  definitional	  task	  that	  is	  one	  of	  theology,	  and	  not	  social	  or	  political	  science.	  	  While	  Thomas	  emphasizes	  the	  constantly	  changing	  nature	  of	  these	  communities	  –	  as	  ‘living	   traditions’	   –	   I	   argue	   that	   when	   these	   ‘living	   traditions’	   are	   recognized	   as	  agents	   within	   international	   relations,	   their	   particular	   version	   of	   religion	   is	  authorized	   and	   thereby	   reified.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   arguments	   for	   recognition	   of	  religious	   communities	   and	   traditions	   in	   international	   relations	   are	   preventing	   the	  “living	  tradition”	   from	  staying	  “alive”.	   	  The	  argument	   for	  recognizing	  religion	   in	  IR	  carries	  a	  reifying	  power,	  and	  Thomas	  lacks	  a	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  to	  this	  process.	  
	  
Habermasian	  Critical	  Theory:	  Mariano	  Barbato	  and	  post-­‐secular	  international	  
relations	  	  Mariano	  Barbato	   is	  also	  critical	  of	   the	  way	   in	  which	  religion	  has	  been	  sidelined	   in	  international	  relations.	  Categorically	  excluding	  religion	  misses	  out	  on	  its	  potential	  to	  provide	  new	  perspectives	   and	   insights	  onto	   international	  problems.	  This	   could	  be	  tapped	   into	   through	   the	   channels	   of	   Jürgen	   Habermas’	   post-­‐secular	   society.	  Accordingly,	  the	  semantic	  figures	  of	  religious	  communities	  “harbor	  concepts	  of	  the	  self,	  community	  and	  agency	  beyond	  class	  [or]	  state”	  and	  might	  help	  to	  “find	  figures	  of	   thought”	   for	   new	   solutions	   and	   approaches	   to	   world	   politics.83 	  “For	   global	  community	  these	  semantics	  are	  rather	  rare.	  Religious	  semantics	  offer	  resources	  for	  fueling	  deliberation	  processes	  with	  notions	  of	  arguing	  beyond	  narrow	  concepts	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Barbato	  2010a:	  554f.	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self-­‐interest	   and	   for	   imagining	   a	   new	   community	   beyond	   the	   given	   ones”. 84	  Recognizing	  religion	  in	  IR,	  therefore,	  would	  enable	  the	  discipline	  to	  address	  issues	  of	   international	   community	   and	   the	   development	   of	   global	   social	   bonds	   in	   a	  different	  manner,	  which	  he	  sees	  as	  particularly	  crucial	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  expanding	  economic	  rationale	  of	  self-­‐interest	  currently	  undermining	  wider	  prospects	  of	  global	  community.85	  Religious	  semantics	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  able	  to	  “improve	  a	  political	  culture	  which	  struggles	   to	  defend	   its	  secular	  concepts	  of	   justice	  against	   the	  pathologies	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	  modernisation	  and	  globalisation”86,	  while	  “old	  representations”	  of	  world	  politics	  lack	  these	  conceptual	  resources	  for	  “developing	  alternatives	  to	  the	  present	  impasses”.87	  	  	  Barbato’s	  Habermasian	  post-­‐secular	  account	  argues	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  religion	  in	  international	  relations	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  manner.	  ”Post-­‐secular	  emancipation,	  as	  I	  would	   like	   to	   term	   the	   project,	   argues	   that	   a	   liberal	   society	   must	   allow	   religious	  citizens	   the	   right	   to	   bring	   their	   arguments	   forward	   from	   a	   religiously	   informed	  perspective	   and	   even	   in	   a	   religious	   language.	   In	   the	   perspective	   of	   an	   emerging	  global	   public	   where	   a	   religious	   majority	   is	   here	   to	   stay,	   this	   post-­‐secular	  emancipation	  of	   the	   religious	  masses	   from	   the	   secular	   elite	   is	   pretty	  much	   in	   line	  with	   Hegel’s	   struggle	   for	   recognition.” 88 	  Barbato’s	   attempt	   to	   have	   religion	  recognized	  in	  IR	  argues	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  Habermasian	  post-­‐secular	  society.	  In	  order	  to	  analyze	  this	  account	  in	  detail,	  therefore,	  I	  will	  continue	  with	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  Habermas’	  own	  writings,	  since	   it	  allows	  me	  to	  engage	   in	  greater	  detail	  with	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  of	  this	  post-­‐secular	  account.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Barbato	  2010a:	  552.	  85	  “Habermas’s	  interest	  in	  the	  moral	  sense	  of	  religious	  communities	  is	  derived	  from	  his	  recognition	  of	  the	  poverty	  of	   the	  secular	  discourse,	  which	   in	   its	  neo-­‐liberal	  and	  naturalistic	   form	  has	  engendered	  the	  diagnosed	  pathologies	  but	  which	  nevertheless	  provides	   insufficient	  resources	  for	  counteracting	  its	  derailments”	  (Barbato/Kratochwil	  2009:12,	  see	  also	  Barbato	  2010a:458ff).	  86	  Barbato	  2010a:	  549.	  87	  Barbato/Kratochwil	  2009:	  324.	  88	  Barbato	  2010a:	  549.	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The	  Habermasian	  post-­‐secular	  society	  
	  As	   one	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	   contemporary	   liberal	   theorists,	   Jürgen	   Habermas	  begins	   his	   work	   on	   post-­‐secularism	   by	   developing	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   self-­‐reflection	   within	   political	   liberalism	   regarding	   its	   dependency	   on	   a	   particular	  version	  of	  secular	  reason,	  and	  the	   following	  categorical	  exclusion	  of	  religion.	  After	  developing	  this	  critique,	  he	  suggests	  an	  alternative,	  “postsecular”,	  account,	  in	  which	  the	  “unexhausted	  semantic	  resource”	  of	  religion	  and	  the	  truth	  potential	  of	  religious	  arguments	   are	   not,	   a	   priori,	   ruled	   out	   of	   public	   discourse.89	  Habermas’	   account	   of	  the	  postsecular	  society	  is	  therefore	  not	  only	  an	  account	  of	  a	  broader	  inclusive	  public	  sphere	   where	   religious	   arguments	   “count”,	   but	   is	   an	   argument	   for	   the	   particular	  inclusion	   of	   religion	   on	   epistemological	   grounds,	   since	   religion,	   per	   Habermas,	   is	  able	   to	   keep	   knowledge	   “hermeneutically	   vibrant”	   that	   “would	   have	   been	   lost	  elsewhere”.90	  	  	  In	  what	   follows,	   I	   argue	   that	   there	   is	  a	  distinctive	  productive	  power	   in	  Habermas’	  argument	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   religion,	   and	   that	   he	   “makes”	   religion	   through	  arguing	  for	  its	  recognition.	  I	  will	  investigate	  the	  Habermas’	  ontological	  assumptions	  regarding	   religion,	   that	   is,	   I	   look	   at	   the	   kind	   of	   religion	  Habermas	   constructs	   and	  what	  he	  envisions	  entering	  the	  public	  sphere	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  “religion”.	  I	  point	  out	   that	  Habermas’	  vision	  of	   religion	   is	   restricted	   to	  a	  particular	   “Judeo-­‐Christian”	  variant,	   or	   those	   versions	   thereof	   that	   embrace	   the	   egalitarian,	   individualistic,	  universal	  ethics	  emerging	  out	  of	  this	  “Judeo-­‐Christian”	  tradition.	  Concluding,	  I	  shall	  suggest	  that	  Habermas’s	  critique	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  self-­‐reflection	  on	  the	  limits	  of	  secular	  philosophy	  and	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  exclusionary	  tendencies	  in	  secular	  political	  theory	  do	  not	  need	  to	  amount	  to	  a	  positive	  recognition	  of	  religion	  in	  public	  life.	  The	  issue	  is	  more	  fruitfully	  addressed	  through	  a	  different	  take	  on	  the	  remedies	  of	  exclusion,	  one	  which	  will	  be	  analyzed	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  postsecular	  see	  Joas	  2008a:	  107;	  2008b.	  90	  Habermas	  2008:	  110;	  henceforth	  only	  referred	  to	  in	  page	  number.	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In	  2001,	  Habermas	  gave	  a	  speech	  on	  Faith	  and	  Knowledge	  during	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  Peace	  Prize	  of	  the	  German	  Book	  Trade.	  He	  was	  reacting	  to	  the	  events	  following	  the	  9/11	   attacks	   in	   New	   York,	   and	   the	   growing	   fear	   of	   radicalization	   of	   partisan	  positions	   at	   either	   end	   of	   the	   secular-­‐religion	   spectrum.	   In	   his	   essay	   collection	  
Zwischen	  Naturalism	  und	  Religion	   (Between	   Naturalism	   and	   Religion),	   in	   2005	   he	  broadened	   this	   thematic	   into	   a	   more	   general	   diagnosis	   of	   a	   problematic	  development	  in	  contemporary	  liberal	  democratic	  societies,	  namely	  the	  withering	  of	  social	   solidarity	   and	   civic	   integration.	  Habermas	   identified	  how	   the	   social	  bond	  of	  liberal	   democratic	   societies	  was	   eroding	   and	  was	   being	   replaced	   by	   growing	   self-­‐reference,	   individual	   preferences	   and	   polarization,	   all	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   ever-­‐expanding	  logic,	  language	  and	  imperative	  of	  the	  market.	  He	  addressed	  this	  problem	  of	  disintegration	  and	  deteriorating	  solidarity	  through	  the	  critical	  examination	  of	  one	  set	  of	  polarized	  positions:	  those	  of	  the	  religious	  and	  the	  secular.	  	  	  The	   broader	   Habermasian	   vision	   of	   democratic	   society	   builds	   upon	   an	  understanding	   of	   a	   pre-­‐existing	   social	   solidarity	   between	   the	   citizens.	   The	   latter	  engage	   with	   each	   other	   in	   public	   discourse,	   in	   order	   to	   deliberate	   about	   the	  foundations	   and	   structures	   of	   their	   common	   existence,	   and,	   ideally,	   agree	   upon	  consensually	  accepted	  norms.	  It	  is	  a	  constant	  process	  of	  deliberation,	  whereby	  each	  citizen	  disposes	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  present	  and	  the	  obligation	  to	  justify	  his	  or	  her	  arguments	   in	   a	   so-­‐called	   ”ideal	   speech	   situation,”	   free	   from	   asymmetric	   coercive	  power	   and	   systematic	   distortion	   of	   communication,	   leaving	   only	   the	   “unforced	  force”	  of	  the	  “better	  argument”.91	  	  	  This	   arena	   for	   deliberation	   is	   dependent	   upon	   an	   attitude	   that	   enables	   solidarity	  between	   its	  members	   in	   order	   to	   prosper.	   It	   is	   an	   attitude	   that	   cannot	   be	   legally	  enforced	  by	  the	  liberal-­‐democratic	  state,	  but	  which	  the	  state	  needs	  to	  assume	  to	  be	  a	  product	  of	  a	  historical	   learning	  process.	   It	   is	  an	  attitude	  ”osmotically	  open	  at	  both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Habermas	  1984:	  171ff.	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ends”,	  which	  yields	  a	  willingness	   to	  alter	  one’s	  original	  position.92	  It	   is,	   further,	  an	  attitude	   that	   acknowledges	   the	   equality	   and	   freedom	   of	   one’s	   fellow	   citizens,	   and	  which	  self-­‐critically	  recognizes	  that	  one’s	  own	  truth	  may	  not	  be	  the	  truth	  of	  others.	  This	  attitude,	  upon	  which	  solidarity	  depends,	  is	  undermined	  in	  the	  secularist	  public	  sphere	  where	  religious	  arguments,	  reasons	  and	  agents	  are	  labeled	  as	  irrational,	  and	  as	   such	   rejected	   as	   illegitimate	   in	   public	   discourse.	   While	   Habermas	   defends	   the	  exclusivity	   of	   nonreligious	   reasoning	   in	   the	   “formal	   public	   sphere”,	   i.e.	   at	   the	  institutional	   level	   of	   parliament,	   court	   and	   public	   administration,	   he	   argues	   for	  eliminating	  this	  exclusiveness	  in	  the	  “informal	  public	  sphere”.93	  	  	  In	   this	   more	   recent	   critique	   of	   the	   “secularist”	   exclusion	   of	   religion	   in	   informal	  public	  deliberation,	  Habermas	  argues	  for	  a	  deepening	  of	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  being	  at	  the	  very	   heart	   of	   liberal	   modernity,	   namely	   the	   capacity	   for	   self-­‐reflection	   and	   self-­‐criticism.	  His	  postsecular	  account	  prescribes	  a	  ”self-­‐reflexive	  overcoming	  of	  a	  rigid	  and	   exclusivist	   secular	   self-­‐understanding	   of	   modernity.“94	  This	   ”presupposes	   an	  epistemic	   mindset	   that	   is	   the	   result	   of	   a	   self-­‐critical	   assessment	   of	   the	   limits	   of	  secular	   reason.“95	  Habermas	   challenges	   secular	   thinking	   to	   reflect	   upon	   its	   own	  limits	  and	  to	  review	  its	  claim	  to	  neutrality.	  Part	  of	  the	  exclusion	  of	  religion	  from	  the	  public	   sphere	   and	   its	   arenas	   of	   deliberation	   builds	   upon	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	  secular	   is	   equivalent	  with	   the	   neutral,	   and	   that	   religion	   is	   necessarily	   partisan	   in	  nature.	   However,	   Habermas	   states,	   ”[t]he	   neutrality	   of	   state	   power	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  different	  worldviews,	  which	  guarantees	  equal	  individual	   liberties	  for	  all	  citizens,	   is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  political	  generalization	  of	  a	  secularized	  worldview.“96	  Rather,	  secular	   philosophy	   and	  political	   theory,	   in	   their	  Hellenic	   roots,	  must	   deepen	   their	  respective	   understandings	   of	   their	   shared	   history	   and	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   they	  mutually	   shaped	   and	   were	   shaped	   by	   early	   Christian	   thought. 97 	  Secularist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Habermas	  2001:	  15,	  my	  translation;	  Cf.,	  1981,	  vol.	  1:	  385ff.	  93	  Habermas	  2010:	  130.	  94	  Habermas	  2008:	  138.	  95	  Habermas	  2008:	  139f.	  96	  Habermas	  2008:	  113.	  97	  Habermas	  2008:	  110f,	  for	  a	  different	  reading	  see	  Osiander	  2000.	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arguments	   for	   the	   exclusion	   of	   religion	   must	   understand	   their	   own	   dependence	  upon	  the	  traditions	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  silence.	  As	  the	  ”major	  world	  religions	  belong	  to	   the	   history	   of	   reason	   itself	   (…)	   (p)ost-­‐metaphysical	   thinking	   misunderstands	  itself	   if	   it	   fails	   to	   include	   the	   religious	   traditions	  alongside	  metaphysics	   in	   its	  own	  genealogy.“98	  In	   excluding	   religion	   from	   the	   fora	   of	   public	   deliberation,	   “secular	  society	  would	   ...	   cut	   itself	   off	   from	  key	   resources	   for	   the	   creation	   of	  meaning	   and	  identity.“99	  	  	  In	   the	  normative	  argument	  outlined	  above,	  Habermas	  claims	   that	   the	  exclusion	  of	  religion	  from	  public	  deliberative	  fora	  furthers	  a	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  polity	  and	  undermines	   social	   solidarity.	   It	   is,	   however,	   not	   only	   on	   grounds	  of	   inclusion	   that	  religion	  ought	  to	  be	  acknowledged.	  “Philosophy	  ...[also]	  has	  good	  reasons	  to	  be	  open	  to	   learning	   from	  religious	  traditions.“100	  Habermas	  does	  not	  only	  challenge	  secular	  thinking	  to	  engage	  in	  deeper	  self-­‐reflection	  and	  criticize	  the	  exclusion	  of	  religion;	  he	  also	   emphasizes	   that	   religions	   could	   contribute	   positively	   to	   secular	   thought.	  Therefore,	   religion	   should	   not	   only	   be	   acknowledged	   due	   to	   the	   value	   of	   more	  perspectives	  on	  truth,	  but	  also	  on	  epistemological	  	  grounds.	  	  	  Secular	   reason	   needs	   to	   be	   enriched	   for	   two	   different	   reasons:	   First,	   Habermas	  points	   to	   the	   ”motivational	  weakness	   of	   rational	  morality	   [which]	   does	   not	   foster	  any	   impulses	   towards	   solidarity,	   that	   is,	   towards	   morally	   guided,	   collective	  action”.101	  Further,	  he	  points	  out	  the	  inability	  of	  pure	  practical	  reason	  to	  answer	  up	  to	   “a	   modernization	   spinning	   out	   of	   control	   armed	   solely	   with	   the	   insights	   of	   a	  theory	  of	  justice.	  The	  latter	  lacks	  the	  creativity	  of	  linguistic	  world-­‐disclosure	  that	  a	  normative	   consciousness	   afflicted	   with	   accelerating	   decline	   requires	   in	   order	   to	  regenerate	   itself.“102 	  Secular	   reason	   is,	   in	   other	   words,	   insufficient	   to	   provide	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Habermas	  2008:	  6.	  99	  Habermas	  2008:	  131;	  see	  also	  Habermas	  2001:	  22.	  100	  Habermas	  2008:	  109.	  101	  Habermas:	   2010:	   74f;	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   liberal	   democracies	   do	   not	   develop	   their	   own,	  rational,	  forms	  of	  solidarity	  or	  morality,	  both	  evolving	  out	  of	  the	  deliberative	  process,	  but	  somehow	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  enough.	  102	  Habermas	  2008:	  211.	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solutions	   to	   the	   spread	  of	   the	   imperatives	  of	   the	  market,	   a	  modernization	  moving	  	  “out	  of	  control”,	  and	  the	  disintegration	  that	  will	  follow.	  	  Here,	   Habermas	   introduces	   his	   epistemological	   argument	   about	   religion	   in	   public	  discourse.	   According	   to	   this	   argument,	   religious	   traditions	   carry	   a	   “semantic	  potential”103	  and	   ”a	   special	   power	   to	   articulate	   moral	   intuitions“	   which	   makes	  “religious	  speech	  into	  a	  serious	  vehicle	  for	  possible	  truth	  contents“.104	  In	  which	  way	  does	   religion	   carry	   these	   semantic	   potentials	   that	   qualifies	   as	   worthy	   of	   a	  recognition	  different	  than	  that	  of	  other	  sources	  of	  knowledge?	  What	  makes	  religion	  different?	  It	  is	  useful	  to	  quote	  Habermas	  at	  length:	  	  	  “Holy	   scriptures	   and	   religious	   traditions	   ...	   have	   articulated	   intuitions	   concerning	  transgression	   and	   salvation	   and	   the	   redemption	   of	   lives	   experienced	   as	   hopeless,	  keeping	   them	   hermeneutically	   vibrant	   by	   skillfully	   working	   out	   their	   implications	  over	   centuries.	   This	   is	   why	   religious	   communities,	   provided	   that	   they	   eschew	  dogmatism	   and	   respect	   freedom	   of	   conscience,	   can	  preserve	   intact	   something	   that	  
has	   been	   lost	   elsewhere	   and	   cannot	   be	   recovered	   through	   the	   professional	  knowledge	  of	  experts	  alone.	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  sufficiently	  differentiated	  expressions	  of	  and	   sensitivity	   to	   squandered	   lives,	   social	   pathologies,	   failed	   existences,	   and	  deformed	  and	  distorted	  social	  relations.	  A	  willingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  philosophy	  to	  
learn	   from	   religion	   can	   be	   justified	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   asymmetry	   of	   epistemic	  claims,	  not	  just	  for	  functional	  but	  ...	  also	  for	  substantive	  reasons.“105	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  religion	  carries	  a	  semantic	  potential	  for	  secular	  thought,	  because	  it	  has	   kept	   something	   “hermeneutically	   vibrant“	   and	   “intact“	   that	  would	   “otherwise	  have	   been	   lost	   elsewhere”	   and	   should,	   on	   “substantive”	   grounds,	   not	   be	   excluded	  from	  public	  discourse.106	  What	  does	  this	  claim	  about	  the	  contribution	  of	  religion	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Habermas	  2008:	  142.	  104	  Habermas	  2008:	  131.	  105	  Habermas	  2008:	  110	  my	  italics.	  106	  The	  possibilities	  and	  problems	  of	  the	  translation	  of	  this	  religious	  knowledge	  into	  secular	  language	  in	  order	  to	  be	  understood	  by	  those	  outside	  of	  the	  religious	  community	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  length	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secular	   discourse	   presuppose?	   In	   the	   following	   section,	   I	   will	   try	   to	   answer	   this	  question,	   and	   will	   show	   why	   this	   epistemological	   recognition	   of	   religion	   is	  problematic.	  
	  
Bound	  by	  recognition	  and	  the	  “making	  of”	  religion	  
	  Per	   Habermas,	   religion	   carries	   a	   semantic	   potential	   and	   could	   enrich	   secular	  thought	   epistemologically.	   This	   is	   possible	   because	   religious	   knowledge	   has	   been	  kept	  “hermeneutically	  vibrant“	  –	  or	  “awake”,	  as	  it	  were,	  in	  the	  German	  original	  –	  and	  has	  thus	  kept	  knowledge	  alive	  that	  would	  have	  been	  lost	  elsewhere.	  Philosophy	  and	  political	  theory	  ought	  to	  stay	  open	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  knowledge,	  not	  only	  for	  functional	  reasons	  or	  for	  reasons	  of	  just	  representation	  in	  public	  discourse,	  but	  for	  substantive	  reasons.	  	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  shall	  point	  to	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  in	  Habermas’	  epistemological	  argument:	  I	  will	  describe	  the	  productive	  power	  of	  his	  argument	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  religion,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Habermas	  constructs	  –	  “makes”	  –	  religion	  by	  arguing	  for	   its	   recognition.	   Thereafter,	   I	   examine	   what	   kind	   of	   religion	   Habermas	   has	   in	  mind,	   and	   conclude	   that	   his	   understanding	   of	   religion	   is	   limited	   to	   a	   “Judeo-­‐Christian”	   version,	   or	   those	   forms	   of	   religion	   that	   embrace	   the	   egalitarian,	  individualist	  universal	  ethics	  emerging	  from	  this	  “Judeo-­‐Christian”	  tradition.	  
	  As	   Habermas	   argues	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   religion,	   he	   is	   not	   reflecting	   upon	   the	  constitutive,	  that	  is,	  the	  constructive	  or	  productive,	  power	  in	  his	  arguments.	  Patchen	  Markell	  has	  argued	  for	  a	  stronger	  visibility	  of	  the	  productive	  powers	  of	  recognition.	  He	  writes:	  ”’Recognition’	  is	  sometimes	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  successful	  cognition	  of	  an	  already-­‐existing	   thing,	   but	   [it	   also	   refers]	   to	   the	   constructive	   act	   through	   which	  recognition’s	   very	   object	   is	   shaped	   or	   brought	   into	   being	  …	   recognition	   does	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  by	  others	  (Barbato	  2010a;	  Cooke	  2011;	  Lafont	  2007,	  2009).	  Before	  the	  possibility	  or	  impossibility	  of	  translation	  can	  be	  discussed	  however	  –	  how	  religion	  can	  contribute	  to	  secular	  discourse–	  we	  need	  to	  discuss	  what	  this	  contribution	  presupposes.	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simply	   know	   its	   objects	   but	   makes	   them”.107	  Recognizing	   religion	   in	   the	   public	  sphere	  does	  not	  simply	  empower	  it,	  it	  does	  not	  merely	  remove	  it	  from	  the	  vault	  that	  is	  our	  private	  life;	  it	  also	  fixates	  that	  which	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  religion.	  It	  draws	  boundaries	   around	   that	   which	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   recognized	   under	   the	   label	   of	  religion.	  As	  I	  will	  show,	  Habermas	  recognizes	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  religion,	  one	  that	  fits	  his	  requirements	  for	  a	  liberal,	  deliberative	  democracy.	  	  	  However,	   recognition	   is	   not	   simply	   productive;	   it	   is	   also	   has	   a	   reproductive	  momentum.	  Only	  those	  subjects	  are	  recognized	  that	  are,	  previous	  to	  the	  recognition,	  
recognizable.	   Markell	   writes	   that	   ”by	   making	   the	   …	   institutionalization	   of	   rights	  dependent	  upon	  one’s	  recognizability	  as	  the	  bearer	  of	  an	  identity,	  the	  politics	  of	  …	  recognition	  risks	  subjecting	  the	  very	  people	  whose	  agency	  it	  strived	  to	  enhance”.108	  Recognition	  binds	  those	  whose	  subjectivity	  it	  aims	  to	  empower	  more	  closely	  to	  who	  they	   “are”,	   that	   is,	   to	   the	   categories	   and	   characteristics	   by	   which	   they	   are	  recognized.	  Recognizability	  comes	  before	  recognition.	   If	   religion	   is	   recognized,	   the	  distribution	  of	  rights,	  resources,	  or	  political	  access	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  recognizability	  of	  a	  group	   as	   religious.	   This	   recognizability	   is	   dependent	   upon	   what	   is	   currently	  ”seen”.109	  It	  is	  dependent	  upon	  whom	  the	  prevailing	  power	  structures	  or	  epistemic	  frameworks	   promote	   into	   a	   position	   from	   whence	   they	   can	   claim	   to	   be	   the	  representatives	  of	  religion.	  The	  consequence	  is	  that	  existing	  forms	  are	  maintained;	  powerful	  groups	  are	  recognized	  as	  ”authentic”	  representatives	  for	  legal	  or	  political	  purposes,	  and	  their	  status	  thereby	  reinforced.	  In	  this	  sense	  recognizing	  religion	  has	  a	  reproductive	  momentum.	  	  In	   other	   words,	   recognizing	   religion	   has	   a	   productive	   and	   reproductive	   power,	  neither	  of	  which	  are	  discussed	  by	  Habermas.	  There	   is	  no	  critical	  or	  genealogically	  informed	   perspective	   displayed	   within	   Habermas’	   postsecular	   account	   regarding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Markell	  2000:	  496;	  See	  also	  Thomassen	  2011.	  108	  Markell	  2003:	  175.	  109	  Bartelson	   points	   to	   a	   similar	   problematic	   of	   recognition,	   presupposing	   an	   identification	   of	   the	  actor	   to	  be	   recognized,	  distinguishing	  between	   those	  who	  are	   to	  be	   recognized	  and	   those	  who	  are	  not.	  However,	   he	  does	  not	  point	   to	   the	   conservative	  momentum	  of	   this	  presupposition.	   (Bartelson	  2013:	  121).	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religion.	   Besides	   lacking	   a	   genealogical	   sensitivity,	   Habermas,	   further,	   does	   not	  address	  the	  performative	  aspect	  of	  the	  term	  “religion”.	  This	  means	  he	  lacks	  a	  way	  to	  assess	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  particular	  meaning	  of	  religion.	  He	  ignores	  the	  question	  of	  who	  is	  empowered	  by	  this	  version	  of	  religion	  and	  who	  is	  not.	  He	  does	  not	  attend	  to	   the	   question	   of	   what	   arguments	   gain	   legitimacy,	   or	   are	   seen	   as	   inevitable.	   He	  takes	   the	   term	   for	   granted,	   and	   therefore	   misses	   out	   on	   the	   politics	   deeply	  interwoven	  into	  the	  term.	  	  	  Markell’s	   point	   raises	   important	   questions:	   What	   does	   Habermas	   imagine	   to	   fall	  within	   the	   category	  of	   religion?	  Which	   type	  of	   religion	  does	  Habermas	  want	  us	   to	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of?	  When	  he	  states	  that	  “a	  philosophy	  which	  relates	  to	  religion	   as	   a	   contemporary	   intellectual	   formation	   enters	   into	   a	   dialogue	   with	   it	  instead	  of	  talking	  about	  it“110,	  what	  –	  or	  who	  –	  does	  he	  see	  embodying	  this	  ‘it’?	  With	  whom	  is	  Habermas	  engaging	  in	  dialogue,	  exactly?	  	  	  Behind	  these	  questions	  lies	  the	  importance	  of	  boundary	  drawing.	  How	  do	  we	  know	  when	   religion	   is	   and	   when	   it	   is	   not?	   What	   and	   who	   ought	   to	   be	   acknowledged,	  included,	   and	   accorded	   a	   political	   voice	   in	   a	   Habermasian	   postsecular	   society?	  Further,	  who	  draws	  the	  line?	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  shall	  examine	  the	  boundaries	  that	   Habermas	   draws	   around	   the	   concept	   of	   religion	   and	   will	   analyze	   how	   his	  arguments	  are	  productive	  of	  religion.111	  If	  religion	  carries	  an	  epistemological	  value	  to	  philosophy	  and	  political	   theory,	   the	  question	   is	  crucial	  as	   to	  what	  gets	   included	  into	   the	  category.	  Or,	  perhaps	  even	  more	   importantly,	  who	   gets	   included	  and	  who	  does	  not,	  whose	  voice	  is	  amplified	  and	  whose	  is	  not.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Habermas:	  2010:	  77.	  111	  For	  an	  extended	  account	  of	  various	  “makings-­‐of”	  religion	  see	  Dressler/Mandair	  2011.	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Habermas’	  ontological	  assumptions	  regarding	  religion	  
	  Habermas	   does	   not	   specify	   what	   he	   means	   by	   religion.	   He	   uses	   the	   term	  interchangeably	   with	   religious	   communities, 112 	  individual	   believers, 113 	  religious	  consciousness114	  or	  religious	  language.115	  The	  closest	  he	  gets	  to	  a	  definition	  is	  when	  he	   speaks	   of	   the	   “unexhausted	   semantic	   potential	   [that]	   can	   be	   found	   only	   in	  traditions	  which	   ...	  have	  not	  yet	  completely	  dissolved	  in	  the	  relentless	  acceleration	  of	   modern	   conditions	   of	   life”.116	  These	   traditions	   are	   the	   “world	   religions	   which	  
[carry]	   the	   only	   surviving	   element	   of	   the	   now	   alien	   cultures	   of	   the	   Ancient	  Empires“,117	  rooted	  –	  as	  antique	  philosophy	  –	  in	  the	  “middle	  of	  the	  first	  millennium	  before	  Christ,	  i.e.	  to	  what	  Jaspers	  called	  the	  ‘Axial	  Age’“.118	  	  	  Although	  religious,	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐religious,	  mentalities	  and	  forms	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  processing	   of	   “cognitive	   dissonances“ 119 	  and	   the	   “’modernization	   of	   public	  consciousness’	   affects	   and	   reflexively	   transforms	   religious	   and	   secular	  mentalities”,120	  there	   is	   still	   something	   in	   the	   religious	   communities	   that	  has	  been	  kept	  ”hermeneutically	  vibrant	  [and]	  preserve[d]	  intact	  ...	  that	  would	  have	  been	  lost	  elsewhere”121	  and	   that	   is	  a	  source	  of	   “unexhausted	  semantic	  potential“.	  Habermas’	  argument	   for	   the	   epistemological	   value	   of	   religion	   –	   and	   the	   reason	   for	   its	  acknowledgement	   and	   respect	   –	   builds	   upon	   a	   vision	   of	   conserved	   religious	  knowledge.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Habermas	  2008:	  110.	  113	  Habermas	  2008:	  131.	  114	  Habermas	  2008:	  231.	  115	  Habermas	  2008:	  130	  116	  Habermas:	  2010:	  77f,	  for	  a	  critique	  see:	  Reder	  2010.	  117	  Habermas	  2008:	  142.	  118	  Habermas	  2008:	  141;	  In	  contrast	  to	  normative-­‐political	  convictions,	  ”[e]very	  religion	  is	  originally	  a	  ’worldview’,	  or	  ’comprehensive	  doctrine’	  also	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  is	  claims	  the	  authority	  to	  structure	  form	   of	   life	   as	   a	   whole.”	   (111).	   ”As	   it	   happens,	   this	   special	   status	   prohibits	   a	   normative-­‐political	  assimilation	  of	   religious	   convictions	   to	  ethical	   convictions,	   as	  practices	  by	  Forst	   (Forst	   (2002):	  93-­‐100)	  when	  he	  accords	  the	  principled	  priority	  of	  procedural	  over	  substantive	  criteria	  of	   justification	  precendence	  over	   the	  distinction	  between	  religion	  and	  secular	  reasons.”	   (Habermas	  2008:	  129,	  Fn.	  35).	  119	  Habermas	  2008:	  136.	  120	  Habermas	  2008:	  111.	  121	  Habermas	  2008:	  110.	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  Apart	   from	  being	   of	   ancient	   origin	   and	   able	   to	   deliver	   knowledge	   “intact“,	   having	  emanated	   from	   these	   historical	   roots,	   Habermas	   also	   conditions	   the	   forms	   of	  religion	  that	  are	  permitted	  to	  enter	  into	  public	  discourse.	  These	  are	  those	  religions	  that	  “embed	  egalitarian	  individualism	  of	  modern	  natural	  law	  and	  universal	  morality	  in	   the	   context	   of	   their	   comprehensive	   doctrine.”122	  Beyond	   the	   criteria	   of	   having	  “eschew[ed]	  dogmatism	  and	  respect	  freedom	  of	  conscience”,123	  the	  form	  of	  religion	  that	   Habermas	   grants	   entry	   into	   the	   informal	   public	   sphere	   need	   to	   fulfill	   the	  Kantian	  conditions	  of	  egalitarian	  individualism	  and	  universalistic	  morality.	  I	  concur	  with	   Partha	   Chatterjee	   that	   the	   “claim	   that	   religious	  movements	   and	   parties	  may	  well	  have	  a	  legitimate	  place	  in	  modern	  politics	  if	  they	  agree	  to	  confine	  themselves	  to	  rational	  debate	  and	  persuasion	  …	  only	  a	  plea	  for	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  religion.”124	  In	  our	   Habermasian	   case,	   I	   argue	   that	   his	   postsecular	   society	   is	   in	   no	   way	   more	  inclusive	   of	   formerly	   excluded	   perspectives,	   but	   is	   selectively	   inclusive	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  those	   perspectives	   that	   correspond	   with	   his	   preexisting	   model	   of	   a	   liberal	  deliberative	  democracy.	  	  I	   want	   to	   point	   out	   two	   things:	   First,	   I	   want	   to	   emphasize	   that	   Habermas’	  epistemological	   recognition	   of	   religion	   relates	   to	   a	   conservative	   vision	   of	   social	  knowledge	  as	  something	  that	  has	  been	  protected	  from	  “erosion”	  and	  that	  has	  been	  kept	   “intact“	   or	   pure.125	  This	   view	   assumes	   a	   purity	   of	   religion	   and	   a	   distinct	  demarcation	   between	   the	   religious	   and	   the	   non-­‐religious,126	  a	   kind	   of	   boundary-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Das	  gelingt	  nur	   in	  dem	  Masse,	  wie	  sie	  (die	  religiöse	  Bürger)	  den	  egalitären	   Individualismus	  von	  Vernunftsrecht	  und	  universalistischer	  Moral	  auf	  einsichtige	  Weise	  in	  den	  Kontext	  ihrer	  umfassenden	  Doktrinen	  einbetten.”	  (Habermas	  2005:	  143).	  123	  Habermas	  2008:	  100.	  124	  Chatterjee	  2006:	  59.	  125	  For	  a	  different	  critique	  regarding	  Habermas’	  protection	  of	  religion	  from	  erosion,	  see	  Lafont	  2007:	  251f,	  2009..	  126	  ”Religious	   certainties	   are	   in	   fact	   exposed	   to	   increasing	   reflective	   pressure	   in	   the	   differentiated	  architecture	   of	   modern	   societies.	   Religiously	   rooted	   existential	   convictions,	   by	   dint	   of	   their	   if	  necessary	  rationally	   justified	  reference	  to	  the	  dogmatic	  authority	  of	  an	  inviolable	  core	  of	   infalliable	  revealed	   truths,	   evade	   that	   kind	   of	   unreserved	   discursive	   examination	   to	   which	   other	   ethical	  orientations	   and	   worldviews,	   i.e.	   secular	   ’conceptions	   of	   the	   good,’	   are	   exposed.	   This	   discursive	  extraterritoriality	   of	   a	   core	   of	   existential	   certainties	   can	   lend	   religious	   convictions	   (on	   certain	  readings)	  an	   integral	   character.”	   (Habermas	  2008	  129f).	  A	   few	  pages	  onwards	  an	  ambivalent	  view	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drawing	  which,	  and	  here	  I	  agree	  with	  Günter	  Kehrer,	  is	  a	  theological	  question,	  and	  not	  one	  of	  political	  or	  social	  theory.127	  	  Secondly,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  however,	  I	  want	   to	  point	   to	   the	  productive	  or	  constructive	  process	   that	   is	   taking	  place	  below	  the	  surface	  of	  Habermas’	  argumentation.	  Here,	  we	  see	  the	  constructive	  nature	  and	  productive	  power	  of	  arguments	  of	  recognition	  and	  their	  reifying	  effects.	  While	  not	  clarifying	  what	   he	  means	   by	   religion,	   he	   still	   implicitly	   shapes	   and	  makes	   it,	   and	  draws	   its	   boundaries	   throughout	   his	   work.	   Religion	   in	   this	   form,	   acceptable	   to	  public	  discourse,	  has	  ancient	  roots,	  can	  deliver	  knowledge	   intact	   from	  these	  roots,	  and	  subscribes	  to	  the	  imperatives	  of	  egalitarian	  individuality	  and	  universal	  morality.	  	  	  
The	  amplified	  voice	  of	  ”Judeo-­‐Christian“	  heritage	  
	  Habermas’	   postsecular	   society	   is	   one	   in	   which	   religious	   arguments,	   reasons	   and	  justifications	   are	   not	   simply	   to	   be	   categorically	   disregarded	   as	   irrational	   or	   as	  lacking	   any	   form	   of	   truth,	   but	   must	   be	   acknowledged	   as	   sources	   of	   knowledge.	  However,	  when	  religion	  becomes	  a	  marker	  for	  that	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  recognized	  in	  public	  discourse,	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  what	  belongs	  in	  the	  category	  and	  who	  makes	  these	  decisions.	  In	  more	  general	  terms,	  it	  must	  be	  clarified	  who	  is	  given	  a	  voice	  in	  public	  discourse	  under	  the	  label	  of	  religion,	  and	  who	  is	  denied	  that	  voice.	  Habermas	  draws	  a	   distinct	   line	   around	   the	   legitimate	   speaker,	  when	   he	   states	   that	   the	   “egalitarian	  individualism	  of	  modern	  natural	  law	  and	  universalistic	  morality“	  must	  be	  embedded	  in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   religions’	   comprehensive	   doctrines	   in	   order	   for	   them	   to	   be	  given	   access	   to	   public	   discourse	   and	   in	   order	   for	   them	   to	   be	   able	   to	   claim	  recognition	  for	  their	  arguments	  and	  justifications.128	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  comes	   to	   display;	   ”As	   long	   as	   secular	   citizens	   are	   convinced	   that	   religious	   traditions	   and	   religious	  communities	  are,	   as	   it	  were,	   archaic	   relics	  of	  premodern	  societies	  persisting	   into	   the	  present,	   they	  can	   understand	   freedom	   of	   religion	   only	   as	   the	   cultural	   equivalent	   of	   the	   conservation	   of	   species	  threatened	  with	  extinction.”	  (Habermas	  2008:138).	  127	  Kehrer	  1998;	  see	  also	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  critique	  of	  this	  “epistemic	  break”	  in	  Butler	  et	  al.	  2011:	  49f.	  128	  Habermas	  2008:	  137.	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My	  critique	  of	  Habermas’	  account	  is	  less	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  deliberative	  discourse	  or	   democracy,	   and	   it	   does	   not	   intend	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   discussions	   regarding	  restrained	  or	  unrestrained	  public	  debate.129	  My	  critique	  is	  more	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  Habermas’	   postsecular	   alternative	   to	   a	   hardened	   secularism	   is	   one	   where	   the	  traditions	  molding	  the	  idea	  of	  secular	  reason	  are	  given	  more	  space,	  whereas	  those	  that	  are	   fundamentally	  different	  are	  as	  excluded	  as	   they	  had	  been	   in	   the	  previous	  secular	  settings,	  if	  not	  more	  so.130	  Habermas’	  postsecular	  account	  is	  inclusive	  for	  the	  traditions	   which	   are	   already	   a	   part	   of	   the	   genealogy	   of	   (liberal)	   reason,	   those	   in	  which	  “egalitarian	  individualism”	  and	  “universal	  morality”	  are	  not	  only	  embedded,	  but	  out	  of	  which	  they	  have	  grown.	  The	  tilt	  towards	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “world	  religions“	  is	  difficult	  to	  miss.	  
	  ”For	  the	  normative	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  modernity,	  Christianity	  has	  functioned	  as	  more	   than	   just	  a	  precursor	  or	  a	   catalyst.	  Universalistic	  egalitarianism,	   from	  which	  sprang	   the	   ideals	   of	   freedom	   and	   a	   collective	   life	   in	   solidarity,	   the	   autonomous	  conduct	   of	   life	   and	   emancipation,	   the	   individual	   morality	   of	   conscience,	   human	  rights	   and	   democracy,	   is	   the	   direct	   legacy	   of	   the	   Judaic	   ethic	   of	   justice	   and	   the	  Christian	  ethic	  of	  love.	  This	  legacy,	  substantially	  unchanged,	  has	  been	  the	  object	  of	  a	  continual	  critical	  re-­‐appropriation	  and	  reinterpretation.	  Up	  to	  this	  very	  day,	  there	  is	  no	   alternative	   to	   it.	   And	   in	   light	   of	   the	   current	   challenges	   of	   a	   post-­‐national	  constellation,	  we	  must	   draw	   sustenance	   now,	   as	   in	   the	   past,	   from	   this	   substance.	  Everything	  else	  is	  idle	  postmodern	  talk.”131	  	  Emphasizing	  as	   it	  does	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  “Judeo-­‐Christian“	  heritage	  of	  secular	  reason	   and	   the	   liberal	   values	   of	   egalitarian	   individualism	   and	   universal	   morality,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Mouffe	  2000,	  Sandel	  2005.	  130	  ”One	  might	  say	   that	   in	   its	  will	   to	   “include	   the	  other”,	  Habermas’s	   thinking	  about	  religion	  has	  a	  paradoxical	  tendency	  to	  perform	  the	  thing	  it	  most	  seeks	  to	  avoid,	  namely	  to	  exclude	  the	  “Other”	  or	  to	  exclude	  otherness.	   Its	  problem	  is	   that	  precisely	   in	   its	  will	   to	  universal	  accommodation,	   it	  may	  only	  end	   by	   immunizing	   itself	   against	   a	   challenge	   from	   something	   more	   profoundly	   outside	   of	   itself.”	  (Harrington	  2007:	  59).	  131	  Habermas	  2002:	  148f,	  my	  italics.	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what	  would	  Habermas’	  postsecular	  society	  look	  like	  outside	  of	  the	  cultural	  realm	  of	  Christianity?	  What	  is	  to	  be	  done	  with	  traditions	  that	  claim	  themselves	  to	  be	  religious	  but	  neither	  have	  Axial	  Age	  roots	  nor	  an	  ancient	  doctrine	  to	  show	  for	  it?	  Why	  should	  they	  carry	  less	  “semantic	  potential“	  for	  secular	  thinking?	  	  	  	  The	   Habermasian	   post-­‐secular	   account	   argues	   for	   an	   (international)	   political	  community	  built	  on	  less	  exclusive	  frameworks	  than	  the	  current	  secular	  variants.	  It	  argues	   against	   the	   categorical	   exclusion	   of	   religious	   agents,	   arguments	   and	   ideas	  and	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  religion’s	  semantic	  potential	  for	  secular	  political	  thinking.	  However,	   the	   argument	   implicitly	   restricts	   who	   and	   what	   can	   and	   should	   be	  included	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  religion	  to	  those	  who	  align	  with	  its	  “Judeo-­‐Christian”	  variant,	   or	   those	   versions	   thereof	   that	   embrace	   the	   egalitarian,	   individualist	  universal	  ethics	  emerging	   from	  this	  “Judeo-­‐Christian”	   tradition.	  The	  arguments	   for	  the	   recognition	   of	   religion	   are	   productive	   of	   that	   which	   they	   argue	   in	   favour	   of.	  However,	  no	  attention	  is	  given,	  neither	  by	  Barbato,	  nor	  by	  Habermas	  himself,	  to	  the	  productive	   or	   reproductive	   powers	   of	   recognition.	   Neither	   display	   this	   form	   of	  genealogical	   sensitivity.	  This	   is	  problematic,	   since	  Habermas’	  post-­‐secular	  account	  sets	  out	   to	  broaden	  the	  scope	  of	  eligible	  speakers	   in	  public	  discourse,	  but	  ends	  up	  limiting	   it	   to	   those	   who	   are	   recognizably	   religious,	   that	   is,	   recognizably	   religious	  according	  to	  the	  implicit	  standards	  established	  by	  Habermas.	  It	  marginalizes	  those	  who	  do	  not	   comply	  with	  established	  criteria	  delimiting	   the	   recognizably	   religious,	  and	  writes	   a	  whole	   range	   of	   possibilities	   out	   of	   the	   picture,	   as	   those	  who	   remain	  unrecognized	  will	   necessarily	   struggle	   to	   achieve	   a	  place	  on	   the	  public	   register	   of	  recognition.132	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  This	   first	  chapter	  engaged	  with	   the	  work	   that	  has	  been	  conducted	   in	   IR	  regarding	  the	   question	   of	   religion.	   It	   thereby	   analyzed	   in	   detail	   the	   accounts	   of:	   the	   social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  See	   also	   Judith	   Butler’s	   discussion	   of	   Althusser’s	   argument	   for	   the	   constitutive	   power	   of	  ”naming”	  (1997a:	  5ff,	  28ff).	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constructivist,	   Daniel	   Philpott;	   the	   English	   School	   scholar,	   Scott	   Thomas;	   and	   the	  Habermasian	   Critical	   Theorist,	   Mariano	   Barbato.	   All	   three	   scholars	   agree	   in	   their	  diagnoses	   that	   religion	   has	   been	   systematically	   excluded	   from	   the	   theory	   and	  practice	  of	  IR,	  and	  while	  they	  list	  different	  reasons	  for	  this	  exclusion,	  they	  continue	  to	  agree	  about	  its	  problematic	  nature	  and	  argue	  for	  the	  need	  to	  recognize	  religion	  in	  international	   affairs.	   In	   their	   arguments	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   religion	   in	  international	  relations,	  however,	  none	  of	  the	  scholars	  paid	  much	  attention	  to	  what	  it	  was	  they	  wanted	  to	  have	  recognized.	  None	  of	  the	  three	  reflected	  on	  how	  religion	  has	  become	  intelligible	  or	  recognizable	  –	  to	  them,	  to	  an	  international	  political	  public,	  or	  to	  the	  discipline	  of	  IR	  –	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  They	  all	  lacked,	  what	  I	  called,	  a	  genealogical	  sensitivity	   to	   the	   process	   by	   which	   religion	   emerged	   as	   a	   differentiated	   and	  differentiable	  entity.133	  	  	  In	   the	   following	   chapter	   I	   will	   engage	   in	   greater	   detail	   with	   the	   aspects	   of	  recognition	  and	  will	  show	  that	  this	  lack	  of	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  work	   on	   religion	   and	   international	   relations,	   but	   is	   but	   one	   aspect	   of	   a	  more	  general	  problematic	  feature	  in	  the	  broader	  recognition	  framework.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Geuss	  2002,	  1994;	  Visker	  1991.	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Chapter	  2:	  Recognition	  	  	  During	  the	  1990s,	  questions	  of	  recognition	  increasingly	  came	  into	  focus,	  due	  to	  the	  flourishing	  literature	  on	  multiculturalism	  and	  identity	  politics	  at	  both	  international	  and	  domestic	   levels.	  At	  an	  international	   level,	  this	  manifested	  itself	   in	  the	  analyses	  of	  identity-­‐based	  conflicts,	  helping	  to	  explain	  why	  some	  actors	  seemed	  to	  act	  against	  their	   material	   interests,	   in	   search	   of	   an	   identity-­‐based	   goal.134	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	  prevailing	  realist	  and	   liberal	  approaches,	   the	   focus	  on	  recognition	  emphasized	   the	  importance	  of	  identities	  –	  subjectivities	  –	  along	  with	  the	  more	  traditional	  quest	  for	  power	   or	   wealth.135	  Recognition	   was,	   however,	   not	   simply	   one	   end	   among	   many	  others,	  but	  a	  basic	  need.136	  Unlike	  other	  basic	  needs,	  such	  as	  the	  need	  for	  shelter	  or	  food	  that	  could	  be	  be	  fulfilled	  without	  changing	  the	  concerned	  individuals	  or	  groups,	  the	   need	   for	   recognition	   was	   considered	   different,	   as	   the	   very	   fulfillment	   of	   this	  particular	  need	  served	  to	  constitute	  the	  individual	  or	  collective	  as	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	   actor.	   Recognition	  mattered	   in	   international	   relations,	   because	   it	   described	   the	  process	   through	   which	   actors	   came	   to	   exist	   as	   actors	   within	   the	   international	  system,	  and	  to	  take	  on	  a	  particular	  identity	  within	  that	  system.137	  	  	  Recognition	  featured	  not	  only	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  constituting	  process	  of	   international	  actors’	  (collective)	  identities,	  but	  also	  as	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  the	  international	   system	   itself.138	  Mutual	   recognition	   between	   sovereign	   states	   was	  most	   prominently	   seen	   by	   scholars	   of	   the	   English	   school	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   the	  transformation	   of	   an	   international	   system	   into	   an	   international	   society.139	  It	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Onuf	  2013;	  Greenhill	  2008:	  345.	  135	  Ringmar	  1995;	  Wendt	  2003;	  Erman	  2013.	  136	  Honneth	  2008;	  Taylor	  1994(1992).	  137	  Greenhill	  2008:	  344.	  138	  Reus-­‐Smit	  2011,	  2013;	  Wendt	  2003;	  Williams	  1998.	  139	  Bull	  2002(1977):	  9ff;	  Wight	  1977:	  23ff.	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part	   of	   a	   gradual	   social	   incorporation	   of	   international	   actors	   into	   a	   rule-­‐governed	  society	   of	   sovereign	   states.140	  The	   international	   society	   thereby	   signified	   a	   higher	  level	   of	   social	   integration	   of	   the	   states	   into	   a	   common	   frame	   of	   reference,	   norms,	  institutions,	  and	  practices.	  	  	  While	   the	   English	   School	   saw	   mutual	   recognition	   between	   sovereign	   states	   as	  reflecting	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   international	   society,	   the	   quest	   to	   achieve	   this	  recognition	  and	  the	  consequence	  of	  this	  quest	  have	  since	  transcended	  the	  focus	  on	  international	  society.	  Recognition	  was,	  in	  this	  sense,	  not	  only	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  international	  system	  had	  evolved	  into	  an	  international	  society,	  but	  was	  further	  seen	   as	   a	   mechanism	   by	   which	   the	   international	   system	   expanded	   and	   evolved,	  possibly	  to	  a	  more	  peaceful	  state.	  In	  the	  work	  of	  Alexander	  Wendt,	  for	  example,	  the	  struggle	   for	   recognition	   is	   a	   mechanism	   by	   which	   the	   international	   system	   will	  expand	   and	   emerge	   into	   an	   overarching	   global	   collective	   identity.141	  For	   Wendt,	  ”desires	  for	  recognition	  [would]	  undermine	  systems	  that	  do	  not	  satisfy	  them”142	  and	  would	   thus	   perpetuate	   the	   development	   towards	   a	   system	   that	   did	   satisfy	   them,	  eventually	  emerging	  in	  the	  form	  of	  what	  he	  called	  a	  ”World	  State”.143	  While	  Wendt’s	  teleological	   vision	   of	   the	   international	   future	   is	   quite	   specific	   to	   his	   work,	   the	  understanding	  of	  recognition	  as	  positive	  empowerment	  runs	  through	  international	  scholarship	  on	  recognition	  more	  broadly.144	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  pointed	  out	  that	  arguments	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  religion	  in	  international	  relations	  assumed	  religion	  to	  be	  a	  pre-­‐differentiated	  object	  awaiting	  recognition,	  and	  I	  argued	  that	  these	  arguments	  lacked	  a	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  process	  by	  which	  religion	  had	  become	  a	  recognizable,	  differentiated	  object	  of	  recognition	  in	  the	  first	   place.	   That	   is,	   I	   argued	   that	   recognition	   arguments	   lacked	   a	   genealogical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Reus-­‐Smit	  2011:	  209.	  141	  Wendt	  2003:	  517,	  528,	  541.	  142	  Wendt	  2003:	  514.	  143	  In	   a	   different	   manner	   Christian	   Reus-­‐Smit	   also	   argued	   that	   the	   struggle	   for	   recognition	   for	  individual	   rights	   	   has	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   evolution	   and	   institutional	   transcendence	   of	   the	  international	  system	  of	  sovereign	  states.	  (Reus-­‐Smit	  2011).	  144	  Honneth	  2011;	  Lindemann	  2010;	  Onuf	  2013.	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sensitivity.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  discuss	  the	  contours	  of	  recognition,	  but	  will	  do	   so	  with	  a	   stronger	   focus	  on	   (international)	  political	   theory.	  After	  outlining	  the	   broad	   scopes	   of	   the	   literature,	   I	   will	   look	  more	   closely	   at	   two	   features	   that	   I	  consider	   problematic:	   First,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   recognition	   presupposes	   and	  reproduces	   its	  entities,	   that	   is,	   its	  objects,	  agents	  or	   identities.	  Second,	   I	  will	  argue	  that	  recognition	  depends	  on	  the	  previous	  recognizability	  of	   its	  objects,	   that	   is,	   it	   is	  can	  only	  “see”	  what	  the	  current	  epistemic	  framework	  allows	  it	  to	  “see”.	  In	  this	  sense,	  recognition	   is	   reproductive	   of	   the	   epistemic	   framework	   within	   which	   it	   features.	  The	   last	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   discusses	   the	   relationship	   between	   recognition	   and	  reification,	   by	   which	   I	   mean	   more	   precisely,	   the	   forgetfulness	   of	   the	   process	   by	  which	  object	   of	   knowledge	  become	  knowable.	  Or,	   in	   terms	   that	   are	  more	   familiar	  within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   chapter,	   a	   forgetfullness	   of	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	  recognized	  becomes	  recognizable.	  Concluding	  the	  chapter	  I	  will	  suggest	  an	  approach	  that	   places	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   how	   something	   becomes	   recognizable	   in	  international	  relations.145	  	  	  
Recognizing	  difference	  
	  Recognition	  has	  featured	  as	  a	  central	  element	  in	  the	  context	  of	  questions	  regarding	  collective	  identity	  formation	  or	  the	  expansion	  of	  international	  society.	  Depending	  on	  the	  context	  and	  the	  particular	  scholar,	  recognition	  may	  be	  differntiated	  in	  multiple	  ways.	  Patchen	  Markell	  separates	  cognitive	  from	  constructive	  aspects	  of	  recognition	  where	   the	   latter	   reflects	   its	   productive	   power	   in	   a	   way	   lacking	   from	   the	   former.	  Alexander	  Wendt	  distinguishes	  thick	  from	  thin	  recognition,	  and	  Eva	  Erman	  between	  declaratory	  from	  constitutive	  recognition,	  while	  Nicolas	  Onuf	  is	  sceptical	  concerning	  the	   possibility	   of	   drawing	   any	   distinctions	  whatsoever.146	  Jens	   Bartelson	   presents	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  To	  be	   clear,	   I	  will	   not	   argue	   that	   recognition	   is	   simply	   reproductive	   or	   it	   that	  merely	   reifies	   its	  objects.	  What	  I	  do	  argue	  is	  that	  the	  emphasize	  on	  the	  empowering	  aspects	  of	  recognition	  with	  which	  IR	   scholarship	   is	   usually	   concerned,	   needs	   to	   be	   balanced	   out	   with	   a	   stronger	   focus	   on	   the	  more	  problematic	  aspects.	  	  146	  Markell	  2000;	  Wendt	  2003;	  for	  an	  elaboration	  on	  “thick”	  recognition	  see	  Strömbom	  2013;	  Erman	  2013,	  Onuf	  2013.	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another	   categorization,	   which	   I	   think	   is	   helpful,	   as	   it	   distinguishes	   but	   does	   not	  necessarily	   separate	   forms	   of	   recognition	   depending	   on	   their	   different	   aims.147	  In	  this	  sense,	  a	  distinction	  may	  be	  made	  between	  political,	  legal	  or	  moral	  recognition,	  where	   political	   recognition	   refers	   to	   what	   counts	   as	   a	   relevant	   actor	   in	   the	  international	  system	  and	  how	  they	  gain	  their	  standing.	  Legal	  recognition	  concerns	  the	  grounds	  upon	  which	  a	  state	  should	  be	  admitted	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  international	  society	  of	   states,	   that	   is,	  what	   it	   takes	   to	  qualify	   as	   a	  member	  of	   the	   international	  society.	  Moral	  recognition,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  argues	   for	   the	  equal	  moral	  worth	  of	  different	  communities	  or	  cultures.	  It	  is	  through	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  equal	  standing	  of	   the	   different	   communities	   and	   collective	   identities	   that	   moral	   recognition	   is	  argued	  to	  enable	  peaceful	  co-­‐existence	  between	  them.148	  The	  concept	  of	  recognition	  has,	  in	  this	  sense,	  been	  invoked	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  ”more	  undesirable	  consequences	  of	   international	   anarchy	   can	   be	   mitigated	   through	   the	   mutual	   recognition	   of	  collective	  identities.	  Here	  the	  concept	  of	  recognition	  is	  used	  to	  suggest	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  by	  telling	  us	  how	  the	  conflicts	  this	  system	  engenders	  can	  be	  resolved	  by	  increasing	  respect	  for	  cultural	  and	  other	  differences.”149	  	  While	   the	   debates	   on	   recognition	   in	   international	   relations	   have	   been	   intimitaly	  connected	   to	   the	   upsurge	   of	   writings	   on	   multiculturalism	   and	   identity	   in	   the	  national	  and	  international	  context,	   they	  have	  also	  been	  intertwined	  with	   literature	  on	   the	   subject	   of	   international	   law.150	  The	   central	   question	   here	  was	  whether	   the	  formal	  recognition	  of	  an	  international	  actor	  as	  a	  state	  simply	  amounted	  to	  declaring	  a	  legally	  significant	  fact,	  since	  a	  number	  of	  objective	  conditions	  for	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  polity	  as	  a	  state	  have	  already	  been	  met,	  or	  whether	  the	  act	  of	  recognition	  itself	  represented	  the	  formal	  constitution	  of	  the	  polity	  in	  question	  as	  a	  state	  in	  relation	  to	  other	   states.151	  Depending	   on	   how	   one	   answered	   this	   question,	   recognition	   was	  seen	  either	  to	  declare	  or	  to	  constitute	  the	  polity	  as	  a	  state,	  that	  is,	  as	  an	  actor	  within	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the	   domain	   of	   international	   relations.	   According	   to	   declaratory	   theory	   of	  recognition,	   an	   actor	   in	   the	   international	   system	   is	   recognized	   as	   a	   state	  when	   it	  fulfills	   a	   certain	   set	   of	   criteria	   –	   possessing	   a	   defined	   territory,	   a	   permanent	  population,	  a	  government,	  and	  a	  capacity	  to	  enter	  into	  relations	  with	  other	  states.152	  Declaring	   statehood,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   therefore	   a	  mere	   formality	   and	   has	   no	   legal	  effect	   as	   to	   the	   actual	   existence	   of	   the	   actor	   as	   a	   state.	   Recognition,	   per	   such	   a	  construction,	  declares	  something	  that	  already	  exists,	  rather	  than	  bringing	  something	  into	   existence.	   Statehood,	   as	   a	   result,	   exists,	   independent	   of	   recognition	   by	   other	  states.153	  In	  contrast,	  according	  to	  the	  constitutive	  theory,	  recognition	  is	  a	  necessary	  requirement	   for	   international	   agency.	   Only	   by	   being	   recognized	   by	   other	  international	   actors,	   can	   a	   political	   entity	   become	   an	   international	   actor	  with	   the	  according	   rights	   and	   responsibilities.154	  It	   is	   this	   final	   constitutive	   strand	   that	   has	  emerged	   as	   predominant	   in	   international	   theorizing,	   and	   this	   will	   represent	   the	  focus	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  The	  constitutive	  theory	  of	  recognition	  adds	  to	  the	  declaratory	  theory	  the	  productive,	  relational	   and	   social	   power	   of	   recognition.	   In	   this	   sense,	   recognition	   is	   not	   only	  cognitive	  of	  existing	  actors,	  but	  elevates	  into	  actorhood	  those	  international	  entities	  that	   are	   recognized.	   A	   polity	   becomes	   a	   state	   through	   recognition	   as	   such	   by	   the	  other,	  previously	  recognized,	  states	  in	  that	  international	  system	  or	  community.	  The	  status	  of	  these	  actors	  is	  dependent	  upon	  recognition,	  a	  mutual	  understanding	  about	  who	  or	  what	  constitutes	  actors	  within	  the	  international	  political	  setting.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  relational	  and	  social,	  with	  no	  actor	  existing	  outside	  this	  context	  as	  such.	  	  Behind	   this	   constitutive	  and	  relational	  view	  of	   recognition	   lie	   references	   to	  G.W.F.	  Hegel’s	  work	  on	  recognition	  between	  individuals	  and	  the	  mutual	  dependency	  in	  the	  development	   of	   their	   subjectivity.	   Hegel’s	   analysis	   in	   the	   Phenomenology	   of	   Spirit	  describes	  the	  self-­‐defeating	  tendency	  of	  asymmetrical	  structures	  of	  recognition	  such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	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  154	  Oppenheim	  1912;	  Lauterpracht	  1944.	  
	   57	  
as	   the	   master-­‐slave	   (Herr	   und	   Knecht)	   relationship	   and	   emphasizes	   the	   need	   for	  reciprocity,	   or	  mutuality	   in	   recognition.155	  In	   other	   words,	   it	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   not	  enough	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   monodirected	   recognition,	   but	   that	   each	   recognition	  must	  take	  place	  within	  a	  context	  of	  equally	  valued	  actors.156	  Recognition	  is	  only	  valuable	  if	  it	  comes	  from	  someone	  perceived	  as	  having	  dignity	  and	  worth,	  and	  since	  the	  slave	  in	   the	   Herr	   und	   Knecht	   relationship	   lacks	   these	   features,	   his	   recognition	   of	   the	  master	   is	   ultimately	   ”worthless”. 157 	  Hegel’s	   model	   assumes	   that	   all	   human	  individuals	  have	  a	  basic	  need	  to	  receive	  recognition	  from	  others.	  Furthermore,	  this	  should	  consist	  of	  a	  mutual	  recognition	  between	  equals.	  The	  very	  self-­‐consciousness	  of	   the	   individual	   “Self”	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   recognition	   (Anerkennung)	   of	   others,	  meaning	  that	  others	  confirms	  our	  sense	  of	  self,	  which	  we,	  then,	  objectify	  as	  personal	  identity.	   Hegel	   sees	   the	   “two	   self-­‐consciousesses”	   of	   the	   “Self”	   and	   the	   “Other”	  develop	   in	   relation	   to,	   and	   as	   dependent	   upon,	   each	   other.	   “They	   recognize	  themselves	  as	  mutually	  (gegenseitig)	  recognizing	  each	  other.”158	  	  	  Hegel’s	   theory	  of	   recognition	  continues	   to	  describe	   the	  way	   in	  which	  man’s	  desire	  for	  recognition	  drives	  forward	  a	  pattern	  of	  societal	  development.159	  This	  is	  thought	  to	   proceed	   through	   alternating	   steps	   of	   conflict	   and	   reconciliation.	   The	   desire	   for	  recognition	   compels	   the	   individual	   to	   challenge	   the	   existing	   order	   in	   a	   way	   that,	  when	  and	  if	  it	  is	  successful,	  gives	  rise	  to	  new	  orders	  that	  are	  better	  able	  to	  fulfill	  his	  recognition	  needs.160	  However,	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   new,	   reconciliated	   order	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  Hegel	  2009(1807).	  “Two	  men	  in	  a	  hypothetical	   ‘state	  of	  nature’	  each	  attempt	  to	  secure	  the	  recognition	  of	   the	  other	  by	  entering	   into	   a	   head-­‐on	   battle	   with	   one	   another.	   Their	   confrontation	   ends	   with	   one	   actor	  surrendering	   to	   the	   will	   of	   the	   other,thereby	   creating	   a	   relationship	   of	   domination	   that	   is	   best	  characterized	   as	   a	   master–slave	   relationship.	   However,	   the	   struggle	   for	   recognition	   doesn’t	   end	  there;	   the	  master	   remains	   dissatisfied	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   has	   only	   secured	   recognition	   from	   an	  actor	   that	  he	  himself	   is	  unable	   to	  recognize	  as	  an	  equal,	  and	  at	   the	  same	  time	  the	  slave	  develops	  a	  growing	  sense	  of	  his	  possibility	  for	  full	  freedom	  and	  agency	  as	  a	  result	  of	  performing	  the	  work	  that	  the	  master	  forces	  him	  to	  do.	  Eventually	  the	  slave	  fights	  to	  free	  himself	  from	  the	  control	  of	  the	  master	  and	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  society	  built	  upon	  the	  principles	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  that	  will	   allow	   for	   all	   individuals	   to	   be	   granted	   lasting	   recognition	   through	   the	   exercise	   of	   their	   basic	  rights	  of	  citizenship”	  (Fukuyama,	  1992:	  192–208;	  Greenhill	  2008:	  353).	  157	  Williams,	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  158	  Hegel	  §	  184;	  Honneth	  1995;	  see	  also	  Onuf	  2013.	  159	  Honneth	  1995.	  160	  Honneth	  1995:	  17.	  
	   58	  
not	   in	   itself	   satisfactory,	   and	  will	   come	   to	   generate	   further	   conflict	   as	   individuals	  struggle	  to	  attain	  an	  even	  more	  satisfactory	  level,	  where	  recognition	  is	  claimed	  for	  new	  facets	  of	  the	  subjects’	  identities.161	  	  	  When	  this	  logic	  enters	  into	  international	  scholarship,	  the	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  of	  Hegel’s	   individual	   subject	   is	   scaled	   up	   to	   a	   collective	   identity	   formation,	   with	  Alexander	  Wendt	  arguing	  ”that	  the	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  between	  states	  will	  have	  the	   same	   outcome	   as	   that	   between	   individuals,	   collective	   identity	   formation	   and	  eventually	  a	  state.”162	  Accordingly,	  the	  identity	  formation	  of	  an	  international	  subject	  is	  paralleled	  with	  that	  of	  an	  individual.	  While	  the	  differences	  are	  numerous	  –	  a	  state	  lacks	  a	  single	  consciousness,	  single	  memory,	  or	  will,	  and	  does	  not	  display	  the	  same	  physical	   vulnerability	   as	   an	   individual	   –	   the	   essential	   aspects	   of	   an	   international	  subject	  could	  usefully	  be	  dug	  out	  by	  the	  analogy.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  its	  existence,	  an	   international	  actor	  –	   in	  most	  cases	  a	  state	  –	  must	  be	  recognized	  as	  such	  by	  the	  other	   members	   of	   the	   international	   community.	   The	   formative	   processes	   of	   the	  identity	   and	   subjectivity	   of	   a	   state	   are	   thus	   dependent	   upon	   recognition	   by	   other	  states,	  how	  they	  acknowledge	  each	  other’s	  existence,	  demand	  and	  receive	  respect,	  or	   ask	   for	   equal	   treatment.	   Statehood	   in	   this	   sense	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   factual	  phenomenon,	  but	  a	  normative	  phenomenon	  permeated	  by	  practices	  of	  recognition,	  the	  ”Self”	  of	  the	  state	  dependent	  on	  the	  recognition	  by	  the	  ”Others”.163	  	  	  The	   attempt	   to	   “scale	   up”	   the	   logic	   of	   recognition	   from	   the	   individual	   to	   the	  collective	   is,	   however,	   ambiguous.	   Aleida	   Assman	   argues	   that	   the	   two	   are	   indeed	  intimately	  intertwined,	  while	  Arash	  Abizadeh	  points	  out	  that	  these	  two	  processes	  of	  identity	   formation	   are	   distinctively	   separate.164	  While	   the	   individual	   identity	   is	  always	   dependent	   upon	   an	   external	   “Other”	   to	   mirror	   its	   self-­‐consciousness,	  Abizadeh	  argues	  that	  the	  collective	  identity	  can	  be	  formed	  by	  a	  mirror	  of	  an	  internal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  Honneth	  1995:	  16.	  162	  Wendt	  2003:	  493;	  see	  also	  Wendt	  1999	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  state-­‐as-­‐person.	  163	  Fabry	  2010;	  Erman	  2013;	   for	   a	   critical	   reading	  of	   identity	   as	   a	   self/other	   relationship	   see	  Onuf	  2013.	  164	  Assman:	  2013:	  78ff;	  Abizadeh	  2005.	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“Other”.	   That	   is,	   "the	   constitution	   of	   the	   collective	   identity	   via	   recognition	   or	  dialogue	   is	   not	   dependent	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   excluded	   individuals.	   ...	   Whether	  collectivities	   with	   an	   external	   other	   are	   better	   able	   to	   win	   identification	   is	   an	  empirical	  question."165	  	  	  Irrespective	  of	   this	   critique	  of	   the	  problems	  of	   “scaling	  up”	   from	   individual	   to	   the	  collective,	  the	  constitutive	  power	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  à	  la	  Hegel	  has	  left	  its	  mark	  on	   IR	   theorizing.	   As	  mentioned	   above,	   Alexander	  Wendt’s	   vision	   of	   a	   teleological	  development	  towards	  a	  ”World	  State”	  is	  one	  example.	  Applying	  Hegel’s	  logic	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  recognition,	  Wendt	  argues	  for	  a	  fundamental	  restructuring	  of	  the	  logic	  of	   the	   international	   system	   from	   one	   consisting	   of	   individual	   states	   to	   a	   ”World	  State”,	   with	   an	   overarching,	   global,	   collective	   identity.166	  He	   sees	   states	   engage	   in	  struggles	  for	  recognition	  –	  brought	  about	  by	  technological	  advances,	  the	  destructive	  potential	   of	  which	  needs	   to	  be	  balanced	  within	   the	  existing	   logic	  of	   anarchy	  –	   the	  resolution	   of	  which	   leads	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   common	   collective	   identity	   of	   the	  states	   in	   question,	   causing	   the	   state’s	   underlying	   interests	   to	   align.167	  The	   (new)	  sense	   of	   ”Self”	   is	   formed	   through	   the	   interaction	   with	   ”Others”.	   In	   the	   end,	   the	  process	   of	   collective	   identity	   formation	   culminates	  with	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   global	  collective	   identity	   that	   encompasses	   the	   entire	   human	   population,	   creating	   what	  Wendt	  calls	  the	  ”World	  State.”	  	  Transcending	   the	   particular	   and	   developing	   into	   a	   universal	   entity,	   as	   Wendt	  envisions,	  however,	  assumes	  the	  starting	  point	  to	  be	  one	  where	  the	  playing	  field	  is	  made	  up	  of	  clearly	  distinguishable,	  bounded	  communities	  –	  states	  in	  this	  case	  –	  that	  insist	  on	  being	  recognized	  in	  their	  particularity.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  seems	  to	  depend	  on	   a	   preexisting	   logic	   of	   differentiation.	   Wendt	   views	   this	   as	   one	   of	   the	   major	  paradoxes	   that	   his	   teleological	   theory	   is	   bound	   to	   overcome,	   stating	   that	   ”if	   the	  desire	   for	   recognition	   is	   about	   being	   accepted	   as	   different,	   the	   effect	   of	   mutual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  Abizadeh	  2005:	  48.	  166	  Wendt	  2003.	  167	  Wendt,	  2003:	  541;	  for	  a	  critical	  reading	  see:	  Greenhill	  2008.	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recognition	  is	  to	  constitute	  collective	  identity	  or	  solidarity”	  or	  ”[t]wo	  actors	  cannot	  recognize	  each	  other	  as	  different	  without	   recognizing	   that,	   at	   some	   level,	   they	  are	  also	   the	   same”.168	  The	   mechanism	   perpetuating	   the	   teleological	   drive	   towards	   a	  ”World	  State”	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  ”just	  as	  the	  willingness	  of	  individuals	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  collective	   identity	  ultimately	  depends	  on	   their	   recognition	  as	  separate	   individuals,	  so	   too	   would	   groups	   entering	   into	   a	   larger	   identity	   want	   their	   difference	  recognized”.169	  The	  central	  point	  here	  is	  that	  there	  is,	  and	  needs	  to	  be,	  a	  difference	  that	  can	  be	  recognized	  and	  subsequently	  overcome.	  There	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  “Self”	  and	  the	  “Other”	  before	  they	  can	  insist	  on	  the	  recognition	  thereof	  and	  continue	  to	  reconcile	  in	  a	  higher	  level	  “We”.	  	  	  While	  the	  teleological	  aspect	  of	  Wendt’s	  approach	  and	  that	  of	  others	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  problematic	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  that	  is	  not	  my	  aim	  here.	  Rather,	  I	  want	  to	  point	  out	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Wendt	  requires	  a	  preexisting,	  potential	  “Self”,	  without	  whom	  the	  struggle	   for	   recognition	   –	   and	   the	  development	   towards	   an	  overarching	   collective	  identity	   –	   would	   not	   be	   possible.	   Wendt	   requires	   a	   differentiated	   logic,	   a	  differentiated	  social	  ontology,	   in	  order	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  recognition	  to	   take	   the	   individual	   “Selves”	   into	   a	   larger	   “Us”.	   There	   needs	   to	   be	   a	   preexisting	  subject	   “Self”	   of	   the	   collective	   identity	   in	   order	   for	  Wendt’s	   recognition	   to	   gain	   a	  foothold.	   Similarly,	   Axel	   Honneth	   recently	   argued	   for	   the	   link	   between	   peaceful	  international	  relations	  and	  the	  recognition	  of	  (pre-­‐)existing	  collective	  “Selves”.	  ”The	  path	   for	   civilizing	   international	   relations	   primarily	   lies	   in	   sustained	   efforts	   at	  conveying	  respect	  and	  esteem	  for	  the	  collective	  identities	  of	  other	  countries.”170	  The	  recognition	   of	   the	   particularity,	   and	   the	   difference,	   of	   “others”	   would	   “civilize”	  international	  relations.	  	  	  Recognition	   reflects	   empowerment.	   This	   is	   especially	   the	   case	   if	  we	   stay	  with	   the	  idea	  that	  recognition	  not	  only	  strengthens	  existing	  actors,	  but	  also	  actualizes	  them,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  Wendt,	  2003:	  560,	  512.	  169	  Wendt	  2003:	  516.	  170	  Honneth	  2011:	  35f.	  
	   61	  
bringing	   them	   into	   existence	   as	   actors	   and	   subjects	   in	   the	   way	   the	   constitutive	  perspectives	   argued.	  However,	   besides	  being	   empowering,	   recognition	   also	   seems	  to	   build	   upon	   an	   assumption	   of	   preexisting	   difference	   between	   the	   potential	  subjects.	   Assuming	   the	   existence	   of	   this	   difference	   reflects	   an	   underlying	  differentiated	  social	  ontology,	  that	  is,	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  as	  constituted	  by	   differentiated	   and	   differentiable	   bounded	   groups,	   waiting	   to	   be	   recognized	   in	  their	   difference,	   and	  waiting	   to	   extend	   recognition	   to	   others.	   In	   this	   sense,	   rather	  than	   necessarily	   transcending	   this	   differentiated	   social	   logic,	   the	   process	   of	  recognition	   presupposes	   it.	   Further,	   as	   I	   will	   argue	   below,	   recognition	   not	   only	  presupposes	  differentiated	  and	  differentiable	  entities	  but,	  by	  extending	   rights	  and	  responsibilities	   to	   them,	   by	   acknowledging	   them	   as	   the	   carriers	   of	   a	   particular	  identity,	   recognition	   reinforces	   and	   reproduces	   them.	   Due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  recognition	  builds	  upon	  a	  differentiated	  social	  ontology,	  it	  reinforces	  the	  boundaries	  around	   and	   between	   social,	   political	   and	   cultural	   collectivities	   and	   communities,	  reinstating	  the	   logic	  of	  a	  differentiated	  social	  ontology,	  while	  sidelining	  alternative	  orders.	  	  	  At	   this	   initial	   point	   I	   tend	   to	   agree	   with	   Abizadeh	   that	   this	   differentiated	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  as	  parceled	  up	  in	  ”Selves”	  and	  ”Others”	  is	  not	  necessary	  at	   all.	   ”The	   problem	   with	   such	   a	   misdescription	   [of	   conceptual	   or	   metaphysical	  necessity	  of	   an	   ”other”]	   however,	   is	   that	   its	  only	   function	   is	   to	   reify	   the	  politically	  generated	   dynamics	   that,	   by	   reference	   to	   other	   possibilities,	   it	   is	   the	   task	   of	  normative	   political	   theory	   to	   call	   into	   question.”171	  The	   question	   of	   ”Self”	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  Abizadeh	  2005:	  59;	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  reifying	  potential	  in	  questions	  of	  identity	  see	  exchange	  by	  McSweeney,	  Buzan	  and	  Wæver	  in	  Review	  of	  Intenrational	  Studies	  1996-­‐1998;	  see	  Rancière	  for	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  recognition,	  where	  the	  subject	  does	  not	  emerge	  through	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  image	  of	  the	  self	  and	  its	  recognition	  by	  the	  other,	  but	  through	  struggle,	  by	  infering	  disruption	  	  in	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  social	  order.	  "	  The	  subject	  that	  emerges	  in	  the	  struggle	  against	  the	  tort	  is	  itself	  torn;	  it	  is	  a	  political	   identity	   that	  retains	   the	  social	  difference,	  and	   is	   therefore	   the	   true	   identity	  of	   identity	  and	  difference.	  This	   is	   an	  antiontological	   identity	   that	   is	  nonontological	  because	   it	  proclaims	   to	  be	  different	  from	  ontological	  difference”	  (Deranty	  2003:	  151).	  Rancière's	  recognition	  is	  of	  the	  workers	  who	   are	   not	   recognized	   as	   workers	   but	   as	   artists,	   poets,	   playwrights,	   those	   transgressing	   and	  subverting	   the	   order	   of	   things,	   by	   claiming	   the	   right	   to	   have	   a	   meaningful	   voice	   beyond	   the	  constraints	  of	  their	  social	  destiny.	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”Other”,	  therefore,	  is	  not	  one	  to	  theoretically	  assume	  prematurely,	  but	  to	  investigate	  empirically	   and	  historically.	  These	   two	   levels	  of	   empirical	  practices	   and	  analytical	  theorizing	  should	  be	  kept	  distinct.	  As	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  regarding	  the	  way	   in	   which	   ethnic	   elites	   use	   the	   “Self/Other”	   language,	   these	   are	   performative	  discourses	  and	  practices,	   and	  should	  be	  appropriately	  analyzed	   for	  what	   they	  are,	  namely	   instruments	   used	   to	   mobilize	   the	   constituencies	   of	   certain	   elites.	   This	  essentially	  amounts	  to	  evoking	  difference	  by	  invoking	  difference.	  ”Scaling	  up”	  from	  the	   primary	   level	   of	   discourse	   to	   theoretical	   levels	   of	   ontology	  would	   represent	   a	  mistake.	   An	   ascription	   of	   difference	   in	   discourse	   must	   be	   acknowledged,	   and	   its	  consequences	  analyzed.	  However,	   it	  must	  be	  analyzed	  as	  an	  empirical	   ”social	   fact”	  and	  not	  a	  theoretical	  necessity.	  	  	  
Problematic	  aspects	  of	  recognition	  
	  In	   this	   part	   of	   the	   chapter,	   I	   wish	   to	   engage	   more	   thoroughly	   with	   the	   logic	   of	  recognition,	  and	  especially	  focus	  on	  the	  problematic	  aspects	  thereof.	  I	  will	  do	  so	  by	  addressing	  two	  main	  problems:	  First	  (1),	  the	  way	  in	  which	  recognition	  presupposes	  and	   reproduces	   its	   entities	   –	   that	   is,	   the	   objects,	   agents	   and	   ”identities”	   of	  recognition.	   Second	   (2),	   the	   way	   in	   which	   recognition	   reproduces	   the	   system	   of	  knowledge	  within	  which	   it	   features,	   that	   is,	   how	   it	   is	   reproductive	   of	   the	   current	  epistemic	   framework.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   these	   two	   problems	   reflect	   a	   reifying	  momentum	   in	   recognition	   that	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   afforded	   sufficient	   attention	   in	  international	   theory.	   In	   the	   last	   section,	   therefore,	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   relationship	  between	   recognition	   and	   reification,	   and	   will	   argue	   for	   the	   need	   to	   analyze	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   objects,	   agents	   and	   identities	   become	   recognizable	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  
Recognition	  presupposes	  and	  reproduces	  its	  objects	  and	  agents	  	  The	   first	  argument	  continues	   the	  previous	  discussion,	   regarding	   the	  way	   in	  which	  recognition	  depends	  on	  –	  and	  reproduces	  –	  differentiated	  and	  differentiable	  entities,	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agents,	   and	   identities.	   Behind	   the	   argument	   lies	   the	   following	   claim:	   The	   game	   of	  recognition	   –	   demanding,	   extending	   or	   receiving	   –	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   part	   of	   a	  constant	   political	   activity,	   through	   which	   agency	   is	   acquired	   and	   identities	   are	  formed.	   However,	   it	   is	   done	   so	   with	   a	   vision	   of	   “identity	   as	   the	   always	   already	  settled	  criterion	  of	  proper	  intersubjective	  relations.”172	  An	  identity	  is	  suggested	  and	  assumed,	   and	   this	   identity	   grounds	   and	  guides	   the	   carrier’s	   actions.	  The	   strife	   for	  recognition	  of	   identity	  or	  agency	  simulates	  an	   impossible	  goal	  of	   sovereignty	  over	  identity	  as	  the	  sovereignty	  over	  knowledge	  about	  who	  one	  actually	  is.	  The	  desire	  for	  sovereignty	  attempts	  to	  render	  the	  constant	  project	  of	  identity	  building	  a	  stable	  and	  a	  steady	  ground	  for	  action.	  This	  is	  a	  mistake.	  The	  following	  paragraphs	  elaborate	  on	  this.	  	  
Recognition	  assumes	  and	  strives	  for	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  identity	  and	  agency	  	  The	  argument	  that	  recognition	  assumes	  and	  strives	  for	  sovereignty	  in	  identity	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  paradox,	  given	  that,	  as	  described	  above,	  identity	  was	  supposed	  to	  evolve	  out	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  subject	  and	  its	  ”other”.	  Indeed,	  the	  entire	  body	  of	  recognition	   literature	   was	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   sovereign	   and	   isolated	  agency.	  Identity	  was	  neither	  a	  static	  fact,	  nor	  in	  any	  way	  contextually	  independent.	  What	   I	   refer	   to	   as	   sovereignty	   in	   identity,	   however,	   touches	   upon	   something	  different.	   While	   the	   constitutive	   theories	   of	   recognition	   view	   identity	   as	   deeply	  inter-­‐relational,	  they	  assume	  that	  identity	  at	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  time	  is	  ”knowable”.	  The	  quest	   for	  recognition	  contains	  a	  desire	  for	  the	  “sovereignty	   in	  knowledge;	   that	  is,	   in	   the	   prospect	   of	   arriving	   at	   a	   clear	   understanding	   of	  who	   you	   are	   and	   of	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  larger	  groups	  and	  communities	  to	  which	  you	  belong,	  and	  of	  securing	  the	  respectful	   recognition	  of	   these	  same	   facts	  by	  others.”	   In	   this	  sense	   the	   logic	  of	  “recognition	   is	   animated	   by	   a	   vision	   of	   sovereign	   agency,	   in	   which	   people	   are	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empowered	  by	  self-­‐knowledge	  and	  by	  the	  confirming	  recognition	  of	  others	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  who	  they	  really	  are”.173	  	  Projecting	   the	  possibility	  of	   sovereignty	   into	   the	   future,	  as	   something	   that	  may	  be	  accomplished	  and	  should	  be	  striven	  for,	  however,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  treats	  identity	  as	  independent	  of	  action,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  treats	  the	  actions	  of	  one’s	  self	  and	  of	  others	  as	   fully	  predictable.	   In	  his	   re-­‐reading	  of	  Hegel,	  Patchen	  Markell	  argues	  against	   the	  common	   understanding	   that	   Hegel	   assumes	   recognition	   to	   be	   a	   precondition	   of	  genuine	  agency	  and	  the	  action	  that	  follows	  from	  this	  agency,	  authentically	  one’s	  own	  action.	  This	  agency	  or	  identity,	  Markell	  argues,	  is	  not	  a	  condition	  or	  a	  state	  that	  can	  be	  secured	  or	  recognized	  in	  advance	  of	  action.	  Rather,	  Hegel’s	  view	  of	  action	  is	  much	  more	   complex.	  While	   action	   indeed	  originates	   out	   of	   a	   relationship	   of	   recognition,	  action	   outruns	   recognition,	   leaving	   it	   inevitably	   belated.174 	  Rather	   than	   simply	  originating	   from	   identity,	   action	   and	   practices	   are	   constitutive	   thereof.	   Identity	   is	  not	   simply	   the	   ground	   for	   action	   but	   is,	   rather,	   dependent	   upon	   actions	   and	   the	  discourses	  that	  surround	  it.	  It	  is	  the	  "results	  of	  action	  and	  speech	  in	  public”.	  It	  comes	  into	  being	   through	   the	   “public	  words	  and	  deeds	   through	  which	  actors	   ‘make	   their	  appearance’	   in	   the	   world.”175	  	   Since	   action	   will	   always	   be	   partly	   unpredictable,	  identity	  and	  agency	  are,	  and	  will	  remain,	  non-­‐sovereign.176	  	  By	   assuming	   and	   striving	   for	   sovereignty	   in	   terms	   of	   knowledge	   of	   identity,	   in	  Markell’s	   terms,	   recognition	   misses	   out	   on	   the	   “constitutive	   vulnerability	   to	   the	  unpredictable	  reactions	  and	  responses	  of	  others”.177	  Rather,	  recognition	  represents	  identity	  as	  an	  authoritative	  fact,	  a	  “fait	  accompli”,	  positing	  it	  as	  the	  source	  and	  guide	  of	  human	  actions	  and	  relations.	  This	  settled,	  “authentic”	  identity,	  however,	  does	  not	  exist,	  nor	  does	  the	  sovereignty	  in	  knowledge	  that	  assumes	  it.	  “[P]olitics,	  after	  all,	  is	  in	  part	  a	  response	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  vulnerability,	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  our	   identities	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are	  shaped	  in	  part	  through	  the	  unpredictable	  responses	  of	  other	  people:	  this	  is	  what	  makes	  being	  recognized	  by	  others	  seem	  so	  acutely	  important	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  trouble	   is	   that	   the	   politics	   of	   recognition	   responds	   to	   this	   fact	   by	   demanding	   that	  others	   recognize	   us	   as	   whom	   we	   already	   really	   are.”178	  Recognizing	   identities	  depends	  upon	  an	   impossible	  goal	  of	   sovereignty	  over	   identity	  as	   sovereignty	  over	  the	   knowledge	   about	   who	   one	   already	   is.	   The	   desire	   for	   sovereignty	   attempts	   to	  make	  the	  ever-­‐ongoing	  project	  of	  identity	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  stable	  and	  a	  steady	  ground	  for	  action.	  	  	  Despite	   its	   good	   intentions,	   recognition	  misunderstands	   the	   relationship	   between	  identity	  and	  action	  and	   is	  blind	   to	   the	   “non-­‐sovereign”	   character	  of	  human	  action,	  that	  is,	  the	  “practical	   limits	  imposed	  upon	  us	  by	  the	  openness	  and	  unpredictability	  of	   the	   future”,	   its	   contingency	   and	   chance.179	  Rather	   than	   striving	   to	   eliminate	   the	  contingency	   and	   aiming	   for	   this	   kind	   of	   sovereignty,	   identity	  must	   be	   understood	  without	  this	  kind	  of	  absolute	  rigidity,	  and	  as	  fundamentally	  incomplete.180	  	  	  Recognition	  assumes	   it	   to	  be	  possible	   to	  know	  who	  we	  and	  others	  are;	   it	  assumes	  sovereignty	   in	  knowledge	  in	   identity,	  and	  recognition	  of	  this	  knowledge	  by	  others.	  Recognition	  assumes	  that	   this	   identity	  will	  guide	  and	  ground	  our	  actions,	  and	  that	  knowledge	  about	  the	  one	  will	  bring	  knowledge	  about	  the	  other.	  If	  we	  know	  who	  an	  actor	  is,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  know	  what	  the	  actor	  will	  do.	  However,	  recognition	  misses	  out	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  identity	  not	  only	  grounds	  action,	  but,	  more	  so,	  it	  is	  constituted	  by	  it,	   including	   the	   performative	   claims	   to	   recognition	   themselves.	   Further,	   since	  human	  action	  never	  can	  rid	  itself	  of	  its	  non-­‐sovereign	  character	  –	  that	  is,	  such	  action	  will	  always	  be	  partly	  unpredictable	  –	  the	  identity	  that	  is	  formed	  by	  these	  actions	  can	  never	  be	   fully	  sovereign.	  There	   is	  a	   limit	   to	  what	  we	  can	  expect	  our	  knowledge	  of	  ourselves	   and	   of	   others	   to	   do	   for	   us.	   The	   pursuit	   of	   recognition	   expresses	   an	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aspiration	   to	   sovereignty	   and	  plays	   into	   a	   framework	  where	   identity	   is	   the	  always	  
already	  settled	  criterion	  of	  proper	  intersubjective	  relations.	  	  	  
The	  benchmark	  of	  misrecognition	  	  	  Another	  way	  in	  which	  recognition	  assumes	  its	  objects	  –	  besides	  sovereign	  identity	  or	  agency	  –	  comes	  to	  the	  fore	  through	  the	  question	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  recognition.	  In	  his	   work,	   Charles	   Taylor	   is	   keen	   on	   keeping	   recognition	   from	   essentializing	  identities,	  for	  example	  through	  patronizingly	  valuing	  minorities	  simply	  due	  to	  their	  oppressed	   status.	   While	   doing	   this,	   however,	   Taylor	   still	   needs	   identity	   as	   a	  benchmark	   by	   which	   to	   judge	   the	   various	   recognitive	   structures	   that	   are	  available.181	  It	  is	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  identity	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  recognition	  is	  measured;	  
misrecognition	   understood	   as	   the	   failure	   to	   appropriately	   respect	   people	   or	  collectives	   for	   who	   they	   “really	   are”.	   However,	   this	   understanding	   of	   injustice	   as	  misrecognition	   is	   “only	   intelligible	   if	   recognition	   itself	   is	  a	  matter	  of	   the	  respectful	  cognition	   of	   an	   identity	   that	   is	   in	   some	   sense	   independent	   of	   the	   vicissitudes	   of	  human	   interaction,	   of	   the	   political	   play	   of	   recognition	   and	  misrecognition	   –	   for	   if	  identities	   were	   not	   independent	   in	   this	   way,	   they	   could	   not	   serve	   as	   reliable	  benchmarks	   by	   which	   to	   judge	   the	   adequacy	   of	   particular	   recognitive	   act	   of	  structures.”182	  	  Recognition	   presupposes	   its	   entities	   through	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   assumes	   and	  strives	   for	   sovereignty	   in	   identity	   and	   agency,	   and	   through	   the	   way	   in	   which	  misrecognition	  assumes	  an	  existing	  identity	  as	  a	  benchmark	  for	  failed	  recognition.	  A	  further	   indication	   of	   how	   recognition	   presupposes	   its	   entities	   is	   reflected	   in	   Axel	  Honneth’s	  argument	  that	  recognition	  indicates	  the	  transition	  from	  “potential”	  to	  an	  “actual”	   identity. 183 	  The	   pre-­‐existence	   of	   a	   ”potential”	   identity	   in	   this	   case	   is	  necessary	   as	   a	   criterion	   for	   judging	   the	   adequacy	   of	   the	   act	   of	   recognition,	  which	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would	   lead	   into	  an	   "actualized"	   identity.184	  That	   is,	   even	   if	   the	   “Self”	  only	  emerges	  through	   interaction	  with	  others,	   this	  constructive	   theory	  of	  recognition	  still	   seems	  to,	   somehow,	   depend	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   “potential”	   entity,	   identity,	   or	   agency.	  Otherwise,	   again,	   there	  can	  be	  no	  way	   to	  assess	  when	  recognition	   is	   successful	  or	  has	   failed.	   When	   Honneth,	   as	   in	   a	   recent	   chapter	   on	   recognition	   in	   international	  relations,	  argues	  that	  ”[t]he	  path	  for	  civilizing	  international	  relations	  primarily	   lies	  in	  sustained	  efforts	  at	  conveying	  respect	  and	  esteem	  for	  the	  collective	  identities	  of	  other	   countries”,185 	  he	   is	   implying	   the	   actualization	   of	   the	   potential	   collective	  identities	   of	   these	   other	   countries.	   Or,	   as	   he	   argued,	   against	  Markell,	   a	   few	   years	  earlier,	  “the	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  represents	  a	  struggle	  for	  the	  social	  articulation	  of	  preexistent	  knowledge.”186	  The	  “preexisting	  knowledge”	  of	  a	   “potential”	   identity	  implies	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  pre-­‐differentiated	  entity	  awaiting	  recognition.	  	  	  Until	  this	  point,	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  referred	  to	  recognition	  in	  general	  terms.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Markell,	  however,	  much	  of	  the	  ”dynamic	  is	  the	  same	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	   assumption	   of	   state	   sovereignty,	   viewing	   it	   as	   a	   completed,	   authoritative	   fact,	  instead	   of	   an	   on-­‐going,	   open	   ended	   activity”. 187 	  In	   the	   forthcoming	   sections,	  therefore,	   I	   wish	   to	   continue	   to	   expand	   upon	   the	   possibilities	   of	   this	   critique	   of	  individual	  recognition	  at	  an	  international	  level.	  	  
International	  recognition	  assumes	  the	  existence	  of	  preconstituted	  actors	  as	  a	  baseline	  
for	  its	  explanatory	  endeavor	  
	  As	  we	  saw	  above,	  the	  game	  of	  recognition	  –	  demanding,	  extending	  or	  receiving	  –	  is	  conceived	   as	   a	   part	   of	   the	   constant	   political	   activity	   through	   which	   agency	   is	  acquired	  and	  through	  which	   identities	  are	   formed.	  However,	   this	   is	  achieved	  via	  a	  vision	  of	   “identity	  as	   the	  always	  already	  settled	  criterion	  of	  proper	   intersubjective	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relations.”188	  An	   identity	   is	   asserted	   and	   assumed	   that	   grounds	   and	   guides	   the	  carrier’s	   actions.	   The	   theory	   of	  moral	   recognition	   in	   this	   sense,	   seems	   to	   ”assume	  that	   the	   entities	   to	   be	   morally	   recognized	   already	   are	   given,	   be	   they	   national	  communities	   of	   (sic!	   or)	   cultures.	   It	   is	   therefore	   tempting	   to	   argue	   that	   moral	  recognition	   actually	   depends	   on	   prior	   political	   recognition	   of	   these	   entities,	  constituting	  them	  as	  bounded	  containers	  of	  distinct	  cultures.”189	  That	  is,	  in	  order	  to	  extend	  recognition	  to	  multiple	  varieties	  of	  different	  states,	  communities,	  or	  cultures,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  distinguishable	  and	  ready	  to	  recognize,	  i.e.	  recognizable.	  They	  need	  to	   have	   been	   politically	   recognized	   –	   that	   is,	   ”existent”	   beforehand,	   via	   the	  constructive	  act	  of	  political	  recognition.	  	  However,	   while	   theories	   of	   political	   recognition	   view	   acts	   of	   mutual	   political	  recognition	  as	  constitutive	  for	  the	  status	  of	  the	  state	  –	  as	  we	  saw	  above	  in	  Honneth’s	  reference	  to	  the	  “potential”	  becoming	  “actual”	  –	  they	  also	  need	  to	  assume	  an	  actor	  that	  can	  enter	  into	  these	  games	  of	  recognition.	  That	  is,	  political	  recognition	  needs	  to	  assume	   the	   ”existence	   of	   pre-­‐constituted	   actors	   as	   a	   baseline	   for	   [its]	   explanatory	  endeavor”.190	  Or,	   in	   the	   words	   of	   Oliver	   Kessler	   and	   Benjamin	   Herboth	   to	   ”frame	  politics	   in	   terms	   of	   recognition	   is	   to	   presuppose	   a	   world	   a	   priori	   divided	   into	   a	  multiplicity	  of	  distinct	  and	  separated	  collectivities”.191	  	  	  
International	  recognition	  reproduces	  a	  social	  ontology	  of	  differentiated	  agency	  
	  While	   the	   constitutive	   theory	   of	   recognition	   binds	   the	   existence	   of	   international	  agents	   to	   the	   intersubjective	   act	   of	   recognition,	   it	   is	   still	   dependent	   upon	  differentiated	   and	   differentiable	   entities	   prior	   to	   that	   recognition.	   It	   depends	   on	  “potential”	   entities	   that	   can	  be	   “actualized”	   through	   recognition.	  As	  we	   saw	  above	  with	  Wendt’s	   vision	   of	   a	   “World	   State”,	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   international	   system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Markell	  2003:	  59f	  189	  Bartelson	  2013:	  119,	  my	  italics.	  190	  Bartelson	  2013:	  113,	  114.	  191	  Kessler/Herboth	  2013:	  157.	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from	   one	   consisting	   of	   separate	   sovereign	   states	   stuck	   in	   a	   condition	   devoid	   of	  overarching	   political,	  moral	   and	   legal	   authority	   towards	   an	   overarching	   collective	  identity	   was	   dependent	   upon	   differentiated,	   bounded	   communities	   seeking	  recognition	   for	   their	   individual	   particularity.192	  It	   builds	   upon	   an	   assumption	   of	   a	  preexisting	   difference	   between	   potential	   subjects.	   Rather	   than	   transcending	   this	  differentiated	  logic	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  recognition	  presupposes	  it,	  and,	  by	  extending	   responsibilities	   and	   rights	   to	   the	   differentiated	   agents,	   recognition	  reproduces	  them	  and	  the	  system	  in	  which	  they	  exist.	  Recognition	  thereby	  solidifies	  boundaries	   around	   and	   between	   political,	   social	   and	   cultural	   collectivities,	  reproducing	   a	   differentiated	   social	   logic.	   Recognition	   perpetuates	   the	   dilemma	   of	  humankind	  divided	  into	  bounded	  groups,	  ensuring	  that	  they	  	  “remain	  locked	  in	  their	  cycles	  of	  identity-­‐based	  conflict."193	  	  Rather	   than	   simply	   assuming	   sovereignty	   in	   identity	   in	   the	   way	   described	   for	  recognition	  above,	  the	  concept	  of	  sovereignty	  functions	  in	  international	  recognition	  as	   a	   source	   of	   self-­‐identity	   and	   a	   principle	   of	   self-­‐recognition,	   allowing	   for	   a	  particular	  kind	  of	  actor	  to	  become	  a	  possible	  object	  of	  recognition,	  while	  excluding	  those	   who	   do	   not	   conform	   to	   this	   ”symbolic	   form”	   from	   the	   realm	   of	   possible	  recognition.194	  In	   the	   case	   of	   Pakistan,	   which	   we	   will	   revisit	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	  there	  had	  been	  a	  long	  process	  of	  consolidating	  the	  British	  Indian	  Muslim	  population	  into	  a	  sovereign	  "nation",	  on	  behalf	  of	  which	  a	  state	  could	  be	  claimed.	  In	  Israel,	  the	  "Jewish	  National	  Home"	  had	  constituted	  an	   intimate	  part	  of	  pre-­‐State	  politics,	  and	  the	   distinct	   nature,	   particular	   identity	   and	   sovereign	   agency	   of	   the	   Jewish	   people	  had	  hardly	  been	  a	  matter	  of	  dispute	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  growing	  political	  rift.	  The	  subsequent	  processes	  of	  international	  recognition	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  took	  the	  claim	  by	  the	  nationalist	  movements	   regarding	   the	  particularity	  and	  sovereignty	   in	   terms	  of	  the	   identity	   and	   agency	   of	   their	   nations,	   and	   “actualized”	   them	   into	   international	  “reality.”	  It	  would,	  however,	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  the	  recognition	  of	  this	  “Muslim	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Homeland”	  and	  “Jewish	  National	  Home”	  as	  the	  recognition	  of	  pre-­‐existing,	  sovereign	  entities.	  More	  on	  this	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  	  	  	  
"Recognizability	  before	  recognition”:	  The	  reproduction	  of	  epistemological	  frameworks	  	  While	   the	   previous	   section	   argued	   that	   recognition	   presupposed	   its	   objects,	  agencies	   and	   “identities”,	   this	   section	   will	   continue	   to	   argue	   that	   recognition	  reproduces	   these	  agencies	  and	   identities	  as	  well	  as	   the	  epistemic	  system	   in	  which	  they	   exist.	   In	   Judith	   Butler’s	   words:	   "One	   'exists'	   not	   only	   by	   virtue	   of	   being	  recognized,	   but,	   in	   a	   prior	   sense,	   by	   being	   recognizable."195	  Recognizability	  always	  
comes	  before	  recognition.	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  recognition,	  a	  person,	  state,	  organization,	  category,	   identity,	   et	   cetera	   needs	   to	   be	   recognizable	   as	   such	   within	   the	   current	  existing	   framework,	   in	   the	   current	   power	   setting	   and	   within	   its	   scheme	   of	  classification.	   “Since	   recognition	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   acknowledgement	   presupposes	   a	  prior	   identification	   of	   the	   actor	   to	   be	   recognized,	   and	   since	   such	   identification	   in	  turn	   presupposes	   the	   possibility	   of	   distinguishing	   those	   actors	   that	   are	   fit	   for	  recognition	   from	   those	   who	   are	   not,	   actual	   practices	   of	   recognition	   will	   always	  depend	   on	   underlying	   schemes	   of	   classification.”196	  Further,	   since	   each	   epistemic	  framework	  and	  each	  scheme	  of	  classification	  is	  dependent	  upon	  context,	  that	  is,	  they	  are	   historically	   and	   spatially	   contingent,	   the	   process	   of	   recognition	   will	   tend	   to	  reproduce	  the	  bias	  of	  that	  particular	  epistemic	  framework.	  As	  recognizability	  comes	  before	   recognition	   and	   recognition	   in	   this	  way	   depends	   on	   the	   current	   epistemic	  framework,	   the	  consequences	  are	   that	  existing	   forms	  –	   the	   “present-­‐beings”	  –	  will	  be	  maintained;	   powerful	   groups	   are	   recognized	   as	   ”authentic”	   representatives	   for	  legal	   or	   political	   purposes,	   and	   their	   status	   is	   thereby	   reinforced.	   In	   this	   sense,	  recognition	   is	   built	   upon	   an	   inherently	   conservative	   logic:	   Since	   recognition	  depends	  on	   recognizability,	   it	   is	  dependent	  on	   the	  epistemic	   range	  allowed	   for	  by	  the	   present	   context	   and	   the	   underlying	   classificatory	   schemes.	   If	   something	   falls	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outside	   of	   the	   epistemic	   range	   of	   the	   possible	   object	   of	   recognition,	   it	  will	   have	   a	  harder	   time	   becoming	   recognized.	   While	   I	   am	   not	   arguing	   that	   the	   agents	   are	  thereby	   locked	  within	   this	   epistemic	   framework	   forever	   –	   agents	  may	   be	   able	   to	  change	   the	   framework	   in	   which	   they	   operate,	   as	   shown	   by	   the	   example	   of	   the	  Muslim	   League,	   below,	   and	   in	   the	   following	   chapter	   –	   I	   am	   arguing	   that	   more	  attention	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  recognizability	  comes	  prior	  to	  recognition	  from	   an	   epistemological	   point	   of	   view.	   Unless	   the	   process	   by	   which	   objects	   and	  agents	   become	   recognizable	   –	   or	   make	   themselves	   recognizable	   by	   changing	   the	  epistemic	   framework	   –	   is	   given	   more	   attention	   the	   framework	   of	   recognition	   is	  bound	  to	  reproduce	  itself	  and	  the	  bias	  inherent	  in	  that	  particular	  framework.	  	  	  The	   next	   chapter	   will	   deal	   in	   greater	   detail	   with	   the	   case	   of	   the	   British	   Indian	  Muslims	  and	  the	  international	  recognition	  of	  Pakistan.	  Allow	  me,	  however,	  to	  briefly	  illustrate	   the	   point	   of	   recognizability	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	   example.	   Pakistan	  was	  claimed,	  constituted	  and	  subsequently	  recognized	  as	  a	  ”Muslim	  national	  home”,	  that	  is,	   it	   differentiated	   itself	   from	   its	   Indian	   neighbor	   mainly	   through	   the	   distinction	  between	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim	  populations,	   land	   and	  property.	   The	  Muslims	  of	  South	  Asia	  were	  a	  very	  heterogeneous	  group,	  speaking	  multiple	  different	  languages,	  in	  possession	  of	  very	  different	   social	   statuses,	  practicing	  a	  wide	   range	  of	  different	  rituals,	   with	   a	   broad	   register	   of	   different	   historiographical	   trajectories.	   They	   had	  been	  a	  heterogeneous	  group	  throughout	  the	  two	  centuries	  of	  British	  Raj.	  During	  the	  Raj,	  however,	  the	  British	  had	  created	  different	  governing	  mechanisms,	  all	  of	  which	  refleted	  a	  particularist	  epistemic	  system.	  For	  example,	  as	  British	  India	  gained	  more	  ”democratic”	   features,	  as	  the	  voting	  rights	  were	  expanded	  and	  the	  political	  system	  of	   representation	   was	   ”fitted”	   onto	   the	   India	   population,	   this	   was	   accomplished	  through	   membership	   of	   groups.	   That	   is,	   the	   Indian	   population	   was	   divided	   into	  groups	   of	   Muslims,	   Hindus,	   Sikhs,	   Christians,	   et	   cetera,	   and	   these	   groups	   were	  accordingly	   provided	   with	   “proper”	   political	   representation.	   It	   was	   not	   that	   the	  British	  thought	  that	  all	  Muslims	  were	  the	  same,	  but	  this	  was	  the	  epistemic	  system	  in	  place	   in	   order	   to	   govern	   the	   300	   million	   strong	   population	   of	   the	   South	   Asian	  subcontinent.	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  The	   Muslims	   of	   British	   India	   had	   been	   made	   recognizable	   through	   a	   British	  epistemic	   system,	   categorizing	   them	   into	   a	   particularity.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   British	  reign,	   ”Muslim”	  was	  an	  eligible	  political	  category,	  one	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  which	  rights	  could	  be	  claimed	  and	  responsibilities	  could	  be	  shouldered.	  That	  process	  had	  been	  a	  slow,	   intricate	   and	   complex	   part	   of	   the	   British	   Empire	   which	   had	   made	   these	  ”Muslims”	  visible	  and	  recognizable	  by	  only	  leaving	  one	  option	  of	  belonging	  open	  in	  the	   census,	   which	   was	   the	   main	   instrument	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   quantifying	   the	  population.	  You	  were	  either	  a	  Muslim,	  or	  a	  Hindu,	  or	  a	  Sikh,	  (et	  cetera)	  but	  nothing	  in	   between.	   This	   group	   had	   then	   been	   accorded	   political	   importance,	   as	   they	  determined	   the	   quota	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   representation	   in	   the	   local	   parliament.	  Further,	   the	   group	   developed	   even	   clearer	   boundaries,	   as	   these	   British	   Indian	  Muslims	  were	   represented	   by	   a	   single	   party	   during	   the	   negotiation	   of	   the	   British	  Indian	  partition,	   alongside	   the	   Indian	  National	  Congress	  of	  Nehru	  and	  Gandhi	  and	  the	  British	  government.	  	  	  Recognition,	  in	  this	  sense,	  followed	  a	  top-­‐down	  process,	  with	  the	  British	  making	  the	  British	  Indian	  Muslims	  recognizable	  as	  a	  subject.	  However,	  as	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  show,	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  recognizable	  was	  as	  much	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  process	  as	  a	  top-­‐down	  one.	  The	  claim,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  political	  party	  of	  the	  All-­‐India	  Muslim	  League	   and	   its	   leader	   Muhammad	   Ali	   Jinnah,	   that	   they	   spoke	   for	   all	   of	   India’s	  Muslims,	   and	   their	   struggle	   to	   sideline	   representational	   claims	   by	   other	   Muslim	  groups	  and	  by	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress,	  are	  relevant	  in	  this	  context.	  While	  the	  British	  had	  been	  instrumental	  in	  creating	  a	  British	  Indian	  Muslim	  subject,	  Jinnah	  and	  the	  Muslim	  League	  continued	  to	  claim	  political	  sovereignty	  on	  behalf	  of	  this	  subject	  by	  arguing	  for	  its	  status	  as	  a	  nation	  with	  the	  right	  to	  statehood	  and	  not	  as	  a	  “mere	  minority”	  among	  other	  minorities.197	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  See	   Jinnah’s	  presidential	  speech	  at	   the	  Lahore	  meeting	  of	   the	  Muslim	  League	   in	  1940,	  where	  he	  argues	   for	   the	   “Two-­‐Nation	   Theory”	   declaring	   the	   fundamental	   difference	   between	   Muslims	   and	  Hindus	  and	  the	  impossibility	  of	  accommodating	  both	  in	  the	  same	  state.	  This	  will	  also	  be	  analyzed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
	   73	  
To	  be	  clear,	  I	  am	  not	  implying	  that	  the	  British	  ”invented”	  the	  British	  Indian	  Muslims	  that	  then	  came	  to	  constitute	  and	  populate	  the	  future	  state	  of	  Pakistan.	  Around	  100	  million	   individuals	   identified	   as	   Muslims	   at	   the	   time	   of	   Indian	   partition,	   and	   60	  million	  of	  these	  came	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  state.	  What	  I	  am	  saying,	  however,	  is	   that	   in	   order	   to	   claim	   statehood,	   to	   claim	  and	  be	   recognized	   as	   an	   agent	   in	   the	  international	  system,	  an	  entity	  needs	  to	  be	  recognizable	  as	  a	  state,	  or	  as	  in	  this	  case	  as	  a	  nation	  with	  the	  right	  of	  statehood.	  This	  process	  of	  recognizability,	  or	  rendering	  an	   entity	   recognizable,	   in	   which	   the	   British	   partook	  with	   reference	   to	   the	   Indian	  Muslims,	  was	  a	  complex,	  power-­‐ridden	  process.	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  framework	  of	   recognition	   in	   international	   scholarship	   today	   is	   capable	   of	   according	   due	  sensitivity	   to	   these	   processes,	   but	   argue	   that	   recognition	   rather	   assumes	   these	  entities	   –	   such	  as	   the	  British	   Indian	  Muslims	  –	   to	  be	   existing	  prior	   to	   recognition.	  This	  way	  the	  processes	  of	  differentiation	  are	  sidelined,	  “forgotten”	  and	  reified	  at	  the	  moment	   of	   international	   recognition.	   International	   recognition	   stabilized	   the	  category	   of	  British	   Indian	  Muslims	   into	   a	  Pakistani	   state,	   and	   thereby	   concretised	  the	  acclaimed	  difference	   from	  the	   Indian	  non-­‐Muslims.	  A	  difference	   that	  had	  been	  the	  product	  of	  struggle	  and	  power	  games	  was	  reified	  into	  international	  law.	  	  	  An	  analogy	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  mythological	  figure	  of	  Medusa.	  As	  a	  Gorgon,	  Medusa	  is	  not	  one	  of	  the	  most	  endearing	  characters	  of	  Greek	  mythology,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  her	  hair	   is	  made	  up	  of	   snakes	   is	   the	   less	   troubling	  part	   of	   her	   character.	  Her	  most	  distinctive	  feature	  is	  not	  her	  hair,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  her	  gaze	  turns	  people	  into	  stone.198	  Like	  Medusa,	  I	  see	  recognition	  as	  leaving	  its	  objects	  frozen	  in	  a	  world	  that	  will	   forget	   about	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  objects	  were	  ever	   alive.	   Like	  Medusa,	   there	   is	   a	  power	   inherent	   in	   recognition	   to	   reify	   its	   objects.	   I	   believe	   that	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	  relationship	  between	  recognition	  and	  reification	   is	  often	  omitted	   from	  discussions	  on	   recognition	   in	   IR,	  where	   the	   focus	   tends	   to	  be	  much	  more	  on	   the	   empowering	  aspects	  of	  recognition.	  The	  last	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  therefore	  proceeds	  to	  investigate	  this	  relationship.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  See	  also	  Appiah	  2005:	  110	  for	  another	  Medusa	  analogy.	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Recognition	  and	  Reification	  	  ”All	  reification	  is	  forgetting.”	  Horkheimer/Adorno199	  	  	  
Reification	  	  Medusa’s	  gaze	  of	  recognition	  turns	  what	  it	  sees	  into	  stone	  and	  forgets	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  objects	  came	  to	  be	  recognizable	  as	  such	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  I	  will	  refer	  to	   this	   forgetfulness	   as	   a	   process	   of	   reification.	   It	   is	   the	   forgetfulness	   of	   the	  processes	   through	   which	   objects	   of	   recognition	   emerge,	   how	   they	   become	  intelligible	   and	   possible	   to	   ”know”.	   That	   is,	   I	   refer	   to	   reification	   as	   the	   process	   of	  sidelining	   genealogical	   sensitivity.	   The	   argument	   is	   that	   there	   is	   a	   relationship	  between	   recognition	   and	   reification	   that	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   engaged	   with	   in	   detail	   in	  international	  scholarship.	  	  	  The	   terminology	  of	   reification	  has,	   in	   itself,	   been	  a	  part	  of	   (international)	  political	  theorizing	   for	   at	   least	   five	   decades	   since	   Peter	   Berger	   and	   Thomas	   Luckmann	  opened	  up	  a	  broader	  constructivist	  approach	   to	  social	   reality	   in	   the	  mid	  1960s.200	  ”Reification	   implies	   that	   man	   is	   capable	   of	   forgetting	   his	   own	   authorship	   of	   the	  human	  world,	   and	   further,	   that	   the	   dialectic	   between	  man,	   the	   producer,	   and	   his	  products	   is	   lost	   to	   consciousness”.201	  Reification	   perceives	   the	   products	   of	   human	  activities	   as	   if	   they	   were	   something	   other	   than	   human	   products,	   detaching	   the	  individual	  as	   the	  author	  or	   the	   ”maker”	  of	   the	  world202	  from	   the	  product	  of	  his	  or	  her	  making.	  The	  term	  has	  since	  been	  used	  parallel	  to,	  and	  synonymously	  with,	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  Horkheimer/Adorno	  (2002(1944)):	  191.	  200	  Berger/Luckmann	  1991(1966).	  201	  Berger/Luckmann	  1991(1966):	  89	  202	  Onuf	  1989.	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terms	   such	   as	   naturalization	   and	   essentialization,	   or	   objectification,	  instrumentalization,	  alienation	  or	  ”thingification”	  (Verdinglichung).203	  	  Karl	  Marx	  has	  provided	  a	   strong	  reference	   for	  writings	   regarding	   reification,	  even	  though	   analyses	   of	   reification	   processes	   had	   been	   part	   of	   different	   philosophical	  traditions	  long	  before	  him.	  Marx	  writes	  that	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  capitalist	  society	  the	   ”social	   character	  of	   activity,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   social	   form	  of	   the	  product,	   and	   the	  share	  of	  individuals	  in	  the	  production	  here	  appears	  as	  something	  alien	  and	  objective	  …	   the	   social	   connection	   between	   persons	   is	   transformed	   into	   a	   social	   relations	  between	   things.”204	  Marx	   describes	   the	   loss	   of	   the	   social	   character	   of	   activity,	   an	  alienation	   of	   the	   producer	   from	   the	   activity	   of	   labor	   and	   a	   detachment	   from	   the	  product	   of	   labor	   that	   accompanies	   capitalist	   production	   and	   the	   exchange	   of	  commodities.	  	  Theodor	   Adorno	   continued	   that	   reified	   concepts	   describe	   social	   phenomena	   as	   if	  they	  had	  the	  properties	  to	  which	  the	  concepts	  refer,	  as	  if	  they	  were	  identical	  to	  the	  object	   they	  describe,	  and	  are	  ”cut	  off	   from	  the	   living	  subjects	  which	  constitute	   the	  substance	  of	  concepts.”205	  He	  calls	  this	  reified	  thinking	  identity-­‐thinking.	  ”To	  believe	  that	  a	  concept	  really	  covers	  its	  object,	  when	  it	  does	  not,	  it	  to	  believe	  falsely	  that	  the	  object	   is	  the	  equal	  of	   its	  concept.”206	  Reification,	   for	  Adorno,	  was	  a	  forgetfulness	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  theoretical	  concepts	  and	  the	  ”real-­‐world”	  things	  they	  claim	  to	  describe	  or	  refer	  to,	  thereby	  ”erasing	  the	  distinction	  between	  concepts	  and	  things	  in	   themselves”.207	  Reification	   thus	   emerged	   as	   a	   process	   of	   forgetting	   about	   the	  social	  nature	  of	  concepts,	  things	  and	  objects	  and	  the	  assumption	  that	  they	  are	  equal	  to	  that	  which	  they	  refer	  to.	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  Guillaume	  2007;	  Hanrieder	  2011;	  Elman	  2005;	  Fraser	  2000;	   for	  a	   critical	  discussion	  on	   the	  use	  and	  misuse	  of	  the	  term	  prior	  to	  Adorno	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ”mistaken”	  attribution	  of	  the	  term	  to	  Hegel	  and	  Marx,	  see	  Rose	  2014(1978)):	  36ff.	  204	  Marx	  1972(1963):	  157;	  see	  also:	  Rose	  2014(1978):	  40.	  205	  Adorno	  1964:	  533f.	  206	  Rose	  2014(1978):	  59.	  207	  Levine	  2012:	  64.	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The	  reifying	  power	  of	  recognition	  	  I	   will	   not	   be	   the	   first	   to	   investigate	   the	   relationship	   between	   recognition	   and	  reification.	  Axel	  Honneth	  has	  extended	  his	  work	  on	  recognition	  by	  connecting	  it,	  or	  rather,	   the	   forgetfulness	   of	   it,	   to	   reification.208	  My	   point,	   however,	   will	   not	   be	   so	  much	   that	   reification	   is	   the	   forgetfulness	  of	   recognition,	   but,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   that	  recognition	  has	  a	  reifying	  power.	  	  Honneth	  had	  argued	  that	  mutual,	  ”intersubjective”	  recognition	  between	  individuals	  was	   absolutely	   central	   to	   the	   identity	   formation	   of	   the	   human	   subject.	   He	  understands	   reification	   as	   a	   process	   of	   forgetting	   about	   the	   dependency	   on	   social	  relations,	  human	  cognition	   ”delud[ing]	   itself	   that	   it	  has	  become	  autonomous	  of	   all	  non-­‐epistemic	   prerequisites”	   that	   is,	   independent	   of	   the	   producer’s	   role	   in	   the	  making	   of	   the	   objects	   of	   knowledge.209	  Similarly	   to	   Berger	   and	   Luckmann,	   above,	  Honneth	  points	  out	  ”that	  knowledge	  of	  the	  true	  was	  itself	  dependent	  on	  the	  making	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  that	  knowledge.”210	  	  For	   Honneth,	   it	   is	   an	   ”annul[ation	   of]	   the	   form	   of	   elementary	   recognition	   that	  ensures	  that	  we	  existentially	  experience	  other	  humans	  as	  the	  other	  of	  our	  self”,	  it	  is	  a	   forgetfulness	   of	   the	   primal	   recognition	   that	   two	   humans	   accord	   each	   other	   in	   a	  fundamental	   process	   of	   intersubjective	   interaction. 211 	  ”[This]	   ’forgetfulness	   of	  recognition’	  can	  now	  be	  termed	  reification.	   I	   thereby	  mean	  to	   indicate	  the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  lose	  consciousness	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  we	  owe	  our	  knowledge	  and	  cognition	   of	   other	   persons	   to	   an	   antecedent	   stance	   of	   empathic	   engagement	   and	  recognition”.212	  In	   this	  sense,	   the	  affective	  attachment	   that	  recognition	  reflects	   is	  a	  precondition	   for	   any	   kind	   of	   subsequent	   cognition	   of	   the	  world	   and	   society.	   This	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  Honneth	  2008.	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  Honneth	  2008:	  56.	  210	  See	  Giambattista	  Vico	  and	  his	  principle	  of	  “verum-­‐factum”,	   in:	   Introduction	  by	  Martin	  Jay:	  5,	  vgl.	  1988:	  Fin-­‐d	  siècle	  Socialism	  and	  Other	  essays).	  211	  Honneth	  2008:	  154.	  212	  Honneth	  2008:	  56.	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attachment	   is	  what	   is	   forgotten	  and	   lost	   in	   the	   reification	  process.	  Reification	   is	   a	  process	  of	  detachment.	  Recognition	  one	  of	  attachment.	  The	  relationship	  which	  Honneth	  sees	  between	  recognition	  and	  reification	  is	  thus	  an	  inverted	  one.	  Recognition	   is	   fundamental	   to	   	  –	  and	  precedes	  –	   	   the	  possibilities	  of	  human	  cognition	  of	  the	  Self	  and	  of	  the	  world.	  Reification	  is	  the	  process	  of	  forgetting	  this	  interrelational	  dependency,	  allowing	  for	  humans	  to	  treat	  each	  other	  as	  ”things”,	  since	  they	  have	  forgotten	  that	  they	  are	  dependent	  upon	  one	  another.	  Reification	  is	  about	   detachment,	   about	   forgetfulness	   of	   the	   dependency	   of	   attachment	   through	  recognition.	  However,	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  recognition	  equals	  attachment,	  and	  that	  both	  are	   lost	   in	   the	   reification	   process,	   does	   not	   that	   attachment	   assume	   a	   prior	  separateness,	   or	   a	   prior	   differentiation	   between	   the	   subjects	   and	   the	   concepts?	  What	  would	  otherwise	  be	  attached?	  A	  differentiation	  is	  after	  all,	  what	  ”distinguishes	  attachment	  from	  fusion	  where	  no	  boundaries	  between	  self	  and	  other	  can	  be	  found.	  And	   so	   differentiation	   is	   as	   much	   a	   condition	   of	   attachment	   …	   as	   it	   is	   a	  consequence”.213	  While	   Honneth	   argues	   that	   differentiation	   and	   detachment	   come	  with	   reification,	   and	   that	   this	   phenomenon	   is	   thus	   the	   opposite	   of	   recognition,	   I	  argue	   that	   this	   differentiation	   is	   a	   precondition	   for,	   and	   a	   consequence	   of,	  recognition,	   since	   it	   presupposes	   and	   reproduces	   differentiated	   entities	   to	   form	  attachments	  and	  to	  recognize	  each	  other.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  After	   sketching	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   recognition	   has	   featured	   in	   international	  scholarship,	   I	   argued	   in	   this	   chapter	   that	   there	   are	   two	   problems	   to	   the	   logic	   of	  recognition.	  First,	   recognition	  presupposes	  and	   reproduces	   its	   entities,	   that	   is,	   the	  objects,	  agents	  and	  ”identities”	  of	  recognition.	  This	  seemed	  like	  a	  paradox,	  since	  the	  main	   argument	   put	   forward	   by	   thinkers	   of	   recognition	   posited	   that	   the	   objects,	  agents	   and	   ”identities”	   were	   not	   sovereign	   in	   and	   of	   themselves,	   or	   in	   any	   way	  isolated	  from	  their	  surroundings,	  but	  that	  they	  developed	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  mutual	  recognition	   between	   the	   ”self”	   and	   the	   ”other”.	   Recognition	   was	   a	   relational	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	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inherently	  social	  endeavor.	  My	  argument,	  however,	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  substance	  of	  a	  preexisting	  identity,	  but	  of	  identity	  itself	  as	  something	  which	  can	  be	   known	   once	   and	   for	   all,	   which	   grounds	   action	   and	   functions	   as	   a	   benchmark	  against	   which	   successful	   or	   failed	   recognition	   could	   be	   measured.	   Recognition	   in	  this	   sense	   assumes	   the	   possibility	   of,	   and	   strives	   for	   sovereignty	   in,	   identity	   and	  agency,	   the	   “potential”	  becoming	   “actual”.	  The	  pursuit	  of	   recognition	  expresses	  an	  aspiration	   toward	   sovereignty,	   and	   plays	   into	   a	   framework	   where	   identity	  constitutes	  the	  always	  already	  settled	  criterion	  of	  proper	  intersubjective	  relations.	  	  	  The	   second	   aspect	   of	   recognition	   discussed	   herein	   posited	   that	   recognition	  reproduces	  the	  epistemic	  framework	  within	  which	  it	   features.	  Here,	   I	  started	  from	  the	   assumption	   that	   before	   a	   person,	   group,	   category,	   institution,	   etc.	   can	   be	  recognized,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  recognizable	  as	  such	  and	  continued	  to	  argue	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  recognition	  was	  thereby	  bound	  to	  reproduce	  the	  systems	  of	  knowledge	  present	  at	  the	  time	  of	  recognition,	  since	  these	  enabled	  the	  visibility	  and	  the	  recognizability	  of	   some,	   but	   not	   of	   others.	   That	   which	   remained	   unrecognizable	   within	   these	  epistemic	   frameworks	   would	   have	   a	   hard	   time	   becoming	   recognized.	   The	  consequences	  are	  that	  existing	  forms	  –	  the	  “present-­‐beings”	  –	  are	  maintained;	  and	  that	  powerful	  groups	  recognized	  as	  ”authentic”	  representatives	  for	  legal	  or	  political	  purposes	   –	   and	   their	   status	   –	   are	   thereby	   reinforced.	   In	   this	   sense,	   recognition	   is	  build	   upon	   an	   inherently	   conservative	   logic:	   Since	   recognition	   depends	   on	  recognizability,	  it	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  epistemic	  range	  allowed	  for	  by	  the	  present	  context	   and	   the	   underlying	   classificatory	   schemes,	   and	   since	   each	   epistemic	  framework	   and	   each	   classification	   scheme	   is	   dependent	   upon	   context,	   that	   is,	   is	  historically	   and	   spatially	   contingent,	   the	   process	   of	   recognition	   will	   tend	   to	  reproduce	  the	  bias	  of	  that	  particular	  epistemic	  framework.	  The	  argument	  does	  not	  imply	   that	   epistemological	   frameworks	   cannot	   change,	   or	   that	   the	   recognition	   of	  agents	  and	  objects	  does	  not	  have	  an	   impact	  upon	  what	  can	  be	   “seen”,	   “known”	  or	  recognized,	  but	  rather	  that	  this	  change	  in	  new	  ranges	  of	  “visibility”	  is	  also	  a	  change	  in	  recognizability,	  i.e.	  a	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  recognizable.	  In	  this	  sense,	  struggles	   for	   recognition	   can	   therefore	   be	   read	   as	   struggles	   for	   recognizability,	   a	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quest	   to	   change	   the	   system	   within	   which	   the	   individuals	   and	   groups	   find	  themselves.	  My	  argument	  is	  against	  assumptions	  by	  scholars	  such	  as	  Honneth,	  who	  needs	   to	   assume	   a	   “potential”	   identity	   to	   be	   “actualized”	   through	   recognition	   and	  thereby	  implies	  that	  this	  “potential”	  identity	  is	  already	  recognizable.	  I	  argue	  against	  these	   assumptions	   regarding	   pre-­‐differentiated,	   pre-­‐existing	   objects	   and	   agents.	  Leaving	  the	  investigation	  of	  how	  these	  objects	  and	  agents	  become	  recognizable	  will	  allow	   the	   framework	  of	   recognition	   to	   stabilize	   and	   reproduce	  both	   itself	   and	   the	  objects	  and	  agents	  within	  it.	  	  	  These	   two	   problematic	   aspects	   of	   recognition	   were	   argued	   to	   reflect	   a	   reifying	  tendency	   of	   recognition,	   and	   the	   final	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   investigated	   the	  relationship	   between	   recognition	   and	   reification.	   Reification	   was	   described	   as	   a	  process	  whereby	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  concepts,	  identities	  and	  objects	  was	  forgotten	  and	  as	  the	  assumption	  that	  these	  concepts	  are	  equal	  to	  that	  which	  they	  refer	  to.	  That	  is,	   reification	   detached	   man	   from	   his	   own	   authorship	   of	   the	   human	   world	   and	  alienated	  the	  concepts	  and	  identities	  from	  their	  process	  of	  emergence,	  seeing	  them	  as	  independent	  of	  all	  social,	  political	  or	  cultural	  prerequisites.	  	  	  Rather	  than	  staying	  with	  the	  framework	  of	  recognition	  in	  international	  theory	  as	  it	  stands	  today,	  I	  argued	  in	  this	  chapter	  for	  the	  need	  to	  address	  the	  reifying	  tendency	  inherent	   in	   recognition,	   in	   particular	   by	   analyzing	   in	   detail	   the	   process	   through	  which	   the	   pre-­‐differentiated	   entities	   of	   recognition	   came	   to	   be	   available	   for	  recognition	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   That	   is,	   I	   argue	   that	   before	  we	   as	   scholars	   continue	  analyzing	   the	   benefits	   and	   problems	   of	   recognition	   in	   international	   relations,	   we	  require	  a	  stronger	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  in	  order	  to	  analyze	  the	  process	  by	  which	  objects,	   agent,	   concepts,	   identities,	   et	   cetera	   become	   recognizable.	   The	   following	  chapters	  attempt	  craft	  such	  a	  level	  of	  sensitivity	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  such	  an	  analysis. 
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Chapter	  3:	  The	  processes	  of	  becoming	  recognizable:	  An	  illustration	  
of	  the	  recognition	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  Israel	  	  	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  illustrate	  the	  critical	  arguments	  made	  thus	  far.	  By	  analyzing	  the	  international	  recognition	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  Israel,	  I	  will	  bring	  together	  the	  discussion	  regarding	   the	   recognition	   of	   religion	   and	   the	   recognition	   of	   states,	   and	   will	  demonstrate	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  the	  “Muslim	  Homeland”	  and	  “Jewish	  National	  Home”	  became	  recognizable	  as	  such.214	  I	  have	  argued	  so	  far	  that	  the	  framework	  of	  recognition	   presupposes	   already	   differentiated	   objects,	   agents	   or	   identities	   and	  thereby	  misses	   out	   on	   their	   very	   process	   of	   differentiation.	   Recognition,	   in	   other	  words,	   lacks	   a	   genealogical	   sensitivity.	   In	   the	   following	   chapter,	   I	   will	   therefore	  illustrate	  a	  few	  of	  the	  differentiation	  processes	  that	  recognition	  not	  only	  misses	  out	  on,	  but	  folds	  into	  forgetfulness	  and	  ultimately	  reifies.	  	  	  The	  British	  withdrew	  from	  India	  in	  August	  1947,	  and	  the	  Crown’s	  colonial	  holding	  was	   partitioned	   into	   the	   Indian	   Union	   –	   containing	   the	   larger	   part	   of	   the	   British	  Indian	   subcontinent,	   including	   most	   of	   the	   princely	   states	   –	   and	   Pakistan	   –	  containing	   the	   northwestern	   and	   northeastern	   provinces,	   including	   the	   princely	  states	   of	   Kashmir,	   Gilgit,	   Baluchistan,	   and	   Sindh.	   Partition	   had	   come	   after	   a	  seemingly	   abrupt	   British	   decision	   to	   leave	   a	   year	   earlier	   than	   originally	   planned.	  The	   new	   international	   border	   was	   drawn	   through	   the	   northwestern	   province	   of	  Punjab	  and	   the	  northeastern	  province	  of	  Bengal	   to	   separate	   the	   ”Muslim	  National	  Home”	   from	   their	   future	   "non-­‐Muslim"	   neighbor.	   The	   dichotomy	   of	   “religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  Pakistan	  and	  Israel	  are	  taken	  here	  as	  paradigmatic	  cases	  which	  carry	  a	  number	  of	  similarities	  	  –	  both	  became	  independent	  after	  decades	  or	  centuries	  of	  British	  rule,	  Pakistan	  in	  1947	  and	  Israel	  in	  1948,	  both	  we	  argues	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  religious	  difference	  –	  yet	  are	  not	  treated	  in	  a	  comparative	  manner	  but	  as	  two	  separate	  illustration	  of	  the	  theoretical	  argument.	  The	  material	  that	  I	  will	  use	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  mainly	  based	  on	  primary	  archival	  UN	  documents,	  collections	  of	  primary	  documents	  from	  the	  Peel	  and	  the	  Punjabi	  Partition	  Commissions	  as	  well	  as	  secondary	  literature.	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difference”	   was	   mirrored	   in	   Palestine,	   where	   the	   British	   withdrew	   from	   their	  Mandate	  a	  year	  later,	  in	  1948.	  With	  the	  birth	  of	  Israel,	  the	  ”Jewish	  National	  Home”	  –	  which	  the	  League	  of	  Nations’	  Mandate	  had	  authorized	  the	  British	  to	  establish	  –	  was	  separated	  from	  its	  "non-­‐Jewish"	  surroundings.	  The	  international	  borders	  that	  came	  to	   surround	   these	   two	   states	   thus	   followed	   the	  demarcation	   line	  between	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  between	  Jew	  and	  non-­‐Jew	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Israel.	   While	   this	   demarcation	   has	   come	   to	   seem	   almost	   natural	   to	   observers	   of	  international	   relations	   today	   –	   the	   “Jewish	   state	   of	   Israel”	   under	   constant	   threat	  from,	  or	  as	  a	  constant	  aggressor	  against,	  its	  regional	  neighbors,	  or	  “Muslim	  violence”	  flowing	  out	  of	   the	  now	  constitutionally	   anchored	   Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan215	  –	  neither	   the	   demarcation	   itself,	   nor	   the	   translation	   of	   differences	   in	   religion	   to	  differences	   in	   state	   are	   as	   unproblematic	   as	   they	   appear.	   Rather	   this	   apparent	  simplicity	  masks	  the	  struggles	  and	  turmoil	  that	  took	  place	  under	  these	  headings	  for	  decades	  and	  centuries	  before	  they	  were	  recognized	  as	  politically	  significant	  for	  the	  two	  new	  international	  agents.	  	  In	   the	   following	   sections,	   I	   will	   examine	   this	   history	   of	   demarcation	   and	  differentiation.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   these	   multiple	   processes	   of	   differentiation	   –	  between	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim,	  and	   Jew	  and	  non-­‐Jew	  –	  were	  stabilized	   through	  colonial	   governing	   practices	   such	   as	   the	   census,	   administrative	   maps,	   quotas	   in	  political	   representation.	   I	   gather	   these	   colonial	   governing	   practices	   under	   the	  heading	   of	   numbers.	   Processes	   of	   differentiation	   were	   also	   stabilized	   via	   local,	  national	   and	   international	   representative	   administration	   –	   which	   I	   discuss	   under	  the	  heading	  of	  representation	  –	  and	  the	  actual	  drawing	  of	  the	  border	  around	  the	  to-­‐be-­‐states	   and	   the	   following	   surveillance,	   violence	   and	   refugee	   administration	   –	  which	   come	   together	   under	   the	   heading	   of	  border-­‐drawing.	   All	   of	   these	   processes	  contributed	  in	  various	  ways	  to	  differentiating	  Muslims	  from	  non-­‐Muslims	  and	  Jews	  from	  non-­‐Jews,	  but	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  argue	  that	  they	  were	  finally	  reified	  –	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215 	  Pakistan	   become	   a	   constitutionally	   ”Islamic	   Republic”	   in	   1956	   and	   the	   current	   Pakistani	  Constitution	  endorses	  "democracy,	   freedom,	  equality,	   tolerance	  and	  social	   justice,	  as	  enunciated	  by	  Islam"(Preamble	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  Pakistan,	  current	  version,	  in	  force	  since	  1973).	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struggles	  to	  form	  and	  uphold	  the	  differentiation	  forgotten	  –	  through	  the	  process	  of	  international	   recognition.	   These	   processes	   of	   demarcation	   and	   differentiation	   are	  lost	  once	  the	  focus	  is	  placed	  upon	  questions	  of	  recognition	  alone.	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  recognition	  presupposes	  difference,	  and	  is	  bound	  to	  reproduce	  it	  unless	  a	  stronger	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  is	  brought	  into	  the	  analysis.	  	  	  
The	  emergence	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  Israel:	  The	  British	  withdrawal	  from	  India	  and	  
Palestine	  	  
	  On	   June	   3,	   1947,	   the	   British	   Government	   issued	   a	   statement	   announcing	   the	  ”intention	  of	  transferring	  power	  in	  British	  India	  to	  Indian	  hands”.	  The	  Second	  World	  War	  had	  left	  the	  British	  heavily	  indebted,	  dependent	  not	  only	  on	  their	  colonies,	  but	  also	  on	   the	  declaredly	  anti-­‐imperialist	  United	  States.	  The	   recent	  war	  had	   seen	   the	  international	   order	   which	   had	   been	   established	   via	   the	   negotiations	   at	   Versailles	  crumble,	   leaving	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   with	   its	   Mandate	   system	   and	   Woodrow	  Wilson’s	  limited	  but	  broadly	  dissemminated	  idea	  of	  self-­‐determination	  merge	  a	  new	  order,	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  struggling	  to	  take	  up	  the	  mantle,	  and	  emerge	  as	  an	  independent	   organization	   during	   the	   beginning	   of	   what	   would	   come	   to	   become	  known	  as	  a	  Cold	  War.	  	  The	   newly	   elected	   British	   Labour	   government	   called	   upon	   two	   boundary	  commissions	   to	   be	   established	   to	   “demarcate	   the	   boundaries	   …	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  ascertaining	   the	   contiguous	   majority	   areas	   of	   Muslims	   and	   non-­‐Muslims.” 216	  Independence	  was	  to	  come	  at	  midnight	  on	  August	  14,	  1947,	  allowing	  for	  about	  ten	  weeks’	  preparation.	  British	   lawyer	  Cyril	  Radcliffe	   left	   for	   India	  on	   July	  7	   to	  head	  a	  commission,	  tasked	  with	  demarcating	  the	  boundary	  between	  the	  emergent	  states.	  It	  was	  his	  first	  visit	  to	  the	  subcontinent.	  Six	  weeks	  later	  the	  results	  of	  the	  commission,	  the	  ”Radcliffe	  line”,	  became	  an	  international	  border.	  It	  not	  only	  separated	  the	  Indian	  Union	  and	  Pakistan	  but	  also	  divided	  the	  northwestern	  region	  of	  Punjab,	  bordering	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Cmd.	  7136.	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Afghanistan,	  and	  the	  northeastern	  region,	  bordering	  Burma,	   into	  respective	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  territories.	  The	  Radcliffe	  Award	  demarcated	  ”Muslim	  Pakistan”	   from	  its	   ”non-­‐Muslim”	   Indian	  neighbor,	   in	   the	   terms	  used	   in	   the	   official	   brief.	   Fourteen	  and	  a	  half	  million	  people	   crossed	   the	  border	  after	  partition	  out	  of	  which	  between	  500,000	  and	  two	  million	  died	  in	  the	  warlike	  conditions	  that	  followed.217	  	  On	  February	  18,	  earlier	  that	  year	  British	  foreign	  secretary	  Ernest	  Bevin218	  spoke	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  about	  Palestine:	   ”We	  are	  unable	   to	  accept	   the	   scheme	  put	  forward	  either	  by	  the	  Arabs	  or	  by	  the	  Jews,	  or	  to	  impose	  ourselves	  a	  solution	  of	  our	  own”.219	  Four	  days	  earlier,	  the	  British	  cabinet	  had	  decided	  to	  return	  their	  Mandate,	  and	   hand	   over	   the	   ”Palestine	   Question”	   to	   the	   United	   Nations.	   Responding,	   the	  General	   Assembly	   met	   in	   special	   session	   in	   New	   York,	   and	   established	   a	   Special	  Committee	   on	   Palestine	   (UNSCOP)	   to	   re-­‐examine	   the	   Palestine	   problem.	   The	  committee	   toured	   the	   country	   during	   the	   summer	   of	   1947,	   and	   presented	   their	  report	  on	  September	  1,	   later	  that	  year.	  There	  was	  unanimity	   in	  UNSCOP	  about	  the	  need	  to	  terminate	  the	  Mandate	  and	  a	  majority	  in	  favor	  of	  partition	  into	  two	  states.	  A	  minority	   proposal,	   however,	   was	   also	   presented	   which	   would	   give	   Palestine	  independence	  as	  a	   ”federal	  state”	  with	   locally	  governed,	  separate	  Arab	  and	   Jewish	  autonomous	   areas.	   It	   would	   leave	   Palestine	   a	   unitary	   state	   under	   ”Arab	  domination”.220	  	  	  During	   the	   following	   two	  months,	   three	   specially	   appointed	   subcommittees	  of	   the	  UNSCOP	   developed	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   different	   recommendations.	   At	   the	   end	   of	  November,	   UNSCOP’s	   recommendations	   were	   brought	   before	   the	   UN	   General	  Assembly	  at	  Lake	  Success	  in	  New	  York,	  where	  the	  vote	  was	  held	  on	  November	  29.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	  Jalal	  2013:	  5;	  Chester	  2009:	  81.	  218	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Bevin	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Attlee	  did	  not	  necessarily	  see	  the	  Jews	  in	  Palestine	  as	  an	   emerging	   nation,	   but	   rather	   as	   a	   religious	   group	  displaced	   by	  war.	  On	   a	   visit	   in	  Washington	   in	  1945	   Bevin	   told	   president	   Truman	   that	   he	   hoped	   that	   the	   Jews	   would	   play	   their	   part	   in	  reconstructing	  Europe	  and	  not	  ”over-­‐emphasise	  their	  separateness	  from	  other	  peoples.’”	  (Times	  14	  November	  1945,	  quoted	  in	  Schindler	  2008:	  58).	  219	  Quoted	  in	  Morris	  2001:	  180	  and	  in	  Cohen	  1982:	  223.	  220	  Schindler	   2008;	   Bevin	   regarded	   the	   UNSCOP’s	   majority	   report	   as	   unjust	   and	   immoral,	   Morris	  2008:	  48;	  73.	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Two-­‐thirds	   of	   the	   votes	   were	   necessary	   for	   ratification.	   ”When	   the	   tally	   was	  complete,	   thirty-­‐three	   states	   had	   voted	   yes,	   thirteen	   no,	   and	   ten	   had	   abstained.	  Partition	  had	  passed,	  but	  not	  very	  comfortably	  …	  The	  nays	  had	  consisted	  of	  the	  Arab	  and	  Muslim	  states,	  Cuba,	  and	  India”.221	  	  	  Resolution	   181	   (II)	   thereby	   terminated	   the	   British	   Mandate	   for	   Palestine	   and	  establish	  two	  states,	  one	  Jewish,	  the	  other	  Arab,	  bound	  in	  an	  economic	  ”union”.	  The	  British	   pullout	   was	   to	   be	   completed	   ”no	   later	   than	   1	   August	   1948”.	  With	   the	   UN	  resolution	  passed,	  massive	  demonstration	  errupted	  in	  cities	  across	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  and	  within	  the	  following	  hours,	  the	  previous	  Mandate	  experienced	  an	  eruption	  of	  violence,	  turning	  into	  a	  civil	  war.	  The	  sentiment	  of	  zero-­‐sum	  conflict	  before	   the	   UN	   Resolution	   was	   transformed	   by	   the	   latter	   into	   an	   full-­‐scale	   war,	  drawing	   in	   the	   neighboring	   countries	   of	   Trans-­‐Jordan,	   Egypt,	   Syria,	   Lebanon	   and	  Iraq.	  The	  culmination	  was	  the	  exodus	  of	  between	  600,000	  and	  760,000	  Palestinian	  Arabs,	   the	   refusal	   of	   the	   Israelis	   to	   allow	   them	   to	   return,	   and	   the	   unwillingness,	  combined	  with	  inability	  of	  the	  neighboring	  Arab	  states	  –	  apart	  from	  Transjordan	  –	  to	  absorb	  them.222	  On	  May	  14,	  1948,	  Israel’s	  first	  Prime	  Minister,	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion,	  proclaimed	  the	  establishment	  of	  ”the	  Jewish	  State”	  in	  Palestine.223	  While	  the	  Israeli	  state	  was	  de	  facto	  recognized	  by	  the	  United	  States	  within	  eleven	  minutes	  after	   the	  end	   of	   the	  Mandate,	   Britain	   took	   over	   eight	  months	   and	   Iraq,	   Lebanon,	   Pakistan,	  Syria	  and	  about	  30	  other	   states	   still	  do	  not	   recognize	   the	   state	  of	   Israel.224	  On	   the	  last	   day	   of	   the	   British	   Mandate	   –	   May	   14	   –	   with	   the	   conditions	   on	   the	   ground	  radically	   changed,	   the	   UN	   commission	   was	   formally	   dissolved.	   The	   British	   had	  withdrawn	  from	  India	  and	  had	  left	  the	  future	  of	  Palestine	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  United	  Nations.	  While	  the	  process	  had	  been	  accompanied	  by	  near-­‐civil	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  221	  Morris	  2001:	  186.	  222	  Khalidi	  2001;	  Schindler	  2008:	  48,	  Morris	  2001,	  2008.	  223	  From	   the	   declaration	   of	   independence:	   ”hereby	   declare	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   Jewish	   state	   in	  Eretz-­‐Israel,	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  state	  of	  Israel.”	  (reprinted	  in	  Laqueur/Rubin	  2008).	  224	  Schindler	  2008:	  43.	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war-­‐like	   conditions,	   Pakistan	   and	   Israel	   had	   emerged	   as	   two	   new	   international	  agents	  and	  were	  shortly	  thereafter	  granted	  membership	  of	  the	  UN.225	  	  
Analyzing	  processes	  of	  differentiation	  between	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim,	  Jew	  and	  
non-­‐Jew	  	  
	  At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   decade,	   Pakistan	   and	   Israel	   were	   internationally	   recognized	   as	  sovereign	   states.	   That	   did	   not	   mean	   that	   they	   were	   universally	   recognized	   –	  conflicts	   concerning	   their	   status	   remain	  until	   today	  –	  but	   it	  meant	   that	   they	  were	  recognized	   by	   a	   large	   majority	   of	   the	   other	   sovereign	   states	   in	   the	   international	  system,	   and	   that	   they	   functioned	   as	   such	   in	   an	   ever-­‐growing	   number	   of	  international	   arenas.	   One	   of	   the	   arguments	   of	   the	   previous	   chapter	   was	   that	   –	  international	  –	  recognition	  reifies	  its	  objects,	  that	  it,	  for	  example,	  forgets	  about	  the	  process	   by	   which	   the	   object	   became	   recognizable	   as	   a	   possible	   agent	   of	  international	   relations.	   Recognition	   assumes	   already	   differentiated	   objects,	   and	  loses	  sight	  of	  the	  differentiation	  process.	  In	  the	  remaining	  part	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  will	  illustrate	   three	   of	   these	   processes	   of	   differentiation	   and	   demarcation	   under	   the	  headings	  of	  numbers,	  representation	  and	  border-­‐drawing.	   I	  will	   start	   by	   examining	  how	   the	   demarcations	   became	   inscribed	   into	   the	   very	   heart	   of	   imperial	   and	  mandate	  governing	  rationality,	   that	   is,	   through	  the	  census	  and	  the	  enumeration	  of	  minorities.	  
	  
Numbers:	  Census,	  enumeration	  and	  immigration	  	  
Pakistan	  
	  The	   population	   upon	   whose	   behalf	   the	   "Muslim	   National	   Home"	   of	   Pakistan	   was	  claimed	   had	   been	   a	   part	   of	   the	   British	   Indian	   Empire	   for	   centuries.	   These	   British	  Indian	   Muslims	   had	   been	   a	   heterogeneous	   group,	   estimated	   to	   comprise	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  Pakistan	  A/350,	  21	  August	  1947	  and	  108(II),	  30	  September	  1947;	  Israel:	  A/RES/273(III),	  11	  May	  1949..	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approximately	  100	  million	  individuals	  at	  the	  time	  of	  partition.226	  Speaking	  different	  languages,	   belonging	   to	   different	   social	   strata,	   and	   carrying	   out	   different	   cultural	  rites	  and	  rituals,	  made	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  British	  administration	  had	  categorized	  them	  under	  the	  same	  label	  seem	  partly	  arbitrary.227	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  examples	  of	  colonial	  categorization	  as	  governing	  practice	  was	  the	  census.	  The	  British	  conducted	  a	  census	  in	  India	  every	  ten	  years,	  beginning	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  It	  was	  intended	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  ”scientific”	  basis	  for	   knowledge	   about	   Indian	   local	   society,	   mapping	   the	   population	   according	   to	  professions,	   language,	   caste,	   religion,	   et	   cetera.	  The	   Indian	  Hindus,	  Muslims,	   Sikhs	  and	   Christians	   thus	   became	   quantifiable	   as	   communal	   entities. 228 	  The	   census’	  enumeration	   of	   the	   Indian	   population	   into	   communities	   further	   functioned	   as	   a	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  the	  colonial	  state	  when	  it	  introduced	  representative	  political	  institutions,	  most	  clearly	  reflected	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  introduce	  separate	  electorates	  for	  Muslims,	   at	   the	   provincial	   level	   in	   1909,	   and	   as	   they	   extended	  provincial	   self-­‐government	   through	   the	   Government	   of	   India	   Acts	   in	   1919	   and	   in	   1935.	   These	  ”marked”	   electorates	   aimed	   to	   increase	   Muslim	   representation	   in	   the	   system	   of	  elective	   local	   government.229	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   they	   also	   sanctioned	   the	  linking	   of	   religion	   with	   political	   representation,	   power	   and	   patronage.	   The	  enumerative	  power	  of	  the	  census’	  categorization	  was	  probably	  the	  most	  influential	  example	   of	   the	   effect	   that	   colonial	   administration	   and	   bureaucracy	   had	   on	  consolidating	   the	   Muslim	   political	   constituency	   and	   stabilizing	   the	   demarcation	  between	   Muslim	   and	   non-­‐Muslim.	   As	   categories,	   the	   ”Muslims”	   and	   the	   ”Hindus”	  consolidated	   and	   lent	   stability	   to	   the	   British	   experience	   of	   heterogenous	   Indian	  social,	   political	   and	   cultural	   life.230	  This	   reduction	   of	   complexity	   was,	   indeed	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  “The	  dilemmas	  on	  imagining	  a	  coherent	  Pakistani	  nation	  have	  been	  compounded	  by	  regional	  and	  linguistic	  diversities	  that	  have	  resisted	  being	  melted	  down	  to	  fit	  the	  monolithic	  molds	  of	  the	  state’s	  Islamic	  identity.”	  (Jalal	  1995:	  74;	  see	  also	  Jalal	  2013	  and	  Devji	  1998,	  2013).	  227	  Devji	  2007,	  2013.	  228	  Talbot/Singh	   2009.	   For	   example	   with	   facts	   such	   as	   the	   number	   of	   mimes	   in	   1941	   India	   was	  around	  60,000.	  (Census	  of	  1941).	  229	  Ahmed	  1999.	  230	  Zuriek	  2007;	  Balagangadhara/Keppens	  2009.	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”mechanism	  for	  organizing	  and	  perpetuating	  state	  power”,	  as	  has	  been	  argued	  many	  times	   before.	   However,	   while	   this	   ”process	   of	   individualizing,	   categorizing,	   and	  disciplining	   corporeal	   bodies”	   functioned	   as	   an	   instrument	   of	   domination,	   it	   also	  opened	  up	   space	   for	   ”liberation”,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  making	   a	   certain	   ”Muslim	   voice”	  audible	  in	  an	  otherwise	  overarchingly	  British	  power	  setting.231	  Through	  the	  census,	  and	   its	   power	   to	   construct	   ”a	   pattern	   and	   a	   structure	   that	   lent	   coherence	   to	   [the	  British]	   cultural	   experience	   of	   India”,232	  however,	   the	   colonial	   regime	   had	   indeed	  elevated	  into	  actorhood	  the	  entity	  or	  identity	  of	  ”the	  Muslims”,	  and	  had	  made	  them	  recognizable	   as	   such.	   Although	   the	   close	   connection	   between	   the	   census	   and	  political	  representation	  and	  power	  left	  this	  connection	  highly	  charged,	   it	  remained	  relatively	  unchallenged	  until	   the	  very	  end	  of	  the	  British	  rule.233	  Instead,	  as	  we	  saw	  above	   and	   will	   examine	   in	   detail	   below,	   the	   census	   featured	   as	   the	   single	   most	  important	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  separating	  the	  new	  Pakistani	  state	  from	  the	  Indian	  Union.234	  	  	  
Israel	  
	  The	   counting	   and	   categorization	   of	   population	   was	   a	   different	   issue	   in	   Mandate	  Palestine.	  Rather	  than	  being	  connected	  to	  political	  representation	  and	  the	  governing	  of	  minorities,	  the	  numbers	  in	  Palestine	  were	  intimately	  connected	  to	  the	  question	  of	  immigration,	   that	   is,	   the	   number	   of	   Jewish	   immigrants	   to	   Palestine	   under	   the	  auspices	  of	  the	  British	  Mandate.	  In	  September	  1922,	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  allotted	   the	  Mandate	  over	  Palestine	  and	   Iraq	   to	   the	  British.	  The	  Mandate	   stipulated	   that	   Palestinians	   should	   receive	   ”administrative	   advice	   and	  assistance	  by	   a	  Mandatory	  until	   such	   time	  as	   they	  are	   able	   to	   stand	  alone.”	  While	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231	  Foucault	  1997(1977):	  2f.	  232	  Balagangadhara/Keppens	  2009:	  63.	  233	  The	   counsel	   of	   the	   Indian	  National	  Congress	   loudly	   contested	   the	   reliability	  of	   the	  1941	   census	  figures	   (Ahmed	   1999:	   124),	   which	   were	   said	   to	   have	   been	   particularly	   problematic	   due	   to	   an	  unprecedented	  increase	  in	  Muslim	  population	  between	  1931	  and	  1941.	  While	  its	  contestability	  was	  not	   questioned	   by	   the	   other	   members,	   the	   representative	   of	   the	   Muslim	   League,	   Muhammad	  Zafrullah	  Khan,	  argued	  that	  the	  Commission	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  figures.	  (Ibid:	  142).	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doing	  so,	  the	  British	  were	  to	  facilitate	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  ”Jewish	  National	  Home”	  through	   immigration.235	  The	   Mandate	   thereby	   affirmed	   the	   Balfour	   Declaration	  given	  by	  the	  British	  Government	  to	  the	  head	  of	  the	  British	  Zionist	  Federation,	  Lord	  Lionel	  Walter	   Rothschild,	   five	   years	   earlier	   in	   1917.	   Thereby	   the	   British	   were	   to	  enable	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  “national	  home	  for	  the	  Jewish	  people”	  which	  would	  be	  facilitated	  through	   immigration	  by	  European	  Jews	  to	  Palestine.236	  However,	   just	  as	  was	   the	   case	   with	   the	   British	   Indian	   Muslims,	   European	   Jewish	   immigrants	   to	  Palestine	   were	   made	   up	   of	   greatly	   diverse	   and	   polyphonous	   cultural-­‐linguistic	  groups	   of	   Eastern,	   Central	   and	   Western	   Europeans,	   and	   a	   multitude	   of	   diverse	  efforts	  were	   needed	   to	   consolidate	   the	   new	  members	   of	   the	   Jewish	   society	   into	   a	  common	  Jewish	  community.237	  	  For	   one,	   the	  Balfour	  Declaration,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  Mandate	   itself,	   spoke	   of	   Jews	   and	  non-­‐Jews	  only.	  The	  Palestinian	  Arab	  population	  was	  mentioned	  only	  as	  “non-­‐Jewish	  communities”,	  and	  not	  explicitly	  by	  name.	  Jews	  were	  further	  alone	  in	  being	  labeled	  “national”	   in	   addition	   to	   being	   a	   religious	   community	   in	   Palestine.	   All	   other	  communities	   were	   neither	   "national"	   nor	   named.	   Instead,	   they	   were	   subsumed	  under	  the	  category	  of	   the	  "other	   inhabitants	  of	  Palestine",	  or	  "non-­‐Jews".238	  One	  of	  the	  few	  suggestion	  of	  Arab	  nationality	  occurred	  in	  Article	  22	  of	  the	  Mandate,	  which	  stipulated	  that	  English,	  Arabic,	  and	  Hebrew	  should	  be	  the	  future	  official	  languages	  of	  Palestine.239	  	  Palestine	   under	   a	   British	   Mandate	   had	   heightened	   the	   salience	   of	   the	   Balfour	  Declaration,	   but	   it	   had	   also	   given	   it	   an	   international	   legal	   status.	   The	   draft	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  League	  of	  Nations:	  The	  British	  Mandate	  in:	  Laqueur/Rubin	  2008:	  Art	  22.	  236	  The	   Declaration	   read	   that	   ”His	   Majesty’s	   Government	   view	   with	   favour	   the	   establishment	   in	  Palestine	  of	  a	  national	  home	  for	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  and	  will	  use	  their	  best	  endeavours	  to	  facilitate	  the	  achievement	   of	   this	   object,	   it	   being	   clearly	   understood	   that	   nothing	   shall	   be	   done	   which	   may	  prejudice	  the	  civil	  and	  religious	  rights	  of	  existing	  non-­‐Jewish	  communities	  in	  Palestine,	  or	  the	  rights	  and	  political	  status	  enjoyed	  by	  Jews	  in	  any	  other	  country.”	  (Balfour	  Declaration,	  reprinted	  in	  Kattan	  2009:	  42).	  237	  Sand	  2009:	  255;	  Schindler	  2008:	  11;	  Shapira	  2012:	  9,	  15.	  238	  British	   Foreign	  Minister	   Arthur	   Balfour:	   The	   Balfour	   Declaration,	   in:	   Laqueur/Rubin	   2008:	   16;	  League	  of	  Nations:	  The	  British	  Mandate	  in:	  Laqueur/Rubin	  2008:	  30-­‐36;	  see	  also	  Shapira	  2012:	  73.	  	  	  239	  League	  of	  Nations:	  The	  British	  Mandate	  in:	  Laqueur/Rubin	  2008:	  35;	  See	  also:	  Zureik	  2007.	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instrument	   of	   the	   Mandate	   included	   the	   Balfour	   Declaration,	   and	   with	   it,	   also	   a	  recognition	   of	   the	   historical	   connection	   between	   the	   Jewish	   people	   and	   land	   of	  Palestine.	   It	   also	  confirmed	   the	  separate	  nature	  of	   the	   Jews	   from	   their	  non-­‐Jewish	  neighbors.	  These	  categories	  of	  "Jews"	  and	  "non-­‐Jews"	  further	  became	  the	  two	  main	  population	  categories	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  census	  classification.	  	  	  Through	  the	  Balfour	  declaration,	  the	  British	  were	  to	  facilitate	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  Palestine,	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  ”Jewish	  National	  Home.”	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  was	  a	  pledge	  to	  help	  Jews	  immigrate	  to	  Palestine.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  since	  more	  than	  90	  percent	   of	   the	   immigrants	   to	   Palestine	   during	   the	   Mandate	   were	   categorized	   as	  ”Jews”	   by	   the	   Jewish	   Agency,	   the	   Jew/non-­‐Jew	   demarcation	   also	   became	   one	  between	  immigrant	  and	  non-­‐immigrant.	  The	  connection	  between	  Jew/non-­‐Jew	  and	  immigrant/non-­‐immigrant	   was	   furthered	   by	   the	   Arab	   response	   to	   the	   increasing	  influx	   of	   people	   from	   Europe	   during	   the	   Mandate.	   The	   growth	   of	   the	   Jewish	  population	   of	   Palestine	   from	   56,000	   to	   650,000	   during	   the	   thirty	   years	   of	   British	  rule	  not	  only	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  durable	  Jewish	  society	  –	  or	  a	  ”Jewish	   National	   Home”	   –	   but	   confirmed	   the	   initial	   fears	   of	   the	   Palestinian	  population	   regarding	   the	   expansive	   aims	   of	   the	   Zionist	   movement	   and	   made	  immigration	  a	  ”matter	  of	  life	  and	  death”	  for	  the	  Arab	  population.240	  	  The	  question	  of	  immigration	  became	  increasingly	  infected	  throughout	  the	  Mandate.	  While	  the	   initial	  argumentation	  of	  the	  British	  officials	  tended	  to	  measure	  numbers	  of	  immigrants	  according	  to	  the	  economic	  ability	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  society	  to	  absorb	  them,	  the	  immigration	  question	  soon	  became	  a	  brick	  in	  British	  wartime	  negotiation.	  As	   the	   British	   increasingly	   came	   to	   see	   the	   war	   in	   Europe	   as	   unavoidable,	   they	  promised	  the	  Arab	  states	  to	  limit	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  Palestine	  in	  return	  for	  their	  support	  against	  the	  Germans.	  As	  the	  war	  proceeded,	  the	  British	  continued	  to	  use	  the	  number	   of	   Jewish	   immigrants	   in	   order	   regulate	   its	   influence	   in	   the	   region,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  240	  Morris	  2001:	  123;	  Shapira	  2012:	  117.	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emphasizing	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   Jewish	   immigrants	   and	   the	   non-­‐Jewish	  indigenous	  population.241	  	  	  
Representation	  
Pakistan	  
	  Besides	   the	   enumerative	   power	   of	   the	   census	   to	   differentiate	   and	   demarcate	   the	  Muslims	   from	   the	   non-­‐Muslims	   and	   the	   Jews	   from	   the	   non-­‐Jews,	   political	  representation	  figures	  as	  a	  further	  instance	  of	  demarcation.	  In	  British	  India,	  the	  All-­‐India	   Muslim	   League	   would	   become	   the	   main	   representative	   body	   for	   Indian	  Muslims,	   and	   would	   voice	   the	   claim	   to	   an	   “independent	   sovereign”	   Pakistani	  state.242 	  While	   the	   Muslim	   League	   and	   its	   leader	   Muhammad	   Ali	   Jinnah	   only	  consolidated	   the	   movement’s	   representational	   function	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  1940s,	   Jinnah	  had	  previously	  made	  his	  position	  clear	  on	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	   Indian	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim	  populations.	   In	  his	  presidential	   address	   to	   the	  All-­‐India	  Muslim	  League	  meeting	  in	  Lahore	  1940,	  Jinnah	  presented	  the	  “Two-­‐Nation	  Theory”	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  a	  separate	  Muslim	  “homeland“.	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims,	  he	  stated,	   were	   two	   nations,	   two	   irreconcilably	   „different	   civilizations“,	   a	   difference	  that	  went	  through	  every	  grain	  of	  human	  life	  down	  to	  marriage	  and	  food.243	  Due	  to	  this	   fundamental	   difference,	   no	   settlement	   was	   to	   be	   expected	   nor	   should	   it	   be	  imposed.	   “To	   yoke	   together	   two	   such	   nations	   under	   a	   single	   state,	   one	   as	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  This	  was	  to	  be	  the	  origin	  of	  MacDonald's	  historic	  White	  Paper	  of	  1939	  which	  set	  British	  policy	  on	  a	  pro-­‐Arab	  course:	  Palestine	  was	  to	  become	  independent	  in	  ten	  years	  as	  a	  unitary	  state,	  with	  Jewish	  immigration	  restricted	  to	  75,000	  over	  a	  five-­‐year	  period.	  ”This	  figure	  was	  calculated	  to	  enure	  that	  the	  Jews	   would	   constitute	   no	   more	   than	   a	   third	   of	   Palestine’s	   population.	   Any	   increase	   was	   made	  consitional	   on	  Arab	   consent.	   The	  principle	   that	   had	   guided	   immigration	  policy	   up	  until	   then	   –	   the	  country’s	  economic	  ability	  to	  absorb	  newcomers	  –	  had	  finally	  been	  rescinded.”	  (Segev	  2000:	  440).	  ”With	  the	  defeat	  of	  German	  forces	  at	  El	  Alamein,	  the	  British	  attempted	  to	  disband	  the	  Palmach	  (the	  elite	  military	  unit)	  since	  it	  no	  longer	  served	  their	   interests.	  There	  was	  a	  revision	  to	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  1939	  White	  Paper	  where	  the	  Jews	  were	  expected	  to	  remain	  a	  permanent	  minority	   in	  Palestine.	  Immigration	   would	   be	   dependent	   on	   arab	   goodwill.	   At	   a	   time	   when	   Jews	   were	   desperately	  attempting	  to	  	  find	  ways	  ou	  of	  Nazi-­‐occupied	  Europe,	  this	  makred	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  Zionist	  relations	  with	  the	  British.”	  (Schindler	  2008:	  37).	  	  242	  Jinnah’s	  presidential	  address	  to	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  of	  Pakistan	  August	  11,	  1947,	  in:	  Burke	  2000:	  25.	  243	  Jinnah’s	  address	  at	  the	  Lahore	  meeting	  in	  1940,	  in:	  Saiyd	  1940:	  13.	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numerical	  minority	   and	   the	   other	   as	   a	  majority,	  must	   lead	   to	   growing	   discontent,	  and	   final	   destruction	   of	   any	   fabric	   that	  may	   be	   so	   built	   up	   for	   the	   government	   of	  such	  a	  state.“244	  The	  Indian	  Muslims,	  according	  to	  Jinnah,	  were	  not	  a	  minority	  of	  the	  Indian	  nation,	  but	  a	  nation	  ”according	  to	  any	  definition	  of	  the	  term,	  and	  they	  must	  have	  their	  homelands,	  their	  territory	  and	  their	  state.”245	  The	  “problem	  in	  India”,	  he	  continued	  “is	  not	  of	  an	  intercommunal	  character,	  but	  manifestly	  of	  an	  international	  one,	  and	  it	  must	  be	  treated	  as	  such.”246	  	  During	   the	  Second	  World	  War	   the	  position	  of	   the	  Muslim	  League,	   and	   its	   claim	   to	  represent	   “All	   India’s	  Muslims”,	   were	   strengthened.	   British	  wartime	   international	  relations,	   especially	   the	   exigency	   of	   the	  war	   effort	   in	   South	  Asia	   –	  which	  was	   the	  frontline	  of	  the	  Japanese	  advance	  –	  depended	  on	  Indian	  support.	  In	  1942,	  Winston	  Churchill	   sent	  Stafford	  Cripps	   to	   India	   to	  negotiate	  with	   the	   Indian	   leaders,	  and	   to	  “sell	   the	   promise“	   of	   India	   receiving	   Dominion	   Status	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   war	   in	  exchange	  for	  its	  support	  for	  the	  British	  war	  effort.247	  While	  the	  Muslim	  League	  lent	  its	   support,	   the	   Indian	   National	   Congress	   and	   its	   leader	   Mahatma	   Gandhi	   and	  Jawaharlal	   Nehru	   not	   only	   refused,	   but	   subsequently	   launched	   the	   „Quit	   India“	  movement,	  demanding	  immediate	  independence.	  The	  British	  responded	  by	  banning	  the	   Congress	   and	   imprisoning	   its	   leadership,	   including	   Gandhi	   and	   Nehru.	   The	  weakening	  of	  the	  Congress,	  which	  had	  claimed	  to	  represent	  all	  Indians,	  Muslims	  and	  non-­‐Muslims	  alike,	  bolstered	  the	  position	  of	   the	  Muslim	  League	  and	  that	  of	   Jinnah	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   colonial	   regime.	   Subsequently,	   Jinnah	   was	   invited	   by	   the	   British	   on	  equal	   footing	   with	   the	   Congress	   leaders,	   thereby	   implicitly	   accepting	   the	   Muslim	  League’s	   claim	   to	   speak	   for	   the	   Indian	  Muslims.	  He	  demanded	  parity	  between	   the	  Congress	   and	   the	   League,	   between	   ”Hindustan	   and	   Pakistan”,	   and	   allowed	   the	  conference	   on	   constitutional	   reform	   in	   Simla	   1945	   to	   fail	   after	   refusing	   to	   accept	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  244	  Jinnah’s	  address	  at	  the	  Lahore	  meeting	  in	  1940,	  in:	  Saiyd	  1940:	  13.	  245	  Jinnah’s	  address	  at	  the	  Lahore	  meeting	  in	  1940,	  in:	  Saiyd	  1940:	  9f,	  14.	  	  246	  Jinnah’s	  address	  at	  the	  Lahore	  meeting	  in	  1940,	  in:	  Saiyd	  1940:	  12.	  247	  Jaffrelot	  2002.	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Muslim	   representation	   in	   future	   Executive	   Council	   that	   was	   not	   chosen	   by	   the	  League.248	  	  	  The	  real	   struggle	   in	  which	   the	  Muslim	  League	  and	   Jinnah	   took	  part,	  however,	  was	  not	  only	  the	  struggle	  for	  a	  territorial	  homeland	  for	  India’s	  Muslims,	  but	  rather	  one	  to	  
create	   a	   united	   ”Muslim	   community”	   in	   India	   despite	   its	   cultural,	   linguistic,	  demographic,	  religious	  and	  political	  plurality.249	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  Muslim	  Homeland,	  or	  a	  Muslim	  community,	   took	  shape	  through	  struggles	  between	  regional	  and	  national	  politics250,	  between	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  particular	  local	  meanings	  attributed	  to	  these	  religious	  markers,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  the	  need	  for	  a	  unified	  Muslim	  front	  on	  the	  national	  stage.251	  	  Early	   on,	   Jinnah	   had	   rejected	   appeals	   to	   the	   religious	   specificity	   of	   the	   Indian	  Muslims.	  Attempts	  to	  frame	  Muslims	  as	  a	  religious	  minority,	  as	  had	  previously	  been	  done	   by	   Gandhi	   and	   the	   Indian	   National	   Congress,	   would	   “confine	   [the	   Indian	  Muslims]	   to	   the	   demographically	   and	   constitutionally	   powerless,	   degraded,	   and	  impossible	   position”	   of	   a	   minority,	   living	   “tolerated”	   under	   a	   Hindu	   Raj.252	  The	  Muslim	  League	  was,	  however,	  not	  only	  prevented	  to	  make	  much	  use	  of	  Islam	  as	  the	  set	   of	   religious	   beliefs	   and	   practices	   of	   a	   minority	   population	   due	   to	   its	   leaders’	  opinions,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  the	  opposition	  of	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  Muslim	  clerics.253	  Many	  of	   these	   rejected	   the	   quest	   for	   Pakistan	   and	   supported	   the	   acclaimed	   secular,	   if	  Hindu	  dominated,	  Indian	  National	  Congress.	  ”To	  opt	  for	  Pakistan	  then,	  was	  to	  give	  up	   India	   as	   part	   of	   the	  Muslim	  world”	   and	   lose	   the	   possibility	   to	   regain	   influence	  within	  the	  subcontinent.254	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  248	  Mansergh	  1970:	  52.	  249	  Gilmartin	  1998:	  1071;	  Jalal	  1994(1985);	  Devji	  2007.	  250	  Jalal	  1994(1985)).	  251	  Devji	  2007;	  Gilmartin	  1998.	  252	  Devji	  2013:	  85;	  2007:	  88.	  At	  the	  Congress	  in	  Nagpur	  1920,	  Jinnah	  parted	  with	  the	  INC	  after	  they	  adopted	   Gandhi’s	   non-­‐cooperation	   resolution,	   stating	   that	   “I	   will	   have	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   this	  pseudo-­‐religious	   approach	   to	   politics.	   I	   part	   company	   with	   the	   Congress	   and	   Gandhi.”	   (Das	  2004(1969)).	  253	  Metcalf	  1997.	  254	  Devji	  2007:	  86.	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  As	   partition	   grew	   closer,	   the	   Muslim	   League	   had	   sidelined	   other	   Muslim	  representatives,	   and	   Jinnah	   had	   gained	   the	   position	   as	   the	   League’s	   –	   and	   its	  constituents’	   –	   “sole	   sokesperson”.255	  Jinnah	   had	   rejected	   the	   relegation	   of	   India’s	  Muslims	   to	   the	   status	   of	   a	   religious	   minority	   –	   which	   would	   have	   been	   able	   to	  provide	  the	  unifying	  power	  needed	  to	  bridge	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  particularities	  of	  Indian	   Muslim	   life	   –	   and	   Muslim	   clerics	   had	   refused	   to	   give	   their	   support	   to	   a	  ”Muslim	   Homeland”.	   According	   to	   Jinnah,	   the	   Muslims	   were	   a	   nation.	   However,	  national	   projects	   had	   previously	   been	   consolidated	   through	   language	   and	   natural	  borders	   of	   mountains,	   rivers	   or	   oceans;	   and	   were	   reinforced	   by	   historiography,	  religious	   rituals,	   et	   cetera.	   The	   Indian	   Muslims,	   however,	   were	   heterogenous	   in	  every	  respect.	  This	  greatly	  heterogeneous	  people	  had	  ”such	  elements	  of	  tradition	  or	  religiosity	  working	  rather	  to	  divide	  them	  more,	  by	  region,	  language,	  sect	  and	  class.	  Islam	  as	  an	  agglomeration	  of	  prejudice,	  practice,	  and	  superstition,	  held	  together	  by	  juridical	  categories	  like	  separate	  electorates	  and	  personal	  law	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  external	   boundaries	   of	   caste	  …	   on	   the	   other,	   had	   to	   be	   translated	   into	   a	   national	  unity	  of	  another	  kind”.256	  Whatever	  this	  consolidating	  power	  would	  be,	  it	  was	  clear	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1940s	  that	  it	  would	  be	  voiced	  through	  the	  representational	  authority	  of	  Jinnah	  and	  the	  Muslim	  League,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  religion	  in	  any	  institutional	  sense.	  257	  In	  the	  elections	  of	  February	  1946,	  the	  League’s	  victory	  vindicated	  its	  claim	  to	  speak	  for	  Muslim	   India.	   As	   Talbot	   and	   Singh	   have	   argued,	   the	   ”consolidation	   of	   political	  allegiances	   around	   religious	   community	   both	   reflected	   and	   contributed	   to	   the	  communal	  polarisation.”258	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  255	  Jalal	  1994(1985).	  256	  Devji	  2007:	  90;	  see	  also	  Jalal	  1994(1985):	  74.	  257	  Jinnah’s	  position	  on	  religion	  left	   little	  space	  for	  Muslim	  imaginings.	  Having	  reached	  the	  goal	  of	  a	  ”Muslim	  Homeland”	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  two-­‐nation	  theory,	  Jinnah	  called	  for	  a	  separation	  of	  state	  and	  religion,	   as	   well	   as	   equal	   citizenship	   rights	   regardless	   of	   affiliation.	   At	   the	   first	   meeting	   of	   the	  Pakistani	   constituent	   assembly	  on	  August	  11,	   1947,	   he	   stated:	   ”You	   are	   free;	   you	   are	   free	   to	   go	   to	  your	  temples,	  you	  are	  free	  to	  go	  to	  your	  mosques	  ot	  to	  any	  other	  place	  of	  workship	   in	  this	  State	  of	  Pakistan.	  You	  may	  belong	  to	  any	  religion	  or	  caste	  or	  creed	  –	  that	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  business	  of	  the	  State.”	  (Jinnah	  2009(1948):	  8).	  258	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Israel	  
	  In	  Palestine,	  the	  political	  representational	  situation	  was	  different.	  While	  the	  highest-­‐ranking	  political	  authority	  of	  the	  country	  was	  vested	  in	  the	  High	  Commissioner,	  who	  represented	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   and	  while	   no	   Palestinian	   parliament	   or	   cabinet	  could	   claim	   popular	   representation,	   the	   Mandate	   had	   foreseen	   a	   representative	  body	   for	   its	   Jewish	   population.	   Designed	   to	   ”advis[e]	   and	   cooperat[e]	   with	   the	  Administration	  of	  Palestine	  in	  such	  economic,	  social	  and	  other	  matters	  as	  may	  affect	  the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Jewish	   National	   Home	   and	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   Jewish	  population	   in	   Palestine”,259	  the	   Jewish	   Agency	   represented	   the	   Palestinian	   Jews,	  both	   Zionist	   and	   non-­‐Zionist.	   It	   centralized	   different	   Jewish	   land	   acquisition	   and	  settlement	  projects.	  There	  was,	   however,	   no	  equivalent	  body	   for	   the	   ”non-­‐Jewish”	  population.260	  	  Throughout	  the	  decades	  of	  Mandate	  rule,	  demands	  for	  representational	  government	  and	   the	   halting	   of	   land	   sales	   lay	   at	   the	   root	   of	   the	   reoccuring	   violence,	   riots	   and	  protests,	  always	  dealt	  with	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  question	  of	  Jewish	  immigration.	  This	  was	  also	  the	  case	  during	  the	  Arab	  Revolt	   in	  April	  1936.	  What	  started	  as	  dispersed	  acts	  of	   violence	   throughout	  Palestine,	  became	  countrywide	   riots,	   and	  ended	   in	   six	  month-­‐long	   strikes.261	  The	   already	   significant	   gap	   between	   ”Jews”	   and	   their	   ”non-­‐Jewish”	  counterparts	  grew	  deeper	  with	  each	  act	  of	  violence.	  	  	  The	  semi-­‐official	  status	  accorded	  to	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  by	  the	  British	  and	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  through	  the	  Mandate	  conferred	  international	  legitimacy	  upon	  the	  Zionist	  movement	   and	   guaranteed	   it	   access	   to	   international	   arenas	   in	   London,	  New	  York	  and	   Geneva.	   The	   demarcation	   between	   Jew	   and	   non-­‐Jew	   was	   therefore	  internationally	   sanctioned	   and	   institutionally	   grounded,	   as	   the	   Jewish	   Agency	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  League	  of	  Nations:	  The	  British	  Mandate	  in:	  Laqueur/Rubin	  2008:	  Art.	  4.	  260	  Khalidi	  2001:	  19;	  Shapira	  2012:	  119.	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  2012:	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claimed	  representation,	  not	  only	  for	  Palestine’s	  Zionists,	  but	  for	  all	  Jews,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  Palestine,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Jewish	  State.	  	  	  In	   contrast,	   the	   Palestinians	   were	   not	   granted	   the	   same	   national	   recognition	   and	  institutional	   framework.	  The	  wording	  of	   the	  Mandate	   for	  Palestine	  mentioned	   the	  ”civil	  and	  religious	  rights	  of	  the	  existing	  non-­‐Jewish	  communities	  in	  Palestine”,	  but	  remained	   silent	   on	   their	   political	   or	   national	   rights.	   During	   the	   1930s,	   the	  surrounding	   countries	   of	   the	   region	   underwent	   processes	   of	   decolonialization.	   In	  Iraq,	  the	  Mandate	  was	  replaced	  by	  self-­‐government,	  and	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  British	   protectorate	   were	   amended	   in	   Egypt’s	   favor.	   As	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   Class	   A	  mandate	  countries	  moved	  towards	  independence,	  Palestine	  alone	  was	  ”governed	  by	  a	   regime	   that	   did	   not	   grant	   representation	   to	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   population.”262	  Further,	  the	  representational	  situation	  was	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Mandate	  itself	  contained	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  Zionist	  project	  of	  building	  a	  ”National	  Home”	  in	   Palestine.	   Any	   claim	   to	   a	   political	   representation	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	  Mandate	   would	   have	   implicitly	   accepted	   its	   terms,	   and	   thereby	   the	   right	   of	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  National	  Home.	  	  	  In	  1923,	  a	  British	  proposal	  was	  put	  forward	  for	  an	  Arab	  Agency	  to	  be	  appointed	  by	  the	  High	  Commissioner.	  Rather	  than	  being	  elected	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Jewish	  Agency,	   it	   was	   ”a	   pale	   reflection	   of	   the	   Jewish	   ❲representative	   body❳,	   without	  sanction	   in	   the	   Mandate,	   and	   without	   international	   standing.”263	  In	   this	   vacuum,	  Palestinian	  Arab	  politics	  were	  increasingly	  dominated	  by	  a	  religious	  leadership	  that	  had	   been	   authorized	   and	   subsidized	   by	   the	   British.	   After	   taking	   control	   over	   the	  Palestine	  territories,	  the	  latter	  had	  created	  the	  entirely	  new	  post	  of	  the	  ”Grand	  Mufti	  of	   Palestine”	   (al-­‐mufti	  al-­‐akbar),	  who	  was	   also	   designated	   the	   ”Mufti	   of	   Jerusalem	  and	  the	  Palestine	  region”	  (mufti	  al-­‐Quds	  wal-­‐diyar	  al-­‐filistiniyya)	  as	  well	  as	  head	  of	  the	  new	  ”Supreme	  Muslim	  Council”,	   an	  advisory	  body	  on	   ”Muslim”	  courts,	   schools	  and	  charities.	  The	  ”existing	  system	  was	  completely	  restructured	  by	  the	  British,	  who	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  262	  Shapira	  2012:	  84,	  see	  also	  Khalidi	  2001:	  19.	  263	  Khalidi	  2001:	  19f.	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effectively	  placed	  the	  mufti	  above	  all	  other	  religious	  officials	  in	  Palestine.”264	  To	  this	  newly	  created	  position	  of	  unprecedented	  power,	  the	  British	  appointed	  Hajj	  Amin	  al-­‐Husayni.	   ”Among	   all	   the	   other	   leaders	   of	   national	   movements	   in	   Arab	   countries	  during	  this	  period	  (and	  among	  Palestinian	  leaders),	  the	  mufti	  was	  alone	  in	  being	  a	  leading	  religious	  figure,	  whose	  base	  of	  power	  was	  a	  ’traditional’	  religious	  institution,	  albeit	  a	  newly	  invented	  one.”265	  After	  the	  1936	  revolt,	  the	  British	  exiled	  most	  Arab	  leaders	  in	  1937,	  while	  others	  fled,	  some	  never	  to	  return	  to	  the	  country,	  most	  notably	  Hajj	   Amin	   al-­‐Husayni	   himself.	   The	   British	   took	   control	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Muslim	  Council,	   appointed	   British	   officials	   to	   supervise	   it,	   and	   deprived	   the	   mufti	   of	   its	  revenues.266	  As	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   approached,	   the	   rift	   between	   the	   Jewish	  Agency	  and	  the	  Mufti	  grew	  wider.	  It	  finally	  came	  to	  a	  head	  with	  the	  Israeli	  claim	  of	  statehood267 	  at	   the	   1942	   Biltmore	   Conference	   in	   New	   York,	   while	   the	   Mufti	  subsequently	  left	  for	  Germany,	  supporting	  the	  National	  Socialist	  German	  and	  Fascist	  Italian	  war	  efforts.268	  	  	  
Border	  drawing	  and	  the	  transfer	  of	  population	  
Pakistan	  
	  After	   the	   war,	   the	   newly-­‐elected	   Labor	   government	   witnessed	   the	   British	   being	  driven	   out	   of	   the	   Indian	   subcontinent.	   Despite	   long	   deliberations	   between	   the	  Muslim	  League,	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  and	  the	  British,	  the	  three	  parties	  were	  unable	  to	  find	  a	  path	  to	  independence	  involving	  a	  unified	  India,	  and	  on	  June	  3,	  1947,	  His	  Majesty’s	  Government	  announced	  the	  transfer	  of	  power	  to	  and	  the	  partition	  of	  British	  India.	  Independence	  was	  to	  come	  ten	  weeks	  later,	  at	  midnight	  on	  August	  14,	  1947.	   British	   lawyer	   Cyril	   Radcliffe	   was	   dispatched	   to	   India	   on	   July	   7,	   to	   head	   a	  commission	   tasked	   with	   demarcating	   the	   boundary	   between	   the	   two	   emergent	  states.	   It	  was	   his	   first	   visit	   to	   the	   subcontinent.	   Six	  weeks	   later,	   the	   results	   of	   the	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  time	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commission,	   the	   ”Radcliffe	   line”,	   became	   an	   international	   border.	   It	   separated	   the	  Indian	   Union	   and	   Pakistan	   but	   also	   divided	   the	   northwestern	   region	   of	   Punjab,	  bordering	   Afghanistan,	   and	   the	   northeastern	   region,	   bordering	   Burma,	   into	  respective	   Indian	   and	   Pakistani	   territories.	   The	   Radcliffe	   Award	   demarcated	  ”Muslim	  Pakistan”	   from	  its	  ”non-­‐Muslim”	  Indian	  neighbor	   in	  the	  terms	  used	  in	  the	  official	   brief	   from	   the	   British	   Government.	   While	   one	   must	   be	   cautious	   when	  estimating	   the	   casualties	   of	   the	   civil	   war-­‐like	   conditions	   that	   followed	   partition,	  numbers	   suggest	   fourteen	   million	   people	   crossing	   the	   border	   of	   which	   between	  500,000	  to	  two	  million	  died.269	  	  
	  
From	  the	  top:	  The	  Radcliffe	  Boundary	  Commissions	  
	  Radcliffe	   and	   his	   Punjabi	   and	   Bengali	   commissions	   had	   been	   instructed	   to	  ”demarcate	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   two	   parts	   of	   [the	   Provinces]	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  ascertaining	   contiguous	   majority	   areas	   of	   Muslims	   and	   non-­‐Muslims.	   …	   For	   the	  purpose	  of	  determining	   the	  population	  of	  district,	   the	  1941	   census	   figures	  will	   be	  taken	   as	   authoritative.	   [The	   commissions]	   will	   also	   be	   instructed	   to	   take	   into	  
[consideration]	   other	   factors”.270	  Apart	   from	   the	   census,	   the	   primary	   source	   of	  information	  upon	  which	  Radcliffe	  relied	  in	  drawing	  his	  lines	  were	  the	  colonial	  maps.	  No	   information	   was	   gathered	   through	   the	   commissions’	   own	   surveys	   or	   ”by	  consulting	   the	   local	   administration,	   police,	   revenue	   officers	   or	   bureaucrats	   in	   the	  border	  districts.”271	  	  The	  official	  maps	  which	  Radcliffe	  utilized	  had	  been	  commissioned	  for	  two	  principal	  reasons.	  The	   first	  was	  colonial	  administration,	  such	  as	   tax	  collection,	  and	   logistics,	  like	   transportation,	   roads	   and	   railways.	   The	   second	  main	   function	   of	   the	  maps	   of	  British	  India	  had	  been	  military,	  especially	  in	  the	  northeast,	  where	  the	  advancement	  of	   the	   Japanese	   forces	   in	  1942	  had	  highlighted	  the	  need	   for	  precise	  cartographical	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knowledge.272	  The	  mark	  of	  colonial	  administration	  and	  military	  imperatives	  on	  the	  maps	   available	   for	   Radcliffe’s	   border	   mission	   became	   clear	   in	   the	   factors	   which	  needed	   to	   be	   considered	   besides	   the	   census	   as	   ”other	   factors”,	   that	   is,	   lines	   of	  communication,	  roads,	  railways,	  canals,	  and	  military	  bases,	   leaving	  aside	  questions	  of	  trade	  patterns	  and	  kinship,	  and	  the	  cultural	  and	  religious	  significance	  of	  cities	  and	  regions.273	  	  	  As	  provided	   for	   in	   the	  statement	  of	   June	  3rd,	   the	  commissions	  were	   to	  demarcate	  the	  boundaries	  according	  to	  the	  contiguity	  of	  Muslim	  majority	  areas	  –	  according	  to	  the	   census	   –	   while	   taking	   ”other	   factors”	   into	   consideration.	   In	   the	   Punjabi	  commission,	  these	  ”other	  factors”	  were	  insisted	  upon	  by	  the	  INC	  and	  the	  Sikhs,	  the	  latter	  pushing	  for	  recognition	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  religious	  and	  cultural	  heritage	  in	  areas	   where	   they	   could	   never	   claim	   numerical	   majority.274	  In	   the	   end,	   the	   ”other	  factors”	   that	   trumped	   the	   cards	  of	   the	   census	  were	   rivers,	   canals,	   railroads,	   roads	  and	  military	  bases.	  These	  were	  the	  factors	  that	  were	  visible	  on	  Radcliffe’s	  maps.	  	  	  As	   discussed	   above,	   the	   enumerative	   power	   of	   the	   census	   had	   shaped	   and	  strengthened	   the	   perception	   of	   clearly	   demarcated	   and	   distinguishable	   religious	  communities	  without	  communal	  or	   individual	  overlaps.	  The	  colonial	  maps,	  heavily	  dependent	  upon	  administrative	  and	  military	  knowledge,	  superimposed	  these	  reified	  religious	  communities	  onto	  visible	  territory.	  The	  census	  and	  the	  map	  came	  together	  in	   the	   cartographic	   representation	   of	   a	   religious/national	   composition,	   thereby	  ”naturalizing	  a	  territorialized	  politics	  of	  ethnic/national	  self-­‐determination”.275	  The	  maps	   enacted	   “immanent	   national	   units	   and	   the	   census	   populates	   those	   entities.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  272	  Khan	  2007;	  Chester	  2009.	  273	  Chester	  2009:	  21.	  274,	   The	   Sikh	   representative	   to	   the	   Punjabi	   commission	   Sardar	   Harnam	   Singh	   argued	   that	   in	   the	  Balfour	   Declaration	   Palestine	  was	   described	   as	   the	   homeland	   of	   the	   Jews	   even	  when	   they	  were	   a	  minority	  in	  it	  in	  1917.	  A	  similar	  logic	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  Sikhs	  in	  the	  Punjab.	  (Partition	  Proceedings,	  Vol.	  II:	  133).	  	  	  The	  references	  to	  the	  religious	  significance	  of	  Sikh	  shrines	  in	  Muslim	  majority	  areas	  were	  dismissed	  by	   the	  Muslim	  League’s	  elected	   judges	  Din	  Muhammad	  and	  Muhammad	  Munir	  as	   ”most	  ridiculous,	  most	   unjustifiable	   and	   most	   unreasoned”	   (Ahmed	   199:	   149f).	   Also,	   the	   reference	   to	   the	   Sikh’s	  ”religious	  freedom”	  as	  an	  important	  ”other	  factor”	  was	  dismissed	  (Ibid.).	  275	  Campbell	  1998:	  79.	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The	  census	  ”fill[ed]	  in	  politically	  the	  formal	  topography	  of	  the	  map.”276	  The	  stronger	  these	   categories	   were	   presented	   as	   natural	   –	   eventually	   making	   their	   way	   into	  international	  relations	  as	  ontologically	  fixed	  entities	  –	  the	  more	  alternative	  accounts	  emphasizing	  alternative	  political	  possibilities	  were	  pushed	  to	  the	  side.	  
	  
From	  the	  bottom:	  the	  everyday	  life	  of	  porous	  borders	  
	  The	   border	   drawing	   by	   Indian	   and	   British	   officials	   was,	   however,	   but	   one	   in	   a	  myriad	  of	   instances	   that	  helped	  to	  demarcate	  Muslims	   from	  non-­‐Muslim.	  Differing	  from	  the	  Punjabi	  border	  in	  the	  northwest,	  for	  example,	  the	  Bengali	  border	  between	  India	   and	   eastern	   Pakistan	   was	   intended	   to	   be	   kept	   porous.	  277	  Still,	   two	   factors	  worked	  to	  seal	  it:	  ”The	  first	  was	  the	  drive	  to	  stop	  smuggling.	  The	  second	  factor	  was	  the	  difficulty	  of	   impressing	   the	  official	   policy	  of	   openness	  upon	  border	  police	   and	  militia.”278	  As	  the	  Muslim	  National	  Guard	  had	  become	  obsolete,	  unemployed	  young	  men	  were	  plenty	  in	  the	  swelling	  border	  communities,	  and	  the	  Bengali	  government	  began	   to	   issue	   calls	   for	   Muslim	   youth	   to	   build	   up	   a	   150,000	   strong	   non-­‐official	  Muslim	   military	   organization	   called	   Ansar	   Bahini.279	  This	   militia	   seemed	   to	   have	  been	   behind	   a	   trend	   starting	   a	   few	   years	   after	   partition	   in	   which	   Muslims	   from	  border	   villages	   in	  West	   Bengal	  moved	   to	   Pakistan	   after	   burning	   down	   their	   own	  houses.	  This	  made	  it	   impossible,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  Hindu	  population	  to	  inhabit	  their	  homes,	   but	   also	   left	   the	   Muslims	   who	   quit	   India	   with	   nothing	   to	   return	   to.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  276	  Campbell	  1998:	  79.	  277	  Chatterji	  1999,	  2007,	  1994;	  The	  Bengal	  Radcliffe	  line	  disrupted	  every	  aspect	  of	  existence	  for	  the	  rural	  community	  along	  the	  border,	  rupturing	  agrarian	  communities	  all	  along	  its	  length.	  Grazing	  one’s	  herds	  along	  the	  borders	  became	  risky	  business,	  where	  rivers	  formed	  the	  borderline,	  fishermen	  were	  attacked,	  villages	  were	  cut	  off	  from	  their	  markets	  and	  markets	  were	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  hinterlands	  that	  served	   them.	  The	  disruption	  of	   roads	   and	   railways	   separated	   the	  North	  of	  Bengal	   from	   the	   rest	   of	  West	   Bengal,	   and	   interrupted	   the	   multi-­‐million	   rupee	   tea	   trade	   of	   the	   Assam	   region.	   Further,	  hospitals	   and	   courts	   lost	   the	   staff	   that	  manned	   them	   and	   the	   border	   separated	   people	   from	   their	  families.	  (Chatterji	  1999:	  231ff).	  	  In	  theory,	  many	  West	  Bengalis	  continued	  after	  partition	  to	  own	  land	  in	  East	  Pakistan	  and	  vice	  versa,	  holding	  legitimate	  claims	  to	  cross	  the	  Radcliffe	   line	  to	  attend	  to	  their	  business	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  late	  1940s	  Bengal	  saw	  three	  different	  conflicting	  national	  directives	  active,	  leaving	  the	   local	  police	   the	  ”discretion	   to	  decide	  which	  particular	  policy	  prevailed	   in	  each	   individual	  case.”	  (Chatterji	  1999:	  234).	  278	  Chatterji	  1999:	  233.	  279	  Chatterji	  1999:	  236f.	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”presence	  of	  armed	  border	  militia	  did	  much	  to	  re-­‐kindle	  communal	  hostilities	  along	  the	   border.	   If	   this	   is	   correct,	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   the	   played	   an	   important	   part	   in	  strengthening	  the	  border	  and	  making	  it	  more	  impregnable.”280	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Bengali	  border,	   there	  was	  an	  official	  agreement	   in	  the	  Punjab	  to	  complete	   the	   ”transfer	  of	  populations”	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   religious	  community,	  which	  was	   the	  only	  one	  of	   its	  kind	   in	   India.	  The	   figure	  of	   ‘the	  refugee’	   in	   this	  region	  was	  marked	   by	   a	   sense	   of	   religious	   belonging.	  However,	   it	  was	   not	   simply	   the	   task	   of	  fixing	   citizenship	   onto	   religious	   differences,	   since	   not	   all	   Muslims	   could	   become	  Pakistanis,	   and	   some	   Muslims	   wanted	   to	   remain	   in,	   or	   return	   to,	   their	   homes	   in	  India.281 	  Bordermaking,	   Vazira	   Zamindar	   writes,	   was	   not	   a	   simple	   geographic	  project,	  but	  one	  that	  ran	  through	  households	  and	  the	  inner	  worlds	  of	  family	  ties.	  As	  such,	   the	   control	   of	  movements	   of	   people	   and	   property	   by	   national	   institutions	   –	  such	  as	   that	  of	   the	  Custodian	  of	  Evacuee	  Property	  –	  helped	   to	  shape	   the	   ”Muslim”	  community	  alongside	  the	  defining	  imprint	  of	  citizenship.282	  	  	  “The	  very	  ways	   in	  which	  one	  came	  to	  be	  marked	  as	  Muslim	  were	   transformed	  by	  the	   process	   of	   this	   long	   Partition,	   of	   dividing,	   categorizing,	   and	   regulating	   people,	  places,	   and	   institutions	   for	   bounding	   two	   distinct	   nations,	   and	   they	   accrued	   new	  meanings,	  for	  alongside	  citizens	  there	  emerged	  the	  ‘undefined’,	  the	  ‘stateless’,	  and	  a	  landscape	   of	   divided	   families.” 283 	  Zamindar	   shows	   how	   the	   quantification	   of	  refugees	  on	  either	  side	  of	   the	  official	  border	  categorized	   the	  ”displaced	  people”	  as	  ”Muslims”	   or	   ”non-­‐Muslims”	   and	   how	   the	   one	   category	   of	   those	   leaving,	   the	  ”evacuees”,	  was	  translated	  into	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  of	  the	  other	  category	  that	  could	  be	  housed	   in	   their	  abandoned	  property,	   the	  so	  called	   ”evacuee	  property”.284	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  280	  Chatterji	  1999:	  239.	  281	  Khan	  2007:	  193ff	  ;	  Zamindar	  2007:	  11.	  282	  Zamindar	  2007.	  283	  Zamindar	  2007:	  226.	  284	  Zamindar	   2007:	   86;	   It	  was	   not	   only	   the	   dichotomizing	   effects	   of	   ”evancuee	  property”	   laws	   that	  helped	   to	   fix	   what	   was	   ”Muslim”,	   but	   also	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   category	   of	   ”evacuees”	   were	   partly	  assumed	  to	  include	  all	  religious	  minorities	  as	  ”intending	  evacuees”,	  fitting	  the	  religious	  category	  into	  the	  status	  of	  a	  leaving,	  or	  soon-­‐to-­‐leave,	  population,	  emptying	  the	  land	  for	  the	  expected	  refugees	  from	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”Thus	   it	   is	   ironic	   that	   the	   very	   formulation	   of	   evacuee	   property	   laws	   as	   a	  cornerstone	  of	  rehabilitation	  programs	  of	  both	  states	  ended	  up	  fixing	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  refugees	  in	  an	  oppositional	  relationship.”285	  	  Other	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  control	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  population	  closed	  the	  seal	  on	  what	   was	   ”Muslim”	   and	   sedimented	   its	   difference	   to	   the	   non-­‐Muslim	   were	   the	  surveillance	  of	  family	  ties	  in	  Pakistan	  of	  Muslim	  Indian	  civil	  servants	  –	  non-­‐Muslims	  not	   being	   surveillanced	   in	   the	   same	   manner	   –	   and	   the	   programs	   to	   repatriate	  Muslim,	  Hindu	  and	  Sikh	  women	  abducted	   in	  the	  Punjabi	  region	  to	  their	  respective	  ”nation”,	  partly	  against	  their	  own	  will.286	  	  	  A	   further	   factor	   in	   consolidating	   the	   difference	   between	  Muslim	   and	   non-­‐Muslim	  was	   fear	   and	   violence.	   The	   wide-­‐ranging	   violence	   accompanying	   the	   process	   of	  Indian	   partition	   did	   not	   simply	   separate,	   disrupt	   and	   destroy,	   but,	   according	   to	  Gyanendra	  Pandey,	  was	  part	   and	  parcel	  of	   the	   creative	  process	  of	   the	  unities	   that	  emerged	   from	  this	  process.	  Violence	  and	  unity	   in	   this	  sense	  constitute	  each	  other.	  ”Violence	   happened	   –	   and	   can	   only	   happen	   –	   at	   the	   boundaries	   of	   community.	   It	  marks	  those	  boundaries.	  It	  is	  the	  denial	  of	  any	  violence	  ’in	  our	  midst’,	  the	  attribution	  of	  harmony	  within	  and	  the	  consignment	  of	  violence	  to	  the	  outside,	   that	  established	  ’community’.”287	  The	  violence	  in	  1946	  and	  1947,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  slaughter	  of	  the	  days	  of	   partition	   and	   independence,	   were	   in	   this	   sense	   also	   constitutive	   of	   a	   process	  consolidating	   the	   ”Muslims”,	   making	   them	   even	   more	   distinguished	   and	  distinguishable	  from	  those	  who	  were	  not	  Muslims.	  	  Colonial,	   official	   government	   inscribed	   and	   shaped	   the	   knowledge	   about	   ”Hindu”,	  ”Sikh”	  and	  ”Muslim”	  identities,	  recognizing	  their	  salience	  by	  accounting	  for	  them	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  other	  side	  of	   the	  border.	   ”The	   institution	  of	   the	  Custodian	  of	  Evacuee	  Property	  can	  be	  squarely	  placed	  in	  a	  comparative	  history	  of	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century,	  particularly	  given	  its	  chilling	  parallels	  with	   the	   Israeli	   equivalent,	   which	   makes	   evident	   its	   silenced	   effects	   in	   ‘emptying’	   the	   land	   and	  creating	  significant	  internat	  dispossession.”	  (Zamindar	  2007:	  10).	  285	  Zamindar	  2007:	  121.	  286	  Menon	  1998,	  2004;	  Major	  1995;	  Zamindar	  2007:	  7ff,	  112ff,	  226ff.	  287	  Pandey	  2001:	  204.	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political	  electoral	   representation.	  The	  creation	  of	  an	   international	  border	  between	  these	  constructed	  but	  nonetheless	  real	  communities	  further	  sharpened	  the	  edges	  of	  the	   blurry	   categories	   that	   otherwise	   embodied	   them,	   reifying	   and	   forgetting	   the	  processes	   through	  which	   they	   emerged.	   Through	   national	   and	   local	   channels:	   the	  regulation	   of	   trade;	   the	   burning	   of	   houses;	   the	  management	   of	   refugees	   and	   their	  property;	   the	   projects	   to	   recover	   abducted	   women	   and	   to	   engage	   in	   surveillance	  against	  Indian	  Muslim	  state	  functionaries;	  the	  control	  over	  the	  movement	  of	  people	  and	  property;	  through	  these,	  and	  many	  other	  processes,	  the	  meaning	  and	  scope	  of	  Muslim	   identity	   and	   a	   ”Muslim	   Homeland”,	   were	   transformed.	   The	   boundary	  drawing	   of	   partition	   –	   the	   official,	   clean,	   rational	   and	   ”representative”	   one,	   or	   the	  unofficial,	  messy,	  long	  and	  partly	  arbitrary	  one	  –	  represented	  the	  parting	  of	  ways	  of	  two	   ”religious	   communities”,	   inscribing	   them	   and	   the	   states	   formed	   around	   them	  into	  the	  international	  system,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  historical	  formation.	  	  
Israel	  
	  Contrasted	  with	  the	  hasty	  creation	  of	  the	  new	  South	  Asian	  borders,	  plans	  had	  been	  available	   for	   Palestine	   for	   more	   than	   a	   decade	   before	   the	   UN	   recommended	  partition	   in	   November	   1947,	   modeled	   on	   the	   first	   partition	   plan	   of	   the	   “Peel	  report”.288	  	  Partition	   ideas	   for	  Palestine	  had	  been	  circulating	  throughout	   the	  period	  of	   the	   British	   Mandate,	   but	   the	   escalation	   of	   violence	   in	   1929	   catalyzed	   British	  officials	  to	  begin	  in	  earnest	  to	  further	  develop	  their	  ideas.	  Until	  the	  mid-­‐1930s,	  these	  ideas	   –	   mainly	   in	   the	   form	   of	   proposals	   for	   cantonization	   –	   remained	   vague	   and	  abstract.289	  The	  Arab	  uprisings	  of	  1936	  concretized	  the	  ideas,	  but	  did	  so	  in	  the	  form	  of	   full	   partition.	   ”After	   several	  months	   of	   unrest,	   it	   became	   clear	   to	  many	   British	  administrators	  that	  anything	  other	  than	  a	   ‘clean	  cut’	  would	  continue	  to	  complicate	  the	  definition	  and	  practical	  governance	  of	  a	  national	  entity.”290	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  288	  Sinanoglou	  2010:	  120;	  Chester	  2008:	  93;	  Fraser	  1988;	  Morris	  2001.	  289	  Erskine	  1935;	  Cust	  1935.	  290	  Sinanoglou	  2009:	  147.	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The	  ”clean	  cut”	  would	  become	  the	  official	  British	  position	  a	  year	  later,	  through	  the	  Report	   of	   the	   Royal	   Commission,	   better	   known	   as	   the	   Peel	   Commission	   after	   its	  chairman	   Lord	   William	   Peel.291 	  The	   report	   not	   only	   confirmed	   the	   Mandate’s	  distinction	   of	   Palestine’s	   two	   essentially	   different	   Jewish	   and	   non-­‐Jewish	   peoples,	  but	   also	   territorialized	   them. 292 	  In	   its	   unanimous	   report,	   the	   Commission	  recommended	   that	   Palestine	   be	   partitioned	   into	   an	  Arab	   state	   –	  which	  was	   to	   be	  joined	  with	  Trans-­‐Jordan	  –	  a	  Jewish	  state,	  and	  a	  new	  British	  mandatory	  area,	  which	  would	  cover	  the	  ”Holy	  Cities”	  of	  Jerusalem,	  Bethlehem	  and	  Nazareth,	  and	  a	  corridor	  to	  Jaffa.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  left	  many	  questions	  open	  –	  such	  as	  the	  precise	  lines	  of	  partition,	  or	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  was	  to	  be	  implemented	  –	  the	  Peel	  report	  was	  the	  first	  public	  proposal	  of	  partition	  put	  forward	  by	  British	  official	  representatives.	  	  	  The	   departure	   of	   the	   Commission	   in	   November	   1936	   was	   triggered	   by	   a	   violent	  rebellion	  in	  April	  that	  same	  year,	  preceding	  the	  general	  strikes	  that	  were	  to	  follow.	  Although	   the	   ”Arab	   uprising”	   was	   not	   the	   first	   in	   mandatory	   Palestine,	   it	   had	  definitely	  been	  the	  most	  violent	  in	  its	  history.	  The	  Commission	  was	  given	  the	  task	  of	  reporting	   on	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   uprising	   and	   proposing	  methods	   for	   rectifying	   the	  causes	  of	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	  grievances.293	  Running	  to	  nearly	  400	  pages	  in	  its	  attempt	  to	   outline	   and	   analyze	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   situation,	   the	   Peel	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  291	  CMD.5479.	  292	  CMD.5479:	  62.	  293	  The	   commitee	   were	   to	   'ascertain	   whether,	   upon	   a	   proper	   construction	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   the	  Mandate,	   either	   the	  Arabs	   or	   the	   Jews	   have	   any	   legitimate	   grievances	   upon	   account	   of	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  Mandate	  has	   been,	   or	   is	   being	   implemented;	   and	   if	   the	  Commission	   is	   satisfied	   that	   the	  grievances	  are	  well	  founded,	  to	  make	  recommendations	  for	  their	  removal	  and	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  their	  recurrence.'	  (Cmd.	  5479:	  ix).	  ”The	  Peel	  Commission	  was	  the	  most	  thorough	  inquiry	  into	  the	  Palestine	  conlict	  carried	  out	  thus	  far,	  but	   there	   was	   something	   misleading	   about	   it.	   The	   royal	   commission	   had	   not,	   of	   course,	   come	   to	  ’study’	  anything;	  it	  had	  come	  to	  help	  the	  government	  divet	  itself	  of	  Palestine.	  Lord	  Peel	  seems	  to	  have	  brought	  with	  him	  a	  foregone	  conclusion:	  ’The	  social,	  moral	  and	  political	  gaps	  between	  the	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	   communities	   	   are	   already	   unbridgeable’,	   he	   wrote	   to	   the	   colonial	   secretary.”	   (Segev	   2000:	  401)	  ”The	   commission	  was	   intended	   as	   cover	   to	   help	   the	   British	   find	   a	   relatively	   graceful	   exit	   from	   an	  increasingley	  uncomfortable	  situation.	  Segev	  (2000:	  413)	  refers	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  commission	  of	  inquiry	  as	   a	   ’ritual	   procedure’.	   (…)	   Such	   bodies	   allowed	   the	  British	   to	  Maintain	   the	   appearance	   to	   judicial	  objectivity	  and	  rationality,	  when	  in	  fact	  political	  consiederations	  played	  a	  determining	  role	  in	  policy	  decisions.”	  (Chester	  2008:	  89).	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Commission’s	  report	  was	  the	  work	  of	  six	  appointed	  members,294	  who	  had	  spent	  the	  previous	  eleven	  months	  listening	  to	  the	  oral	  testimony	  of	  British	  officials,	  Jews,	  and	  Arabs	   (though	   the	   latter	   boycotted	   the	   Commission	   until	   a	   week	   before	   its	  departure),	   reading	   letters,	   memoranda,	   and	   petitions,	   and	   touring	   Palestine	   and	  parts	  of	  neighboring	  Trans-­‐Jordan.295	  It	  also	  reflected	  the	  Commission’s	  experience	  of	   a	   Palestinian	   ”reality”,	   that	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   already	   was	   parted	   into	   two	  separated	   communities.	   The	   salience	   of	   this	   experienced	   partition	   on	   the	   ground	  was	   expressed	   in	   the	   Commission’s	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   separate	  Arab	   and	   Jewish	  economies,	  school	  systems,	  lifestyles,	  residential	  areas,	  and	  even	  health	  facilities.296	  ”The	  thirty-­‐year	  transitional	  Mandate	  period	  (had)	  enabled	  the	   Jews	  to	  establish	  a	  society	  and	  economy	  of	  their	  own	  in	  Palestine.”297	  	  	  Starting	   its	   narrative	   from	   the	   Biblical	   days	   of	   Abraham,	   the	   report	   traced	   the	  history	  of	  the	  problem	  in	  Palestine,	  examined	  the	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  life	  under	   the	   Mandate,	   and	   offered	   suggestions	   for	   managing	   problems	   within	   the	  terms	   of	   the	   Mandate.	   However,	   the	   report’s	   central	   recommendation,	   and	   that	  which	   is	   important	   for	   our	   analysis,	   fell	   outside	   the	   bounds	   of	   the	   Mandate	  altogether.	  It	  saw	  the	  Mandate	  as	  unworkable	  as	  long	  as	  Jews	  and	  Arabs	  could	  not	  be	   brought	   together	   in	   a	   single	   representative	   legislature. 298 	  The	   situation	   in	  Palestine	   had	   reached	   a	   ”deadlock”,	   and	   ”if	   the	   existing	  Mandate	   continued,	   there	  was	   little	  hope	  of	   lasting	  peace	   in	  Palestine”.299	  	   In	  order	  to	   lead	  the	  reader	  to	  this	  conclusion,	  ”the	  report	  had	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  the	  conflict	  was	  indeed	  driven	  by	  a	  clash	  of	  two	  distince	  and	  irreconcilable	  national	  communities	  rather	  than	  by	  ethnic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  294	  Lord	  Peel	  himself,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  India	  from	  1922	  to	  1923	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  joint	  select	  committee	  on	  the	  Indian	  constitution	  in	  1933–4;	  Sir	  Horace	  Rumbold,	  a	  diplomat	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Europe,	  and	  Asia;	  Morris	  Carter,	  chief	  of	  Tanganyika	  Territory	   from	  1920	  to	  1924	  and	  chairman	  of	  the	  1932–3	  Kenya	  land	  commission;	  Reginald	  Coupland,	  Beit	  professor	  of	  colonial	  history	  at	  Oxford	  and	  editor	  of	  the	  Round	  Table	  from	  1917	  to	  1919;	  Laurie	  Hammond,	  governor	  of	  Assam	  from	  1927	  to	  1929	  and	  chairman	  of	  the	  Indian	  delineation	  committee	  in	  1935–6;	  and	  Sir	  Harold	  Morris,	  president	  of	  the	  Industrial	  Court	  from	  1926	  to	  1945.	  	  295	  Sinanoglou	  2009:	  149	  296	  Klieman	  1980:	  289	  297	  Shapira	  2012:	  98	  298	  CMD.5479:	  Chapter	  22:	  380ff	  299	  CMD.5479:	  Chapter	  22:	  380	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hatreds,	   economic	   competition	   or	   domination,	   anger	   over	   immigration,	   or	   poor	  government.”300	  	  The	  function	  of	  the	  extensive	  historical	  part	  of	  the	  report	  that	  went	  2000	  years	  back	  into	  Jewish	  history	  was	  mainly	  to	  make	  the	  historicist	  argument	  of	  the	  deep	  historical,	  spiritual	  and	  now	  ideologically	  national	  Jewish	  connection	  to	  the	  land	   of	   Palestine,	   presenting	   the	   Jews	   as	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   the	   non-­‐Jewish	  population.301	  	  What	   the	   over	   400	   page	   long	   report	   did,	   in	   the	   end,	   was	   to	   reaffirm	   the	   Zionist	  narrative	  of	  a	   Jewish	  historical	   connection	   to	   the	   land	  of	  Palestine,	   the	   idea	  of	   the	  Jewish	   people	   ”return[ing]	   to	   their	   historic	   homeland”,	   and	   the	   fundamental	  difference	  of	   the	   Jews	  from	  their	  non-­‐Jewish	  neighbors.302	  In	  this	  sense,	   the	  report	  stated	  that	  the	  “culture	  of	  Arab	  Palestine	  …	  born	  as	  it	  is	  of	  Asia,	  it	  had	  little	  kinship	  with	   that	   of	   the	   National	   Home,	   which,	   though	   it	   is	   linked	   with	   ancient	   Jewish	  tradition,	   is	   predominantly	   a	   culture	   of	   the	   West.	   Nowhere,	   indeed,	   is	   the	   gulf	  between	  the	  races	  more	  obvious.”	  303	  The	  commission	  had	  taken	  the	  situation	  they	  found	  on	  the	  ground	  –	  that	  of	  separate	  education	  systems,	  economies	  and	  language	  –	  as	  evidence	  reflecting	   the	  narrative	  of	   the	  separate	  nature	  of	   the	   two	  peoples	  of	  Palestine.	  	  	  On	   2	   April	   1937,	   the	   Daily	   Herald	   broke	   the	   story	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   plan	   for	  dividing	  Palestine,	  which	  was	  officially	  endorsed	  by	  the	  British	  government	  when	  it	  was	  published	  on	  7	  July	  1937.	  The	  partition	  line	  more	  or	  less	  followed	  the	  existing	  Jewish	   and	   Arab	   settlement	   pattern.	   The	   proposed	   Jewish	   state	  was	   estimated	   to	  contain	  some	  225,000	  Arabs,	  who	  were	  to	  be	  transferred,	  modeled	  on	  the	  exchange	  between	   Turkey	   and	   Greece	   during	   the	   1920s. 304 	  It	   would	   come	   with	   “just	  compensation”	  for	  those	  moved,	  but	  for	  those	  who	  objected,	  the	  transfer	  would	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  300	  Sinanglou	  2010:	  134;	  ”It	  is	  not	  a	  natural	  or	  old-­‐standing	  feud.”	  (CMD.5479:	  395)	  301	  Dubnov	  forthcoming:	  36;	  Sinanglou	  2010:	  135	  302	  CMD.5479:	  3	  303	  CMD.5479:	  2,	  117.	  304	  ”Before	   the	   operation	   the	   Greek	   and	   Turkish	  minorities	   had	   been	   a	   constant	   irritant.	   Now	   the	  ulcer	   has	   been	   clean	   cut	   out,	   and	  Greco-­‐Turkish	   relations,	  we	  understand,	   are	   friendlier	   than	   they	  have	  ever	  been	  before.”	  (CMD.5479:	  390);	  See	  also	  Shields	  2013.	  
	   106	  
implemented	  by	  the	  British;	  ”in	  the	  last	  resort”	  by	  means	  of	  compulsion.	  The	  Arab	  Higher	  Committee	  rejected	  the	  plan	  in	  July	  1937.	  Jewish	  opinion	  remained	  divided.	  	  Though	   initially	   rejected,	   the	   Peel	   report	   resurfaced	   ten	   years	   later	   in	   UN	  negotiations	   on	   Israeli	   independence	   and	   the	   partition	   of	   Palestine	   in	   the	   fall	   of	  1947.	   ”[N]early	   a	   decade	   after	   the	   Peel	   report’s	   release,	   the	   United	   Nations	  recommended	   the	   partition	   of	   Palestine,	   using	   the	   Peel	   proposals	   and	  maps	   as	   a	  blueprint.”305	  In	  February	  1947,	  when	  the	  British	  had	  decided	  to	  leave	  Palestine	  and	  hand	  over	  the	  question	  of	  its	  future	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  they	  did	  not	  expect	  that	  the	  UN	  would	  achieve	  a	  binding	   resolution,	  which	   required	   a	   two-­‐thirds	  majority,	  mainly	  due	   to	  previous	  Soviet	  opposition	   to	  Zionist	  policies.	  However,	   contrary	   to	  British	  and	  Arab	  expectations,	  both	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  blocs	  supported	  the	  draft	  resolution.306	  The	  UN	  decision	  to	  partition	  intensified	  the	  waves	  of	  violence	  that	  had	  engulfed	  Palestinian	  society	  during	  the	  final	  years	  of	  the	  British	  Mandate.	  A	  month	  before	   Israel	   declared	   itself	   independent,	   the	   Arab	   states	   surrounding	   the	   future	  state	   countered	   the	   first	   attempt	   at	   a	   large-­‐scale	   Jewish	   offensive.	   ”The	   Arab	  Legion’s	  goal	  had	  been	  to	  take	  control	  of	  areas	  designated	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Arab	  state	  and	   as	   far	   as	   possible	   avoid	   clashing	   with	   the	   Jews”.307	  However,	   each	   ”wave	   of	  violence	   brought	   with	   it	   further	   distancing	   and	   segregation	   of	   these	   national	  communities,	   each	   into	   its	   own	   territory.”308	  On	  May	   14,	   1948,	   David	   Ben-­‐Gurion	  declared	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   Israeli	   State.	   Within	   the	   following	   months	   the	  Jewish	  State	  of	  Israel	  was	  recognized	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  world’s	  existing	  states.	  The	  war	   of	   1948	   continued,	   and	   ended	   with	   the	   expulsion	   of	   between	   600,000	   and	  760,000	  Palestinian	  Arabs.	  ”Now,	  given	  the	  destruction	  of	  all	  the	  Jewish	  settlements	  on	   the	   Arab	   side,	   and	   the	   Arab	   evacuation	   from	   the	   Jewish	   side,	   a	   new	   reality	  materialized:	   two	  ethnically	  homogenous	  states,	  a	  mainly	   Jewish	  one	  and	  a	  purely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  305	  Sinanoglou	  2010:	  120.	  306	  Shapira	  2012:	  15f.	  307	  Shapira	  2012:	  165.	  308	  Shapira	  2012:	  96.	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Arab	  one.	  The	  conclusion	  was	   that	   the	  State	  of	   Israel	  could	  not	  allow	  the	  Arabs	   to	  return	  to	  their	  homes.”309	  	  
Conclusion	  	  
	  This	  chapter	  has	  tried	  to	  illustrate	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  the	  “Muslim	  Homeland”	  and	  the	  “Jewish	  National	  Home”	  became	  recognizable	  as	  such.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  had	   argued	   that	   recognition	   assumes	   –	   and	   reproduces	   –	   already	   differentiated	  objects,	   agents,	   or	   identities	   and	   thereby	   misses	   out	   on	   their	   process	   of	  differentiation.	   Recognition,	   in	   this	   sense,	   lacked	   genealogical	   sensitivity.	   The	  chapter	   illustrated	  some	  of	   these	  differentiation	  processes,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Pakistan,	  the	  differentiation	  between	  the	  British	  Indian	  ”Muslims”	  and	  the	  ”non-­‐Muslims”	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Israel,	  between	  the	  ”Jews”	  and	  the	  ”non-­‐Jews”.	  	  	  In	  British	  India,	  the	  census	  was	  argued	  to	  have	  reified	  the	  heterogeneous	  group	  of	  British	   Indian	   Muslims	   into	   a	   homogenous,	   politically	   representative	   entity.	   In	  Palestine,	   the	   Mandate	   reaffirmed	   the	   Balfour	   Declaration’s	   distinction	   between	  Jews	  and	  non-­‐Jews,	  which	  continued	   to	  serve	  as	   the	  categories	   	   in	   the	  subsequent	  census.	  The	  question	  of	  political	  representation	  showed	  a	  Muslim	  League	  under	  M.A.	  Jinnah	   claiming	   and	   gaining	   sole	   representational	   power	   over	   British	   Indian	  Muslims,	  continuing	  to	  deepen	  the	  distinction	  between	  Muslims	  and	  non-­‐Muslims	  as	  fundamental,	   national	   and	   civilizational.	   And	   prior	   to	   history	   and	   politics.	   In	  Palestine,	   the	   international	   recognition	   of	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   Jewish	   Agency	  affirmed	  the	  alleged	  difference	  between	  the	  Jews	  and	  the	  non-­‐Jews	  as	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  of	  two	  ”peoples”,	  and	  tied	  the	  Jews	  to	  what	  had	  previously	  been	  claimed	  as	   Palestinian	   territory.	   The	   boundary	   drawing	   and	   subsequent	   transfer	   of	  population	   illustrated	   the	   work	   by	   the	   boundary	   commissions	   in	   British	   India	   to	  separate	  the	  future	  Pakistani	  "Muslim	  Homeland"	  from	  its	  "non-­‐Muslim"	  neighbor.	  It	  showed	  how	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  census	  and	  the	  colonial	  maps	  were	  authorized	  and	   their	   conflictual	   and	   ambiguous	   background	   erased.	   Further,	   local	   border	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control,	   family	   surveillance	   and	   refugee	   administration	   were	   illustrated	   in	   the	  micro-­‐activities	   undertaken	   to	   stabilize	   the	   officially	   sanctioned	   separation.	   In	  Palestine,	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Peel	   Commission	   authorized	   the	   claims	   of	   the	   Balfour	  declaration	   and	   the	  Mandate	   regarding	   the	   separate	   nature	   of	   the	   Jews	   from	   the	  non-­‐Jews,	  and	   territorialized	   these	  differences.	  Ten	  years	   later,	   this	  differentiation	  made	   its	  way	   into	   the	   United	  Nations’	   deliberations	   on	   Israeli	   independence,	   and	  was	  thereafter	  reified	  and	  inscribed	  into	  international	  law	  through	  the	  partition	  of	  Palestine.	  	  	  These	   historical	   instances	   of	   demarcation	   illustrate	   the	   contested,	   political,	   and	  processual	  nature	  of	   the	   categories	   relied	  upon	  by	  authorities	   that	   recognized	   the	  states	   of	   Pakistan	   and	   Israel	   in	   the	   late	   1940s.	   The	   international	   recognition	   of	  Pakistan	   and	   Israel	   reified	   the	   boundaries	   around	   and	   between	   political	  communities.	  It	  reinstated	  the	  logic	  of	  a	  differentiated	  social	  ontology	  of	  "Self"	  and	  "Other".	   The	   recognition	   process	   reproduced	   and	   reinstantiated	   the	   colonial	  epistemological	   framework	   of	   differentiated	   and	   differentiable	   religious	   and	  cultural	   communities,	   reifying	   them	   into	   internationally	   recognized	   and	  recognizable	  political	  communities.	  International	  recognition	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  Israel	  may	   have	   been	   intended	   to	   empower	   national	   communities	   and	   further	   peaceful	  coexistence.	  It	  was,	  however,	  also	  a	  process	  of	  reification	  of	  religious	  difference	  into	  political	  difference.	  	  	  In	   the	   fourth	   chapter,	   I	   will	   continue	   the	   theoretical	   discussion	   of	   the	   second	  chapter,	  investigating	  different	  responses	  to	  the	  problematic	  aspects	  of	  reification	  in	  international	   relations.	   I	  will	   continue	   to	   argue	   for	   the	   importance	  of	   genealogical	  sensitivity,	   and	   for	   the	  need	   to	   investigate,	   rather	   than	  assume,	   the	  differentiation	  processes	  predicating	  recognition.	  That	  is,	  I	  will	  contine	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  become	  recognizable	  in	  international	  relations.	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Chapter	  4:	  Becoming	  recognizable	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  I	  argued	  that	  recognition	  in	  international	  relations	  lacked	  a	  sense	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   its	   objects	   had	   become	   possible	   to	   recognize,	   or	  recognizable.	   That	   is,	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   framework	   of	   recognition	   in	   scholarship	  often	   lacked	   sensitivity	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   processes	   of	   emergence	   of	   its	   objects,	   agents	  and	  epistemological	  frameworks.	  It	  lacked,	  what	  I	  termed	  as	  genealogical	  sensitivity.	  In	   this	   sense,	   Chapter	  2	   showed	   that	   recognition	  presupposed	  and	   reproduced	   its	  objects,	  agents	  or	  identities,	  and	  that	  it	  harbored	  a	  reproductive	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  framework	  of	  knowledge	  –	  the	  epistemic	  framework,	  within	  which	  the	  recognition	  itself	   took	   place.	   In	   the	   last	   part	   of	   that	   chapter,	   I	   argued	   that	   these	   aspects	   of	  presupposing	  and	  reproducing	  objects	  and	  epistemic	  frameworks,	  together	  with	  the	  lack	   of	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   implied	   that	   recognition	   held	   a	   reifying	   power.	   By	  that,	   I	  meant	   precisely	   the	   tendency	   to	   ”forget”	   about	   the	   processes	   by	  which	   an	  object	  or	  agent	  of	  international	  relations	  becomes	  recognizable,	  that	  is,	  available	  for	  recognition.	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   wish	   to	   continue	   this	   line	   of	   thought,	   by	   asking	   how	   these	  processes	   of	   reification,	   recognizability	   and	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   can	   be	  approached.	   How	   can	   we	   regain	   the	   lost	   perspectives	   of	   the	   processes	   through	  which	  agents,	  or	  objects	  became	  recognizable	  to	  international	  scholars?	  One	  of	  the	  more	   elaborate	   bodies	   of	   literature	   on	   the	   problems	   of,	   and	   possible	   answers	   to,	  reification	   has	   come	   from	   a	   perspective	   that	   was	   generally	   skeptical	   to	   claims	  regarding	   any	   kind	   of	   premises	   concerning	   the	   way	   the	   ”world	   was”,	   including	  claims	   that	   the	  world	  was	   constituted	   of	   pre-­‐differentiable	   entities,	   susceptible	   to	  recognition	  or	   in	  danger	  of	  misrecognition.	   I	  will	  engage	  with	  this	  ”post-­‐positivist”	  literature	   and	   extract	   from	   it	   the	   aspects	   that	   I	   believe	   to	   be	   helpful	   for	   the	  particular	  question	  of	  recognition.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  sketch	  a	  possible	  version	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of	  how	  I	  wish	  to	  engage	  with	  recognition.	  Rather	  than	  accessing	  recognition	  through	  the	  more	  common	  means	  that	  I	  rendered	  problematic	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  will	  argue	  for	  an	   approach	   that	   traces	   the	   multiple	   paths	   by	   which	   an	   object	   of	   international	  relations	  –	  an	  agent,	  a	  concept,	  or	  an	  identity	  –	  becomes	  recognizable.	  
	  
Post-­‐Positivism:	  Against	  the	  forgetfulness	  of	  reification	  and	  remembering	  the	  
process	  of	  becoming	  	  I	  begin	  my	  introductory	  remarks	  concerning	  post-­‐positivist	  thought	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  this	  body	  of	  literature,	  appending	  the	  disclaimer	  that	  I	  cannot,	  nor	   do	   I	   attempt	   to,	   fully	   cover	   this	   vast	   intellectual	   landscape.	   This	   is	   not	   a	  literature	  review.	  What	  I	  will	  do,	  however,	  is	  highlight	  two	  aspects	  which	  cut	  across	  many	   of	   the	   different	   accounts	   that	   I	   subsume	   under	   the	   label	   of	   post-­‐positivist	  scholarship.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  we	   find	   the	   rejection	  of	  ontological	   realism	  and	   the	  correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  the	  rejection	  of	  monism	  or	  the	  singularity	  of	  knowledge,	  truth,	  or	  method.	  Other	  characterizations	  are	  certainly	  possible	  and	  may	  even	  be	  more	  conclusive,	  but	  by	  focusing	  on	  these	  two	  aspects,	  I	  open	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  processes	  –	  of	  what	  I	  will	  call	  ”becoming”	  –	  and	  plurality	  –	  what	  I	  will	  discuss	  as	  ”pluralization”	  –	  two	  aspects	  that	  will	  continue	  to	  inform	  my	  own	  approach	  to	  recognition,	  which	  will	  be	  outlined	  below.	  	  Post-­‐positivist	  thought	  emerged	  in	  IR	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	   influenced	  by	  a	  growing	  interest	  in	  work	  on	  the	  philosophy	  and	  sociology	  of	  knowledge.310	  The	  first	  central	  aspect	  of	  this	  scholarship	  relevant	  to	  our	  discussion	  is	  its	  wide-­‐ranging	  rejection	   of	   ontological	   realism	   and	   the	   correspondence	   theory	   of	   truth,	   two	  cornerstones	  of	  more	  standard	  methodology.	  While	  ontological	  realism	  assumed	  the	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  Cox	   (1981);	   Ashley	   (1981);	   Ashley/Walker	   (1990);	   Hoffman	   (1988);	   Linklater	   (1981);	   Smith,	  (1994);	   Smith	   (2004);	   Zehfuss	   (2002);	   Walker	   (1993);	   Hacking	   (1999);	   Bierstecker	   (1989);	  	  Guillaume	  2007,	  2009;	  Guzzini	  2013;	  Holden	  2002:	  Albert	  et	  al:	  (2001);	  Inayatullah/Blaney	  (2000);	  	  Parker	  (1980);	  Jackson/Nexon	  (1999);	  Lapid	  1989;	  Zehfuss	  (2002);	  Wight	  (2006);	  Lapid/Kratochwil	  (1996);	  Ashley	  1989,	  Brown	  1994;	  Buzan	  1991;	  Campbell	  1992,	  1998,	  1996,	  George/Campbell	  1990;	  Walker	  1990	  1992;	  George/Campbell	  1990.	  
	   111	  
existence	  of	  a	  ”world	  out	  there”311,	  correspondence	  theory	  argued	  that	  propositions	  are	  true	  when	  they	  match,	  that	  is,	  when	  they	  correspond	  with	  this	  reality.312	  	  Ontological	  realism	  reflects	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  world	  exists	  independently	  from	  its	  observer.	   Against	   this	   assumption,	   Immanuel	   Kant	   demonstrated	   that	   what	   is	  observed	   is	   always	   constituted	   by,	   and	   dependent	   upon,	   the	   observing	   subject.	  Reality	  could	  not	  be	  known	  through	  experience	  of	  the	  ”factual”	  world	  of	  phenomena,	  but	   only	   through	   the	   faculty	   of	   reason.	   Time,	   space,	   content,	   meaning	   and	   even	  causation	  are	  all	  categories	  of	  the	  mind.	  ”Insofar	  as	  the	  subject	  is	  deeply	  inplicated	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  object,	   it	   is	   impossible	  to	  derive	  concepts	  and	  theoretical	  assertions	  directly	   from	   ’the	   facts.’	   If	   the	  objects	  of	  experience	  are	  not	   simply	   ’out	  there’,	   to	  understand	   the	  world	  we	  have	   to	  reflect	  on	   the	  categories	  we	  use.”313	  In	  other	  words,	   because	   the	   objects	   of	   the	  world	   are	   dependent	   on	   the	   subject	  who	  perceives	  them,	  no	  objective	  ”facts”	  or	  ”truths”	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  observing	  these	  objects.	  We	   can,	  however,	   reflect	  upon	   the	   categories	  we	  use	   to	  describe	  or	  make	  sense	  of	  our	  observations.	  As	  these	  very	  categories	  are	  part	  of	  the	  human	  mind	  and	  not	  a	  ”property	  of	  the	  object	  world”,	  an	  alternative	  to	  ontological	  realism	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  we	  gain	  knowledge	  as	  humans.314	  “Any	  such	  alternative	  will	   highlight	   the	   constitution	   of	   what	   we	   perceive	   as	   the	   world	   through	   our	  cognitive	   endowment	   and	   conceptual	   instruments.”315	  That	   is,	   any	   alternative	   to	  ontological	  realism	  would	  focus	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  is	  constituted	  through	  human	  faculties.	  This	  is,	  however,	  not	  a	  one-­‐man-­‐show	  but,	  for	  the	  post-­‐positivists	  as	  well	  as	  for	  Kant,	  a	  collective	  endeavor.316	  However,	  since	  the	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  George	  1994:	  11,	  21,	  156.	  312	  Giambattista	   Vico	   (1668-­‐1744),	   Immanuel	   Kant	   (1724-­‐1804)	   Ludwig	   Wittgenstein	   1889-­‐1951,	  showing	  their	  inadequcy,	  in	  IR:	  Kratochwil	  /uggie	  1986,,Hollis/Smith	  1990,	  see	  also:	  Lakoff	  1987.,	  313	  Friedrichs/Kratochwil	  2009:	  704.	  314	  For	  a	  different	  conclusion	  see:	  Patomaki/Wight,:	  2001.	  315	  Friedrichs/Kratochwil	  2009:	  704.	  316	  For	   the	   consequences	   of	   	   self-­‐referentiality	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   illness	   see:	   Friedson	   2009a,	  2009b..	  	  	  	  	  
	   112	  
cognitive	   faculties	   of	   others	   are	   ultimately	   inaccessible,	   the	   alternative	   to	  ontological	  realism	  needs	  to	  build	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  ”cognitive	  endowments	  and	   conceptual	   instruments”	   are	   publically	   displayed,	   that	   is,	   through	   the	  interpretation	   of	  motives	   and	   through	   the	  meaning	   of	   intersubjective	   socially	   and	  culturally	  transmitted	  schemes.	  An	  alternative	  to	  ontological	  realism	  would,	  in	  other	  words,	  take	  the	  ”intersubjective	  quality	  of	  social	  reality”	  seriously.317	  	  The	  correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth	  is	  intimately	  connected	  with	  ontological	  realism	  and	   assumes	   that	   one	   can	   grasp	   reality	   through	   conceptual	  matching,	   that	   is,	   the	  concepts	  we	  use	   to	  describe	   the	  world	   are	   assumed	   to	   correspond	  with	   the	   thing	  they	   describe.	   However,	   if	   the	   Kantian	   critique	   of	   ontological	   realism	   described	  above	  is	  correct,	  and	  the	  subject	  is	  always	  part	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  object,	  then	  there	  can	  be	  no	  physical	  reality	  with	  which	  the	  concepts	  can	  correspond.	  What	  we	  perceive	   as	   the	  world	   cannot	   be	   separated	   from	   our	  minds	   and	   the	   theories	   and	  concepts	  we	  use	   to	  make	  sense	  of	   it.	  An	  alternative	   to	   this	  correspondence	   theory	  will	   therefore	   focus	   on	   the	   processes	   through	   which	   knowing	   subjects	   create	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world,	  that	  is,	  how	  we	  reach	  consensus	  on	  our	  shared	  theories	  and	   concepts.318	  In	   sum,	   a	   critique	   of	   ontological	   realism	   and	   the	   correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth	  takes	  seriously	  the	   intersubjective	  quality	  of	  social	  reality,	  and	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  knowledge	  is	  constituted	  as	  authoritative	  and	  is	  expressed	  in	  theories	  and	  concepts.	  	  This	   critique	  manifested	   itself	   via	  many	   different	   expressions,	  with	   scholars	   of	   IR	  arguing	   for	  a	  closer	   investigation	   into	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   international	  scholarship	  
itself	  constructs	  authoritative	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  –	  in	  the	  literal	  sense	  of	  the	  word	  –	  by	  presenting	   their	  operative	  concepts	  and	   theories	  as	   reflecting	   the	   “way	  things	   are”.319	  Instead,	   the	  post-­‐positivist	   scholars	  wanted	   to	   know	  how	   this	   “way	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  Friedrichs/Kratochwil:	  704.	  318	  Friedrichs/Kratochwil:	  705.	  319	  Cox,	   Ashley	   (1987;	   1988;	   1989),	   Ashley/Walker	   (1990),	   Hoffman,	   Linklater	   and	   Steven	   Smith	  argued	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  necessity	  for	  IR	  to	  consider	  its	  philopohy	  of	  science	  underpinnings	  becuase	  of	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things	  were”	  had	  come	  to	  appear	  as	  a	  natural	  condition,	  and	  as	  an	  unquestionable	  foundation	  upon	  which	  theories	  could	  be	  built.	  They	  sought	  to	  “de-­‐naturalize”	  what	  had	   come	   to	   seem	   natural.	   Many	   did	   so	   by	   pushing	   for	   a	   historicist	   analysis	   of	  knowledge,	  similarly	  to	  constructivist	  scholarship	  –	  with	  which	  the	  post-­‐positivists	  had	  many	  of	  these	  meta-­‐theoretical	  concerns	  in	  common320	  –	  seeking	  to	  “reveal	  the	  connections	  between	  representations	  of	   social	   reality	  and	   the	  social	  production	  of	  knowledge	  (…)	  and	  problematizing	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  social	  world	  as	  we	  observe	  it,	  and	  the	  socio-­‐historical	  conditions	  that	  make	  it	  appear	  as	  an	  objectively	  given	  order”.321	  	  	  Echoing	   the	   work	   of	   Friedrich	   Nietzsche	   and	   Michel	   Foucault,	   post-­‐positivist	   IR	  scholars	   sought	   to	   trace	   the	   emergence	   of	   ideas	   and	   practices	   and	   examine	   the	  ”condition	  of	  possibility”	  for	  certain	  knowledge	  and	  its	  concepts	  and	  institutions.322	  Emphasizing	   the	  mutual	   constitution	  of	   power	   and	  knowledge,	   scholars	   sought	   to	  ”unmask	   the	   operation	   of	   power	   in	   the	   ‘knowledge’	   of	   global	   politics”323,	   ”expose	  choice	   poising	   as	   truth”, 324 	  ”reveal	   how	   problematic	   are	   the	   taken-­‐granted	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   policial	   effects	   that	   epistemological	   and	   ontological	   decisions	   IR	  make	   have	   on	   their	   concrete	  research	  proposals.	  	  320	  Price/Reus-­‐Smit;	   But	   also	   differed	   clearly	   from.	   As	   Judith	   Butler	   has	   argued,	   constructivist	  arguments	   tend	   to	   operate	   in	   two	   ways.	   In	   the	   first,	   discourse	   becomes	   an	   omnipotent	   force	   so	  deterministic	   that	   ’it’	   acts	   as	   the	   governing	   subject	   such	   that	   all	   accounts	   of	   human	   agency	   are	  expunged.	   In	   the	  second	  –	  which	  keeps	  with	   the	   logic	  of	   the	   first,	  but	   changes	   the	  character	  of	   the	  subject	  –	   the	  volitional	  human	  agent	   reigns	   supreme	  and	  willfully	  engages	   in	   construction	  without	  constraint.	  (Butler	  1993:	  4-­‐12).	  For	  the	  differences	  in	  critical	  international	  relations	  theory	  –	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  scholars	  such	  as	  Robert	  Cox,	   those	  drawing	  on	   the	  Frankfurter	   school	   and	   Jürgen	  Habermas	   such	  as	  Andrew	  Linklater,	   the	  postmoderns	  drawing	  on	  Foucault,	  Nietzsche	  and	  Derrida,	  such	  as	  Ashley,	  Walker	  and	  Shapiro,	  and	  the	  feminist	  work	  done	  by	  Elshtain,	  Enloe,	  Sylvester,	  Tickener	  –	  see	  Hutchings	  2000.	  321	  In	  order	  to	  further	  a	  ”reflexive”	  stance	  among	  scholars	  concerning	  the	  way	  in	  which	  knowledge	  is	  constituted	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  with	  reflexivity	  meaning	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  social	  processes	  that	   subtends	   the	   production	   of	   knowledge	   and	   how	   this	   knowledge	   in	   turn	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	  practices,	  beliefs	  and	  commitments	  of	  social	  agents	  (including	  IR	  scholars)	  Hamati-­‐Ataya	  2013:	  671,	  674,	  681	  see	  also	  Guzzini	  2000,	  2005;	  and	  Hamti-­‐Ataya	  2011).	  322 	  Resonating	   with	   Nietzschean	   and	   Foucaultian	   work,	   it	   challenged	   the	   foundations	   of	  Enlightenment	   thought,	   the	   idea	   of	   progress,	   modern	   notions	   of	   rational	   humankind,	   meaning	  constructed	   in	   dichotomous	   relationships	   and	   universalist	   assumptions	   in	   theory	   and	   method,	  Cochran	  1995:	  239	  323	  George/Campbell	  1990:	  281	  324	  John	  Varquez	  1995:	  220	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structures”325 	  such	   as	   ”anarchy”, 326 	  ”sovereignty”327 	  or	   the	   ”state	   of	   nature”328	  pointing	  to	  the	  ”acts	  of	  force	  that	  enables	  [their]	  founding	  and	  [further,	  how	  these]	  are	   dissolved	   into	   acts	   of	   forgetting”329 ,	   that	   is,	   pointing	   to	   their	   process	   of	  reification.	  In	  short,	  this	  post-­‐positivist	  scholarship	  questioned	  the	  assumptions	  that	  underpinned	   the	   claims	   to	   knowledge	   of	   the	   world,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ontological	  realism	  and	  correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth	  that	  supported	  them.	  I	  will	  return	  to	  the	  attempts	   at	   denaturalization	   and	   the	   focus	   on	   constitution	   below,	   where	   I	   will	  discuss	   it	   as	   a	   contrast	   between	   ”becoming”	   –	   which	   refers	   to	   the	   processual	  constitution	  of	  knowledge	  –	  and	  ”being”	  –	  as	  stabilized	  knowledge.	  	  This	   skepticism	  of	  ontological	   realism	  and	   correspondence	   theory	   is	   accompanied	  by	   another	   feature	   of	   post-­‐positivist	   thinking	   that	   I	  wish	   to	   highlight,	   namely	   the	  rejection	  of	  what	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  Archimedean	  point	  of	  truth,	  or	  a	  belief	  in	  monism.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  single	  version	  of	  truth,	  of	  perspective,	  or	   method	   from	   whence	   to	   judge	   the	   validity	   of	   analytical	   or	   ethical	   claims	   to	  knowledge.330	  In	  short,	  post-­‐positivists	  were	  all	  about	  plurality.	  Contrasting	  with	  the	  acceptance	   of	   the	   Kantian	   critique	   of	   ontological	   realism	   described	   above,	   this	  commitment	  to	  plurality	  was	  argued	  to	  be	  explicitly	  anti-­‐Kantian.331	  Against	  Kant’s	  vision	   of	   human	   reason	   as	   the	   only	   channel	   through	   which	   the	   individual	   could	  access	   reality	   or	   universal	   truth,	   post-­‐positivists	   presented	   a	   position	   that	   was	  ”marked	   by	   pluralism	   in	   values,	   methods,	   techniques	   and	   perspectives”, 332	  ”portend[ing]	  a	  new	  pluralism	  as	  the	  cutting	  …	  edge	  of	  international	  theory”.333	  But,	  as	  Thomas	  Biersteker	  pointed	  out,	  this	  was	  no	  common	  understanding	  of	  plurality,	  or	   pluralism	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   more	   liberal	   forms	   of	   thinking.	   Rather,	   it	   was	   a	  ”critical	   pluralism,	   designed	   to	   reveal	   embedded	   power	   and	   authority	   structures,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  325	  Lapid	  1989:	  242	  326	  Ashley	  1988,	  Alker	  1996.	  327	  Bartelson	  1995	  328	  Jahn	  1999.	  329	  Burke	  2008:	  365;	  Connolly	  1995	  330	  Price/Reus-­‐Smit:	  1999:	  262	  331	  Kratochwil	  2007;	  Vasquez	  1995.	  332	  Dunn	  1987:	  79,	  see	  also:	  Lapid	  1989:	  244	  333	  DerDerian	  1988:	  190	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provoke	  critical	   scrutiny	  of	  dominant	  discourses	  engage	  marginalised	  peoples	  and	  perspective	   and	   provide	   a	   basis	   for	   alternative	   conceptualisations”. 334 	  In	   the	  following	  sections,	   I	  will	  discuss	  this	  “critical”	  understanding	  of	  plurality	  –	  which	  I	  will	   call	  pluralization	  –	  by	  contrasting	   it	  with	   the	  more	  common	  understanding	  of	  pluralism.	  	  	  This	  form	  of	  pluralism	  understands	  plurality	  as	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  entities	  residing	  in	  an	   existing	   network	   of	   social	   relations.335	  These	   entities	   can	   be	   included	   into	   the	  network,	   whereby	   the	   plurality	   grows,	   or	   they	   can	   be	   excluded,	   whereby	   the	  plurality	   is	   limited.	   Pluralism	   in	   this	   sense	   reads	   plurality	   along	   the	   dichotomous	  lines	  of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion.336	  The	  recognition	  arguments	  that	  were	  explored	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters	  reflect	  this	  position,	  where	  recognition	  or	  inclusion	  featured	  as	   the	   remedy	   to	   exclusion.	   By	   viewing	   exclusion	   and	   inclusion	   in	   a	   dichtomous	  manner,	  however,	  narratives	  of	  exclusion	  predetermine	  that	  which	  can	  be	  included.	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   exclusion	   narratives	   prestructure	   the	   inclusion	   possibilities.	   As	  long	  as	  inclusion	  or	  recognition	  is	  the	  answer	  to	  exclusion,	  any	  critique	  of	  exclusion	  will	  amount	  to	  an	  argument	  for	   inclusion	  or	  recognition	  featuring	  within	  the	  same	  frame	  of	   reference,	   and	  will	   thereby	   reproduce	   this	   particular	   frame	  of	   reference.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  this	  pluralism,	  a	  plurality	  of	  more	  or	  less	  stable	  units	  in	  a	  pluralistic	   whole	   can	   be	   settled,	   sanctioned	   and	   secured	   by	   different	   institutions,	  regulations,	  arguments	  for	  recognition,	  or	  distributions	  of	  rights.337	  	  However,	   as	   David	   Campbell	   has	   demonstrated	   and	  Maja	   Zehfuss	   has	   argued,	   by	  starting	   from	  the	  assumption	  of	  pre-­‐established,	   separate	  entities	   inhabiting	   these	  social	  networks,	  this	  form	  of	  pluralism	  –	  and	  the	  associated	  forms	  of	  tolerance	  and	  liberalism	  –	  underplays	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  these	  very	  entities	  have	  come	  into	  being.338	  ”The	  fascinating,	  subtle	  creation	  of	  the	  subject	  …	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  334	  Biersteker	  1989:	  264	  335	  Honig	  2001,	  Brown	  2008	  ,	  Tønder	  2013.	  336	  Walker	  1993.	  337	  Mahmood	  2012;	  Brown	  2008;	  Zizek	  2008.	  338Zehfuss	  2002:254,	  see	  also	  2001.	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not	   part	   of	   an	   analysis	   which	   starts	   by	   postulating	   subjects.	   Hence,	   political	  questions,	   for	   instance	   about	   how	   subjects	   come	   to	   be	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   are	  ignored.339	  …	   I	   worry	   that	   questions	   which	   concern	   these	   starting	   points	   are	   not	  asked”.340	  Since	  the	  focus	  in	  pluralism	  is	  rather	  on	  the	  interaction	  of	  preconstituted	  units,	  without	  regard	  for	  the	  processes	  of	  their	  emergence,	  “theorists	  both	  bypassed	  complex	  and	  normatively	  freighted	  constitutive	  questions	  (How	  did	  the	  units	  come	  to	  be?),	  and	  naturalised	  and	  depoliticised	  their	  own	  role	  within	  them.”341	  As	  a	  result,	  this	   form	   of	   pluralism	   remains	   ”unattuned	   to	   the	   crucial	   role	   new	   enactments	   or	  
performances	   play”	   in	   generating	  new	  entities	   susceptible	   to	   recognition.342	  It	   also	  ignores	   the	   possibilities	   that	   had	   not	   already	   been	   realized	   and	   were	   not	   yet	  available	  for	  recognition.	  	  In	   contrast	  with	   this	   understanding	   of	   plurality	   as	   pluralism,	   post-­‐positivist	  work	  emphasized	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  plurality,	  one	  that	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  as	  ”pluralization”.	  On	  the	  surface,	   this	  call	   for	  plurality	   is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  previous	  pluralist	  one,	  with	  many	   of	   its	   tenets	   following	   Judith	   Butler’s	   point	   that	   ”[t]he	   task,	   it	   seems,	   is	   to	  compel	   the	   terms	   of	   modernity	   to	   embrace	   those	   they	   have	   traditionally	  excluded.”343	  Through	   ”embracing”	   the	   excluded,	   ”difference”	   and	   “alterity”	  would	  not	   only	   be	   ”celebrated”	   but	   ”those	   forces	   that	   efface,	   erase	   or	   suppress	   alterity	  
[would	  be]	  actively	  oppose[d]	  and	  resist[ed]”.	  344	  This	  pluralizing	  modus	  seeks	  ”the	  active	  affirmation	  of	  alterity.”345	  	  Now,	   if	   pluralization	   seeks	   to	   affirm	   alterity,	   or	   embrace	   difference,	   how	   does	   it	  differ	  from	  the	  former	  pluralist	  versions	  of	  this	  argument?	  One	  possible	  entry	  point	  is	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  exclusion	  problematic	  itself.	  As	  distinct	  from	  the	  view	  of	  pluralism,	   pluralization	   does	   not	   understand	   exclusion	   and	   inclusion	   in	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  339	  Zehfuss	  2001:	  341.	  340	  Zehfuss	  2002:	  35.	  341	  Barder/Levine	  2012:	  596.	  342	  Campbell	  1998:	  205,	  FN:	  171.	  343	  Butler	  1997:	  161.	  344	  Campbell	  1998:	  5.	  345	  Campbell	  2005:	  133;	  see	  also	  Walker/Ashley	  1990.	  
	   117	  
dichotomous	  manner,	  that	  is,	  as	  opposite	  locations	  along	  a	  line	  of	  increasing	  social	  and	  political	  justice.	  Rather,	  exclusion	  is	  a	  tragic	  necessity	  for	  all	  human	  endeavors.	  It	  is	  necessary,	  since	  it	  is	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  boundary	  drawing	  process	  involved	  in	  every	  kind	  of	  human	  action.	  Boundaries	  are	  drawn	  around	  concepts	   in	  order	  to	  make	   them	   intelligible,	   between	   inside	   and	   outside,	   or	   between	   the	   self	   and	  others.346	  It	   is	  here	  that	  I	   locate	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  responses	  to	   the	   critique	   of	   exclusion.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   in	   the	   approach	   described	   in	   the	  previous	  section	  on	  pluralism,	  exclusion	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  inclusion,	  and	  inclusion,	  therefore,	   is	   the	   answer	   to	   the	   exclusion	   problematic.	  A	  contrario,	   the	   approach	   I	  will	   describe	   in	   the	   following	   paragraphs	   views	   exclusion	   not	   as	   the	   absolute	  opposite	  of	   inclusion,	  but	  as	  something	   inevitable	   to	  any	  kind	  of	  human	  endeavor.	  This	   only	   becomes	   problematic	   once	   the	   boundary	   between	   the	   excluded	   and	  included	   is	   naturalized,	  when	   this	   very	   boundary	   becomes	  normatively	   laden	   and	  the	  mutually	  constitutive	  relationship	  between	  the	  “inside	  and	  outside”	  is	  no	  longer	  acknowledged.	   That	   is,	   it	   becomes	   a	   problem	   once	   a	   dichotomy	   between	   the	  excluded	  and	   the	   included	   leads	   to	  a	  detachment	  of	   the	  one	   from	  the	  other,	  when	  the	  ”interdependency”	  is	  forgotten	  and	  the	  boundary	  is	  naturalized	  or	  reified.347	  	  	  This	  detachment	  comes	  from	  the	  process	  of	   forgetting	  that	   the	  boundaries	  are	  the	  
effect	   of	   social	   and	   political	   negotiations	   and	   struggles,	   and	   not	   an	   ontological	  constant	   or	   natural	   divide,	   or	   forgetting	   about	   the	   interdependency	   between	   the	  seemingly	  dichotomous	  components.	  This	  detachment	   is	  a	  necessary	  condition	   for	  the	   possibility	   of	   naturalizing	   the	   separation	   and	   treating	   each	   part	   as	   a	   given.348	  The	   pluralization	   response	   to	   exclusion	   is,	   therefore,	   not	   to	   be	   found	   within	   the	  framework	   of	   the	   exclusion/inclusion	   dichotomy,	   but	   as	   a	   more	   complex	   web	   of	  relationships	   and	   dependencies.	  While	   pluralism	   seeks	   to	   protect	   the	   plural	   form	  and	   sees	   the	   conditions	   of	   plurality	   in	   protective	   institutions	   or	   regulations,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  346	  Abbott	   has	   described	   boundaries	   as	   seemingly	   coherent	   line	   made	   up	   out	   of	   individual	   dots.	  (Abbott	  1995);	  Walker	  1993.	  347	  Honneth	  2008	  	  348	  See	   here	   discussions	   on	   the	   dangers	   of	   reification	   as	   forgetting	   Adorno	   1964;	   Honneth	   2008;	  Levine	  2012.	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pluralization	   seeks	   a	   plurality	   through	   strengthening	   the	   conditions	   for	   plurality,	  that	  is,	  in	  questioning	  preconditions	  for	  exclusionary	  structures,	  namely	  naturalized	  boundaries.	  	  To	   sum	   up,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   pluralization,	   exclusion	   becomes	   problematic	  once	   boundaries	   become	   fixed	   and	   normatively	   laden,	   a	   dichotomous	   either/or-­‐relationship	  becomes	   stabilized	   and	   the	   interdependency	   across	   the	  border	   is	   not	  acknowledged.	  The	  quest	  of	  pluralization	  is	  deeply	  intertwined	  with	  the	  questioning	  of	  that	  which	  is	  settled,	  an	  analysis	  of	  boundary	  drawing	  and	  boundary	  stabilization.	  It	  feeds	  on	  a	  critical	  genealogical	  denaturalization	  of	  settled	  knowledge.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  based	   upon	   a	   genealogical	   approach,	   one	   that	   explores	   the	   alternatives	   to	   the	  present	  state	  of	  things	  and	  authorities.	  It	  ”strives	  to	  thaw	  perspectives	  which	  tend	  to	  stay	   frozen	   within	   a	   particular	   way	   of	   life,	   to	   offer	   alternative	   accounts	   [of]	  possibilities	  crowded	  out	  by	  established	  regimes	  of	  thought.”349	  	  From	   the	   pluralizing	   perspective,	   the	   possibility	   of	   plurality	   lies	   in	   this	   critical	  approach,	   this	   denaturalization,	   or	   genealogy.	   Pluralization	   opens	   up	   the	  possibilities	  for	  other	  versions	  of	  history,	  knowledge,	  truth,	  identities,	  or	  conceptual	  meanings	  through	  critical	  and	  genealogically	  sensitive	  approaches.	  It	  seeks	  to	  create	  conditions	   enabling	   possibilities	   for	   the	   formulation	   of	   alternatives,	   be	   they	  conceptual,	  ethical	  or	   identitarian.	   It	  seeks	  to	   intervene	  into	  ”established	  modes	  of	  thought	  …	  disturb	  those	  practices	  that	  are	  settled	  …	  render	  as	  produced	  that	  which	  claims	   to	   be	   naturally	   emergent	   …	   foster	   possibilities	   being	   foreclosed	   or	  suppressed	  by	  that	  which	  exists	  or	  is	  being	  put	  in	  place.”	  It	  represents	  a	  ”concern	  or	  dissatisfation	  with	  what	   is	   settled	  and	  creates	   the	   conditions	  of	  possibility	   for	   the	  formulation	  of	  alternative.”350	  	  	  By	   enabling	   a	   destabilization	   of	   settled	   boundaries	   and	   normalities,	   critique	   and	  genealogy	  are	  the	  conditions	  for	  plurality	  and	  the	  answer	  to	  exclusionary	  practices	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  349	  Connolly:	  1995:	  28	  350	  Campbell	  1998:	  4;	  See	  also:	  Inayatullah/Blaney	  2004.	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or	  theories.	  As	  William	  Connolly	  states:	  “For	  it	   is	  when	  a	  genealogical	  sensibility	  is	  mapped	  onto	  the	  pluralist	  imagination	  that	  both	  perspectives	  achieve	  their	  highest	  level	   of	   attainment.”351	  In	   its	   affirmation	   of	   plurality,	   this	   genealogically	   sensitive	  approach	  sees	  the	  source	  of	  exclusion	  in	  hardened,	  dichotomous	  entities,	  as	  well	  as	  settled	   knowledge,	   institutions,	   authorities	   and	   powers.	   The	   answer	   to	   this	  exclusion,	  therefore,	  is	  not	  the	  inclusion	  of	  more	  entities,	  but	  rather	  the	  softening	  of	  dichotomies,	  and	  the	  questioning	  of	  settled	  knowledge,	  institutions,	  authorities	  and	  powers.352 	  It	   emphasizes	   what	   Derrida	   has	   called	   ”becoming”,	   which	   Connolly	  picked	  up	  on,	  the	  latter	  contrasting	  it	  with	  ”being”.	  	  	  
Being	  and	  Becoming	  	  	  Connolly	   embraces	   Derrida’s	   differentiation	   between	   being	   and	   becoming353,	   and	  uses	  this	  conceptual	  pair	  to	  differentiate	  between	  “crystallizations	  that	  persist,	  even	  as	   subterranean	   forces	  may	   accumulate	  within	   them”354	  and	   a	  movement	   “from	   a	  netherworld	  below	  the	  register	  of	  positive	  acceptance,	  identity,	  legitimacy,	  or	  justice	  onto	   one	   or	   more	   of	   those	   registers.” 355 	  Despite	   the	   somewhat	   nebulous	  characterization,	  the	  main	  distinction	  between	  being	  and	  becoming	  is	  one	  between	  equilibrium	  and	  emergence,	  or	  between	  stability	  and	  process,	  and	  this	  is	  how	  I	  will	  continue	   to	   use	   them.	   Becoming,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   used	   to	   describe	   contingent,	  complex,	  uncertain,	  interconnected,	  “messy”	  processes,	  “intermediate”	  and	  between	  moments	   of	   equilibria,	   that	   is,	   between	  moments	   of	   being.	  While	   the	  moments	   of	  being	  represent	  states	  of	  stability,	  they	  are	  not	  the	  states	  towards	  which	  the	  process	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  351	  Connolly	  1995:	  32.	  352	  Settlement,	  as	  such,	  was	  seen	  to	  depend	  on	  a	  suppression	  of	  deviating	  voices.	  ”Regimes	  of	  truth”	  could	  never	  keep	  their	  status	  as	  such	  without	  annihilating	  its	  competitors’.	  353	  Derrida	  2007;	  Connolly	  1995,	  1999,	  2005,	  2011.	  354	  Connolly	  2005:	  121;	  ”I	  agree	  (…)	  with	  philosophers	  of	  becoming	  who	  say	  that	  various	  degrees	  of	  creativity	  are	  always	  in	  play.	  However,	  I	  further	  contend	  (…)	  that	  various	  constellations	  have	  internal	  powers	   of	   maintenance	   which	   help	   to	   sustain	   them	   as	   organisms	   or	   states	   before	   the	   presure	   of	  accumulation	  triggers	  a	  more	  radical	  process	  of	  diequilibrium	  and	  teleo-­‐searching.	  This	  is	  the	  issue	  posed	   even	   by	   Gilles	   Deleuze	   and	   Felix	   Guattari	   when	   they	   ask,	   ’What	   holds	   things	   together’?	  Connolly	  2012:	  405.	  355	  Connolly	  2005:	  122	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of	  becoming	  strives.356	  The	  “world	  of	  becoming”,	  as	  Connolly	  describes	  it,	  is	  a	  world	  in	  movement,	  but	  not	  a	  movement	  towards	  a	  distinct	  end.	  	  	  In	  his	  emphasis	  on	   the	   importance	  of	   “becoming”	  –	   the	  “politics	  of	  becoming”	   in	  a	  “world	   of	   becoming”	   –	   Connolly	   is	   implying	   more	   than	   a	   principled	   view	   or	  description	  of	  social	  and	  political	  dynamics.	  He	  is	  not	  simply	  arguing	  that	  the	  world	  is	   contingent	   and	   complex.	   Like	   many	   other	   post-­‐positivist	   scholars,	   he	   is	   also	  arguing	  for	  an	  ”ethos	  of	  disturbance”,357	  meaning	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ethical	  component	  to	   this	   work,	   which	   is	   disruptive	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   settled	   knowledge,	   boundaries	   and	  naturalized	  entities.	  This	  “ethos	  of	  disturbance”,	  however,	  is	  not	  simply	  disruptive;	  its	  aim	  is	  not	  simply	  to	  display	  the	  “actual”	  contingency	  of	  the	  world	  by	  forcing	  any	  stable	  part	  of	  it	  into	  motion.358	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  “disturbance”,	  per	  Connolly,	  is,	  rather,	  to	   achieve	   a	   balance	   between	   becoming	   and	   being,359	  between	   the	   “politics	   of	  governance	   and	   the	   politics	   of	   disturbance”.360	  However,	   since	   the	   becoming	   is	  “perpetually	  susceptible	  to	  forgetfulness”	  a	  “perpetual	  case	  [has]	  to	  be	  made	  for	  the	  renewal	   of	   democratic	   energies	   of	   denaturalization”	   of	   final	   markers”.361	  In	   other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  356	  “World	  of	  becoming	  consisting	  of	  multiple	  force-­‐fields	  with	  different	  speeds	  and	  degrees	  of	  agency	  (…)	  marked	  by	  surprising	   turns	   in	   time,	  uncanny	  experiences	   (…).	  Time	  periodically	   folds	   the	  new	  into	  being	   in	   a	  universe	   that	   is	   intrinsically	   open	   to	   an	  uncertain	  degree	   and	   in	  which	   this	   or	   that	  force-­‐field	   flowing	   ‘outside’	   the	   purview	   of	   another	  may	   abruptly	   introduce	   new	  pressures	   into	   it.	  Becoming,	   an	   open	   universe,	   multiple	   dimensions	   of	   the	   outside,	   all	   these	   work	   upon	   each	   other	  according	   to	   such	   a	   philosophy/creed.	   In	   a	   world	   of	   becoming,	   emergent	   formations	   are	   often	  irreducible	   to	   patterns	   of	   efficient	   causality,	   purposive	   time,	   simple	   probability	   or	   long	   cycles	   of	  recurrence	   (…)	   a	   philosophy	   of	   becoming	   calls	   attention	   to	   a	   host	   of	   messy	   states	   and	   processes	  ‘intermediate’	   between	   subjects	   and	   objects,	   or	   better	   put,	   not	   readily	   assimilable	   to	   either	  prefabricated	  container	  (…)	  They	  also	  call	  into	  question	  fantasies	  of	  human	  mastery	  over	  a	  world	  of	  solids”	  (Connolly	  2011:	  70ff)	  357	  Connolly	  1995,	  1999,	  2001,	  2011,	  2013;	  see	  also	  Alexander	  Barder	  and	  Daniel	  Levine’s	  critique	  of	  constructivist	   IR	   scholarship,	   seen	   as	   merely	   managing	   global	   politics,	   building	   of	   a	   set	   of	  predetermined	  concepts	  and	  understandings	  of	  a	  consensually	  constituted	  reality,	  followed	  by	  a	  call	  for	  disruptive	  theorizing	  and	  politics.	  They	  quote	  Adorno,	  saying	  that	  ”the	  splinter	  in	  your	  eye	  is	  the	  best	   magnifying-­‐glass’;	   those	   tools	   are	   to	   be	   valued	   which	   scatter,	   disrupt	   or	   diffract	   one’s	  perspective	  precisely	  because	  of	   the	   fact	  of	   that	   scattering,	  disrupting	  or	  diffraction.	   (Barder/Levine	  2012:	  602).	  358	  ibid.	  1995:	  21.	  359	  “there	  are	  periods	  of	  relative	  stability	  and	  equilibrium	  in	  most	  temporal	  zones	  or	  force-­‐fields	  in	  a	  world	   of	   becoming	   (…)	   But,	   particularly	   when	   one	   mode	   of	   endurance	   is	   touched	   (…)	   moved	   by	  another	  moving	  at	  a	  different	  speed	  on	  another	  tier	  of	  chrono-­‐time,	  a	  more	  dramatic	  change	  may	  be	  in	  the	  cards”	  (Connolly	  2011:	  73,	  italics	  in	  original).	  360	  Ibid.:	  21.	  361	  ibid	  1995:	  154f.	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words,	   since	   the	   settled	   being	   will	   always	   reign	   supreme	   over	   the	   processual	  becoming	  –	  since	  the	  fact	  is	  ”perpetually	  susceptible	  to	  forgetfulness”	  that	  this	  being	  is	   but	   a	   settled	   becoming	   and	   neither	   natural	   nor	   necessary	   –	   the	   ”energies”	   of	  becoming	   must	   therefore	   be	   nurtured.	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   achieve	   a	   balance	   between	  being	   and	   becoming	   in	  which	   the	   tension	   between	   them	   does	   not	   dissolve	   into	   a	  consensual	   agreement	   about	   the	   “way	   things	   are”,	   letting	   the	   being	   merge	   into	  reification.	   “These	   tensions	   constitute	   my	   ideal	   […]	   of	   democratic	   politics	   as	   an	  ambiguous	  medium	  of	  enactment	  and	  disturbance.”362	  However,	  more	  than	  being	  an	  ideal,	   it	   is	   a	   “regulative	   ideal	   for	   pluralist	   politics	   itself”.363	  Since	   the	   aspect	   of	  becoming	  is	  on	  a	  constant	  losing	  streak,	  however,	  Connolly	  sees	  the	  balancing	  act	  of	  being	   and	   becoming	   as	   taking	   place	   in	   the	   ”active	   cultivation	   of	   generosity	   to	  contemporary	  movements	   of	   pluralization”364,	   or	   in	   the	   cultivation	   of	   an	   ethos	   of	  responsiveness, 365 	  that	   is,	   in	   the	   cultivation	   of	   virtues,	   which	   ”radicalize	   the	  experience	  of	  contingency”.366	  So,	  even	  if	  the	  becoming’s	  ”ethos	  of	  disruption”	  is	  not	  an	   end	   in	   and	   of	   itself,	   or	   the	   final	   stop	   of	   these	   denaturalizing	   attempts,	   it	   is	   a	  necessary	  means	  of	  balancing	  against	  the	  strength	  of	  being	  and	  keeping	  this	  being	  from	   merging	   into	   reifications	   through	   the	   forgetfulness	   of	   its	   relationship	   to	  becoming,	  that	  is,	   its	  processuality.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Connolly’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ethos	  of	  disturbance	  is	  a	  means	  of	  attaining	  a	  level	  of	  balance	  in	  the	  tension	  between	  being	  and	  becoming.	  	  Approaching	  the	  question	  of	  recognition	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  becoming	  seems	  to	  provide	   the	  genealogical	   sensitivity	   that	  was	   lacking	   from	  the	  prior	  approaches	   to	  recognition	  illustrated	  and	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  It	  takes	  issue	  with	  the	  identified	  reifying	   aspects	   of	   recognition	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   process	   of	   emergence	   of	   the	  objects	  or	   agents	   that	  were	   to	  be	   recognized.	   Its	   emphasis	  on	   the	  analysis	  of	  how	  these	  objects	   came	   to	  be,	   and	  how	   they	  came	   to	  become	   intelligible	   to	   scholars	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  362	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international	  relations,	  seems	  to	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  critique	  that	  recognition	  presupposed	   and	   reproduced	   its	   objects	   and	   frameworks	   of	   knowledge.	   The	  perspective	   of	   becoming	   offered	   ways	   to	   track	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   objects	   of	  recognition,	   to	   denaturalize	   the	   knowledge	   about	   them	   and	   the	   epistemic	  frameworks	  within	  which	  they	  featured.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  post-­‐positivist	  approach	  of	   becoming	   presents	   itself	   as	   a	   viable	   optional	   approach	   to	   recognition	   in	  international	  relations.367	  	  I	   agree	   with	   Connolly	   regarding	   the	   problematic	   aspect	   of	   sidelining	   the	  interdependent	   relationship	   between	   being	   and	   becoming	   –	   which	   was	   also	  emphasized	  in	  Honneth’s	  work	  on	  reifications	  –	  and	  that	  their	  tension	  must	  be	  kept	  and	  nurtured	  rather	  than	  overcome	  and	  mastered.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  him	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  367	  Finding	  a	  balance	  between	  being	  and	  becoming	  via	  an	  ethos	  of	  disturbance,	  and	  thereby	  opening	  up	  the	  space	  for	  the	  formulation	  of	  alternatives	  to	  the	  present	  state	  all	  sounds	  good	  in	  abstracto,	  but	  what	  would	   this	   perspective	   of	   becoming	   look	   like,	   for	   example,	  within	   the	   recognition	  process	   of	  Pakistan	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  census,	  the	  perspective	  of	  becoming	  would	  illuminate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  works	  as	  a	  ”modern	  instrument	  of	  domination	  and	  liberation	  (…)	  a	  mechanism	  for	  organizing	  and	  perpetuating	  state	  power”.(Foucault	  1997:	  2f)	  Or,	   it	  would	   highlight	   the	   ontologizing	   process	   Campbell	   calls	   ”ontopolitics”	   by	   zooming	   in	   on	   the	  enumerative	  power	  of	  the	  census	  to	  shape	  and	  strengthen	  the	  perception	  of	  clearly	  demarcated	  and	  distinguishable	   religious	   communities	  without	   communal	  or	   individual	  overlaps.	   It	  would	   combine	  this	  power	  with	  that	  of	  the	  map,	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  administrative	  and	  military	  knowledge,	  which	  inserted	  these	  ontologized	  religious	  communities	  onto	  visible	  territory.	  	  Regarding	   the	  work	  of	  drawing	   a	  border,	   the	  perspective	  of	   becoming	  would	  bring	   to	   the	   fore	   the	  work	  that	  the	  refugee	  administration	  carried	  out	  in	  categorizing	  “displaced	  people”	  as	  ”Muslims”	  or	  ”non-­‐Muslims”	   and	   how	   the	   one	   category	   of	   those	   leaving,	   the	   ”evacuees”,	  was	   translated	   into	   the	  number	  of	   individuals	  of	   the	  other	  category	  that	  could	  be	  housed	   in	  their	  abandoned	  property,	   the	  so-­‐called	  ”evacuee	  property”.	  It	  would	  illuminate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  evacuee	  property	  laws	  ended	  up	  fixating	  two	  sets	  of	  refugees	  –	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim	  –	  in	  an	  oppositional	  relationship.	  It	  would	  dig	  deeper	  into	  the	  role	  of	  the	  recovery	  programs	  of	  Muslim	  women	  abducted	  in	  the	  Punjabi	  region	  to	   their	   respective	   “nation”.	   Colonial	   government	   inscribed	   and	   shaped	   knowledge	   about	   ”Hindu”,	  ”Sikh”	  and	  ”Muslim”	  identities,	  recognizing	  their	  salience	  by	  accounting	  for	  them	  in	  political	  electoral	  representation.	  The	  creation	  of	  an	   international	  border	  between	  these	  constructed	  but	  nonetheless	  real	  communities	  further	  sharpened	  the	  edges	  of	  the	  blurry	  categories	  that	  embodied	  them.	  Chatterji	  and	   Zamindar	   in	   Chapter	   3	   described	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   artificial	   lines	   drawn	   on	   a	   map	   became	  geopolitical	   realities.	   Through	   the	   regulation	   of	   trade,	   the	   burning	   of	   houses,	  murder	   of	   fishermen	  crossing	  borderline	  rivers,	   the	  management	  of	   refugees	  and	   their	  property,	   the	  projects	   to	   recover	  abducted	  women	  and	  keeping	  Indian	  Muslim	  state	  functionaries	  under	  surveillance,	  controlling	  the	  movement	  of	  people	  and	  property,	  through	  these,	  and	  many	  other,	  processes	  the	  meaning	  and	  scope	  of	   Muslim,	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   state	   founded	   on	   Islam,	   as	   a	   ”Muslim	   Homeland”	   was	  transformed.	  The	  boundary	  drawing	  of	  partition	  –	  the	  official,	  clean,	  rational	  and	  democratic	  one,	  or	  the	   unofficial,	   messy,	   long	   and	   partly	   arbitrary	   one	   –	   represented	   the	   parting	   of	   ways	   of	   two	  “religious”	  communities,	   inscribing	  them	  and	  the	  states	  formed	  around	  them	  into	  the	  history	  of	  the	  international	  system.	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that	  the	  being	  will	  always	  trump	  the	  becoming,	  leaving	  it	  in	  the	  margins	  of	  collective	  memory	   to	   be	   forgotten.	   Connolly	   had	   argued	   that	   since	   this	   was	   the	   case,	   the	  disruptive	  power	  of	  becoming	  must	  be	  nurtured	  and	  prioritized	  over	  the	  aspects	  of	  being.	   I	   do	   not	   share	   this	   assumption,	   but	   rather	   argue	   that	   becoming	   inhabits	   a	  much	  more	  central	  position	  in	  individual	  and	  world	  politics	  alike.	  I	  agree	  with	  Mary	  Douglas	  and	  David	  Chandler	  that	   it	   is	   the	  power	  of	  disorder	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  contingency	   –	   as	   aspects	   of	   becoming	   –	   that	   necessitate	   beings	   as	   instruments,	  controlling	  this	  contingency	  and	  the	  power	  of	  disorder.368	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  develop	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  clarify	  the	  difference	  in	  my	  use	   of	   the	   terminology	   of	   being	   from	   that	   of	   reification.	  While	   being	   is	   a	   state	   of	  equilibrium	  and	  stability,	  reification	  is	  the	  state	  that	  knowledge	  arrives	  at	  when	  the	  genealogical	   process	   of	   its	   emergence	   is	   forgotten	   and	   naturalized.	   Beings	   are	  stabilizations	  of	  meanings,	   identities,	  concepts,	  and	  states,	  which	  are	  necessary	  for	  objects,	   agents	   and	   events	   to	   be	   intelligible;	   this	   is	   the	  basis	   upon	  which	   thinking	  about	   world	   politics	   is	   predicated.	   While	   being	   is	   necessary	   for	   intelligibility,	  reification	  is	  the	  sedimantation	  of	  this	  being	  as	  the	  being,	  as	  a	  foundational	  ontology	  about	  how	  the	  world	  ”is”.	  Reification	  is	  the	  state	  I	  wish	  to	  avoid.	  Being,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  a	  necessity	  for	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  objects	  and	  agents	  in	  world	  politics,	  and	  emerges	  through	  a	  stabilization	  of	  the	  process	  of	  becoming.	  When	  the	  relationship	  and	   the	   interdependency	   between	   being	   and	   the	   process	   of	   becoming	   –	   the	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  process	  of	  emergence	  –	  are	  forgotten,	  the	  knowledge	  and	  its	  objects	  and	  agents	  are	  reified.	  It	  is	  this	  latter	  reification	  that	  was	  identified	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  recognition	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  thesis,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  that	  I	  am	  trying	   to	   find	   an	   alternative	   to	   in	   this	   chapter.	   In	   other	   words,	   reification	   occurs	  when	  the	  relationship	  between	  being	  and	  becoming	  is	  sidelined	  to	  benefit	  of	  being	  as	  the	  being.	  As	  an	  alternative,	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  maintain	  the	  tension	  of	  this	  relationship	  between	  being	  and	  becoming	  without	  lapsing	  into	  the	  domination	  of	   either,	   neither	   of	   being	   as	   reification,	   nor	   of	   becoming	   as	   constant	   disruption.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  368	  Douglas	  2002(1966);	  Chandler	  2013.	  
	   124	  
Mine	   is	   not	   the	   first	   attempt	   to	   compose	   an	   account	   where	   neither	   being	   nor	  becoming	   is	   accorded	   priority.	   Others,	   such	   as	   accounts	   on	   Critical	   Realism,	   New	  Materialism	   or	   various	   versions	   of	   pragmatism,	   practice	   or	   performativity,	   have	  sought	  different	  ways	   to	   think	  about	   their	  relationship.	   I	  will	  shortly	  outline	   these	  accounts	  before	  proceeding	  to	  sketch	  the	  route	  that	  I	  will	  follow	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  the	  approach	  I	  call	  becoming	  recognizable.	  	  
Pragmatism,	  practice	  and	  performativity:	  Being	  as	  reiterated	  becoming	  	  Those	   scholars	  working	   on	   pragmatism,	   practices	   and	   performativity	  will	   have	   to	  forgive	  me	  for	  classing	  them	  together	  under	  a	  single	  heading.	  As	  I	  am	  not	  to	  extend	  the	  discussion	  to	  these	  variations,	  but	  will	  merely	  make	  use	  of	  them	  to	  illustrate	  a	  few	  of	  the	  many	  attempts	  to	  address	  the	  relationship	  between	  –	  what	  I	  have	  thus	  far	  labelled	  –	  being	  and	  becoming,	  I	  hope	  they	  will	  deign	  to	  be	  instrumentalized	  in	  this	  somewhat	   crude	   manner.	   The	   scholarship	   on	   pragmatism,	   practices	   and	  performativity	   has	   criticized	   the	   bifurcation	   between	   being	   and	   becoming	   as	   an	  artificial	  construct	  that	  wishes	  to	  protect	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	  being.369	  They	  have	  seen	  themselves	   as	   being	   equipped	   to	   build	   bridges	   between	   the	   gaps	   of	   the	   forces	   of	  stability	  and	  change370	  to	  “help	  us	  to	  move	  …	  to	  a	  non-­‐foundationalist	  epistemology	  that	  acknowledges	  the	  historicity	  of	  knowledge	  without	  annihilating	  the	  realism	  of	  the	  common	  world	  we	  live	  in”371	  or	  to	  ”escape	  from	  the	  epistemological	  deadlock”	  of	  deconstruction,	   by	   circling	   in	   on	   the	   ”useful	   and	   reliable”	   knowledge	   constructed	  within	   community	   of	   practices,	   the	   moral	   or	   judicial	   barometer	   of	   which	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  369	  See:	   Friedrich	   Kratochwil,	   Raymond	  Duvall,	   Arjun	   Chowdhury,	   and	   Janice	   Bially	  Mattern	   in	   the	  edited	   volume	   on	   International	   Practice	   by	   Emanuel	   Adler	   and	  Vincent	   Pouliot,	   but	   also	   empirical	  chapters	   in	  which	  Rita	  Abrahamsen	  and	  Michael	  Williams	  analyze	   the	  practices	  of	  private	   security	  companies,	  or	  Janice	  Gross	  Stein	  discusses	  the	  community	  of	  practice	  constituted	  by	  NGOs	  working	  in	   the	   field	   of	   humanitarian	   aid	   (Abrahamsen/Williams	   2011;	   Bially	   Mattern	   2011;	  Duvall/Chowdhury	   2011;	   Stein	   2011).	   	   Others,	   such	   as	   Patrick	   Morgan	   provide	   a	   practice-­‐based	  account	  of	  the	  policy	  of	  deterrence	  and	  Norrin	  M.	  Ripsman	  of	  balances	  of	  power,	  while	  Richard	  Little	  discusses	  the	  British	  government’	  s	  response	  to	  the	  Spanish	  Civil	  War	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  Lene	  Hansen	  the	   Muhammad	   cartoon	   crisis	   in	   Denmark	   in	   2005/06	   (Hansen	   2011;	   Little	   2011;	   Morgan	   2011;	  Ripsman	  2011).	  370	  As	  well	  as	  the	  meaningful	  and	  the	  material,	  the	  rational	  and	  the	  practical,	  agencies	  and	  structures,	  Adler/Pouliot	  2011;	  for	  a	  critique	  see	  Ringmar	  2014.	  371	  Hamati-­‐Ataya	  2012:	  291.	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composed	   of	   tribunals	   of	   one’s	   peers,	   rather	   than	   being	   based	   upon	   a	   Kantian	  judgment	  of	  Reason.372	  While	   rejecting	   the	   idea	  of	  a	   foundational	   “Kantian”	   reality	  or	  being,	  they	  do	  not	  fully	  accept	  the	  anti-­‐foundational	  kind	  of	  rejection	  found	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  becoming,	  but	   rather	  build	  on	  an	   image	  of	   the	   reality	  of	   a	  being	  as	  constituted	   through	  practices,	  performances,	  or	  other	   forms	  of	  practical	  or	   textual	  reproductions.373	  	  While	  I	  will	  not	  go	  into	  the	  controversies	  regarding	  the	  textual	  or	  non-­‐textual	  basis	  for	   these	   accounts,	   I	   will	   point	   out	   that	   much	   of	   the	   work	   on	   performance,	   or	  performativity,	  refers	  to	  the	  work	  of	  John	  Austin,	  who	  argued	  that	  some	  statements	  do	  not	  simply	  assert	  a	  given	  fact,	  but	  rather	  bring	  about	  –	  performatively	  –	  the	  very	  fact	  they	  express.	  ”To	  say	  something	   is	  to	  do	  something”.	  374	  This	  understanding	  of	  performatively	   constituting	   ”reality”	   has	   been	   developed	   by	   Jacques	   Derrida	  who	  diverges	   from	  Austin,	  whom	  he	  criticizes	   for	  underestimating	  the	  constitutive	  role	  of	   rupture	   in	   speech,	   that	   is,	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   will	   always	   remain	   a	   risk	   of	   the	  utterance	   not	   being	   able	   to	   reproduce	   the	   expected	   form. 375 	  He	   therefore	  differentiates	   between	   the	   performative	   –	  which	   is	   creative	   –	   and	   the	   citational	   –	  which	   is	   referential	   and	   iterative.	   Judith	   Butler	   develops	   this	   line	   of	   thought	   by	  showing	  that	  gender	   is	  an	  effect	  of	  performative	  and	   iterative	  practices,	  which	  are	  never	  able	  to	  entirely	  fix	  their	  identities,	  and	  which	  will	  therefore	  always	  be	  open	  to	  change.376	  In	  IR,	  this	  understanding	  of	  performativity	  was	  applied	  to	  work	  on	  state	  identity	  in	  the	  1990s	  with	  David	  Campbell	  or	  Cindy	  Weber	  arguing	  that	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  international	  actor	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  acts	  which	  ex	  post	  appear	  as	  the	  acts	  of	   a	  naturally	  given	  state.377	  In	  other	  words,	   the	  accounts	  on	  pragmatism,	  practices	   and	   performances	   relocated	   the	   question	   of	   being,	   viewing	   it	   as	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  372	  Friedrichs/Kratochwil	   2009:	   712	   ”This	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   the	   experience	   of	   physical	   reality,	   in	  whatever	  form.	  The	  point	  is	  rather	  that	  the	  assumption	  of	  ’objective’	  physical	  reality	  is	  inadequate	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  social	  science	  (ibid.	  705);	  Friedrichs/Kratochwil	  2009;	  Bourdieu	  2004;	  Wittgenstein	  1953	  373	  Wittgenstein,	  Kaplan,	  Austin	  374	  Austin	  1962;	  Austin/Urmson/Warnock	  1979.	  375	  Derrida	  1988.	  376	  Butler	  1990;	  1993.	  377	  Weber	  1998;	  Campbell	  1998,	  see	  also	  Dillon	  and	  Everart	  1992.	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stabilization	  of	  different	  modes	  of	  becoming,	  be	  these	  reiterations,	  performances	  or	  practices.	  	  	  
New	  Materialism:	  Assemblages	  of	  beings	  	  	  	  Coming	   under	   the	   heading	   of	   New	  Materialism	   are	   approaches	   of	   Agent	  Network	  Theory	  (ANT),	  post-­‐humanism,	  complexity	  theory	  and	  other	  labels	  put	  on	  a	  group	  of	  approaches	   that	   have	   devoted	   renewed	   attention	   to	   agency	   in	   social	   and	   political	  theorizing.378	  From	  the	  critique	  of	   ”liberal	  modernist”	   conceptions	  of	   the	  world,	   in	  which	   agency	   is	   seen	   to	   lie	   only	   in	   the	   human	   subject,	   the	   New	   Materialists	  emphasize	  the	  lack	  of	  autonomy	  of	  this	  human	  subject.	  Rather,	  agency	  is	  seen	  to	  lie	  in	  the	  web	  of	  relations,	  in	  complex,	  fluid,	  overlapping	  networks	  and	  assemblages	  of	  human	   and	   non-­‐human	   elements.379 	  Agency	   is	   temporarily	   constituted	   by	   the	  emergent	  web	  of	  heterogeneous	  relations380,	  dependent	  upon	  a	  network	  of	  alliances	  within	   a	   ”shifting,	   heterogeneous	   and	   expansive	   relations	   field”	   where	   it	   is	   the	  relation	  that	  matters	  more	  than	  the	  actors	  themselves.381	  	  	  If	  we	  wish	  to	  continue	  with	  the	  terminology	  used	  thus	  far,	  these	  scholars	  also	  seek	  to	  find	  a	  different	  balance	  between	  being	  and	  becoming.	  While	  the	  centrality	  of	  their	  ontological	  uncertainty	  leaves	  one	  to	  assume	  that	  they	  are	  focused	  on	  the	  strength	  of	   the	   becoming,	   they	   do	   not	   ”postulate	   a	  world	   in	  which	   everything	   is	   always	   in	  radical	   flux.”382	  Rather,	   the	  balance	  sought	  here	  between	  being	  and	  becoming	  sees	  these	   assemblages	   and	   networks	   as	   constituted	   of	   beings,	   as	   stabilizations	   that	  interact,	  clash	  and	  constitute	  new	  forms	  of	  agency.	  It	  “is	  the	  agency	  of	  ’being’	  which	  is	   at	   work	   beneath	   the	   world	   of	   ’becoming’	   …	   differing	   modes	   of	   being	   clash	   in	  unpredictable	  ways.”383	  However	   it	   is	  a	  very	  particular	  understanding	  of	  being.	  As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  378	  Law	  2004,	  2008,	  2009;	  Latour	  2013;	  Cudworth/Hobden	  2013.	  379	  Bennett	  2010;	  Chandler	  2013.	  380	  Law	  2009:	  71.	  381	  Barry	  2013.	  382	  Connolly	  2012:	  401.	  383	  	  Chandler	  2013:	  528.	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David	  Chandler	  puts	  it	   	  “what	  is	  key	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  being	  at	  stake	  here	  is	  that	   it	   is	  not	  determinable	  beforehand,	   it	   is	  not	   isolatable	  as	  an	  inner	  essence,	   it	   is	  being	   that	   is	   determinate	   only	   in	   that	   particular	   assemblage	   or	   at	   the	   particular	  moment	   of	   intersection.” 384 	  In	   these	   assemblages,	   beings	   are	   interacting	   and	  changing	  each	  other,	  rather	  than	  being	  changed	  –	  or	  constituted	  for	  that	  matter	  –	  by	  any	  autonomous	  human	  agent.	  The	  understanding	  of	  being	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  accounts	  of	  practices	  and	  performances,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  non-­‐foundational.	  However,	  differing	   from	   the	   previous	   account	   is	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   beings	  necessary	   to	   create	   the	  networks	  and	  assemblages.	   In	   fact,	   as	  Chandler	   continues,	  the	  “creativity	  of	  new	  material	  or	  post-­‐human	  approaches	  stems	  from	  the	  attention	  to	   a	   great	   range	   of	   ’being’,	   enlarging	   the	   number	   of	   actors	   and	   actants	   and	   their	  traces,	   connections	   and	  mediations.”385	  A	   balance	   between	   being	   and	   becoming	   is	  therefore	   emergent	   through	   the	   complex	   actions	   and	   interactions	   of	   numerous	  agential	  assemblages.	  	  	  	  
Critical	  Realism:	  Being	  as	  the	  condition	  for	  any	  process	  of	  becoming	  
	  A	  still	  different	  approach	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  being	  and	  becoming	  has	  been	  proposed	   by	   work	   on	   “Critical	   Realism”.	   Here,	   the	   anti-­‐foundational	   aspects	   of	  becoming	   are	   acknowledged,	   but	   not	   in	   the	   way	   in	   which	   New	   Materialism	  embraced	   and	   built	   a	   being	   around	   this	   ontological	   insecurity.	   Rather,	   as	   Heikki	  Patomäki	   and	   Colin	  Wight	   have	   argued,	   Critical	   Realism	   takes	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  underlying	   reality	   as	   a	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   events	   and	   perceived	   and/or	  experienced	  phenomena.386	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   aspect	  of	  becoming	   is	   acknowledged	  as	  the	  way	  in	  which	  social	  ontologies	  are	  constructed.	  However,	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  becoming	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  multiple	  interpretations	  of	  reality,	  are	  dependent	  upon	   one	   underlying	   reality.	   ”Ontologically,	   if	   discourses	   do	   construct	   their	   own	  objects,	   then	   what	   constructed	   the	   discourses	   themselves?	   …	   Even	   the	   term	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  384	  Chandler	  2012:	  529.	  385	  Chandler	  2012:	  FN	  59.	  386	  Patomäki/Wight	  2001:	  223.	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construction,	  …	   implies	   a	   set	   of	  materials,	  whether	   social	   or	  natural,	   out	   of	  which	  this	   so-­‐called	   reality	   is	   constructed	   and	   which	   have	   to	   exist	   prior	   to	   the	  construction.”387	  An	  underlying	  reality,	  or	  being,	  is	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  all	  kinds	  of	  constructions	  or	  constitutive	  processes	  of	  becoming.	  Differing	  from	  the	  two	  previous	  accounts,	  where	  being	  appeared	  as	  a	  stabilization	  of	  becoming,	  the	  Critical	  Realists	  emphasize	  the	  way	  in	  which	  becoming	  depends	  upon	  an	  underlying	  being.	  Otherwise,	  becoming	  would	  have	  no	  place	  to	  start	  from,	  no	  pieces	  from	  which	  to	  create	  constructions,	  and	  no	  material	  from	  which	  to	  construct	  the	  constitutively	  working	  discourses.	  	  	  These	   different	   approaches	   have	   tried	   to	   find	   other	   ways	   of	   thinking	   about	   the	  relationship	   between	   being	   and	   becoming	   than	   those	   offered	   by	   more	   common	  Kantian	   traditions	   or	   the	   post-­‐positivist	   rejection	   thereof.	   In	   the	   final	   part	   of	   this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  outline	  the	  alternative	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  argue	  for.	  	  	  
Becoming	  recognizable:	  Beyond	  recognition	  and	  beyond	  critique	  	  ”[T]he	  impossibility	  of	  a	  universal	  ground	  does	  not	  eliminate	  its	  need:	  it	  just	  transforms	  the	  ground	  into	  an	  empty	  place	  which	  can	  be	  partially	  filled	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  (the	  strategies	  of	  this	  filling	  is	  what	  politics	  is	  all	  about).”	  (Ernesto	  Laclau,	  1995:	  158).	  	  ’Politics	  is	  the	  terrain	  of	  competing	  ontologies’”(Colin	  Wight	  2006:2).	  	  These	   quotes	   by	   Ernesto	   Laclau	   and	   Colin	   Wight	   illustrate	   the	   basic	   idea	   of	   the	  alternative	   that	   I	   wish	   to	   explore	   in	   these	   last	   paragraphs.	   The	   perspective	   of	  becoming	  had	  argued	  for	  the	  “impossibility	  of	  a	  universal	  ground”,	  and	  opened	  itself	  up	   for	   alternatives	   to	   settled	   knowledge,	   which	   had	   claimed	   the	   necessity	   of	   this	  ground(ing).	  The	  becoming	  opened	  up	  space	  which	  could	  be	  ”filled”	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  beings,	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  letting	  their	  individual	  truth-­‐claims	  balance	  each	  other,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  387	  Patomäki/Wight	  2001:	  217.	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chastening	  ”identitarian	   thinking”	  and	  thereby	  avoiding	  a	  reification	  of	  agents	  and	  objects,	  concepts	  and	  identities.	  Allow	  me	  to	  explain	  this	  process	  step-­‐by-­‐step.	  	  Post-­‐positivism	  allowed	  us	  a	  focus	  on	  how	  something	  becomes	  recognizable	  insofar	  as	   it	   closely	   follows	   the	   emergence	   of	   something	   as	   intelligible.	   It	   asks	   how	  something	  becomes	  recognizable,	  but	  also,	  moving	  further,	  asks	  how	  the	  possibility	  of	   becoming	   recognizable	   depends	   upon	   the	   epistemic	   system	   within	   which	   the	  recognition	  features.	  While	  arguing	  that	  recognition	  has	  a	  reproductive	  momentum	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  this	  epistemic	  framework	  –	  recalling	  Butler’s	  point	  that	  only	  that	  which	  is	  recognizble	  can	  be	  recognized	  –	  I	  also	  asked	  how	  this	  very	  framework	  of	  knowledge	  is	  changed	  through	  the	  newly	  recognized	  agents,	  concepts,	  identities	  and	  objects.	  In	  this	  sense,	  how	  does	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  recognizable	  influence	  the	  epistemic	  systems	  and	  the	  possibilities	  of	  –	  yet	  others	  –	  becoming	  recognizable	  within	  them?	  My	  interest	  in	  recognition	  focusses	  on	  how	  an	  object	  becomes	  recognizable,	  but	  also	  how	  this	  recognition	  changes	  the	  framework	  within	  which	  recognition	  features.	  The	  question	   that	   remains,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   therefore:	  how	  can	  we	  maintain	  sensitivity	  toward	  novel	   forms	  of	  existence,	  of	  agency,	  or	  concepts	  without	   forging	   them	  into	  the	   intelligibility	  –	   the	  recognizability	  –	  of	  current	  cognitive	  or	  epistemic	  systems?	  How	   can	   we	   unlock	   the	   language	   of	   emergence	   without	   forcing	   it	   into	   the	  straightjacket	  of	  predetermined	  grammar?	  	  As	  we	  saw	  above,	  Connolly	  suggested	  for	  this	  an	  “ethos	  of	  responsiveness”,	  that	  is,	  a	  constant	  nurturing	  of	  the	  denaturalizing	  qualities	  of	  different	  systems,	  practices	  and	  discourses,	  while	   Innana	  Hamati-­‐Ataya	   has	   argued	   for	   an	   expanded	   reflexivity	   of,	  and	  in,	  IR	  scholarship	  itself.	  Acknowleging	  both	  these	  forms	  of	  calls,	  I	  will	  pick	  up	  on	  an	   argument	   made	   recently	   by	   Daniel	   Levine.	   In	   his	   work	   on	   “Recovering	  Interntional	  Relations”	  he	   also	   argued	   for	  nurturing	   a	   form	  of	   reflexivity,	  what	  he	  calls	   a	   “sustainable	   critique”,	  meaning	   a	   change	   in	   the	   conduct	   of	   IR	   theorists,	   to	  include	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   pluralism	   in	   perspectives,	   similar	   to	   a	   Nietzschean	  perspectivism,	  what	  he	  calls	  building	  up	  a	  “constellation”	  of	  reified	  perspectives	  on	  a	  particular	  question,	  event	  or	  issue.	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  To	   Levine,	   critical	   scholarship	   has	   been	   of	   great	   importance	   to	   international	  scholarship.	  However,	  critique	  alone	  does	  not	  have	  the	  ability	   to	  sustain	   itself,	  but	  tends	   to	   relapse	   into	   new	   reifications,	   and	   new	   naturalizations	   of	   new	   beings.	  Acknowledging	   the	   problems	   of	   these	   reifications,	   he	   argues	   that,	   instead	   of	  attempting	   to	  rid	  ourselves	  of	   these	  sedimented	  beings,	  we,	  as	   IR	  scholars,	   should	  rather	  sustainably	  manage	  them,	  and	  in	  that	  way,	  sustain	  the	  critical	  momentum.	  In	  order	   to	  do	   that,	   Levine	  draws	  on	  what	  Theodor	  Adorno	  has	   called	  constellations.	  These	   constellations	   arrange	   “multiple	   perspectives	   around	   a	   particular	   event	   or	  cluster	  of	  events	  in	  world	  politics	  for	  the	  specific	  purpose	  of	  managing	  reifications.	  …	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   construct	   polyvocal	   and	   highly	   pluralist	   narratives.	   Individual	  paradigms	  are	  understood	  to	   function	   like	  snapshots	  or	  sonar	  soundings:	  a	  means	  by	  which	  preexisting	  political-­‐social-­‐normative	  sensibilities	  are	  stretched	  and	  fitted	  onto	   a	   complex,	   indeterminate,	   vital	   world.” 388 	  Through	   these	   constellations,	  identitarian	   thinking	   in	   international	   relations	   theory	   can	   be	   chastened,	   and	   the	  dangers	  of	  reification	  avoided.	  	  	  	  Levine	  addresses	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  critique	  in	  international	  relations	  as	  a	  loss	  of	  momentum.	  Critical	  attempts	   in	   IR	  so	   far	  –	   innovative	  work	  by	  Barry	  Buzan,	  Chris	  Brown,	   David	   Baldwin,	   Stefano	   Guzzini,	   Jef	   Huysmans,	   Jens	   Bartelson,	   etc.	   –	   have	  debunked	   individual	   reifications,	   but	   have	   not	   taken	   issue	   with	   the	   deeper	  underlying	  problem	  at	  stake.	  The	  problem	  is,	  Levine	  points	  out,	  not	  the	  reifications	  as	  such.	  “All	  knowledge	  is	  predicated	  on	  reifications”.389	  In	  order	  to	  create	  practical	  knowledge,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  simplify	  and	  reduce	   the	  complexity	  of	   the	  world.	  Yet	  with	   this	   simplification,	   one	   risks	   naturalizing	   ontological	   assumptions	   of	   certain	  ”fact-­‐value	  traditions”.390	  Reifications	  occur	  when	  this	  step	  of	  reduction	  is	  forgotten	  and	  the	  simplifications	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  correspondent	  with	  reality.	  ”Theory,	  it	  would	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  2012:	  101f.	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  Levine	  2012:	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  2013:	  17.	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seem,	  can	  live	  neither	  with	  reification	  nor	  without	  it.”391	  The	  challenge	  for	  Levine	  is	  therefore	  to	  retain	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  need	  for	  reifications	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	   danger	   of	   naturalizing	   the	   ontological	   assumption	   of	   the	   reifications	   on	   the	  other.	   Similarly	   to	   Connolly’s	   account	   above,	   he	   seeks	   a	   balance	   between	   the	  necessity	   of	   stabilizations	   –	   what	   he	   calls	   reifications	   –	   and	   the	   critique	   of	   the	  naturalization	  of	   these	   stabilizations.	   Critical	   IR	  has	   thus	   far	  unveiled	  naturalizing	  tendencies,	   but	   it	   overlooked	   how	   scholars	   and	   practitioners	   depended	   upon	  reifications.	  The	  task	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	  to	  unveil	  individual	  reifications	  or	  beings,	  but	  to	  seek	  a	  more	  “sustainable”	  solution.	  	  Thinking	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   practical	   knowledge	   can	   never	   escape	   reifications.	  Therefore,	   Levine	   argues,	   we	   must	   devise	   a	   way	   to	   work	   with	   them,	   while	  maintaining	  an	  awareness	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  are	   reductions	   and	   simplifications.	  Levine	  seeks	  a	  way	  to	  balance	  the	  need	  for	  reification	  with	  the	  danger	  of	  forgetting	  the	  fact	  that	  reifications	  are	  not	  natural.	  He	  frames	  his	  argument	  in	  the	  terminology	  of	  reifications	  alone.	  In	  my	  reading	  of	  him,	  I	  make	  the	  distinction	  between	  being	  and	  reification,	  with	  being	  referring	  to	  the	  stabilization	  of	  knowledge	  necessary	  for	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  objects	  and	  agents	  and	  the	  naturalization	  of	   these	  stabilizations	  as	  reifications.	   In	  the	  terms	  of	  this	  chapter	  so	  far,	  Levine’s	  argument	  would	  therefore	  run	  approximately	  thus:	  the	  beings	  cannot	  be	  eradicated,	  but	  the	  acceptance	  of	  their	  presence	   must	   come	   with	   a	   reflection	   on	   fact	   that	   they	   are	   simplifications	   and	  reductions	   of	   their	   own	   becoming.	   That	   is,	   instead	   of	   an	   ad	   hoc	   critique	   of	   an	  individual	  concept,	  norm,	  or	  identity,	  a	  ”sustainable	  critique	  is	  needed”.392	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Connolly,	  Levine	  sees	  the	  becoming	  as	  on	  a	  constant	  losing	  streak,	  and	  notes	  that	  critique	  has	  created	  an	  opportunity	  to	  undermine	  the	  strength	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  Levine	  2013:	  17.	  392	  Levine	  2013:	  53;	  A	   similar	  point	   is	  made	  by	  Hutchings	   ”This	   insecurity	   is	  best	   summed	  up	  as	  a	  capacity	   for	   constant	   theoretical	   self-­‐reflection	   in	   which	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   conditions	   of	  possibility	   of	   critique	   is	   acknowledged	   even	   as	   its	   claim	   to	   authoritative	   judgment	   is	   made”	  (Hutchings	  2000:	  87).	  Also	   ”Critique	   is	  premised	  on	   the	   impossibility	  of	   a	  definitive	   answer	   to	   the	  conditions	   of	   its	   own	   possibility	   and	   can	   only	   content	   itself	   with	   the	   acknowledgment	   of	   the	  revisability	  of	  any	  grounds	  on	  which	  its	  specific	  claims	  are	  based”	  (ibid.:	  90).	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of	  the	  being,	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  the	  becoming.	  Connolly’s	  answer	  to	  strengthen	  the	  perennially	  losing	  side	  of	  the	  becoming	  was	  to	  nurture	  an	  ethos	  –	  of	  generosity,	  of	  engagement,	   and	   of	   disruption.	   Similarly,	   Levine	   looks	   to	   nurture	   an	   affective-­‐intellectual	  disposition	  and	  a	  philosophical-­‐normative	  sensitivity,	  in	  short,	  an	  ethos	  of	   chastened	   reason.	   ”Chastened	   reason	   points	   theorists	   toward	   seeking	   tools	   by	  which	  to	  enhance	  and	  preserve	  sensitivity	  to	  reification	  in	  its	  encounter	  with	  world	  politics.”393	  Rather	   than	   trying	   to	   overcome	   them,	   Levine	   wants	   to	   ”sustainably	  
manag❲e❳	   reification:	   accepting	   its	   centrality	   to	   conceptual	   thinking	   and	   actively	  devising	   tactics	   and	   practices	   by	   which	   to	   remember	   its	   effects	   and	   contain	  them.”394	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  Levine	  turns	  to	  Theodor	  Adorno’s	  constellation,	  which	  embodies	   an	   attempt	   to	   balance	   reifications	   against	   each	   other,	   not	   in	   order	   to	  achieve	   a	   consensus	   between	   conflicting	   perspectives,	   but	   to	   allow	   for	   the	  reifications	   of	   each	   perspective	   to	   counterbalance	   those	   of	   others.	   It	   aims	   at	  retaining	  the	  conflict	  and	  tension,	  thus	  ”chasten[ing]”	  the	  reason	  that	  is	  drawing	  on	  this	   constellation.	   “In	   practice	   that	  means	   cultivate	   a	   hermeneutic	   or	   curatorial	  …	  disposition	  that	  takes	  up	  a	  variety	  of	  affects	  as	   it	  weaves	  together	  stories	  of	  world	  politics”.395	  	  	  Adorno	  himself	  described	  his	  constellation	  as	  a	  ”juxtaposed,	  rather	  than	  integrated	  cluster	   of	   changing	   elements	   that	   resist	   reduction	   to	   a	   common	   demoninator,	  essential	   core,	   or	   generative	   first	   principle.” 396 	  When	   Levine	   applies	   it	   to	  international	   relations,	   it	   is	   to	  describe	   the	  arrangement	  of	   ”multiple	  perspectives	  around	   a	   particular	   event	   or	   cluster	   of	   events	   in	   world	   politics	   for	   the	   specific	  purpose	   of	  managing	   reifications.	  …	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   construct	   polyvocal	   and	   highly	  pluralist	  narratives.”397	  Levine	  proposes	  two	  ways	  of	  integrating	  Adorno’s	  work	  into	  IR	   scholarship.	   ”The	   first	   step	   lies	   in	  …	   identifying	  key	  ways	   in	  which	   identitarian	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  8;	  See	  also	  Jay	  1984;	  Levine	  2012.	  397	  Levine	  2012:	  101f.	  
	   133	  
thinking	   moves	   to	   conflate	   concepts	   and	   real-­‐world	   things”.398	  Now,	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	   concepts	   allow	   theorists	   to	   separate	   phenomena,	   events,	   or	   issues	   from	   an	  otherwise	  undifferentiated	  continuum	  of	  an	  interrelated	  world.	  They	  are	  necessary	  instruments	  of	  intelligible	  communication.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  concepts	  subsume	  the	  particular	   under	   the	   general,	   and	   force	   differences	   into	   one	   unitary	   system	   of	  thought,	   one	   ”truth	   that	   silences	   all	   others”.399	  Concepts	   tend	   to	  become	   conflated	  with	   the	   real-­‐world	   things	   they	   originally	   aimed	   to	   describe.	   It	   is	   this	   tendency	  Adorno	  calls	  identitarian.400	  Further,	  similarly	  to	  the	  work	  undertaken	  by	  aesthetic	  IR,	   it	   aims	   to	   “engage	   the	   gap	   that	   inevitably	   opens	   up	   between	   a	   form	   of	  representation	  and	  the	  object	  it	  seeks	  to	  represent.”401	  	  	  This	  ”chastening”	  of	  identitarian	  thinking	  falls	  within	  the	  category	  of	  non-­‐identity	  in	  the	  negative	  dialectic	  of	  Adorno.	  Thus,	  for	  Levine,	  the	  ”second	  step	  ❲of	  research❳	  lies	  in	  developing	  a	  constellation	  of	  methodological	  paradigms	  that	  keep	  those	  various	  forms	   of	   non-­‐identity	   in	   view”. 402 	  The	   aim	   of	   such	   counter-­‐balancing	   is	   to	  ”continuously	  estrange	  concepts	  from	  the	  world	  they	  mean	  to	  describe:	  continually	  chastening	  reason	  by	  disrupting	  its	  identitarian	  tendencies	  and	  thus	  checking	  them	  …	   this	   process	   of	   estrangement	   [called]	   non-­‐identity	   …	   Theorists	   are	   positively	  obliged	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  negative	  mode	   of	   thinking”.403	  For	   Adorno,	   refusing	   simple	  categorization	   was	   the	   only	   way	   of	   avoiding	   the	   danger	   of	   reification	   and	   the	  distancing	   and	   forgetting	   of	   the	   human	   suffering	   inherent	   in	   (world)	   politics	   that	  accompanies	   such	   reductions.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   the	   abolition	   of	   concepts	   or	  categories,	   but	   is	   rather	   a	   call	   for	   reflection	   on	   the	   reifying	   effects	   and	   their	   de-­‐humanizing	  consequences.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  398	  ibid.	  241.	  399	  Bleiker	  2000:	  140.	  400	  For	   Adorno,	   there	   has	   always	   been	   identitarian	   tendencies,	   but	   in	   the	   late-­‐modern	   era,	   that	  process	   of	   conflation	   have	   taken	   on	   potentially	   world-­‐destroying	   dimensions.	   The	   dangers	   of	  conceptual	   thinking,	   to	   Adorno,	   became	   different	   and	   much	   more	   pressing	   ”after	   Auschwitz	   and	  Hiroshima.”	  (Horkheimer/Adorno	  1987).	  401	  Bleiker	  2001:	  512.	  402	  Levine	  2012:	  241.	  403	  Levine	  2012:	  72.	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The	  work	   of	   the	   constellation	   is	   to	   actively	   intervene,	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  “awareness	  is	  not	  lost	  to	  reification’s	  peculiar	  form	  of	  forgetting.”404	  The	  perspective	  carries	  along	  much	  of	  the	  impetus	  from	  the	  approach	  of	  becoming,	  but	  without	  the	  need	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   single	  winner	   in	   the	   genealogical	   struggle	   of	  meaning.	   Also,	   its	  meta-­‐positioning	   does	   not	   force	   it	   to	   detach	   itself	   from	   the	   narratives	   –	   or	   the	  narrators	   –	  of	   being.	  Rather,	   it	   aims	  at	   retaining	   the	   richness	  of	   each	  being,	  while	  balancing	   their	   truth	   claims	   against	   each	   other	   and	   thus	   avoiding	   identitarian	  conflation	  of	  one	  being	  with	  the	  being.405	  	  	  While	   Levine’s	   chastening	   takes	   place	   within	   the	   realm	   of	   IR	   theorizing	   and	   its	  methodological	   paradigms,	   I	   will	   use	   this	   idea	   of	   constellations	   to	   illustrate	   the	  approach	  I	  take	  to	  counter	  the	  reifying	  tendencies	  of	  recognition	  which	  I	  identified	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  and	  to	  nurture	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  within	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  recognizable.	  The	   following	   chapter	  will	   illustrate	   this	   approach	  with	   reference	   to	  the	  historiographical	  material	  that	  was	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  There,	  the	  parallel	  processes	  towards	  international	  recognition	  of	  the	  “Muslim	  Homeland”	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  “Jewish	  National	  Home”	  of	  Israel	  were	  used	  as	  illustrations	  for	  the	  processes	  by	   which	   “religion”	   in	   international	   relations	   became	   recognizable,	   a	   perspective	  which	   would	   have	   been	   lost,	   had	   the	   religious	   features	   of	   these	   two	   new	  international	   actors	   and	   their	   path	   to	   statehood	   simply	   been	   recognized.	   In	   the	  following	   chapter,	   I	   will	   continue	   the	   illustration	   of	   how	   religion	   “became	  recognizable”	  in	  international	  relations,	  by	  focusing	  less	  on	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  something	  becomes	  recognizable,	  but	  more	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  these	  processes,	  that	  is,	   showing	   how	   the	   “beings”	   of	   the	   “Muslim	  Homeland”	   and	   the	   “Jewish	  National	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  404	  ibid.	  110.	  405	  Similar	  movements	  between	  –	  instead	  of	  within	  or	  against	  –	  beings	  is	  outlined	  by	  Kojin	  Karatani,	  who	  prescribes	  a	  continuous	  movement	  between	  discourses	  (Karatani	  2005).	  The	  repeated	  change	  of	  angle	  should	  not	  be	  misread	  as	  a	  search	  for	  a	  stable	  third	  position,	  but	  it	  ”is	  rather	  in	  the	  instability	  and	  permeability	  of	  totalisation	  that	  we	  might	  discern	  the	  dynamics	  of	  forceful	  attempts	  at	  discursive	  closures.”	  (Svensson	  2013:	  4).	  This	  is	  also	  to	  be	  found	  within	  the	  Actor-­‐Network	  literature	  or	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ”New	  Materiality”	  (Law	  2009;	  Latour	  1993;	  Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  1986;	  See	  also	  Millennium	  Special	  Issue	  41(3),	  2013).	  See	  also	  Heideggerian	  approaches	  to	  the	  pluralisty	  of	  the	  present,	  for	  example	  in	  Chakrabarty	  2000.	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Home”	  came	  to	  be	  intelligible	  as	  such.	  With	  Levine’s	  image	  of	  the	  “sonar-­‐soundings”	  in	  mind	  I	  will	  outline	  a	  –	  limited	  –	  constellation	  of	  “Muslim”	  and	  “Jewish”	  “beings”,	  with	   the	   hope	   that	   these	   illustrations	   will	   nurture	   a	   non-­‐identitarian	   thinking	  regarding	  religion	  in	  international	  relations.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   continued	   the	   argumentation	  of	   the	  previous	   chapters	   regarding	  the	   reifying	   aspects	   of	   recognition,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   call	   for	   an	   approach	   that	   can	  nurture	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   process	   of	   how	   something	   becomes	  recognizable	   in	   international	   relations.	   I	   did	   so	   by	   tapping	   into	   post-­‐postivist	  scholarship,	   and	   in	   particular	   by	   engaging	   its	   emphasis	   on	   the	   importance	   of	  questioning	  ontological	  premises	  and	  denaturalizing	  seemingly	  natural	  knowledge,	  an	  aspect	  which	  I	  termed	  ”becoming”.	  While	  this	  aspect	  offered	  me	  a	  way	  to	  engage	  with	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   and	   track	   the	   processes	   of	   how	   something	   becomes	  recognizable,	   it	   tended	   to	   underestimate	   the	   dependency	   of	   the	   stability	   of	  knowledge	   for	   objects	   and	   agents	   to	   be	   intelligible,	   an	   aspect	   contrasting	   with	  becoming,	   which	   I	   termed	   ”being”.	   Allowing	   the	   being	   to	   incorporate	   itself	   into	  naturalized	  knowledge,	  forgetting	  about	  the	  way	  it	  ”became”	  what	  it	  ”is”	  would	  end	  up	  reifying	  the	  being.	  This	  was	  the	  aspect	  of	  recognition	  that	  I	  aimed	  to	  avoid.	  What	  I	   pursued,	   instead,	   was	   a	   balance	   between	   being	   and	   becoming,	   between	  stabilizations	  of	  knowledge	  and	  an	  awareness	  of	  their	  non-­‐natural	  character.	  After	  outlining	  different	  alternatives	  to	  this	  sought-­‐for	  balance,	  I	  presented	  the	  alternative	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  work	  with.	  This	  alternative	  built	  on	  the	  critical	  power	  of	  becoming	  in	  order	   to	  open	  up	  space	   for	  alternative	  knowledge,	  objects	  and	  agents,	  and	   then	  argued	  in	  favor	  of	  filling	  this	  space	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  beings,	  leaving	  the	  truth-­‐claim	  of	  each	  being	  to	  balance	  out	  the	  truth-­‐claim	  of	  the	  others.	  The	  hope	  was,	  in	   this	   way,	   to	   nurture	   the	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   of	   ”non-­‐identitarian”	   thinking.	  Thus,	  I	  aimed	  to	  present	  a	  perspective	  sensitive	  to	  the	  way	  new	  objects	  and	  agents	  become	  recognizable	  in	  international	  relations.	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Chapter	  5:	  Being	  ”Muslim	  Pakistan”	  and	  ”Jewish	  Israel”:	  Reginald	  
Coupland	  and	  Muhammad	  Zafrullah	  Khan	  	  In	  this	  final	  chapter,	  I	  return	  to	  the	  cases	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  Israel,	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  the	  theoretical	  discussion	  of	  the	  thesis’	  last	  part.	  The	  last	  illustration	  –	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  3	  –	  demonstrated	  the	  different	  processes	  by	  which	  these	  two	  international	  actors	  became	  recognizable	  as	  a	  ”Muslim	  Homeland”	  and	  a	  ”Jewish	  National	  Home”.	  In	   contrast,	   this	   chapter	   wishes	   to	   illustrate	   the	   different	   outcomes	   of	   such	  processes,	  that	  is,	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  knowledge	  was	  stabilized	  around	  Pakistan	  as	  Muslim	  and	  Israel	  as	  Jewish.	  While	  the	  last	  illustration	  was	  wide	  in	  scope,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  be	  narrowed	  down	  to	  two	  individuals.	  I	  will	  trace	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   Muslim	   Pakistan	   and	   Jewish	   Israel	   become	  recognizable	  in	  each	  of	  their	  cases	  –	  that	  is,	  I	  will	  follow	  four	  processes	  –	  and	  outline	  the	  Muslim	  Pakistan	  and	   Jewish	   Israel	   that	  emerged	   from	  them.406	  I	  had	  argued	   in	  the	   pervious	   chapter	   that	   by	  multiplying	   the	   number	   of	   these	   outcomes	   –	  what	   I	  called	  ”beings”	  –	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  create	  a	  ”truly	  pluralist	  narrative”	  of	  these	  two	  new	   international	  agents,	   that	   is,	   to	  chasten	  simplified,	   ”identitarian”	   thinking	  and	   thereby	   to	   counter	   the	   problematic,	   reifying	   aspects	   of	   recognition	   that	   had	  been	  identified	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  	  The	   first	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   had	   argued	   that	   recognition	  was	   problematic,	   since	   it	  presupposed	   and	   reproduced	   its	   objects,	   agents	   and	   epistemic	   frameworks,	   and	  accorded	   too	   little	  attention	   to	   the	  process	  by	  which	   these	  emerged.	   I	  argued	   that	  recognition,	  in	  this	  sense,	  lacked	  genealogical	  sensitivity,	  and	  that,	  by	  sidelining	  and	  ”forgetting”	  about	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  objects,	  agents	  and	  frameworks	  emerged,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  406	  The	   sources	   of	   this	   chapter	   are,	   beyond	   the	   documents	   from	   the	   UN	   archives	   and	   partition	  documents	   used	   in	   chapter	   3,	   mainly	   the	   writings	   of	   Zafrullah	   Khan	   and	   Reginald	   Coupland	  themselves.	  Zafrullah	  Khan’s	  speeches	  in	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  and	  Sub-­‐commissions	  are	  added	  to	  this.	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recognition	   had	   a	   reifying	   tendency.	   I	   sought	   to	   investigate	   reification	   as	   the	  forgetfulness	   of	   the	   processes	   of	   emergence,	   of	   how	   something	   becomes	  recognizable.	  I	  asked	  what	  are	  the	  processes	  of	  becoming	  in	  international	  relations,	  that	   is,	   how	   do	   objects	   and	   agents	   become	   recognizable,	   and	   how	   do	   epistemic	  frameworks	   change	   in	   order	   for	   new	   agents	   and	   objects	   to	   become	   recognizable.	  Finally,	  I	  inquired	  how	  we	  might	  nurture	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  recognition	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  dangers	  of	  reification.	  In	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  part,	  I	  argued	  that,	  unless	  these	  kinds	  of	   investigations	  are	  conducted	  into	  the	  premises	  upon	  which	  recognition	  rests,	  the	  latter	  is	  bound	  to	  remain	  within	  and	  reproduce	  its	  originating	  epistemic	  framework	  and	  the	  bias	  which	  that	  framework	  carries.	  	  In	   the	  second	  part	  of	   the	   thesis,	   I	   sought	   to	  address	   these	  questions	  of	   reification,	  recognizability	  and	  genealogical	  sensitivity.	   I	  began	  by	  addressing	  ”post-­‐positivist”	  scholarship,	  due	  to	  its	  general	  skepticism	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  reified	  ontological	  premises	  concerning	   the	  way	   the	   ”world	   is”,	   including	   the	  claims	  of	   recognition	  regarding	  a	  pre-­‐differentiated	   –	   and	   differentiable	   –	   world.	   I	   termed	   this	   perspective	   one	   of	  ”becoming”,	   in	   order	   to	   emphasize	   the	   importance	   placed	   on	   the	   process	   of	  emergence,	  of	  becoming	  recognizable	   instead	  of	  assuming	  a	  recognizable	  object	  or	  agent	  prior	   to	   recognition.	  This	  processuality	   reflected	   the	  genealogical	   sensitivity	  that	  I	  saw	  as	  lacking	  from	  recognition	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  thesis.	  However,	  while	  the	  perspective	  of	  ”becoming”	  raised	  the	  prospect	  of	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  entities	  of	  recognition,	  it	  tended	  to	  underestimate	  the	  dependency	  on	  a	  certain	  stability	   of	   these	   entities	   for	   them	   to	   be	   intelligible,	   a	   state	   of	   equilibrium	   that	   I	  referred	  to	  as	  ”being”.	  To	  put	  it	  in	  other	  words,	  I	  was	  searching	  for	  an	  approach	  that	  allowed	  me	  to	  keep	  the	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  process	  of	  ”becoming”	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  acknowledging	  the	  necessity	  of	  moments	  of	  equilibrium	  of	  ”being”.	  ”Becoming”	   was	   important	   in	   order	   not	   to	   let	   these	   ”beings”	   crystallize	   into	  reifications	   –	   not	   naturalizing	   their	   ontological	   assumptions	   –	   but	   it	   was	   not	  designed	  to	  make	  the	  ”beings”	  altogether	  redundant.	  I	  sought	  to	  retain	  the	  tension	  between	   being	   and	   becoming,	   not	   allowing	   one	   to	   dominate	   the	   other.	   My	  suggestion	  was	  to	  allow	  the	  perspective	  of	  ”becoming”	  open	  up	  space	  for	  alternative	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knowledge,	   truth,	   concepts,	   agents,	   et	   cetera,	   through	   its	   genealogical	   sensitivity,	  and	   then	   fill	   this	   space	   with	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   ”beings”,	   allowing	   their	   competing	  truth-­‐claims	   to	   balance	   each	   other	   out,	   thereby	   hindering	   one	   ”being”	   from	  becoming	   dominant	   and	   settling	   into	   reified	   knowledge.	   I	   described	   this	   as	   an	  analysis	  of	  ”becoming	  recognizable”	  and	  thereby	  referred	  to	  the	  ”becoming”	  as	  the	  necessary	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   and	   the	   ”recognizable”	   as	   the	   ”beings”	   without	  which	   the	   object,	   agents,	   identities	   of	   recognition	   –	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   thesis,	  ”religion”	   –	  would	   not	   be	   intelligible	   to	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   “The	   existence	   of	  many	  such	   worldviews	   helps	   remind	   the	   theorist	   of	   the	   limits	   of	   any	   single	   one.”407	  By	  positioning	   the	   different	   beings	   against	   each	   other,	   the	   hope	   was	   to	   disrupt	  identitarian	  –	  reified	  –	  thinking,	  which	  conflated	  concepts	  and	  real-­‐world	  things,	  in	  my	  case	  religion	   in	   international	  relations.	   In	   the	   following	  sections,	   I	  will	  present	  the	   setting	   for	   the	   forthcoming	   analysis,	   and	   will	   introduce	   the	   two	   individuals	  whose	  life	  and	  work	  will	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  analysis.	  	  	  
Becoming	  Muslim	  Pakistan	  and	  Jewish	  Israel	  	  Late	  November	  in	  1947,	  the	  recently	  founded	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  was	  voting	  on	  the	  ”Palestine	   Question”.	   The	   future	   of	   the	   former	   British	   Mandate	   had	   been	   under	  investigation	   since	   spring	   that	   year,	   and	   different	   sub-­‐committees	   of	   the	   United	  Nations	   Special	   Committee	   on	   Palestine	   (UNSCOP)	   had	   presented	   their	  recommendations	   regarding	   partition	   and	   the	   possibilities	   of	   establishing	   an	  independent	   ”Jewish	   state	   of	   Israel”.	   Although	   the	  majority	   proposal	   had	   been	   in	  favor	  of	  partition	  and	  Israeli	  independence,	  few	  believed	  that	  the	  proposal	  would	  be	  able	  to	  unite	  the	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  votes	  necessary	  to	  pass	  the	  recommendation.	  The	  Pakistani	  representative	  Muhammad	  Zafrullah	  Khan,	  who	  had	  led	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	  partition	  plan	  and	  Israeli	  independence,	  even	  spoke	  of	  it	  as	  the	  ”mutilation	  of	  a	  living	  body”.408	  Against	  this	  background	  of	  opposition	  and	  expectation	  of	  failure,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  407	  Levine	  2012:	  102.	  408	  A/AC.14/32,	  p.	  45,	  Report	  of	  the	  Sub-­‐Committee	  2,	  11	  Nov.	  1947.	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vote	   cast	   confirmed	   the	   partition	   plan	   and	   envisioned	   recognizing	   Israeli	  independence	  in	  spring	  1948.	  	  	  Pakistan	  had	  been	  recognized	  only	  a	  few	  months	  earlier,	  in	  August	  1947,	  gaining	  its	  independence	   together	  with	   India	   after	   almost	   two	   hundred	   years	   of	   British	   rule.	  Together	  with	   the	   party	   of	   the	   All-­‐India	  Muslim	   League,	   the	   same	   Zafrullah	   Khan	  had	  argued	  for	  an	  independent	  ”Homeland”	  for	  British	  Indian	  Muslims	  in	  Pakistan,	  separated,	   as	   it	   were,	   along	   lines	   of	   ”religious	   difference”	   from	   its	   non-­‐Muslim	  Indian	  neighbor.	  During	  the	  fall	  of	  1947,	  he	  found	  himself	  in	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	   the	  UN	   arguing	   against	   the	   prospects	   of	   a	   future	   state	  with	  prima	   facie	   similar	  lines	   of	   demarcation,	   namely	   those	   between	   Jewish	   and	   non-­‐Jewish	   communities.	  The	  borders	  of	   the	   future	   ”Jewish	  state”	  had	  been	  –	  and	  would	  continue	   to	  be	  –	  a	  subject	  of	  great	  controversy,	  but	  the	  categories	  in	  which	  these	  questions	  were	  cast	  were	  those	  assuming	  a	  separation	  between	  Jewish	  and	  non-­‐Jewish	  populations,	  land	  and	  property.	  	  	  As	   I	   previously	   pointed	   out,	   the	   cases	   pf	   Pakistan	   and	   Israel	   are	   not	  meant	   to	   be	  compared,	   but	   rather	   function	   as	   an	   illustration	   of	   two	   historically	   parallel	  processes	   of	   international	   recognition	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   decolonialization	  process	   after	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   Both	   gained	   their	   independence	   through	  partition	   from	   their	   neighbors,	   largely	   according	   to	   differences	   in	   religious	  denomination:	   Pakistan	   was	   the	   ”Muslim	   Homeland”	   that	   had	   been	   parted	   from	  non-­‐Muslim	   India,	   while	   Israel	   was	   the	   ”Jewish	   National	   Home”	   that	   had	   been	  carved	  out	  of	   its	  non-­‐Jewish	  surroundings.	  This	  seems	   like	  a	  perfect	   illustration	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  we	  should	  recognize	  religion	  in	  international	  relations.	  Religion,	  one	   could	   put	   it,	   is	   at	   the	   very	   center	   of	   these	   partition	   processes,	   and	   therefore	  absolutely	   central	   to	   the	   creation,	   authorization	   and	   legitimization	   of	   new	  international	   actors.	   However,	   the	   thesis	   has	   thus	   far	   argued	   the	   contrary.	  Recognition	  of	  religion	  would,	  instead,	  reify	  it	  and	  the	  agents	  and	  orders	  arising	  in	  its	  name.	   It	  would	  depoliticize	  the	  process	  by	  which	  religion	  became	  recognizable,	  intelligible	   and	   differentiated	   as	   a	   clearly	   defined	   entity,	   and	   it	   would	   sideline	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alternatives	   to	   it.	   Rather	   than	   recognizing	   religion	   in	   international	   relations,	   I	  argued	   for	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   religion	   became	  recognizable	  as	  a	  differentiated	  and	  differentiable	  point	  of	  reference	  –	  a	  concept,	  an	  identity,	  a	  state	  –	  to	  begin	  with.	  	  	  	  	  
Reginald	  Coupland	  and	  Muhammad	  Zafrullah	  Khan	  
	  
	  As	  Beit	  Professor	  of	  Imperial	  History	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Oxford,	  Reginald	  Coupland	  was	   sent	   to	   Palestine	   in	   1936	   with	   the	   Royal	   –	   ”Peel”	   –	   Commission	   in	   order	   to	  investigate	   the	   underlying	   reasons	   for	   the	   recurring	   violence	   under	   the	   British	  Mandate.	   Coupland	   had	   previously	   studied	   the	   unification	   of	   nationalities	   within	  Britain,	  and	  national	  conflicts	  within	   the	  Empire	  –	  Canada,	  South	  Africa	  and	  as,	  an	  editor	   of	   the	   influential	   imperial	   journal,	   The	   Round	   Table,	   the	   partitioning	   of	  Ireland	   –	   a	   legacy	   which	   meant	   that	   he	   left	   for	   Palestine	   with	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  authority	  on	  the	  matters	  concerned.409	  Although	  the	  report	  he	  eventually	  wrote	  for	  the	  commission	  was	  not	  the	  first	  to	  suggest	  a	  territorial	  solution	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  conflict,	  the	  ”Peel”	  report	  was	  the	  first	  conclusive	  official	  British	  document	  arguing	  for	   the	   full	   partition	   of	   Palestine.	   Ten	   years	   later,	   in	   1947,	   the	   report	   became	   the	  foundational	  document	  for	  the	  partition	  plan	  for	  Palestine	  that	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  UN.410	  Four	   years	   after	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   Peel	   report,	   in	   1941,	   Coupland	  was	  sent	   to	  British	   India	  where	  he	  was	  given	  a	  similar	   task,	  being	  asked	   to	   investigate	  the	   prospects	   of	   constitutional	   change	   and	   the	   possibilities	   of	   partition.	   Despite	  distinct	   similarities	   in	   his	   analysis	   of	   the	   Palestine	   and	   Indian	   situations411,	   he	  rejected	  the	  latter’s	  claims	  to	  partition.	  Both	  in	  Palestine	  and	  India,	  Coupland	  was	  in	  close	  contact	  to	  the	  proponents	  and	  architects	  of	  partition	  to	  come.412	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  409	  Coupland	  1917a,	  1917b,	  1925.	  410	  Sinanoglou	  2009,	  2010;	  Dubnov	  forthcoming;	  Klieman	  1980;	  Fraser	  1988.	  411	  See	  Coupland’s	  publications:	  The	  Indian	  Problem	  1933-­‐1935;	  Indian	  Politics:	  1936-­‐1942,	  and	  The	  Future	  of	  India:	  Report	  on	  the	  constitutional	  Problem	  in	  India	  (Coupland	  1942a,	  1942b,	  1943).	  412	  During	  his	  stay	  in	  Palestine	  from	  November	  1936	  to	  January	  1937,	  Coupland	  had	  a	  close	  dialogue	  with	  Chaim	  Weizmann	  and	  other	  representatives	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  (Dubnov	  forthcoming	  33,	  40).	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  The	   Pakistani	   representative	   at	   the	   UN,	   Muhammad	   Zafrullah	   Khan,	   led	   the	  opposition	  to	  the	  Palestine	  partition	  plan	   in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Special	  Committee	  on	   Palestine	   (UNSCOP),	   and	   later	   in	   the	   General	   Assembly,	   until	   its	   vote	   on	  November	   29,	   1947.	   Soon	   to	   be	   appointed	   the	   first	   foreign	  minister	   of	   the	   newly	  established	   state,	   Khan	   had	   a	   long	   track	   record	   of	   representative	   functions	   under	  the	   British	   Raj.	   From	   1935	   until	   1941,	   he	   represented	   the	   Indian	  Muslims	   at	   the	  British	   Indian	   Viceroy’s	   Executive	   Council,	   and	   led	   the	   Indian	   delegation	   to	   the	  League	  of	  Nations	   in	  1939.	  He	  presided	  over	   the	  Muslim	  League,	   and	   took	  part	   in	  drafting	  its	  Lahore	  Resolution	  in	  1940,	  which	  proclaimed	  the	  Muslim	  League’s	  claim	  to	   Pakistan	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   Further,	   he	   represented	   the	   Muslim	   League	   in	   the	  Radcliffe	   Punjabi	   Boundary	   Commission	   in	   drawing	   the	   India-­‐Pakistani	   border	   in	  the	  spring	  of	  1947.	  Some	  weeks	  after	  Pakistani	  independence,	  and	  three	  weeks	  after	  granted	  membership	   to	   the	  UN,	  Khan	   led	   the	  opposition	   to	   the	  Palestine	  partition	  plan	  as	  chair	  and	  secretary	  of	  a	  Sub-­‐Committee	  of	  the	  UNSCOP	  investigating	  Israel’s	  claims	  to	  independence.	  	  	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  will	  analyze	  Coupland	  and	  Khan’s	  parts	  in	  the	  process	  of	  ensuring	  that	  the	  “Muslim	  Homeland”	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  “Jewish	  National	  Home”	  of	  Israel	  became	  recognizable	  as	  such.	  In	  the	  vocabulary	  used	  thus	  far,	  an	  attempt	  has	  been	  made	  to	  to	  describe	  the	  becoming	  of	  two	  versions	  of	  two	  “beings”	  of	  religion	  –	  Muslim	  and	  Jewish	  –	   in	  order	  to	  allow	  their	  truth-­‐claims	  balance	  each	  other.	   I	  will	  approach	  Coupland	  through	  his	  writing	  of	  the	  Peel	  report	  on	  Palestine	  in	  1936/37	  and	  his	  work	  on	  India	  in	  1941,	  published	  1942/43.	  Khan	  is	  read	  through	  his	  work	  on	   the	   Indian	   Boundary	   Commission	   in	   1947	   and	   in	   the	   UNSCOP	   Committee	   on	  Palestine	  later	  the	  same	  year.	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   it	   is	   unclear	   as	   to	   Weizmann’s	   influence	   over	   the	   report’s	   final	   form,	   the	   intimate	   contact	  between	   the	   two	   men	   and	   Weizmann’s	   heavy	   lobbying	   in	   London	   would	   have	   helped	   reassure	  Coupland	  of	   the	   desirability	   of	   partition	   (Weizmann	   to	  W.	  Baer,	   Zurich,	   27	   June	  1937,	  Letters	   and	  Papers,	  vol.	  XVIII,	  124-­‐5;	  Sinanglou	  2010:	  126;	  Fraser	  1988:	  665).	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Reginald	  Coupland,	  Palestine	  and	  the	  Peel	  commission	  	  	  The	   Palestine	   Royal	   –	   “Peel”	   –	   commission	   had	   been	   sent	   out	   to	   analyze	   the	  escalation	  in	  violence	  in	  Palestine	  and,	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  this,	  the	  broader	  conflict	  in	  the	  Mandate	  that	  had	  increased	  in	  intensity	  over	  the	  previous	  years.	  It	  was	  a	  conflict	  between	   the	   claim	  of	   a	   Jewish	  population	  –	  which	  had	  been	  promised	  a	   ”National	  Home”	  in	  Palestine	  by	  the	  British	  in	  the	  1917	  Balfour	  Declaration,413	  and	  later	  in	  the	  Mandate	   through	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   –	   and	   an	   Arab	   population	   whose	  independence	   had	   been	   assured	   to	   them	   by	   the	   same	   British	   in	   return	   for	   their	  support	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War.414	  	  	  For	  Coupland,	  the	  conflict	  in	  Palestine	  was,	  at	  the	  ”core	  of	  the	  case	  …	  political	  …	  Nor	  is	   the	  conflict	   in	   its	  essence	  an	   interracial	  conflict,	  arising	   from	  any	  old	   instinctive	  antipathy	   of	   Arabs	   towards	   Jews	   …	   It	   is,	   as	   elsewhere,	   the	   problem	   of	   insurgent	  nationalism”. 415 	  The	   tensions	   between	   Arabs	   and	   Jews	   had	   emerged	   between	  conflicting	   national	   claims,	   and	   therefore,	   in	   the	   end,	   this	   was	   a	   political	   conflict.	  There	  was	  no	  doubt	  in	  his	  mind	  that	  it	  was	  a	  complicated	  issue	  –	  “a	  conflict	  between	  right	  and	  right”	  –	  one	  that	  had	  hardened	  through	  the	  persistent	  use	  of	  violence.	   It	  was,	  however,	  a	  political	  conflict,	  and	  as	  such,	  subject	  to	  a	  political	  solution.	  	  While	   the	   conflict,	   to	   Coupland,	   was	   political,	   the	   groups	   inhabiting	   this	   conflict,	  were	   not.	   The	   Jews	   and	   the	   Arabs	   were	   fundamentally	   different.	   They	   were	   two	  different	   ”races”,	  or	   ”nations”,	  which	  had	  different	   religions	  and	  different	  cultures.	  The	  “culture	  of	  Arab	  Palestine	  …	  born	  as	  it	  is	  of	  Asia,	  it	  had	  little	  kinship	  with	  that	  of	  the	   National	   Home,	   which,	   though	   it	   is	   linked	   with	   ancient	   Jewish	   tradition,	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  413	  ”His	  Majesty’s	  Government	  view	   in	   favour	   the	  establishment	   in	  Palestine	  of	   a	  National	  Home	  of	  the	   Jewish	   people,	   and	  will	   use	   their	   best	   endeavors	   to	   facilitate	   the	   achievement	   to	   the	   object,	   it	  being	  clearly	  understood	  that	  nothing	  shall	  be	  done	  which	  may	  prejudice	  the	  civil	  and	  religious	  rights	  of	  exiting	  non-­‐Jewish	  communities	  in	  Palestine”	  (Letter	  from	  Mr.	  Balfour,	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  affairs,	  to	  Lord	  Rothschild,	  November	  2,	  1917,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration).	  414	  H.	   McMahon’s	   pledge	   to	   the	   Sheriff	   of	   Mecca,	   1915/1916,	   original	   in	   Arabic,	   English	   version	  quoted	  in:	  Palestine:	  Legal	  Arguments	  Likely	  to	  be	  Advanced	  by	  Arab	  Representatives,	  Memorandum	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (Lord	  Halifax),	  January	  1939,	  UK	  National	  Archives,	  CAB	  24/282,	  CP	  19	  (39).	  415	  Palestine	  Royal	  Commission,	  “Peel”	  Report	  1937:	  131.	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predominantly	  a	  culture	  of	  the	  West.	  Nowhere,	  indeed,	  is	  the	  gulf	  between	  the	  races	  more	   obvious.”416	  While	   the	   roots	   of	   the	   Arab	   “race”	   are	   not	   further	   defined,	   the	  particularity	   of	   the	   Jewish	   ”race”	  was	   a	   ”historical	   fact”.	   As	   early	   as	   “1100	  BC	   the	  Israelites	  …	  were	  already	  distinguishable	   from	  the	  peoples	  of	   the	  coast	  …	  by	   their	  peculiar	  religion”.417	  	  However,	  while	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  groups	  was	  fundamental,	  they	  were	  not,	  as	   such,	   incompatible.	   There	   was	   no	   ”zero-­‐sum	   game”	   between	   these	   ”nations”,	  ”races”	   or	   ”religions”.	   The	   British	   Commonwealth	   had	   been	   able	   to	   accommodate	  multiple	   national	   claims	  within	   one	   single	   political	   community,	   and	   there	  was,	   in	  theory,	   nothing	   that	   should	   hinder	   Palestine	   from	   going	   down	   that	   same	   path.	   In	  spite	  of	  the	  rock-­‐hard	  boundaries	  around	  the	  groups,	  there	  was	  no	  incompatibility,	  as	  such,	  between	  them.	  While	  it	  ”had	  long	  been	  obvious	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  cultural	  ‘assimilation’	  between	  Arab	  and	  Jew	  is	  a	  phantasy”418,	  there	  was	  nothing,	  in	  theory,	  standing	   in	   the	   way	   of	   political	   accommodation.	   The	   overcoming	   of	   the	   conflict	  would,	   therefore,	   amount	   to	   working	   across	   these	   boundaries,	   not	   modifying	   or	  questioning	  the	  boundaries	  themselves.	  	  While	  ”politics	  had	  begun	  to	  play	  their	  part	  in	  alliance	  with	  religion	  …	  ”In	  Palestine,	  as	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   Moslem	   world,	   nationalism	   had	   been	   more	   political	   than	  religious”.419	  The	   same	   was	   true	   for	   the	   Jews,	   where	   ”Zionism,	   in	   fact,	   is	   Jewish	  nationalism,	   and	   like	   nationalism	   elsewhere	  …	   its	   driving	   force	   is	   political	   rather	  than	  religious.”420	  	  Rather	  than	  arising	  from	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  ”religions”,	  ”civilizations”	  or	  ”races”,	  the	   antagonism	   between	   Jews	   and	   Arabs,	   according	   to	   Coupland,	   was	   ”a	   conflict	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.	  2.	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.	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[that]	   had	   been	   created	   between	   two	   national	   ideals”.421 	  The	   reasons	   for	   the	  emerging	  violence	  were	  ”obvious	  …	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  National	  Home	  [as	  the]	  blank	  negation	  of	  the	  rights	  implied	  in	  the	  principle	  of	  national	  self-­‐government	  [for	  the	  Arabs].”	  As	  “the	  National	  Home	  has	  grown	  the	  fear	  has	  grown	  with	  it	  that,	  if	  and	  when	   self-­‐government	   is	   conceded,	   it	  may	   not	   be	   national	   in	   the	   Arab	   sense,	   but	  government	  by	  a	  Jewish	  majority.”422	  	  	  The	  conflict	  between	  the	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  population	  did	  not	  arise	  out	  of	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game	  by	  two	  incompatible	  ”races”,	  but	  rather	  due	  to	  the	  competing	  claims	  of	  Zionist	  and	  Arab	  nationalisms.	  These	  claims	  had	  concretized	   into	  a	  hardened	  conflict	   line,	  and	  were	  spurred	  on	  by	  a	  fear	  of	  minority	  subjugation.	  That	  is,	  a	  conflict	  that	  was,	  in	  the	  beginning,	  not	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game,	  had	  been	  turned	  into	  one,	  as	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  respective	  nationalisms	  became	  seen	  as	  increasingly	  incompatible.	  The	  antagonism	  had	   hardened	   until,	   at	   the	   point	  when	   Coupland	  was	  writing,	   ”nobody	   ...	   [would]	  venture	  …	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  Arabs	  and	  the	  Jews.”423	  To	  describe	  what	  the	  conflict	   had	   become,	   Coupland	   drew	   on	   accounts	   from	   the	   ground.	   ”To	   quote	   the	  Arab	  delegates	  of	  1922	  again,	   ’Nature	  does	  not	  allow	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  spirit	  of	  co-­‐operation	   between	   two	   people	   so	   different.’”.424	  In	   the	   end,	   the	   Peel	   report	   and	  Coupland	   stated	   that,	   a	   conflict	   that	   would	   have	   been	   possible	   to	   solve	   within	   a	  single	  state,	  had	  hardened	  its	  conflict	  lines	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  partition	  along	  these	  very	  lines	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  only	  feasible	  response	  to	  the	  constant	  violence.425	  	  Although	   partition	   seemed	   inevitable	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Palestine,	   it	   was	   not	  unproblematic.	  The	  largest	  difficulty	  was	  the	  minorities	  left	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  new	  border.	   “The	   existence	   of	   these	   minorities	   clearly	   constitutes	   the	   most	   serious	  hindrance	   to	   the	   smooth	   and	   successful	   operation	   of	   Partition.	   The	   ’Minority	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Problem’	   [was	   one	   of	   the]	   intractable	   products	   of	   post-­‐war	   nationalism.” 426	  Reflecting	   the	   view	   of	   this	   being	   a	   political	   conflict	   between	   essentially	   different	  ”races”,	   Coupland	   suggested	   that	   the	   minority	   problem	   could	   be	   solved	   by	  population	   exchange.	   An	   example	   could	   be	   found	   in	   the	   exchange	   of	   population	  between	   Greece	   and	   Turkey	   in	   the	   1920s:	   ”Before	   the	   operation	   the	   Greek	   and	  Turkish	  minorities	  had	  been	  a	   constant	   irritant.	  Now	   the	  ulcer	  has	  been	  clean	  cut	  out,	  and	  Greco-­‐Turkish	  relations,	  we	  understand,	  are	  friendlier	  than	  they	  have	  ever	  been	   before.”427	  The	   ”irritated”	   relationship	   between	   the	   ”Greek	   nationals	   of	   the	  Orthodox	  religion”	  and	   the	   ”Turkish	  nationals	  of	   the	  Moslem	  religion”428	  had	  been	  solved	  by	  a	  clean,	  simple	  and	  accurate	  surgical	  operation.	  The	  medical	  metaphor	  of	  extracting	   the	   ”ulcer”	   of	   alien	   minorities	   confirms	   the	   view	   of	   these	   ”nations”,	  ”races”	  or	  ”religions”	  as	  homogenous	  entities	  that	  could	  be	  plucked	  away	  for	  sake	  of	  the	  health	  of	   the	   larger	  organism.	  While	  not	  necessarily	  problematic	  as	  such,	  once	  the	   “ulcer”	   became	   ”irritated”	   it	   needed	   to	   be	   removed.	   This	   ”irritation”	   was,	   in	  itself,	  not	  inevitable,	  but	  when	  left	  to	  fester	  long	  enough,	  had	  to	  be	  taken	  care	  of.429	  	  	  In	   Palestine,	   Coupland	   saw	  an	   Israeli	   state	   taking	   shape	   as	   a	   political	   claim	  by	   an	  essentially	   homogenous	   Jewish	   group. 430 	  The	   Jews	   could	   be	   measured	   and	  accounted	  for,	  referring	  to	  the	  estimates	  made	  in	  the	  1931	  census,	  and	  the	  territory,	  that	   this	   group	  had	  purchased	  until	   the	  date	   of	   partition.	  The	   recommendation	  of	  the	  Peel	  report	  continued	  to	  suggest	  an	  absolute	  halt	  of	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  Arab	  territory	   until	   the	   date	   of	   partition.	   Once	   published	   in	   July	   1937,	   the	   British	  government	   officially	   endorsed	   the	   report,	   but	   its	   partition	   proposal	   was	  undermined	  by	   the	  Woodhead	  Commission’s	   report	  a	  year	   later,	  which	   found	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  426	  Peel	  Report:	  390,	  my	  brackets.	  427	  Ibid.	  390.	  428	  Ibid.	  390.	  429	  ”Seeing	  the	  intermingling	  of	  different	  ethnonational	  groups	  as	  a	  source	  of	  friction	  and	  a	  potential	  future	  war,	  the	  notion	  of	  population	  transfer	  –	  i.e.	  forced	  displacement	  of	  mass	  populations	  –	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  not	  only	  as	  a	   legitimate	   ’vaccine’	  but	  also	  as	  a	   ’progressive’	  solution	   for	  many	  of	   the	  crises	  taking	  place	  in	  Europe’s	  post-­‐dynastic	  backyard	  (…)	  compulsory	  resettlement	  of	  national	  minorities	  would	  be	  organized	  and	  regulated	  by	  international	  treaties.”	  (Dubnov	  forthcoming:	  26).	  430	  While	  homogenous	   in	   their	  cultural,	   racial	  and	  religious	  sense,	   there	  was	  no	  question	  regarding	  the	  political	  heterogeneity.	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the	   Jewish	   state	  would	   contain	   an	   Arab	  minority	   amounting	   to	   49	   per	   cent	   of	   its	  total	   population.431	  The	   initial	   limited	   impact	   of	   the	   report	   and	   its	   partition	   plan,	  however,	  did	  not	  undermine	  its	  authority	  as	  it	  featured	  as	  the	  blueprint	  for	  the	  UN’s	  Palestine	  partition	  plan	  ten	  year	  later.432	  	  	  
Coupland,	  British	  India	  and	  the	  claim	  to	  Pakistan	  
	  Four	  years	  after	   the	  publication	  of	   the	  Peel	   report,	   in	  1941,	  Coupland	  was	  sent	   to	  British	   India	   to	   analyze	   the	   constitutional	   problem	   in	   India	   on	   behalf	   of	   Nuffield	  College,	  Oxford,	  with	  which	  he	  was	  affiliated.	  His	  writings	  concerning	  India	  contain	  a	  parallel	  structure	  to	  that	  the	  Peel	  Report,	  giving	  a	  long	  survey	  of	  the	  history	  of	  India,	  before	   moving	   into	   the	   political	   impasse	   he	   was	   sent	   to	   analyze,	   and	   lastly	  concluding	   with	   recommendations	   for	   the	   future.	   Similarly	   to	   his	   position	   on	  Palestine,	   the	   conflict	   in	   British	   India	   was	   seen	   as	   one	   between	   competing	  nationalisms,	  and	  therefore	  presented	  a	  political	  problem.	  While	  in	  Palestine,	  these	  competing	   nationalisms	   had	   plunged	   into	   an	   irreversible	   conflict,	   Pakistani	  nationalism	  was	  relatively	  new	  and	  was	  therefore	  possible	  to	  modify.	  The	  “doctrine	  of	  Partition	  has	  been	  preached	  for	  so	  short	  a	  time	  that	  Moslem	  convictions	  about	  it	  can	  hardly	  yet	  have	  been	  set	  in	  an	  unbreakable	  mold“.433	  	  	  As	   in	   Palestine,	   these	   nationalisms	   were	   tied	   to	   groups	   who	   were	   essentially	  different.	   Coupland’s	   work	   continued	   the	   logic	   of	   previous	   reports.434	  The	   groups	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  431	  Cmd.	  5854;	  See	  also	  UN	  doc.:	  A/364:	  39.	  432 	  Arie	   Dubnov’s	   account	   of	   the	   intellectual	   history	   of	   Coupland	   presents	   the	   paradox	   in	  accommodating	   his	   firm	  belief	   in	   the	   need	   to	   partition	  Palestine	  with	   his	   aim	   for	   unity	  within	   the	  British	   Commonwealth.	   The	   paradox,	   however,	   disappears	   once	   viewed	   through	   a	   federal	  escatological	  framework,	  that	  is,	  an	  understanding	  that	  only	  by	  gaining	  separate	  nation-­‐states	  would	  the	  Jews	  and	  the	  Arabs	  be	  able	  to	  overcome	  their	  idiosyncracies	  and	  become	  a	  part	  of	  the	  unity	  in	  the	  Commonwealth	   of	   Nations.	   Since	   the	   transnational	   and	   comparative	   thinking	  was	   influential	   with	  Coupland	   and	  many	   of	   his	   contemporaries,	   the	   Palestinian	   solution	   of	   partition	   should	   have	   been	  suggested	  in	  the	  Indian	  case	  as	  well.	  	  433	  Coupland	  1943:	  18;	  75	  434	  	  Referring	  to	  Lord	  Durham’s	  report	  from	  1912,	  Coupland	  quotes	  „I	  found	  two	  nations	  warring	  in	  the	  bosom	  of	  a	  single	  state,	  I	  found	  a	  struggle	  not	  of	  principles	  but	  of	  races	  ...	  every	  contest	  ...	  has	  run	  its	  course.“	  (ii;	  53)	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were	  made	   up	   of	   “two	   sharply	   contrasted	   …	   social	   systems,	   the	   ways	   of	   life	   and	  thought,	  they	  have	  inspired.	  Hinduism	  has	  its	  primeval	  roots	  in	  a	  land	  of	  rivers	  and	  forests,	  Islam	  in	  the	  desert.”435	  He	  went	  on	  to	  contrast	  the	  monotheism	  of	  Islam	  with	  the	  different	  manifestations	  of	  Hindu	  divinity,	  the	  simplicity	  of	  the	  mosque	  with	  the	  rich	  imagery	  of	  the	  temple,	  the	  equality	  of	  Islam	  with	  the	  Hindu	  caste	  system,	  Arabic	  and	   Persian	   as	   the	   classical	   language	   of	   the	   one	   as	   against	   the	   Sanskrit	   of	   the	  other.436	  It	   was	   an	   analysis	   of	   Indian	   development,	   which	   ran	   very	   closely	   to	   the	  “Two	  Nation”	   theory,	   a	   theory	   that	   had	   become	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  Muslim	   League’s	  case	  for	  Pakistan	  a	  few	  years	  earlier.437	  	  	  However,	  while	  Coupland	  had	  been	  rather	  clear	  regarding	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  conflict	  and	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  the	  groups	  behind	  the	  claims	  in	  the	  Peel	   report,	   he	  was	  more	   ambivalent	   in	   the	   case	   of	   India.	   Here,	   the	   nationalisms	  were	   younger,	   and	   the	   rift	   between	   them	   not	   as	   far-­‐reaching	   or	   long-­‐lasting.	  Partition,	   therefore,	   did	   not	   seem	   as	   necessary	   as	   between	   Jews	   and	   Arabs	   but	   a	  one-­‐state	  solution	  could	  –	  and	  should	  –	  be	  aimed	  for.438	  	  	  While	  the	  political	  conflict	  between	  Hindu	  and	  Muslim	  nationalisms	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  sedimented	  itself	  into	  an	  unbridgeable	  abyss,	  the	  conflict	  was	  complicated	  by	  the	  way	   in	  which	   religion	   seemed	   to	   have	   infiltrated	   it.	  While	   the	   Jews	   and	   Arab	  Muslims	   in	   Palestine	   were	   fundamentally	   different,	   an	   accommodation	   of	   both	  ”races”	  would	  have	  been	  possible.	  In	  India,	  Coupland	  registered	  a	  stronger	  influence	  of	  religion	   into	  the	  very	  core	  of	   the	  conflict,	  hindering	   its	  solution.	  He	  writes,	   ”Not	  until	   this	   religious	   group-­‐consciousness	   has	   been	   eclipsed,	   as	   it	   has	   long	   been	   in	  most	  Western	  countries,	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  allegiance	   to	  some	  other	  kind	  of	  group	  will	  Indian	  politics	  cease	   to	  be	  dominated	  by	  religious	  differences.”439	  The	  reference	   to	  ”Muslims”	   –	   and	   their	   difference	   to	   the	   “non-­‐Muslims”	   –	   represented	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  435	  Coupland	  1942a	  31;	  Coupland	  1943:	  16.	  436	  Coupland	  1942a:	  Chapter	  3,	  see	  also	  Fraser	  1988	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis.	  437	  Ibid.	  438	  Coupland	  1943:	  100-­‐110.	  439	  Ibid.	  16.	  
	   149	  
amalgamation	  of	  race,	  nation,	  culture	  and	  civilization,	  religion	  itself,	  and	  seemed	  to	  undermine	   rational	   thinking,	   thereby	   preventing	   a	   political	   solution	   to	   a	   political	  conflict.	  	  	  What	   Coupland	   saw	   as	   a	   political	   conflict	   between	   competing	   nationalisms	   had	  taken	  on	  a	  religio-­‐cultural	  color.	  This	  needed	  to	  be	  overcome	  in	  order	  to	  return	  to	  the	   political	   nature	   of	   the	   conflict	   and	   the	   possibility	   to	   solve	   it	   politically.	   It	   had	  been	  overcome	   in	  Europe,	  where	   it	  was	  a	   remnant	  of	   the	  past.	  Also,	   in	   the	  newer	  versions	  of	  nationalism	  growing	   in	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  Muslim	  world,	   this	   reference	   to	  religion	  no	  longer	  represented	  the	  prevailing	  practice.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  Pakistani	  claim	   to	   independence	   through	  partition,	  Coupland	  wrote,	   ”There	   is	  another	  point	  on	  which	  the	  ideology	  of	  Partition	  seems	  out	  of	  date.	  The	  nationalism	  it	  preaches	  is	  based	   on	   religion.	   It	   is	   because	   they	   are	   Moslems	   that	   the	   Moslems	   of	   India	   are	  entitled	  to	  political	   independence	  …	  Yet	   in	   inverting	  the	  dictum	  of	  Cujus	  regio,	  ejus	  
religio,	   in	   looking	   forward	   to	   creating	   a	   political	   nexus	   between	   Pakistan	   and	   the	  Moslem	  countries	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  (…)	  are	  not	  the	  Partitionist	  inviting	  a	  repetition	  of	   what	   happened	   twenty	   years	   ago?	   If	   Panislamism	   was	   dead	   then,	   can	   it	   be	  resuscitated	  now?“	  He	  continues	   that	   it	   is	   in	   this	   “character	  of	   its	  nationalism	  that	  the	  doctrines	  of	  Partition	  seems	  reactionary.“440	  	  While	  the	  conflict,	  as	  in	  Palestine,	  was	  political,	  it	  seemed	  in	  Pakistan	  more	  muddled	  with	   “religion”.	   Interestingly,	   where	   Coupland	   analyzed	   the	   ”Hindu-­‐Moslem	  antagonism”	  he	  drew	  an	  analogy	  between	  the	  recurrent	  religious	  riots	  in	  Belfast	  and	  those	   in	   India,	   “the	   old-­‐standing	   quarrel	   between	   Catholics	   and	   Protestants	   in	  Ulster“	  having	  “similar	  features	  with	  the	  Hindu-­‐Moslem	  quarrel	  in	  India“.	  However,	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  conflicts	  ”aris[e]	  from	  a	  difference	  of	  race,	  stiffened	  by	  a	  difference	  of	   religion“.441	  Tensions	   arising	   between	   Hindus	   and	   Muslims	   were	   therefore	   ”at	  root	  a	  cultural	  conflict“.442	  However,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Palestine,	  this	  “cultural	  conflict	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  440	  Ibid.	  106.	  441	  Coupland	  1943:	  15.	  442	  Ibid.	  16.	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is	  reinforced	  by	  political	  tradition.	  …	  It	  is	  this	  political	  aspect	  of	  the	  feud	  which	  now	  dominates	  all	  else,	  and	  the	  reason	  for	  that	  is	  crystal	  clear	  ...	  Religious	  peace	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Pax	  Britannica.	  Toleration	  was	  imposed	  by	  a	  neutral	  authority.	  However,	  the	  birth	  of	  Indian	  nationalism	  brought	  politics	  into	  the	  picture,	  and	  inevitably,	  almost	  automatically,	  Hindu-­‐Moslem	  antagonism	  grew	  with	   its	   growth	   ...	   it	   adopted	   from	  the	   outset	   the	   democratic	   ideology	   of	   the	   West.	   Crudely	   interpreted,	   democracy	  means	   the	   rule	   of	   the	   majority,	   and	   Indian	   Moslems	   were	   well	   aware	   that	   they	  numbered	   rather	   less	   than	   one-­‐quarter	   of	   the	   Indian	   people.”443	  The	   essentially	  political	  conflict	  of	  nationalism	  had	  taken	  on	  the	  color	  and	  the	  complications	  of	  the	  racial,	  religious,	  cultural	  differences	  prevailing	  within	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent.	  	  	  The	  minority	  question	  was,	  according	  to	  Coupland,	  inherent	  to	  nationalism.	  Further,	  as	  the	  Palestine	  and	  the	  Indian	  conflict	  were	  conflicts	  between	  nationalisms,	  it	  was	  only	  natural	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  minorities	  would	  emerge.	  The	  claims	  for	  Pakistan	  as	   a	   “Muslim	   Homeland“	   were	   therefore	   not	   simply	   interpreted	   to	   be	   claimed	   in	  respect	   of	   a	   “Muslim	   nation“,	   but	   rather	   in	   respect	   of	   a	   minority	   in	   fear	   of	  subjugation	   under	   the	   “rule	   of	   the	   Hindu	   Raj“,	   amplified	   by	   the	   Indian	   National	  Congress’	  “unitarian“	  and	  “totalitarian“	  tendencies.444	  While	  the	  Palestinian	  solution	  to	   the	   minority	   problem	   would	   be	   achieved	   by	   a	   surgical	   clean-­‐cut	   population	  exchange,	   the	   fear	   of	   the	   Indian	   Muslim	   minority	   and	   the	   connected	   national	  aspirations	   would,	   from	   Coupland’s	   perspective,	   have	   been	   able	   to	   be	  accommodated	   in	   a	   single	   Indian	   state.	   Not	   least	   due	   to	   the	   difficulties	   in	  transferring	  a	  population	  the	  size	  of	  the	  British	  Indian	  Muslim.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  443	  Ibid.	  16f.	  444There	  was	  no	  question	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Indian	  Muslims	  were	  a	  nation.	  „If	  a	  people	  feels	  itself	  to	  be	  a	  nation,	  it	  is	  one.	  And	  that	  most	  Indian	  Moslems	  or,	  at	  any	  rate,	  their	  leaders	  now	  feel	  that	  they	  are	   a	   nation	   is	   not	   in	   doubt.“(Coupland	   1943a:	   110).	   This	   differed	   from	   the	   picture	   of	   the	  Muslim	  League,	   with	   which	   Coupland	   otherwise	   had	   shared	   many	   assumptions.	   „Grounding	   itself	   on	   the	  principle	   of	   self-­‐determination	   as	   enunciated	   by	   the	   American	   president	   Woodrow	   Wilson,	   the	  essence	  of	  the	  AIML’s	  (All-­‐Indian	  Muslim	  League)	  demand	  was	  that	  by	  international	  standards	  Indian	  Muslims	  were	   not	   a	  minority	   but	   a	   nation	   entitled	   to	   exercise	   sovereignty	   over	   areas	  where	   they	  were	  in	  the	  majority.“	  (Jalal	  2013:	  8);	  see	  also	  Devji	  for	  an	  account	  on	  a	  non-­‐territorial	  understanding	  of	  the	  Muslim	  and	  Jewish	  nation	  (Devji	  2013).	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In	   short,	  while	   the	   political	   conflict	   in	   Palestine	   had	   come	   too	   far	   to	   allow	   for	   an	  accommodation	   of	   the	   essentially	   different	   Jews	   and	   Arabs,	   the	   religiously	  influenced	   political	   conflict	   in	   India	   still	   had	   the	   potential	   to	   be	   reversed.	   The	  “Muslim”	   and	   “Jewish”	   beings	   emerging	   underneath	   the	   spotlight	   onto	   Coupland	  were	   essentialist;	   the	   boundaries	   between	   the	   being	   of	   the	   “Muslim”	   and	   “non-­‐Muslim”	  or	  the	  “Jew”	  and	  “non-­‐Jew”	  were	  not	  to	  be	  transcended.	  In	  the	  Jewish	  case,	  religion	  was	   included	   in	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  other	   identitarian	  categories	  such	  as	  race	  or	  culture,	  and	  was	  not	  in	  itself	  politically	  problematic.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Indian	  Muslims,	   religion	   was	   a	   problem,	   and	   unless	   the	   religious	   consciousness	   was	  overcome,	  it	  would	  continue	  to	  hinder	  a	  political	  solution	  to	  an	  essentially	  political	  problem.	  	  	  
Muhammad	  Zafrullah	  Khan,	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  Radcliffe	  boundary	  Commission	  
	  While	  Coupland	  was	  still	   speaking	  within	  a	  colonial	   context,	  Muhammad	  Zafrullah	  Khan	  was	  addressing	  a	  much	  more	  profoundly	  international	  audience.	  As	  a	  lawyer	  under	  the	  British	  Raj,	  Zafrullah	  Khan	  had	  come	  to	  hold	  high	  representative	  positions	  for	  the	  British	  Indian	  Muslims	  on	  the	  Viceroy’s	  Executive	  Council,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  India	  as	   a	  whole	   at	   the	   League	   of	  Nations.	   After	   the	  British	  withdrawal,	   Zafrullah	  Khan	  represented	  Pakistan	  at	  the	  United	  Nations.	  A	  few	  weeks	  after	  his	  country	  attained	  membership,	  he	  was	  elected	  Chair	  and	  Secretary	  of	  Sub-­‐Committee	  2	  to	  the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Committee	  of	   the	  Palestinian	  Question.	  The	  Committee	  had	  been	  given	   the	   task	  of	  developing	   a	   detailed	   plan	   based	   on	   a	   Palestinian	   one-­‐state	   solution.	   Khan	   was	  thereby	  the	  head	  of	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	  Israeli	  independence	  claim.	  	  	  Only	  a	  few	  months	  earlier,	  Khan	  had	  represented	  the	  Muslim	  League	  at	  the	  Radcliffe	  Boundary	  Commission,	   negotiating	   the	   future	  border	  between	   India	   and	  Pakistan.	  This	  Muslim	  League	  had	  voiced	  its	  claim	  to	  Pakistan	  seven	  years	  earlier,	  in	  1940,	  in	  what	   has	   come	   to	   be	   known	   as	   the	   Lahore	   declaration.445	  Here,	   Muhammad	   Ali	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  445	  Jinnah	  1940.	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Jinnah,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Muslim	  League,	  had	  pointed	  out	  the	  incompatible	  differences	  between	   Muslims	   and	   Hindus.	   These,	   he	   said,	   "have	   two	   different	   religious	  philosophies,	   social	   customs,	   literatures.	  They	  neither	   inter-­‐marry,	  nor	  even	   inter-­‐dine.	  Indeed,	  they	  belong	  to	  different	  civilizations.	  Their	  views	  of	  this	  life	  and	  the	  life	  hereafter	   are	   different.	   The	  Muslims	   are	   not	   a	  minority	   as	   the	  word	   is	   commonly	  understood	  …	  Muslims	  are	  a	  nation	  according	  to	  any	  definition	  of	  the	  term,	  and	  they	  must	   have	   their	   homelands,	   their	   territory	   and	   their	   state.”446	  This	   ”Two-­‐Nation	  Theory”	  claimed	  that	  Muslims	  were	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  non-­‐Muslims,	  that	  they	  constituted	  a	  nation	  of	   their	  own	  and,	  as	  such,	  had	  a	  right	   to	  an	   independent	  state.	  	  	  While	   Khan’s	   demands	   for	   Pakistan	   were	   unmistakable,	   he	   did	   not	   refer	   to	   the	  language	   of	   two	   incompatible	   races,	   nations	   or	   religions	   in	   the	   same	   manner	   as	  Jinnah.	  Rather,	  once	  in	  the	  Radcliffe	  Boundary	  Commission,	  he	  spoke	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   Muslim	   majority	   in	   some	   regions	   of	   the	   subcontinent.447	  The	   numerical	  strength	  was	   to	  be	  ensured	  by	  use	  of	   the	  1941	  census,	  which,	   contested	   though	   it	  may	   have	   been,	   was	   the	   only	   viable	   measurement	   of	   the	   population.	   Further,	  Zafrullah	  Khan,	   time	  and	  again,	   stated	   that	   the	   ”real	   reason”	   for	  partition	  was	  not	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  nations	  or	  races,	  or	  civilizations	  for	  that	  matter,	  but	  rather	  the	  economic	  disparity	  and	  exploitation	  of	  Muslims	  by	  Hindus	  and	  Sikhs	  under	  British	  rule.448	  Therefore,	   as	   a	   protection	   from	   further	   subjugation,	   a	   Muslim	   ”national	  home”	  was	  needed	  for	  the	  Muslim	  nation.	  	  	  
Khan,	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  the	  opposition	  to	  Israeli	  independence	  
	  A	   few	  weeks	   after	   Pakistani	   independence,	   in	  August	   1947,	   Khan	  was	   sent	   to	   the	  United	  Nations	  as	  it	  first	  representative.	  Soon,	  he	  was	  to	  lead	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	  partition	  of	  Palestine	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  Israel.	  However,	  despite	  Khan’s	  own	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  446	  Reprinted	  in	  Gwyer	  and	  Appadorai,:441ff.	  447	  Partition	  of	  the	  Punjab	  (Sadullah	  1983):	  254ff.	  448	  Partition	  of	  the	  Punjab	  (Sadullah	  	  1983):	  405.	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caution	  in	  arguing	  for	  Pakistan	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  a	  “Muslim	  nation”,	  these	  had	  been	  the	  officially	  recognized	  claims	  that	  had	  been	  put	  forward	  as	  underpinning	  Pakistani	   independence.	   At	   the	   negotiations	   in	   the	   Ad	   Hoc	   Committee	   on	   the	  Palestine	   Question	   and	   the	   General	   Assembly,	   Khan’s	   resistance	   to	   Israeli	  independence	  was	  questioned.	  How	  was	  the	  Israeli	  claim	  in	  any	  way	  different	  from	  that	  of	  Pakistan?	  In	  which	  way	  was	  a	  Jewish	  National	  Home	  different	  from	  a	  Muslim	  National	  Home?	  	  Responding,	  Khan	  pointed	   to	   the	  Pakistani	  Muslims’	  connection	   to	   the	   land.	  While	  they	  were	  indigenous	  to	  their	  country,	  the	  Palestinian	  Jews	  were	  not.	  Khan	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  Jewish	  narrative	  of	  the	  ancient	  connection	  with	  the	  land	  of	  Palestine.	  The	  Jews	  were	   immigrants	   to	   Palestine.	   Their	   numbers	   had	   grown	   extensively	   during	  recent	  years,449	  but	  their	  sheer	  numbers	  were	  not	  sufficient	  to	  legitimize	  a	  claim	  to	  political	  independence.450	  	  The	  Palestine	  Question	  was	  considered	  as	  urgent	  due	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  European	  Jews	   following	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   While	   pointing	   out	   his	   unquestionable	  sympathy	   for	   the	   refugees,451	  Khan	   insisted	   that	   the	   question	   of	   refugees	   and	  displaced	  persons	  was	  separate	  from	  claims	  concerning	  the	  political	  sovereignty	  of	  Israel.	  Jewish	  immigration	  had	  begun	  before	  the	  war,	  and	  had	  been	  authorized	  and	  regulated	  by	  the	  British	  Mandatory	  Power.	  The	  Mandate	  had	  been	  managed	  by	  the	  British	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  and	  had	  included	  two	  sets	  of	  –	  possibly	  contradictory	   –	   pledges	   and	   promises.	   First,	   a	   promise	   had	   been	   made	   for	   Arab	  independence	   in	   return	   for	   support	   rendered	   to	   the	  British	  War	  effort	  against	   the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  Germany.452	  This	  promise	  was	  unclear	  regarding	  the	  potential	  inclusion	  or	  exclusion	  of	  Palestine.	  Then,	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration	  of	  1917	  had	  stated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  449	  Legal	  and	   illegal	   immigration	   to	  Palestine	  had	  pushed	  the	   Jewish	  population	   in	   from	  174,600	   in	  1931	   to	   608,200	   in	   1946.	   The	   Arab	   population	   was	   estimated	   to	   have	   grown	   from	   693,000	   to	  1,076,700	  in	  the	  same	  time	  period	  (UNSCOP	  Report	  on	  Palestine	  A/364)	  450	  A/AC.14/32,	  Report	  by	  the	  Sub-­‐Committee	  2.	  451	  Palestine	  had	  received	  almost	  the	  equivalent	  number	  of	  refugees	  as	  every	  other	  state	  combined,	  and	  had	  no	  capacity	  to	  support	  continued	  mass	  immigration..	  452	  H.	  McMahon’s	  pledge	  to	  the	  Sheriff	  of	  Mecca,	  1915/1916,	  reprinted	  in:	  Laqueur/Rubin	  2008.	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British	   support	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   ”Jewish	   National	   Home”.	   This	   was	   another	  promise	   with	   vague	   edges,	   since	   it	   did	   not	   clarify	   whether	   this	   ”Home”	   was	   to	  emerge	  through	  statehood,	  or	  within	  a	  preexisting	  state.	  	  	  While	   the	  representatives	  of	   the	   Israeli	   independence	  claim	  –	   the	   Jewish	  Agency	  –	  saw	   no	   contradiction	   between	   these	   pledges,	   but	   rather	   a	   clear	   vow	   for	   a	   post-­‐mandatory	   Israeli	   state,	   Khan,	   with	   the	   representatives	   of	   Iraq,	   Egypt,	   Syria,	  Lebanon	   and	   Afghanistan,	   read	   the	   promise	   of	   a	   ”Jewish	   National	   Home”	   as	   a	  promise	   for	   a	   ”cultural	   centre”453	  that	   provided	   no	   foundation	   for	   any	   kind	   of	  political	   claims	   to	   independence.	   As	   this	   ”Jewish	   National	   Home”	   lacked	   a	   clear	  definition,	  it	  became	  a	  central	  point	  of	  disagreement.	  However,	  Khan	  argued	  that,	  no	  matter	  what	   the	   ”National	  Home”	  actually	  meant,	   the	  Balfour	  Declaration	  had	   tied	  its	   promise	   to	   a	   second	   sentence,	   namely	   that	   “it	   being	   clearly	   understood	   that	  nothing	  shall	  be	  done	  which	  may	  prejudice	  the	  civil	  and	  religious	  rights	  of	  existing	  non-­‐Jewish	  communities	  in	  Palestine”.	  The	  promotion	  of	  this	  Jewish	  National	  Home	  could	   not	   be	   allowed	   to	   infringe	   upon	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   indigenous	   population.	  Further,	  per	  Khan,	   the	  Mandatory	  Power	  was	  also	  obliged	   to	  protect	   the	  Mandate	  from	  ”control	  of	   the	  government	  of	  any	   foreign	  Power”.454	  Elevating	   the	  claim	  of	  a	  ”Jewish	  National	  Home”	   to	   the	   claim	   to	   a	   ”Jewish	   State”	  was	  nothing	   short	   of	   this	  kind	   of	   infringement,	   and	   the	   claiming	   of	   control	   by	   a	   Foreign	  Power.	   Even	   if	   the	  promise	   of	   the	   Balfour	   Declaration,	   and	   later	   the	  Mandate,	   to	   establish	   a	   ”Jewish	  National	   Home”	   in	   Palestine	   was	   indeed	   legitimate,	   that	   very	   Mandate	   would	   in	  itself	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  State	  in	  Palestine.	  	  	  When	   Khan	   was	   asked	   in	   the	   Ad	   Hoc	   Committee	   by	   Chaim	  Weizmann,	   again,	   to	  clarify	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  right	  of	  Pakistan	  to	  independence	  and	  the	  Israeli	  claim,	  his	  differentiation	  was	  a	  temporal	  one.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Indian	  Muslims,	  who	  had	   ”already	   been	   settled	   in	   India	   before	   the	   matter	   of	   partition	   came	   up	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  453	  A/AC.14/32,	  p.	  7,	  Report	  by	  the	  Sub-­‐Committee	  2.	  454	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  Mandate;	  A/AC.14/32,	  p	  15f,	  Report	  of	  the	  Sub-­‐Committee	  2,	  11	  November	  1947.	  
	   155	  
discussion”455	  the	   Jews	   were	   immigrants	   to	   Palestine.	   The	   claim	   of	   these	   non-­‐indigenous	   immigrants	   did	   not	   only	   go	   against	   the	   Covenant	   of	   the	   League	   of	  Nations	  and	  the	  Mandate,	  Khan	  argued,	  but	  it	  went	  counter	  to	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  UN.	  ”The	   United	   Nations	   cannot	   subscribe	   to	   the	   principle	   that	   a	   racial	   or	   religious	  minority	  …	  can	   insist	  upon	   the	  breaking	  up	  of	  a	  homeland	  or	  shatter	   the	  political,	  geographical,	  and	  economic	  unity	  of	  a	  country	  without	  the	  consent,	  and	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  majority.	  …	  [This]	  constitute[s]	  a	  dangerous	  precedent	  which	  might	  be	  adopted	   by	   dissident	   elements	   in	  many	   states	   and	   thus	   become	   a	   source	   both	   of	  internal	   conflict	   and	   international	   disorder.” 456 	  The	   sheer	   number	   of	   Jews	   in	  Palestine	  was	   not	   in	   itself	   sufficient	   to	   generate	   a	   political	   right	   to	   independence.	  The	  Arab	  majority	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  Palestine	  disposed	  of	  the	  right	  to	  decide	  over	  its	  own	  fate	  –	  of	  self-­‐determination	  –	  and	  not	  just	  a	  Jewish	  minority.	  	  	  Rather	  than	  acknowledging	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐rule	  by	  Jewish	  majority	  areas,	  as	  he	  had	  claimed	  for	  the	  Muslims	  of	  Pakistan,	  the	  “national	  Home”	  of	  the	  Jews	  could	  rather	  be	  accomplished	  by	   securing	   the	  600,000	   ”Jews	  already	   in	  Palestine	  …	  as	   a	  minority,	  complete	   religious,	   cultural,	   linguistic,	   educational	   and	   social	   freedom	   within	   the	  independent	  State	  of	  Palestine”.457	  Instead	  of	  granting	  the	  Jewish	  population	  a	  state,	  they	  would	  be	  protected	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  the	  national	  minorities	  in	  any	  other	  country,	  that	  is,	  through	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  number	  of	  rights.	  	  As	   in	   the	  negotiations	  of	   the	  Pakistani-­‐Indian	  border	  earlier	   that	   same	  year,	  Khan	  used	   the	   language	   of	   “race”,	   “civilization”,	   “nation”,	   or	   “religion”	   very	   scarcely	   in	  referring	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Jews.	  Much	  more	  frequent	  are	  references	  to	  the	  Jewish	  people,	   the	   Jewish	  minority,	  or	  simply	   Jews.	  The	  distinction	  between	  the	   Jews	  and	  the	  Arab	  “non-­‐Jews”	  was	  not	  framed	  as	  fundamental	  in	  the	  way	  Coupland	  conceived	  of	  the	  situation,	  nor	  were	  the	  two	  groups	  seen,	  as	  such,	  as	  incompatible.	  This	  careful	  vocabulary,	  however,	  was	  not	  without	  reason.	  Had	  Khan	  emphasized	  the	  difference	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and	  the	  ”racial”,	  ”religious”	  and	  in	  extension,	  the	  “national”	  specificity	  of	  the	  Jewish	  population,	   he	   would	   have	   prepared	   the	   ground	   for	   claims	   to	   independence	   on	  behalf	  of	  that	  very	  nation.	  Any	  similar	  iteration	  of	  the	  ”Two-­‐Nation	  Theory”	  that	  had	  constituted	  a	  foundation	  for	  the	  Pakistani	  claim	  to	  statehood,	  had	  to	  be	  avoided.	  The	  two	  peoples	  were,	   to	  Khan,	   not	   incompatible.	   There	  were	   ”no	   territorial	   frontiers	  between	  Jews	  and	  Arabs”;	  there	  was	  no	  natural	  border	  along	  which	  an	  international	  state	  border	  could	  be	  drawn.	  Violence	  in	  the	  past	  had	  cleaved	  the	  groups	  apart	  from	  each	  other.	  Partition	  would	  only	   reify	   this	   separation	  and	  perpetuate	   the	  violence	  emerging	  from	  it.	  Partition	  ”in	  the	  case	  of	  Palestine	  would	  amount	  not	  to	  the	  setting	  up	   of	   two	   self-­‐contained	   entities,	   but	   to	   the	   dismemberment	   and	  mutilation	   of	   a	  living	  body.”458	  Instead	  of	  working	   towards	  strengthening	   the	   trust	  and	  deepening	  the	  relationship	  between	  two	  mutually	  politically,	  economically,	  socially	  dependent	  groups,	  the	  partition	  would	  ”forcibly	  driv[e]	  …	  a	  Western	  wedge	  into	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Middle	   East.” 459 	  Rather	   than	   solving	   a	   problematic	   situation,	   partition	   would	  contribute	  to	  its	  perpetuation.	  	  	  
Constellation	  of	  beings	  
	  The	  representatives	  of	  the	  national	  movements	  –	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  in	  Palestine	  and	  the	   Muslim	   League	   in	   India	   –	   presented	   Israel	   and	   Pakistan	   to	   an	   international	  audience	  as	   Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  Homelands	   in	  need	  of	  statehood	  through	  partition	  from	   their	   non-­‐Jewish	   and	   non-­‐Muslim	   neighbors.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   sought	   to	  illustrate	   the	   way	   in	   which	   these	   references	   to	   religion	   in	   international	   relations	  became	  recognizable	  as	  such,	  by	  tracking	  the	  formation	  of	  two	  different	  “beings”	  of	  religion	  that	  is,	  the	  “Muslim	  Homeland”	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  “Jewish	  National	  Home”	  of	  Israel.	  I	  accomplished	  this	  by	  analyzing	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  differentiation	  was	  made	   between	   the	   Jewish	   and	   non-­‐Jewish,	   and	   the	   Muslim	   and	   the	   non-­‐Muslim,	  respectively,	  by	  placing	  a	  “spotlight”	  on	  two	  contemporary	  players	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	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these	  differences,	  namely	  Reginald	  Coupland	  and	  Muhammad	  Zafrullah	  Khan.	  Both	  Coupland	   and	   Khan	   were	   interlocutors	   in	   the	   two	   cases;	   examining	   their	   work	  therefore	   presents	   an	   unusual	   possibility	   to	   look	   more	   carefully	   at	   the	   way	  “religion”	  was	   formed,	  by	   tracing	   the	  processes	  of	   “Muslim”	  Pakistan	  and	   “Jewish”	  Israel	  becoming	  recognizable,	  in	  a	  relational	  manner.	  	  	  The	   religion	   that	   emerges	   from	   our	   examination	   of	   the	   work	   of	   Coupland	   and	  Zafrullah	  Khan	  is	  ambiguous	  and	  partly	  contradictory,	  possibly	  explainable	  through	  the	   different	   contexts	   and	   the	   different	   audiences	   to	   which	   they	   had	   to	   cater.	  Coupland	   still	   found	   himself	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   British	   Empire	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   processes	   of	   decolonialization,	   upholding	   an	   image	   of	   an	   active	   Britain,	  participating	  in	  the	  process	  of	  deconstructing	  its	  Empire,	  instead	  of	  being	  its	  passive	  victim.	  While	  the	  UN	  negotiations	  regarding	  Israeli	   independence	  in	  1947	  build	  on	  Coupland’s	  Peel	  report,	  when	  he	  was	  writing	  in	  1937,	  Coupland	  was	  located	  within	  a	  colonial	   discourse	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   multi-­‐national	   state	   containing	  essentially	  different	  “races”	  still	  enduring.	  	  A	  brief	  look	  at	  how	  these	  players	  constructed	  the	  “beings”	  of	  “Muslim	  Pakistan”	  and	  “Jewish	   Israel”	   shows	   that	   the	   colonial	   intellectual	   of	   Coupland	   understood	   these	  concepts	   as	   natural	   and	   essential,	   the	   Jewish	   ”race”	   being	   differentiated	   by	   its	  particular	  religion	  since	  ancient	  times.	  While	  this	  difference	  was	  fundamental,	  there	  was	  not	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  relationship	  between	  the	  Jews	  and	  their	  non-­‐Jewish	  neighbors.	  While	  the	  boundaries	  around	  the	  Jewish	  ”race”	  of	  Palestine	  and	  the	  Muslim	  ”race”	  of	  India	   were	   clear	   cut	   and	   impossible	   to	   transcend	   through	   assimilation,	   it	   was	  possible	   to	   accommodate	   them	   within	   a	   single	   political	   community	   as	   had	   been	  done	   within	   the	   British	   Commonwealth	   on	   previous	   occasions.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  Palestine,	  the	  references	  to	  religion	  are	  melted	  into	  a	  single	  pot	  together	  with	  ”race”,	  ”nation”	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  ”culture”	  and	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  cause	  much	  trouble	  in	  and	  of	   themselves.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Pakistan,	   religion	   had	   become	   more	   clearly	  differentiated	   from	   “race”	   or	   “nation”	   and	  was	   now	   seen	   to	   threaten	   the	   political	  solution	   to	   a	   political	   conflict	   by	   pulling	   Pakistani	   nationalism	   back	   to	   old	   Pan-­‐
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Islamic	  ideas.	  Religion,	  in	  this	  sense,	  was	  an	  outdated	  framework,	  which	  needed	  to	  be	   overcome,	   the	   British	   Indian	   Muslims	   emancipated	   from	   their	   religious	  consciousness,	   as	   had	   been	   the	   case	   in	   Europe,	   and	   in	   most	   instances	   of	   Arab	  nationalism.	   The	   difference	   between	   Muslim	   and	   non-­‐Muslim	   here	   refers	   to	  difference	  in	  race,	  nation	  and	  culture,	  but	  does	  not	  necessarily	  include	  a	  difference	  in	  religion.	  Religion,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan,	  did	  not	  have	  to	  be	  part	  of	  –	  or	  should	  not	  even	  have	  been	  central	  to	  	  –	  Muslims	  and	  their	  claims	  to	  political	  independence.	  	  	  	  Khan,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   mainly	   stayed	   away	   from	   essentialized	   categories,	  emphasizing	  time	  and	  again	  their	  contingent	  nature.	  While	  representing	  the	  Muslim	  League	  in	  the	  negotiation	  of	  the	  international	  border	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  –	  which	   put	   forward	   an	   acclaimed	   “Two-­‐Nation”	   Theory	   of	   fundamentally	   different	  Hindus	   and	   Muslims	   –	   he	   remained	   cautious	   in	   his	   use	   of	   this	   vocabulary.	   The	  British	   Indian	   Muslims	   needed	   a	   “homeland”,	   but	   more	   in	   order	   to	   escape	   their	  economic	  and	  social	   subjugation	  by	   the	  Sikhs	  and	  Hindus	  during	  British	   rule	   than	  due	  to	  an	  inherent	  need	  to	  territorialize	  Islam.	  	  At	   the	   UN	   negotiations,	   Khan	   needed	   to	   balance	   the	   Pakistani	   claim	   to	   a	   Muslim	  National	  Homeland	  while	  refuting	  the	  same	  right	  to	  a	  Jewish	  National	  Homeland	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Palestinian	  Jews.	  He	  needed	  to	  argue	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Jews	  were	  different	  from	  the	  Palestinian	  Arabs,	  but	  without	  recognizing	  their	  specific	  status	  as	  a	  nation	  with	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  as	  the	  case	  had	  been	  for	  the	  Pakistani	  Muslims.	  Although	   he	   had	   been	   cautious	   of	   the	   essentialized	   language	   of	   different	   “races”,	  “religions”	  or	  “nations”,	  Pakistan	  had	  claimed	  independence	  as	  a	  Muslim	  Homeland	  due	  to	  religiously	  marked	  differences	  from	  its	  Indian	  neighbor,	  and	  he	  had	  to	  clarify	  why	  the	  Jews	  were	  not	  a	  comparable	  case	  to	  the	  Muslims.	  Facing	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  legacy,	  Khan	  could	  not	  return	  to	  the	  Muslims’	  need	  for	  socio-­‐economic	  refuge,	  since	  the	  Russian	  and	  European	  Jewish	  immigrants	  to	  Palestine,	  who	  would	  be	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  new	  Jewish	  state,	  had	  every	  reason	  to	  seek	  refuge	  outside	  of	  their	  home	   countries	   following	   the	   genocide	   of	   the	   Holocaust.	   The	   distinction	   he	   then	  ended	  up	  drawing	  between	  the	  Indian	  Muslims	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Jews	  on	  the	  one	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hand,	   and	   the	   Arab	   non-­‐Jews	   and	   the	   Palestinian	   Jews	   on	   the	   other,	   was	   that	   of	  being	  or	  not	  being	  indigenous.	  The	  temporal	  argument	  of	  connection	  to	  the	  territory	  –	   the	   Indian	   Muslims	   were	   a	   part	   of	   the	   land	   before	   partition	   was	   considered	   –	  became	  his	  main	  point	  of	  differentiation.	  As	  Faisal	  Devji	  has	  argued,	  this	  point	  was	  weak,	  if	  anything,	  since	  the	  Pakistani	  movement	  started	  in	  the	  provinces	  outside	  the	  future	   Pakistan,	   where	   the	   Indian	   Muslims	   were	   a	   minority.	   Further,	   in	   order	   to	  “consolidate”	   post-­‐partition	   Pakistan,	   a	   population	   exchange	   of	   almost	   15	  million	  people	   had	   to	   take	   place,	  with	   hundred	   of	   thousands,	   if	   not	  millions,	   dying	   in	   the	  process,	   while	   still	   leaving	   almost	   40	   out	   of	   India’s	   100	   million	   Muslims	   outside	  Pakistani	  territory.460	  Zafrullah	  Khan	  tried	  to	  distinguish	  a	  “Jewish	  minority”	  from	  a	  “Muslim	  nation”	  with	  reference	  to	  their	  status	  as	  peoples	  indigenous	  to	  the	  land.	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  was	  not	  a	  particularly	  successful	  venture.	  	  During	  his	  time	  on	  the	  boundary	  commission,	  Khan	  represented	  the	  Muslim	  League	  with	   a	   clearly	   reified	   understanding	   of	   the	   difference	   between	  Muslims	   and	   non-­‐Muslims.	   Similarly,	   in	   the	   UN,	   Khan	   represented	   the	   opposition	   to	   the	   Palestine	  partition	   and	   Israeli	   independence,	   a	   group	   of	   Egypt,	   Syria,	   Transjordan	   and	   Iraq,	  which	   was	   also	   very	   focused	   on	   reified	   distinctions	   between	   Jews	   and	   non-­‐Jews.	  Although	   representing	   two	   bodies	   with	   a	   strongly	   reified	   language	   and	  understanding	  of	   the	  situation,	  Khan	  hardly	  ever	  adopted	   that	   language.	  However,	  while	   Khan’s	   attempts	   to	   stir	   this	   solid	   brew	   and	   loosen	   these	   essentialized	  categories	   remained	   unsuccessful	   Coupland’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   natural	  distinction	  between	  Jews	  and	  non-­‐Jews	  found	  its	  way	  into	  the	  Peel	  report,	  and	  from	  thence,	   into	   the	  negotiations	  of	   the	  UN	  General	  Assembly,	  with	   this	  understanding	  eventually	  becoming	  authorized	  in	  international	  law.	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Conclusion	  
	  Reginald	  Coupland	  and	  Muhammad	  Zafrullah	  Khan	  are	  individual	  “spotlights”	  which	  I	   have	   used	   to	   illustrate	   the	   relational	   and	   international	   character	   of	   “religion”	  becoming	   recognizable	   in	   international	   relations.	   Their	   accounts	   are	   by	  no	  means	  comparable,	   and	   the	   analysis	   does	   not	   attempt	   a	   comparison	   of	   any	   kind.	   While	  Coupland	  was	  a	  part	  of	   the	  colonial	  apparatus,	  Khan	  embodied	  a	  part	  of	   the	  post-­‐colonial	  independence	  movement.	  What	  brings	  them	  together,	  however,	  is	  that	  their	  accounts	   ended	   up	   on	   the	   table	   at	   the	   UN,	   as	   opposing	   perspectives	   on	   the	   same	  problem.	  	  	  Coupland	   adopted	   the	   language	   of	   national	   –	   racial,	   religious,	   cultural	   –	  homogeneity,	   in	   a	   manner	   very	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   the	   national	   movements,	   and	  abstracted	  it	  into	  an	  analytical	  framework	  and	  policy	  recommendations.	  While	  this	  had	   made	   him	   adopt	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   Jewish	   Agency	   regarding	   the	   essential	  nature	  and	  difference	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Nation	  and	  its	  right	  to	  a	  national	  Home,	  Zafrullah	  Khan	  had	  had	  to	  modify	  the	  connection	  between	  religious	  differences	  and	  the	  claims	  to	  nation-­‐statehood	  in	  order	  to	  reconcile	  upholding	  own	  claim	  to	  a	  Muslim	  nation-­‐state	  while	  refuting	  the	  Jewish	  one.	  	  	  With	  this	  brief	  sketch,	  I	  tried	  to	  show	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  “Muslim”	  Pakistan	  and	  the	   “Jewish”	   state	  of	   Israel	  became	  recognizable	  as	   such.	  By	   focusing	  on	  Coupland	  and	   Khan’s	   versions	   of	   these	   two	   instances	   –	   these	   two	   “beings”	   –	   I	   can	   begin	   to	  conceive	   of	   a	   pluralist	   narrative	   of	   religion	   in	   international	   relations,	   hopefully	  contributing	  to	  chastening	  a	  thinking	  that	  conflates	  the	  concepts	  –	  of	  religion,	  either	  Muslim	   or	   Jewish	   –	   with	   the	   “real-­‐world”	   versions	   thereof.	   They	   are	   a	   part	   of	  conceptual,	   national,	   international,	   identitarian,	   cultural	   and	  minoritarian	   politics.	  Simply	   recognizing	   religion	  would	  mean	   abstracting	   it	   into	   an	   analytical	   category,	  thereby	   detaching	   it	   from	   the	   context	   from	   which	   it	   evolved	   and	   sidelining	   the	  struggles,	   chances	   and	   processes	   behind	   it.	   It	   would	   sideline	   the	   politics	   of	  conceptual	   demarcation,	   the	   politics	   of	   recognition,	   and	   the	   politics	   of	   religion.	   It	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would	   mean	   taking	   the	   ”winners”	   of	   the	   genealogical	   battle	   at	   face	   value,	   and	  thereby	   reifying	   the	   end	   product,	   that	   is,	   the	   religious	   marker	   in	   Pakistani	   and	  Israeli	  international	  agency.	  However,	  if	  the	  borderlines	  of	  new	  international	  actors	  are	   to	   follow	   the	   lines	  of	   ”religious”	  boundaries	   –	  Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Muslim	  or	   Jew	  and	   non-­‐Jew	   –	   this	   boundary-­‐drawing	  must	   be	   investigated	   rather	   than	   taken	   for	  granted.	  	  	  The	  accounts	  of	  Coupland	  and	  Khan	  can	  easily	  be	  read	  as	  two	  opposing	  approaches:	  Coupland,	  an	  arch-­‐imperialist	  unable	  to	  rid	  himself	  of	  his	  essentialized	  worldview	  of	  clearly	   bounded	   entities	   inhabiting	   the	   world,	   confronted	   with	   Khan,	   a	   post-­‐positivist	   hero,	   trying	   his	   best	   to	   denaturalize	   the	   hardened	   line	   of	   the	   colonial	  heritage	  he	  was	  left	  to	  deal	  with.	  This	  is,	  naturally,	  not	  the	  picture	  I	  wanted	  to	  leave.	  While	  I	  cannot	  make	  any	  judgments	  regarding	  the	  motives,	  interests	  or	  fears	  of	  the	  two	  men,	   nor	   do	   I	   claim	   to	   explain	   their	   arguments	   or	   actions,	   I	   can	   follow	   their	  arguments.	  What	  emerges	  are	  two	  complex	  accounts	  of	  contemporary	  actors	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  –	  and	  to	  some	  extent,	   to	  make	  political	  gains	  –	   from	  two	  seemingly	  separate,	  yet	  connected,	  situations	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  changing	  international	  system,	  both	  deeply	  entrenched	  in	  a	  violent	  history	  and	  destined	  for	  an	  even	  more	  violent	  future	  to	  come.	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Conclusion	  
	  “Political	   differences,	   differences	   conditioned	   by	   political	   inequality,	   economic	   exploitation,	   and	   so	  on,	   are	   naturalized	   and	   neutralized	   into	   cultural	   differences,	   different	   ways	   of	   life,	   which	   are	  something	   given,	   something	   that	   cannot	   be	   overcome,	   but	   must	   be	   merely	   tolerated.	   To	   this,	   of	  course,	  one	  should	  answer	  in	  Benjaminian	  terms:	  from	  culturalization	  of	  politics	  to	  politicization	  of	  culture.”461	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  been	  about	  recognition.	  More	  precisely,	  it	  has	  been	  about	  recognition	  and	   religion	   in	   international	   relations.	  Despite	   claims	   to	   the	   contrary,	   religion	  has	  (re-­‐)emerged	   as	   a	   central	   reference	   point	   in	   international	   relations.	   It	   frames	   the	  claims	  to	  sovereignty	  by	  Syrian	  and	  Iraqi	  armed	  forces	  seeking	  to	  redraw	  the	  map	  of	  the	   Middle	   East.	   It	   authorizes	   local	   leaders	   in	   “nation-­‐building”	   or	   “democracy-­‐promoting”	  projects	  in	  Sudan,	  Burma	  and	  China.	  It	  marks	  the	  borders	  of	  legality	  in	  the	  changing	  Egyptian	  political	   landscape	  and	  the	  highest	  political	  authority	  of	   the	  transforming	   Iranian	   society.	   Religion	   seems	   omnipresent,	   and	   its	   importance	   for	  international	  relations	  is	  beyond	  doubt.	  Besides	  featuring	  in	  everyday	  international	  affairs,	  religion	  was	  argued	  to	  lie	  at	  the	  very	  center	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  current,	  Westphalian,	   international	   order	   of	   sovereign	   states	   emerging	   as	   a	   direct	  consequence	   of	   Protestant	   challenges	   to	   Catholic	   profane	   and	   ecclesiastical	  authority.	   “No	   Reformation,	   no	   Westphalia”,	   Daniel	   Philpott	   stated.	   Alternatively,	  responding	   to	   current	   challenges	   to	   the	   claim	  of	   the	   “secular	  neutrality”	   of	   liberal	  democracy,	  post-­‐secular,	  Habermasian,	  alternatives	  argue	  for	  a	  more	  differentiated	  and	  inclusive	  –	  international	  –	  government	  recognizing	  religion	  in	  public	  discourse.	  	  In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   started	   from	   these	   claims	   for	   the	   need	   to	   recognize	   religion	   in	  international	   relations,	   and	   argued	   that	   this	   is	   not	   as	   unproblematic	   as	   it	   seems.	  “Religion”	  didn’t	  simply	  sit	  around	  waiting	  to	  be	  recognized.	  I	  analyzed	  the	  work	  by	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three	  international	  scholars	  and	  their	  arguments	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  religion,	  and	  concluded	   that	   they	   did	   not	   reflect	   upon	   what	   it	   was	   they	   wanted	   to	   have	  recognized.	  None	  paid	  attention	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   “religion”	   for	  which	   they	  sought	   recognition	   had	   emerged	   as	   a	   differentiated	   –	   and	   differentiable	   –	   entity,	  ready	  to	  shoulder	  the	  weight	  of	  recognition.	  What	  religion	  “was”	  varied,	  depending	  on	  the	  argument	  that	  was	  made;	  it	  was	  a	  set	  of	  ideas	  (Philpott),	  the	  “living	  tradition”	  of	  a	  community	  (Thomas),	  or	  an	  epistemic	  treasure-­‐chest	  (Barbato	  and	  Habermas).	  None	  of	  these	  scholars	  asked	  how	  religion	  had	  come	  to	  be	  recognizable	  as	  religion,	  nor	   did	   they	   reflect	   on	   the	  way	   their	   own	   arguments	   contributed	   to	   this	   process,	  that	   is,	   how	   their	   arguments	   for	   recognition	   were,	   in	   fact,	   constructive,	   or	  productive	   of	   that	   for	   which	   they	   sought	   recognition.	   I	   termed	   this	   problematic	  aspect	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  genealogical	  sensitivity.	  	  	  Following	  this	  close	  reading	  of	  scholarship	  on	  religion	  and	  the	  recognition	  thereof,	  I	  engaged	  in	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  framework	  of	  recognition	  itself.	  I	  pointed	  out	   that	   accounts	   such	   as	   those	   of	   Axel	   Honneth,	   Charles	   Taylor,	   and,	   in	   IR,	  Alexander	   Wendt,	   built	   their	   recognition	   arguments	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	  entities	   of	   recognition	   –	   in	   these	   cases	   “identities”	   –	   were	   available	   prior	   to	   the	  recognition	  process	  itself.	  While	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  substance	  of	  these	  entities	  changed	   –	   the	   particular	   identities	   emerging	   through	   intersubjective	   processes	  between	   a	   “Self”	   and	   an	   “Other”	   –	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   entity	   itself	  was	   taken	   for	  granted.	  Honneth	  saw	  a	  “potential”	  identity	  becoming	  “actual”	  through	  recognition;	  Taylor	   needed	   a	   benchmark	   against	   which	   he	   could	   estimate	   the	   damage	   of	  
misrecognition;	   and	   Wendt	   needed	   pre-­‐differentiated	   “Selves”	   overcoming	   their	  differences	   and	   merging	   into	   an	   “Us”	   of	   the	   World	   State.	   These	   recognition	  arguments	  presupposed	  a	  differentiated	   social	   ontology,	   assuming	   that	   the	   agents	  and	   objects	   that	   were	   susceptible	   to	   recognition	   were	   differentiated	   and	  differentiable	   prior	   to	   recognition.	   Against	   this,	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   process	   of	  
becoming	   recognizable	   epistemologically	   preceded	   recognition,	   meaning	   that	   only	  that	   which	   is	   recognizable	   within	   the	   current	   framework	   of	   knowledge	   can	   be	  recognized.	  Following	   from	  this	   is	  an	  argument	   for	   the	   investigation	  –	  rather	   than	  
	   164	  
the	   assumption	   –	   of	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   the	   entities	   of	   recognition	   became	  susceptible	  to	  be	  recognized,	  that	  is,	  how	  they	  became	  recognizable.	  The	  argument	  did	   not	   imply	   that	   the	   epistemological	   frameworks	   cannot	   change,	   or	   that	   the	  recognition	  of	  agents	  and	  objects	  does	  not	  have	  an	   impact	  on	  what	   can	  be	   “seen”,	  “known”	   or	   recognized,	   but	   rather	   argues	   that	   this	   change	   in	   new	   ranges	   of	  “visibility”	   is	   a	   change	   in	   recognizability,	   i.e.	   a	   part	   of	   the	   process	   of	   becoming	  recognizable.	   In	   this	   sense,	   struggles	   for	   recognition	   can	   be	   read	   as	   struggles	   for	  recognizability,	   a	   quest	   to	   change	   the	   system	   within	   which	   the	   individuals	   and	  groups	  find	  themselves.	  My	  argument	  countered	  the	  assumptions	  by	  scholars,	  such	  as	  Honneth,	  who	  needs	  to	  assume	  a	  “potential”	   identity	   to	  be	  “actualized”	  through	  recognition,	   and	   thereby	   implies	   that	   this	   “potential”	   identity	   is	   already	  recognizable.	   I	   argued	  against	   such	  assumptions	   regarding	  pre-­‐differentiated,	  pre-­‐existing	   objects	   and	   agents.	  Neglecting	   the	   investigation	   of	   how	   these	   objects	   and	  agents	  become	  recognizable	  would	  allow	  the	  framework	  of	  recognition	  to	  stabilize	  and	  reproduce	  itself	  and	  the	  objects	  and	  agents	  within	  in.	  	  	  Building	   upon	   the	   argumentation	   of	   the	   first	   chapter,	   I	   continued	   to	   argue	   that	  recognition	  lacks	  genealogical	  sensitivity,	  by	  which	  I	  mean	  that	  it	  lacks	  attentiveness	  to	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   concepts,	   identities,	   agents,	   or	   objects	   emerge	   as	  differentiated	  and	  differentiable	  entities,	  ripe	  for	  recognition.	  I	  argued	  that	  this	  lack	  of	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   reflects	   a	   reifying	   tendency	   in	   recognition,	   that	   is,	   a	  particular	  form	  of	  forgetfulness	  about	  these	  processes	  of	  emergence.	  In	  the	  second	  part	   of	   the	   thesis,	   I	   continued	   to	   investigate	  means	   of	   approaching	   these	   reifying	  tendencies	   of	   recognition,	   and	   how	   a	   stronger	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   to	   the	  processes	  by	  which	  something	  becomes	  recognizable	  in	  international	  relations	  can	  be	   nurtured.	   I	   suggested	   starting	   from	   a	   perspective	   of	   ”becoming”,	   in	   order	   to	  emphasize	   the	   importance	   placed	   upon	   the	   process	   of	   emergence,	   of	   becoming	  
recognizable,	   instead	   of	   assuming	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   recognizable	   object	   or	   agent	  prior	   to	   recognition.	   This	   processuality	   reflected	   precisely	   the	   genealogical	  sensitivity	   I	   saw	   as	   lacking	   in	   recognition	   in	   the	   first	   part	   of	   the	   thesis.	  However,	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while	   the	   perspective	   of	   “becoming”	   raised	   the	   prospect	   of	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  emergence	  of	  the	  entities	  of	  recognition,	  it	  tended	  to	  underestimate	  the	  dependency	  upon	  a	  certain	  stability	  of	  these	  entities	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  be	  intelligible,	  a	  state	  of	  equilibrium	   that	   I	   referred	   to	   as	   ”being”.	   In	   other	   words,	   I	   was	   looking	   for	   an	  approach	  that	  allowed	  me	  to	  maintain	  the	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  process	  of	  ”becoming”,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   acknowledging	   the	   necessity	   of	   moments	   of	  equilibrium	  of	  ”being”.	  ”Becoming”	  was	  important,	  in	  order	  not	  to	  let	  these	  ”beings”	  crystallize	  into	  reifications	  –	  thereby	  not	  naturalizing	  their	  ontological	  assumptions	  –	  but	   it	  was	  not	   supposed	   to	  make	   the	   ”beings”	   altogether	   redundant.	   I	   sought	   to	  retain	   the	   tension	  between	  being	  and	  becoming,	  not	  allowing	  one	  to	  dominate	   the	  other.	  My	   suggestion	  was	   to	   let	   the	   perspective	   of	   ”becoming”	   open	   up	   space	   for	  alternative	   knowledge,	   truth,	   concepts,	   agents,	   et	   cetera	   through	   its	   genealogical	  sensitivity,	   and	   then	   fill	   this	   space	   with	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   ”beings”,	   allowing	   their	  competing	   truth-­‐claims	   to	   balance	   each	   other	   out,	   thereby	   hindering	   one	   ”being”	  becoming	   dominant	   and	   settling	   into	   reified	   knowledge.	   I	   described	   this	   as	   an	  analysis	  of	  ”becoming	  recognizable”	  and	  referred	  to	  the	  ”becoming”	  as	  the	  necessary	  genealogical	   sensitivity	   and	   the	   ”recognizable”	   as	   the	   ”beings”	   without	   which	   the	  object,	   agents	   and	   identities	   of	   recognition	   –	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   thesis,	   ”religion”	   –	  would	  not	  be	  intelligible	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  This	   theoretical	   argumentation	   was	   illustrated	   through	   the	   international	  recognition	   of	   Pakistan	   and	   Israel.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   the	   illustration	   –	   Chapter	   3	   –	  attempted	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   processes	   that	   would	   be	   assumed	   or	   taken	   for	  granted	  if	  the	  framework	  of	  recognition	  were	  left	  as	  it	  was.	  Here,	  I	  outlined	  different	  processes	  by	  which	  Pakistan	  had	  become	  recognizable	  as	  a	  ”Muslim	  Homeland”	  and	  Israel	  as	  a	  	  ”Jewish	  National	  Home”,	  that	  is,	  how	  religion	  had	  become	  intelligible	  as	  an	   internationally	   relevant	  and	  differentiable	   category,	   and	  how	   the	   ”Muslim”	  and	  the	   ”Jewish”	   had	  become	   recognizable	   points	   of	   reference,	   demarcating	   these	   two	  new	   international	   actors.	   I	   picked	   out	   three	   instances	   through	   which	   these	  processes	  could	  be	  traced.	  First,	  I	  looked	  at	  numbers.	  That	  meant	  that	  I	  tracked	  the	  way	   in	  which	  different	  uses	  of	  numbers	  had	  shaped	  the	  meaning	  or	   the	  ”being”	  of	  
	   166	  
Muslim	   Pakistan	   and	   the	   Jewish	   state	   of	   Israel.	   One	   such	   example	   was	   how	   the	  categorization	  in	  the	  British	  Indian	  census	  had	  forced	  its	  population	  to	  identify	  with	  one	  single	  category,	  either	  Muslim,	  Hindu,	  Christian,	  Sikh,	  etc.	  Since	  the	  census	  and	  its	  categorization	  –	  a	  process	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ”enumeration	  of	  minorities”	  –	  was	  the	  ground	  upon	  which	  political	  representation	  was	  extended,	  the	  stakes	  increased	  and	   the	   authority	   of	   this	   very	   ”being”	   was	   increased.	   Second,	   I	   showed	   how	   the	  claim	  to	  political	  representation	  in	  itself	  had	  formed	  what	  could	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  ”Muslim”	   or	   ”Jewish”	   international	   actors.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Israel,	   the	   Jewish	  Agency	  had	  been	  authorized	  by	  the	  British	  Mandate	  to	  represent	  –	  Zionist	  and	  non-­‐Zionist	  –	  Jews	   in	  questions	   regarding	   the	   ”Homeland”,	  while	  Muhammad	  Ali	   Jinnah	   and	  his	  Muslim	  League	  had	  claimed	  and,	  after	  an	  internal	  struggle,	  had	  gained	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ”sole	   spokesman”	   for	   the	   British	   Indian	   Muslims.	   What	   became	   recognizable	   as	  ”Jewish”	   or	   ”Muslim”	   policies	   and	   claims	  were	   thus	   –	   also	   –	   dependent	   upon	   the	  internal	   politics	   of	   the	   power	   struggles	   for	   representation.	   The	   last	   process	   of	  becoming	   recognizably	   ”religious”	   in	   these	   two	   cases	   was	   the	   process	   of	   border	  drawing.	  I	  tried	  to	  show	  that,	  both	  from	  the	  top-­‐down	  perspective	  of	  official	  border-­‐drawing	  commissions	  –	  Radcliffe	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  Peel	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Israel	  –	   and	   from	   the	  bottom-­‐up	  perspective,	   the	  drawing	  of	  boundaries	  was	  dependent	  upon,	   and	   produced,	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   knowledge	   about	   what	   the	   border	   was	  supposed	   to	   demarcate.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Pakistan,	   the	   official	   brief	   had	   been	   to	  separate	   ”Muslim”	   from	   ”non-­‐Muslim”	   areas,	   property	   and	   population,	   while	   in	  Israel	   a	   similar	   distinction	   had	   been	   between	   ”Jew”	   and	   ”non-­‐Jew”.	   The	  aforementioned	   census	   played	   a	   great	   role	   in	   settling	   where	   and	   who	   these	  categories	  referred	  to,	  but	  so	  did	  colonial,	  administrative	  and	  military	  maps	  where	  roads,	   rivers	   and	   storage	   facilities	   demarcated	   the	   borders	   of	   the	   future	   ”Muslim	  Homeland”	  and	  ”Jewish	  state”.	  Further,	  this	  demarcation	  process	  was	  also	  furthered	  by	  more	   grounded	   processes	   such	   as	   refugee	   administration,	   or	   the	   ”retrieval”	   of	  ”abducted”	  women.	  	  Simply	  recognizing	  religion	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Pakistani	  and	  Israeli	  independence	  would	  side-­‐line	   these	  processes	  of	  enumeration,	  representation	  and	  border-­‐drawing,	  forgetting	  about	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  ”Muslim”	  and	  the	  ”Jewish”	  as	  recognizable	  categories,	  and	  thereby	  reifying	  religion.	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  The	  second	  illustration	  continued	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  analyzing	  the	  process	   of	   becoming	   recognizable.	   While	   the	   first	   illustratory	   chapter	   focused	   on	  tracing	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   religion,	   both	   Muslim	   and	   Jewish,	   emerged	   as	   a	  recognizable	  category,	  the	  second	  illustration	  put	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ”beings”	  –Muslim	  or	  Jewish	  –	  emerging	  from	  these	  processes.	  It	  did	  so	  in	  order	  to	  show	  the	  emergence	   of	   multiple	   ”beings”	   in	   the	   constellation	   of	   religion	   in	   international	  relations.	   While	   the	   first	   illustration	   was	   broad	   in	   range	   and	   wide	   in	   scope,	   this	  second	   illustration	   placed	   a	   much	   more	   limited	   focus	   on	   two	   individuals:	   the	  colonial	  intellectual	  Reginald	  Coupland	  and	  Pakistan’s	  UN	  representative	  and	  future	  foreign	  minister	  Muhammad	   Zafrullah	   Khan.	   These	   two	  men	  were	   interesting,	   as	  they	  constituted	  the	  opposite	  positions	  during	  the	  negotiations	  that	  led	  up	  to	  Indian	  partition	  and	   Israeli	   independence	   in	   the	  United	  Nations	   in	   the	   fall	  of	  1947.	  While	  Coupland	  had	  been	  the	  author	  of	  the	  first	  Palestine	  Partition	  Plan	  –	  the	  ”Peel	  report”	  –	   upon	   which	   the	   final	   plan	   was	   based,	   Khan	   represented	   the	   opposition	   to	  Palestinian	  partition	  and	  thus	  the	  independence	  and	  international	  recognition	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel.	  Not	  only,	  however,	  were	  these	  two	  men	  on	  opposing	  sides	  of	  history	  –	  Coupland	  embodying	  the	  colonial	  regime	  and	  its	  partition	  plan,	  while	  Khan	  shaped	  post-­‐colonial	  Pakistan	  and	  rejected	  the	  partition	  of	  the	  former	  Palestine	  Mandate	  –	  but	   each	   played	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   both	   individual	   cases.	   Only	   four	   years	   after	  leaving	   Palestine	   with	   a	   plan	   for	   partition,	   Coupland	  was	   sent	   to	   British	   India	   to	  analyze	   the	  possibilities	  of	   constitutional	   change	  and	  partition	   there.	  Khan,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  had	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  representing	  the	  British	  Indian	  Muslims	  during	   the	  British	  Raj	   and,	   through	   the	  Muslim	  League,	   their	   claim	   to	  Pakistan	  on	  the	  Radcliffe	  boundary	  commission.	  A	   few	  weeks	  after	  Pakistani	   independence,	  he	  was	   sent	   as	   its	   first	   representative	   to	   the	   UN	  where	   he	   led	   the	   opposition	   to	   the	  partition	  of	  Palestine.	  These	  two	  “spotlights”,	   therefore,	  not	  only	  give	  us	  a	  view	  on	  how	   two	   individuals	   partook	   in	   the	   processes	   of	   shaping	   the	   recognizability	   of	  ”Muslim”	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  ”Jewish	  state	  of	  Israel”,	  but	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  much	  more	  transnational	  and	  relational	  perspective	  concerning	  these	  processes.	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What	   emerged	   underneath	   these	   two	   ”spotlights”	   were	   contradictory	   and	  ambiguous	  accounts	  of	   the	  ”Muslim”	  and	  the	  ”Jewish”	  ”beings”.	  An	   image	  emerged	  that,	  indeed,	  questioned	  any	  reified	  assumptions	  regarding	  religion	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  recognition.	  The	  ”Jewish	  being”	   featured	   in	  Coupland’s	  account	  as	  an	  ancient,	   fundamentally	   separate	   racial,	   national,	   religious	   and	   cultural	   entity	  contrasting	  with	  Khan’s	  minimal,	  temporal	  distinction	  of	  the	  Jews	  as	  non-­‐indigenous	  immigrants.	  The	  ”Muslim	  being”	  for	  Coupland	  was	  as	  fundamental	  as	  the	  Jewish	  one,	  but	  differed	  in	  respect	  of	  religion,	  which,	  in	  the	  Jewish	  case	  played	  a	  limited	  role	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  while	  in	  the	  Muslim	  case,	  the	  people	  required	  emancipation	  from	  their	  religion	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   for	   a	   political	   accommodation	   with	   the	   non-­‐Muslim	  population.	  Khan’s	  internationally	  relevant	  Muslims	  were,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  mainly	  a	   socio-­‐economic	   category	  without	  distinct	   essence	   to	  differentiate	   them	   from	   the	  non-­‐Muslims.	  By	  illustrating	  the	  ambiguous	  and	  partly	  contradictory	  “Muslim”	  and	  “Jewish”	   beings,	   I	   aimed	   to	   counter	   the	   reifying	   tendencies	   in	   the	   recognition	   of	  religion	   that	   were	   identified	   in	   the	   first	   part	   of	   the	   thesis.	   It	   was	   an	   attempt	   to	  nurture	  a	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  within	  the	  recognition	  framework	  and	  to	  illustrate	  it	  on	  behalf	  of	  religion.	  	  	  At	  the	  center	  of	  the	  thesis	  stand	  two	  set	  of	  tensions.	  First,	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  need	   for	  stabilization	   in	  order	   to	  make	  the	  world	   intelligible	  –	  stabilizations	   that	   I	  called	   “beings”	   –	   and	   the	   dangers	   of	   reification	   (as	   “frozen”	   beings)	   as	   the	  ”naturalization”	   of	   social	   facts.	   While	   post-­‐foundational	   work	   has	   been	   very	  successful	   in	   its	   attempts	   to	   denaturalize	   reifications,	   it	   has	   paid	   less	   attention	   to	  other	  forms	  of	  non-­‐foundational	  stabilizations.	   I	   try	  to	  develop	  this	   line	  of	  thought	  by	  differentiating	  between	  reification	  and	  being	  and	  search	  for	  ways	  to	  cultivate	  the	  latter	  while	  avoiding	  the	  former.	  	  This	  tension	  –	  between	  the	  need	  for	  beings	  and	  the	  dangers	  of	  reifications	  –	  is	  paralleled	  by	  a	  second	  tension,	  namely	  that	  of	  recognition	  and	  subjectification,	  or,	  better,	  between	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  subjectification.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  side	  recognition	  has	  an	  empowering	  aspect,	  that	  of	  creating	  a	  subject	  or	   being	   constitutive	   of	   agents.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   side	   recognition	   subjectifies	   in	  more	   problematic	   sense	   of	   the	   word,	   namely	   subordinates	   the	   recognized	   to	   the	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power	   and	   the	   epistemic	   framework	   of	   the	   recognizer.	   The	   thesis	   places	  most	   its	  focus	   on	   the	   problematic	   aspects	   of	   recognition,	   that	   is,	   being	   subjectified	   rather	  than	  on	  the	  becoming	  a	  subject.	  The	  empowering	  aspect	  of	  recognition	  featured	  less	  prominently	  as	  it	  has	  been	  treated	  in	  length	  by	  others.	  	  	  As	  with	  all	   academic	  work,	   the	  question	  arises	   regarding	   relevance.	   In	  which	  way	  are	   these	  arguments	  original?	  Or,	  hasn’t	  post-­‐foundational	  work	  done	   this	  before?	  To	   this	   I	  would	   like	   to	   clarify	   that	   this	   is	  not	  a	   straight	   forward	  post-­‐foundational	  thesis.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   argues	   that	   there	   is	   a	   reifying	   tendency	   to	  recognition	  and	  that	  a	  genealogical	  sensitivity	   is	   lacking	   from	  the	  study	  of	  religion	  and	   recognition	   in	   IR.	   This	   is,	   indeed,	   an	   argument	   put	   forward	   by	  many	   other	   –	  post-­‐foundational	  –	  scholars	  before	  me,	  even	  if	  it	  has	  had	  different	  form	  and	  focus.	  If	  the	   thesis	   would	   have	   ended	   there	   it	   would	   have	   been	   a	   rather	   typical	   post-­‐foundational	  work,	  identifying	  a	  reifying	  tendency	  in	  recognition	  and	  asking	  where	  to	   go	   in	   order	   to	   nurture	   the	   genealogical	   sensitivity	   that	   seems	  missing.	   But	   the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  continues	  and	  deepens	  the	  discussion	  by	  identifying	  limits	  to	  post-­‐foundational	  reasoning	  and	  suggesting	  a	  different	  path.	  	  While	  the	  second	  part	  continued	  the	  first	  part’s	  search	  for	  a	  genealogical	  sensitive	  approach,	   it	  did	  not	  end	  with	  a	  deconstruction	  of	   religion	  –	  others	  have	  done	   this	  too.	   Rather,	   what	   the	   second	   part	   does	   is	   to	   restructure	   different	   kinds	   of	   post-­‐foundational	   theorizing	   around	   a	   discussion	   about	   ”being”	   and	   ”becoming”	   and	   to	  frame	   my	   critique	   of	   recognition’s	   reification	   as	   a	   stabilization	   of	   ”beings”.	   It	   is	  therefore	  not	  an	  argument	  against	  stabilizations	  as	  such,	  but	  against	  their	  particular	  reified	  version.	  Instead	  of	  deconstructing	  religion,	  I	  sought	  to	  reconstruct	  different	  understandings	  of	  it	  –	  different	  stabilized	  meanings	  or	  ”beings”	  –	  and	  placing	  them	  in	  what	  Adorno	  called	  a	  constellation.	  What	  I	  saw	  the	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  doing	  was	   not	   only	   to	   deconstruct	   and	   critique	   prevailing	   knowledge	   but	   opening	   up	   a	  space	   for	   a	  multiplicity	  of	   stabilized	  meanings,	   or	   ”beings”,	   letting	   their	   individual	  truth	  claims	  balance	  each	  other.	  This	  was	  what	  the	  fifth	  chapter	  aimed	  at	  by	  reading	  Coupland	   and	   Khan.	   Both	   men	   were,	   in	   different	   ways	   part	   of	   the	   process	   of	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recognizing	  Pakistan	  and	   Israel,	   both	  with	  a	   contested	  –	   and	   indeed	   contestable	   –	  usage	   of	   the	   terminology	   of	   religion.	   However,	   instead	   of	   leaving	   them	   after	  deconstructing	   their	   understandings	   and	   uses	   of	   ”religion”	   I	   continued	   to	  reconstruct	  them	  and	  place	  the	  different	  ”religions”	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other.	  Rather	  than	   aiming	   to	   keep	   the	   plate	   clear	   of	   foundations	   –	   as	   post-­‐foundational	   work	  would	  do	  –	  my	  aim	  was	  to	  enable	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  different	  foundations	  and	  in	  that	  manner	   work	   against	   a	   single	   ”being”	   gaining	   the	   status	   of	   the	   single	   Being,	   i.e.	  become	  reified.	  This	  way	   I	  hoped	   to	  nurture	   the	  genealogical	   sensitivity	   sought	   in	  the	   first	   part	   and	  which	  was	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   open	   up	   to	   those	   new	   agents,	  objects,	  subjects,	  frameworks	  that	  are	  not	  yet	  recognizable	  as	  such.	  The	  aim	  of	  this,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	  was	   to	   sustain	   a	  multiple	   and	   ”mutually	   incompatible	  ways	   of	  seeing.”	   (Levine	   2012:	   63),	   i.e.	   a	   particular	   understanding	   of	   plurality	   that	   is	   not	  reducible	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  difference.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  my	  account	  of	  becoming	  recognizable	  is	  more	  than	  an	  application	  of	   post-­‐positivist	   scholarship	   to	   the	   question	   of	   recognition.	   While	   it	   does	   show	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  aspect	  of	  processuality	  –	  what	  I	  called	  becoming	  –	  is	  central	  for	  any	   account	   that	   aims	   at	   addressing	   reifications,	   it	   did	   not	   satisfy	   itself	   with	   a	  ”critique	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  religion”,	  or	  a	  ”genealogy	  of	  religion	  in	   international	  relations”.	  Instead,	  what	  I	  sought	  was	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  processuality	  and	  the	  states	  of	  equilibrium	  –	  between	  the	  becoming	  and	  the	  being	  –	  without	  assuming,	  as	  Connolly	  and	  Levine	  have	  done,	  that	  the	  aspect	  of	  becoming	  is	  constantly	  in	  danger	  of	   being	   forgotten.	   I	   do	   not	   believe	   that	   the	   aspect	   of	   processuality,	   of	   becoming,	  needs	  to	  be	  protected	  from	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  being	  or	  from	  the	  forgetfulness	  that	  exemplified	  reification.	  Rather,	  I	  agree	  with	  Mary	  Douglas	  that	  the	  reproduction	  of	  stability	   –	   in	   being	   –	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   “potency	   of	   disorder”	   of	   everyday	  (international)	   life.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   being	   is	   emphasized	   and	  prominently	   featured	   is	   not	   necessarily	   due	   to	   a	   process	   of	   forgetfulness	   –	  reification	   –	   but	   a	   mechanism	   of	   controlling	   the	   contingency	   that	   is	   the	   human	  condition,	   as	  well	   as	   a	   reduction	  mechanism	  of	   the	   complexity	   inherent	   in	  human	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life.462	  Rather	   than	   being	   sidelined	   or	   “forgotten”,	   the	   processuality	   within	   the	  aspect	   of	   becoming	   is	   constantly	   present.	   The	   balancing	   act	   between	   being	   and	  becoming	   is	   therefore	  not	  one	  which	   I	   seek	   to	  use	   in	  order	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	  strength	  of	  being;	  rather,	  it	  represents	  their	  inherent	  and	  constant	  tension.	  Leaving	  being	   to	   take	  over	  would	   indeed	  amount	   to	  reification.	  Allowing	  becoming	   to	  gain	  the	   upper	   hand	   would	   ignore	   the	   dependence	   on	   states	   of	   equilibrium	   for	   the	  intelligibility	   for	   objects,	   agents,	   events,	   institutions,	   et	   cetera	   in	   international	  affairs.	  	  	  Another	  question	  that	  may	  arise	  concerns	  the	  ethical	  and	  political	  consequences	  of	  the	  suggested	  approach.	  As	  it	  builds	  on	  a	  post-­‐positivist	  approach,	   it	   is	  susceptible	  to	   the	   common	   critique	   that	   it	   lacks	   the	   ability	   to	   distinguish	   a	   good	   “being”,	  “narrative”	   or	   “version	   of	   reality”	   from	   a	   bad	   one,	   not	   only	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   plot,	  characters	  and	  ending,	  but	  in	  a	  much	  more	  fundamental	  ethical	  sense.	  Some	  stories	  are	   ethically	   less	   desirable	   than	   others.	   Some	   are	   able	   to	   consolidate	   conflicting	  perspectives,	   while	   others	   are	   directly	   destructive.	   There	   cannot	   be	   an	   absolute	  equality	  between	  each	  “being”.	  Further,	  if	  all	  “beings”	  are	  lined	  up	  next	  to	  each	  other	  without	  rank	  or	  order,	  where	  does	  the	  politics	  of	  it	  all	  go?	  Is	  there	  not	  a	  danger	  of	  depoliticizing	  the	  recognition	  process?	  I	  would	  reject	  both	  scenarios.	  Neither	  ethics	  nor	  politics	  disappear	  from	  my	  perspective,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  see	  them,	  one	  needs	  to	  shift	   away	   from	   the	   assumption	   that	   ethics	   or	   politics	   require	   deontological	  grounding,	  that	  is,	  that	  judgments	  of	  right	  or	  wrong,	  good	  or	  bad	  result	  according	  to	  the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   “beings”	   align	   themselves	   with	   a	   particular	   moral	   content.	  Rather,	  my	  perspective	  is	  neither	  nihilistic	  nor	  depoliticizing,	  since	  it	  maintains	  the	  ability	  to	  judge.	  However,	  instead	  of	  judging	  the	  different	  “beings”	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  content,	   that	   is,	   their	   correspondence	   to	   a	   deontological	   moral	   ground,	   I	   would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  judge	  them	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  462	  See	   Chandler	   2012	   for	   a	   critical	   view	   on	   post-­‐positivist	   Enlightenment	   critique,	   emphasizing	  precisely	   this	   point	   that	   they	   were	   not	   necessarily	   looking	   for	   firm	   foundations,	   but,	   to	   a	   greater	  extent,	   were	   looking	   to	   balance	   out	   contingency	   and	   certainty	   and	   transforming	   complexity	   into	  regularities	   susceptible	   to	   understanding,	   thereby	   ”humanising	   the	   world”.	   Rather	   than	   seeking	  freedom	  as	  the	  independence	  from	  natural	  laws,	  they	  sought	  freedom	  in	  the	  knowledge	  of	  these	  laws.	  (Chandler	  2012:	  517-­‐520).	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representations	  of	  reality.	   Instead	  of	  asking	  what	  is	  the	  inherent	  ethical	  content	  of	  this	   “being”,	   I	   ask	   what	   are	   the	   political	   implications	   of	   constructing	   and	  representing	   reality	   in	   this	   manner.	   What	   follows	   from	   the	   narrative	   that	   brings	  about	   a	   particular	   image	   of	   the	   world?	   What	   are	   the	   consequences	   of	   these	  representations?	   It	   is	   also	   not	   de-­‐politicizing,	   as	   the	   politics	   is	   relocated	   to	   the	  activity	   of	   filling	   the	   epistemic	   ground	   with	   various	   versions	   of	   how	   things	   are	  supposed	  to	  be,	  filling	  it	  with	  “beings”.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Colin	  Wight:	  “Politics	  is	  the	  terrain	  of	  competing	  ontologies”.	  	  	  In	   line	  with	  this	  critique,	  one	  could	  continue	  to	  ask	  where	  responsibility	   is	   located	  once	   the	   aim	   has	   been	   set	   to	   create	   a	   ”truly	   pluralist	   narrative”	   by	   allowing	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   ”beings”	   into	   the	   ring.	   If	   every	   perspective	   –	   each	   being	   –	   is	  ”equalized”,	  who	  carries	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  overall	  picture?	  Who	  can	  be	  called	  upon	   to	   take	   responsibility	   for	   the	   consequences	   of	   this	   or	   that	   constellation	   of	  beings?	   My	   response	   here	   resonates	   with	   the	   previous	   answer.	   If	   we	   accept	  Immanuel	  Kant’s	  argument	  that	  truth	  and	  knowledge	  are	  not	  properties	  of	  things	  in	  the	   world	   but	   –	   since	   they	   are	   always	   filtered	   through	   the	   observing	   subject	   –	  functions	  in	  semantic	  systems	  and	  a	  reality	  that	  is	  not	  directly	  accessible,	  but	  rather	  represented,	   then	   political	   and	   ethical	   responsibilities	   stem	   from	   this	  representation.	   	   Such	   an	   understanding	   asks	   for	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   politics	  involved	   in	   representing	   reality	   in	   this	  or	   that	  manner.463	  The	   charges	  of	  nihilism,	  ethical	   relativism	   or	   depoliticization	   with	   regard	   to	   my	   approach	   are	  understandable	  and	  my	  response	  will	  probably	  not	  satisfy	  the	  challengers,	  since	   it	  assumes	   a	   different	   –	   non-­‐deontological	   –	   ground	   of	   reasoning.	   However,	   since	   it	  puts	   ethics	   and	   politics	   into	   the	   choices	   made	   regarding	   the	   way	   in	   which	   one	  represents	  one’s	   “being”	  –	   in	   the	  process	  of	  becoming	   recognizable	  –	   it	  places	   the	  burden	  of	  responsibility	  at	  the	  very	  center	  of	  each	  and	  every	  actor	  who	  partakes	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  these	  “beings”.	  Coupland’s	  picture	  of	  a	  “Muslim”	  being	  in	  need	  of	  emancipation	  is	  not	  ethically	  dismissible	  simply	  because	  it	  goes	  against	  the	  ideal	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  463	  Zehfuss	  2002.	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equality	   of	   religions,	   but	   rather	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   paternalistic	   image	   of	  communities	   or	   individuals	   will	   create	   a	   conflictual	   situation	   within	   these	  communities	   or	   individuals,	   who	   will	   eventually	   demand	   an	   end	   to	   paternalistic	  politics.	   Further,	   even	   if	   he	   was	   not	   the	   source	   of	   the	   ideals	   underlying	   these	  policies,	  his	  role	  in	  producing	  and	  reproducing	  this	  particular	  “Muslim	  being”	  leaves	  him	  responsible	  for	  it.	  	  	  In	   this	   thesis,	   I	  argued	   in	   favor	  of	   increased	  attention	  being	  paid	   to	   the	  process	  of	  
becoming	   recognizable	   in	   international	   relations.	   I	   sought	   to	   investigate	   how	   to	  approach	  the	  reifying	  tendencies	  that	  featured	  in	  the	  recognition	  framework,	  that	  is,	  how	   to	   approach	   the	   forgetfulness	   of	   the	   processes	   of	   emergence	   of	   recognition’s	  objects,	  agents	  and	  epistemic	  frameworks.	  I	  asked	  about	  the	  processes	  of	  becoming	  in	  international	  relations,	  that	  is,	  how	  objects	  and	  agents	  become	  recognizable	  and	  how	  epistemic	   frameworks	  change	   in	  order	   for	  new	  agents	  and	  objects	   to	  become	  recognizable.	   Finally,	   I	   asked	   how	   it	   would	   be	   possible	   to	   nurture	   genealogical	  sensitivity	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   recognition,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   dangers	   of	  reification.	   In	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   part,	   I	   argued	   that,	   unless	   these	   kinds	   of	  investigations	   are	   conducted	   into	   the	  premises	  upon	  which	   recognition	   rests,	   it	   is	  bound	  to	  remain	  within,	  and	  reproduce,	  its	  originating	  epistemic	  framework	  and	  the	  particular	  bias	   that	   this	   framework	  carries.	  The	  second	  part	  attempted	   to	  prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  answering	  these	  questions	  and	  for	  nurturing	  a	  degree	  of	  genealogical	  sensitivity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  reifying	  tendencies	  in	  recognition.	  It	  did	  so	  by	  suggesting	  an	  approach	  where	  the	  multiple	  versions	  of	  the	  recognizable	  objects	  and	  agents	  –	  the	  
recognizable	  beings	  –	  balance	  each	  other’s	  truth	  claims.	  The	  limits	  of	  the	  recognition	  framework,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   alternative	   approach	   of	   becoming	   recognizable	   were	  illustrated	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  international	  recognition	  of	  the	  ”Muslim	  Homeland”	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  ”Jewish	  National	  Home”	  of	  Israel”,	  that	  is,	  by	  reference	  to	  religion	  in	   international	   relations.	   These	   historical	   instances	   of	   demarcation	   illustrate	   the	  contested,	   political,	   and	   processual	   nature	   of	   the	   categories	   relied	   upon	   by	   the	  authorities	  that	  recognized	  the	  states	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  Israel	  in	  the	  late	  1940s.	  Their	  international	   recognition	   reified	   the	   boundaries	   around	   and	   between	   political	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communities	  and	  reinstated	  the	  logic	  of	  a	  differentiated	  social	  ontology	  of	  "Self"	  and	  "Other".	   The	   recognition	   process	   reproduced	   and	   re-­‐instantiated	   the	   colonial	  epistemological	  framework	  of	  differentiated	  and	  differentiable	  religious	  and	  cultural	  communities,	   reifying	   them	   into	   internationally	   recognized	   and	   recognizable	  political	  communities.	  By	  re-­‐reading	  these	  two	  cases,	  my	  illustrations	  attempted	  to	  stem	   these	   reifying	   tendencies	   of	   this	   recognition	   with	   regard	   to	   ”religion”	   in	  international	  relations.	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